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ABSTRACT 
 
This thesis is about the construction of a nationalised public Catholic culture in 
Slovakia from 1985 to 1993. At the core of this culture was the assumption that the 
Catholic Church had always been an integral part of the Slovak nation, her past, her 
present and her future. The thesis seeks to answer the question of who created this 
culture during the 1980s and 1990s and how and why they did so. To answer these 
questions this thesis  adopts a cultural approach and explores how this culture was 
created utilising the concepts of collective memory, symbols and events as its main 
analytical tools. The data for this analysis include, but are not restricted to, materials 
produced in relation to various commemorative events and pilgrimages, especially 
those related to the leading  national Catholic  symbols: the National Patroness Our 
Lady of the Seven Sorrows and Saints Cyril and Methodius. The thesis argues that 
this culture was deliberately constructed from the point of view of many actors. 
Before 1989 these included the official Catholic hierarchy, underground Catholic 
Church communities, the pope and nationalist Communists. After 1989 these actors 
continued to construct this culture even as their positions of power changed. Most 
notably, underground Catholics became part of current ecclesiastical and political 
elite, and communist nationalists dissociated themselves from the Communist Party 
but retained their position within the cultural and political elite. The thesis consists of 
three chapters. The first chapter looks at how the nationalised public Catholic culture 
started in the mid-1980s with underground Catholic communities that focused on 
culture and grassroots mobilisation. The second chapter looks at how the nationalist 
Communists and the official church hierarchy became involved in construction of 
parts of this culture and how their involvement resonated with the underground 
Catholic communities. Chapter Three examines how this culture continued to develop 
in the early 1990s in a new political context, and how it contributed to a broader 
cultural legitimisation of Slovak independence.  
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INTRODUCTION 
 
5 July 1991: Thousands of people gather in a city in southern Slovakia for a ‘national’ 
pilgrimage. The occasion is the feast of Saints Cyril and Methodius. The location was 
Nitra, the site of the oldest diocese on Slovak lands.1 The pilgrimage was the first of 
its kind since 1948, when the ruling Communist Party launched a campaign to 
dismantle the nationalised public Catholic culture; pilgrimages were just one victim of 
a broader effort to selectively de-nationalise and privatise religion.2  
Before the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia gained a monopoly on power 
in 1948, Cyril and Methodius—the 9th-century Christian missionaries and linguists 
who became national saints—figured  at the centre of nationalised official culture, 
which celebrated the Slovak nation as a historical nation with a distinctive culture, 
and therefore entitled to cultural and political autonomy. Nitra itself was placed at the 
centre of a distinctly Slovak nationalist and Slovak Catholic interpretation of national 
history. According to such narratives, it was Nitra which first saw Christianity 
introduced on Slovak soil, and it was there that the first state to formally preside over 
Slovak territory, the chiefdom of Prince Pribina, was established.3 These nationalists 
also believed that Nitra was the centre of Great Moravia and that Slovaks were the 
first Slavic nation to be Christianised (the faith brought by Cyril and Methodius in the 
9th century). According to the Slovak nationalists from the pre-Communist era, this 
reading of Slovak history entitled Slovaks to political and cultural autonomy.  
In 1991, the Catholic Church hierarchy seemed to be returning to these 
narratives. During the first post-Socialist ‘national pilgrimage’ to Nitra, Ján 
Chryzostom Korec, Cardinal of Nitra diocese and the leading figure of the post-
Socialist Church in Slovakia, announced that Slovakia had a ‘right to a life on its 
own.’4 This statement came as Czech and Slovak representatives had, for over a 
year, been in discussions concerning the proposed reform of the federal constitution, 
                                                          
1
 ‘Ako Solúnski bratia,’ Katolícke Noviny, 21 July 1991, 3. 
2
 Juraj Zajonc, ‘Prečo je Nitra staroslávne mesto,’ in E Krekovič, E Krekovičová, E Mannová (eds.), 
Mýty naše Slovenské, (Bratislava, 2005), pp. 139-50. 
3
 Imrich Kružliak, Cyrilometodský Kult u Slovákov, Dlhá cesta k slovenskej cirkevnej provincii (Prešov, 
2003); Martin Hetényi, Peter Ivanič, 'Poznámky k šíreniu kultu sv. Cyrila a Metoda v rokoch 1939-1945 
na príklade mesta Nitra', in P. Sokolovič (ed.), Život v Slovenskej republike, Slovenská Republika 
1939-1945 Očami mladých historikov IX, (Bratislava, 2010), pp. 336-344; Zajonc, ‘Prečo je Nitra’, pp. 
139-50.  
4
 ‘Ako Solunski bratia,’ 3.  
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with the aim of making the federation functional in its new democratic context. 
Cardinal Korec, however, was clearly not interested in supporting the federative 
arrangement. His words anticipated growing support on the part of the Slovak 
hierarchy for the break-up of the Czechoslovak common state. During the three years 
between the fall of state socialism in 1989 and the eventual break-up of 
Czechoslovakia in 1993, Cardinal Korec and other leading members of the Slovak 
episcopate increasingly warmed to those nationalists who saw Czecho-Slovak 
negotiations as useless or even illegitimate, and who wanted to determine Slovakia’s 
future unilaterally.  
The Slovak episcopate, then, began to shift focus: turning away from 
discussions of the Czechoslovak or Slovak constitution. Instead, they utilised 
nationalised Catholic culture in support of this nationalist cause. Such repertoires of 
nationalised public Catholic culture would in turn come to play a major role for Slovak 
nationalists in their campaign for independence. When the Slovak National Assembly 
declared independence and enacted a Slovak constitution on 1 January 1993, the 
hierarchy of the Slovak Church as well as Catholic elites, heralded in the new state. 
Segments of this nationalised public Catholic culture would then continue to play an 
important role in maintaining national autonomy, national unity, and national identity 
in Slovakia, a process in which a variety of nationalist forces, within as well as 
outside the Church, had since come to be involved. 
For scholars who study the role of the Catholic Church in post-Socialist Slovak 
society and specifically in post-Soviet renditions of nationalism, this behaviour of the 
Catholic Church hierarchy during the break-up of Czechoslovakia signified that the 
Catholic Church in Slovakia had emerged after 1989 as the  de-facto ‘national 
Church.’ It had, they contend, after over forty years of societal marginalisation, finally 
regained its status as a church dominant not only numerically, but also as one of the 
leading symbols of national autonomy, national unity, and national identity.  
Some scholars saw this mobilisation of Catholic culture as the revival of 
Catholicism as the nationalist and political force it had been throughout the pre-
Communist era in the country. Assuming that the Catholic Church in Slovakia has 
been ‘tied to the nation historically…the leadership of the Church grants rhetorical 
and institutional support to political and cultural institutions dedicated to the national 
inspirations,’ political scientists describe the various ways in which the Catholic 
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Church had played this role of a ‘national Church’ in post-Socialist Slovakia.5 
According to Slovak sociologist Miroslav Tížik, after the establishment of the 
independent Slovakia, ‘Christianisation of the state’ began, manifest in the change of 
public symbols and public collective memory of the state from ‘ideologically neutral’ to 
closely associated with Christianity.6 In a study on Church-state relations in Slovakia, 
political scientists Lavinia Stan and Lucian Tursescu observe that ‘the dominant 
Roman Catholic Church behaves and is treated as de-facto national Church.’7 
Indeed, some scholars go as far as calling Slovakia a ‘Roman Catholic state.’8   
In understanding the historical roots of the post-Communist position of the 
Church in this way, these scholars in fact follow a Catholic nationalist narrative which 
has been created in the process of the nationalisation of the Catholic Church and in 
an effort to establish the Church as a legitimate part of the Slovak nation.9 These 
narratives portray those Catholics who supported national emancipation as 
representative of the Catholic Church, and the Catholic Church itself as an institution 
which offered unwavering support for Slovak national emancipatory struggles and 
vitally supported preservation of Slovak national identity. According to these 
narratives, as a result of suppression during the Communist era (1948-1989), the 
Catholic Church was relegated to the background of social and political life, although 
after its re-emergence post-1989, it played a vital role in the recreation of Slovak 
nationalised culture and identity.  
These studies are somewhat lacking not only in their understanding of the the 
relationship between the Catholic Church and the Slovak nation as having developed 
linearly; this is a neat and tidy teleological story, but it leaves out an important part of 
                                                          
5
 Timothy A. Byrnes, Transnational Catholicism in Post-communist Europe (Lanham and Oxford, 
2001), p. 65; Sabrina Petra Ramet, ‘The Re-emergence of Slovakia’, Nationalities Papers 22(1994), 
99-117; Frans Hoppenbrouwers, ‘Nationalist Tendencies in the Slovak Roman Catholic Church,’ 
Religion in Eastern Europe 18(1998): 24-45.  
6
 Miroslav Tížik, Náboženstvo vo verejnom živote na Slovensku, Zápasy o ideový charakter štátu a 
spoločnosti (Bratislava, 2011), p. 202.  
7
 Lavinia Stan and Lucian Turcescu, ‘Slovakia’ in L. Stan and L. Turcescu (ed.), Church, State, and 
Democracy in Expanding Europe, (Oxford, 2013), p. 164.  
8
 Milan Reban, ‘The Catholic Church in the Post-1989 Czech Republic and Slovakia’, in S P. Ramet 
(ed.), Religion and Politics in Post-Socialist Central and Southeastern Europe, Challenges since 1989, 
(London, 2014), pp. 57-8.  
9
 See e.g. Milan S. Ďurica, Dejiny Slovenska a Slovákov (Bratislava, 1995); Emília 
Hrabovec, Slovensko a Svätá stolica 1918-1927 vo svetle vatikánskych prameňov (Bratislava, 2012); 
Kružliak, Cyrilometodský Kult u Slovákov; Róbert Letz, Sedembolestná Panna Mária v Slovenských 
Dejinách (Bratislava, 2014); Peter Mulik (ed.), Katolicka Cirkev a Slovaci, Usilie Slovakov o 
Samostatnu Cirkevnu provinciu, Zbornik referatov z odborneho seminara 20 rokov samostatnej 
slovenskej cirkevnej provincie (Bratislava, 1998); Štefan Vargaš, Cyrilometodské Dedičstvo, v 
náboženskom, národnom a kultúrnom živote Slovákov (Bratislava, 1991).  
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the picture. On the most general level, these studies are right in assuming that there 
was a powerful nationalised culture before the onset of the Communist regime and 
that the Communist state sought to de-nationalise and privatise this public Catholic 
culture. However, in assuming only a story of Catholic persecution and 
marginalisation during the Communist era, they oversimplify the manner in which a 
nationalised public Catholic culture emerged in Slovakia– a story that begins before 
the collapse of Communist rule. This thesis aims to examine the development of this 
culture in the period between 1985 and 1993. 
In the most general sense, by ‘a nationalised public Catholic culture’ I mean 
those discourses and practices which present the Catholic Church as an integral part 
of the national legacy. This thesis focuses on those parts of this nationalised culture 
which are related to popular Catholic devotions, especially those featuring Our Lady 
of Seven Sorrows (Slovakia’s national patroness) and Saints Cyril and Methodius. 
Despite this focus on popular devotions, I use the term ‘public’ nationalised public 
Catholic culture (as opposed to  ‘popular’) to suggest that both before and after 1989, 
this nationalised culture was constructed not only at grassroots level, but also by 
various elite groups: by Catholics and non-Catholics alike.  
The creation of a nationalised public Catholic culture in Slovakia was a long 
and protracted process related to and dependent on a number of political cultural and 
social developments, the most crucial of which was Slovak nation-building and the 
Slovakisation (both institutional and cultural) of the Catholic Church on the territory of 
what is now Slovakia. Indeed, the Catholic nationalist narrative of the aforementioned 
studies is itself a product of this process of the nationalisation of Catholic culture. I 
will describe this process in a greater detail later in this introduction; for now, suffice it 
to say that the beginnings of the construction of nationalised public Catholic culture 
date to the first Czechoslovak Republic. At the centre of this culture were two 
symbols: the National Patroness ‘Our Lady of the Seven Sorrows’ and to an even 
greater extent, Saints Cyril and Methodius.10 Catholics mobilised these symbols and 
the histories related to them as a counterstance to the official culture which was 
being promoted by progressive Czechoslovak elites.11 The main symbolic figure for 
these progressive elites was Jan Hus, a Czech Catholic priest who in the 15th 
                                                          
10
 James Mace Ward, Priest, Politician, Collaborator, Jozef Tiso and the Making of Fascist Slovakia 
(Ithaca and London, 2013), p. 92. 
11
 James Ramon Felak, “At the Price of the Republic,” Hlinka’s Slovak People’s Party, 1929-1938 
(Pittsburgh and London), pp. 21-22.  
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century attempted to reform the Church, but was met with refusal and eventually 
executed as a heretic. Initially, it was the Slovak hierarchy and Catholic nationalist 
elites playing the central role in this process. Many of these elites were connected to 
the populist Hlinka’s Slovak People’s Party (HSĽS), led by and named after the 
priest-politician, Andrej Hlinka. Hlinka’s Slovak People’s Party actively took up the 
effort to reinterpret Cyril and Methodius as symbols of Slovak Catholicism and Slovak 
autonomy despite what the progressive Czechoslovak official culture had to say 
about them,and the party regularly organised celebrations of the saints throughout 
Slovakia, at which they were discussed as such.12 It was these elites who cast local 
Catholic symbols as national Catholic symbols and imagined the Church as part of 
the Slovak nation and its history.  
Under the wartime Slovak Republic (1939-1945), the major role in the 
construction of nationalised culture was played by the Slovak People’s Party, now re-
named the Hlinka’s Slovak Peoples’ Party (HSĽS). It abolished the multiparty system, 
usurped all political power and gained almost full control of the public sphere. The 
Slovak state was a Nazi satellite and its leaders willingly followed in Germany’s 
footsteps in crushing democracy and violating human rights, including deportating 
over 40,000 of its Jews to concentration camps. (The deportations were halted at one 
point and a significant portion survived but most of them were deported in the later 
months of the war.)13 At this time, the state also legitimised its existence by the 
mobilisation of public Catholic culture; the state sought to forge its idea of the Slovak 
nation as historical and the current state as the culmination of the historical 
development of the nation. The Church hierarchy, clergy, and laity for the most part 
assisted in the development of this state-sponsored nationalised culture.14 The 
expansive network of national pilgrimages and commemorations were also widely 
represented in the press15 during this period, and the nationalised public Catholic 
culture was most fully integrated with the official nationalised culture in terms of the 
overlap of symbols, histories, and events. This culture, especially those parts which 
were actively supported by the state, lost some of their standing when the wartime 
                                                          
12
 Ward, Priest, Politician, Collaborator, p. 93.  
13
  Ibid., pp. 229-35, 243-45, 262-4, 250-1.  
14
 Yeshayahu Jelinek, The Parish Republic: Hlinka’s Slovak People’s Party, 1939-1945 (New York and 
London, 1976), pp. 108-112; Hetényi, Ivanič, ´Poznámky k šíreniu kultu sv. Cyrila a Metoda', pp. 336-
344; Ivan A. Petranský, ´Katolícka Cirkev v období prvej Slovenskej Republiky', in M. Lacko (ed.), 
Slovenská republika očami mladých historikov, 1939-1945, Vol. I., (Trnava, 2002).  
15
 Hetényi, Ivanič, ´Poznámky k šíreniu kultu‘, pp. 336-344; Vargaš, Cyrilometodské Dedičstvo, pp. 94-
6.  
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Slovak Republic met its demise in 1945, but the contribution that HSĽS had already 
made towards the construction of nationalised culture would continue to shape the 
development of this culture long after the war.  
After the short-lived second Czechoslovak Republic (1945-1948) collapsed, 
Communists gained a monopoly of power. The Communist Party dismantled the 
nationalised public Catholic culture through the de-nationalisation of the collective 
memories and symbols, that is, through their privatisation and localisation, and in 
turn, their no longer being represented by nation-wide events, in the press, or taught 
in schools or universities. Even smaller aspects of faith, such as rituals, were likewise 
confined to localities, or were privatised within the home. Perhaps couternintuitively, 
this de-nationalisation was also backed by many believers, who did not wish to 
associate their church with a regime they considered illegitimate and anti-religious.16 
All of this will be described in greater detail later in this introduction as well as in 
chapter one. 
 Even during the later stages of the Communist regime, the Catholic Church 
as such was never officially recognised as a creator of the real socialist culture. 
Catholics and Catholicism were supposed to remain 'pure.' Collective public activities 
of the Church were confined to liturgies within the Church: pilgrimages were allowed, 
but the official authorities made sure that these pilgrimages did not acquire nation-
wide prominence nor contribute to broader conceptualisations of the Slovak nation. 
From the 1960s onward, Socialist culture increasingly embraced the idea of the 
Slovak nation. Yet the Catholic Church remained excluded. Local priests remained 
the only creators of this restricted Catholic culture as the Church was fully 
subordinated to the Communist party in both ideology and practice. Symbols which 
had hitherto (in the pre-Communist era) meant unity between nation and the Church 
were now reduced to symbols of local value; other symbols, such as that of Cyril and 
Methodius, were ‘international’—they no longer carried any particular meaning for   
                                                          
16
 Vladimír Jukl, Interview with the author, 7 January 2010, Bratislava, Slovakia; Ján Ch. Korec, 
Interview with the author, 17 August 2012, Nitra, Slovakia; František Mikloško, interview with the 
author, 13 July 2010, Bratislava, Slovakia; Juraj Chovan Rehák, Interview with the author, 14 April 
2015, Hubová, Slovakia; Ján Sokol, Interview with the author, 29 May 2012, Trnava, Slovakia; Jozef 
Šulavík, Interview with the author, Bratislava 13 July 2010, Bratislava, Slovakia; František Tondra, 
Interview with the author, 11 November 2011, Spišská Kapitula, Slovakia; Alojz Tkáč, Interview with 
the author, 12 November 2011, Košice, Slovakia; Jozef Vlkovič, sr., Interview with the author, 14 July 
2010, Bratislava, Slovakia. 
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Slovak national identity or its connection with Christianity. Now instead they 
symbolised Slavic brotherhood and the fact that Slavic cultures had already been 
quite  highly materially and culturally developed at early stages. The only arena in 
which Catholic figures and events received mention was insofar as they were actively 
involved in national emancipation.  
This situation began to change from the early 1980s—a phenomenon that has 
been excluded from many histories of the Church. Leading Slovak scholars seemed 
to have assumed that because the state prevented and disabled the continuation of 
the nationalised culture which resembled that of the pre-1948 era, no nationalised 
public Catholic culture was constructed during Communism.17 One of the main claims 
of my thesis is that although the official authorities continued to limit and supress 
some aspects of religious life, the early 1980s – almost a decade before the collapse 
of Communism-- saw the gradual rise of a powerful nationalised public Catholic 
culture constructed from the viewpoint of various actors, including the official 
authorities.  
The most powerful expression of the re-emerged nationalised culture was an 
increased demand for popular devotions. For instance, the number of pilgrims to the 
national shrine in Šaštín grew steadily from an estimated 30,000 in 1985 to 40,000–
50,000 in 1986, 60,000 in 1987, and 60,000–70,000 in 1988.18 Yet this was not 
merely a bottom-up phenomenon. By the middle of the decade, leading figures within 
the Communist state apparatus recognised the power of the new Catholic culture and 
sought to make it a national one—even if their main aim was the legitimisation of their 
own rule. It was this nationalised public Catholic culture, created under late 
Communism by both oppositionists and the state, which continued to expand and 
thrive after 1989.  
My thesis seeks to excavate this long-ignored phenomenon of late Communist 
Catholicism and its links to the development of a Slovak nationalised culture. I will 
address the who, why, and how of this culture’s rise as well as the influence it had on 
the movement for independence in the early 1990s. I argue that this nationalised 
public Catholic culture which presented the Catholic Church as an integral part of 
                                                          
17
  See e.g. Letz, Sedembolestná.; Milan S. Ďurica, Slováci a Sedembolestná (Bratislava, 2008); Naša 
Národna Svätyňa v Šaštíne (Trnava, 1990), pp. 30-35; Ernest Macák, Naša Sedembolestná Matka 
(Bratislava, 2004). 
18
 ‘Šastínsky Príhovor Otca Biskupa Gábriša‘, Náboženstvo a Súčastnosť, 5 (1984), 8. ‘Pútne slávnosti 
na Slovensku v r. 1986,‘ 17–19; ‘Šaštín—September 1987,‘ NaS 5(1987), p. 11; ‘Šaštín—’88,‘ 
Katolícky mesačník, 5(1988), 1. LIBRI PROHIBITI (henceforth LP).  
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nation was deliberately constructed as the complex handiwork  of many actors. More 
specifically, the process of creating this Catholic (sometimes ethno-) nationalised 
culture commenced in the mid-1980s with underground Catholic communities which 
focused on culture and mobilisation. Nationalist Communists made parts of this 
culture mainstream in the late 1980s as they realised the potential of this Catholic 
culture to maintain their own power. Thus when the regime collapsed in 1989, the 
public culture of Catholicism had been firmly embedded in official as well as 
underground culture. This public Catholic culture continued to develop in the early 
1990s in a new political context and became a vitally important instrument for those 
Slovak nationalists who successfully fought for Slovak independence. Although many 
Catholic leaders did not want outright independence (many of them supported less 
ambitious project of greater political autonomy for Slovakia within Czechoslovakia), 
the nationalised public Catholic culture nevertheless contributed to a broader cultural 
legitimisation of Slovak independence. This culture provided those Slovak and 
Catholic nationalists who wanted independence with the cultural tools to do so. 
However, this use of public Catholic culture in politics made it a point of 
contestationeven until the present day.  
My introduction consists of five parts. The first part reviews the literature on 
religion and nationalism, and nationalised public Catholic cultures during late 
Socialism and early post-Socialism. The second part introduces my methodology and 
presents the concepts that will be used to explore the construction of a nationalised 
public Catholic culture in Slovakia. In the third part, I will give a brief overview of the 
development of this nationalised culture before the onset of Communism. The fourth 
part looks at the data and sources used in my thesis. The fifth section surveys my 
chapters.  
 
1. Catholicism and Nationalised Culture in the Current Scholarship   
By studying the construction of a nationalised public Catholic culture which 
developed during late-Ssocialism and in early post-Socialism, this thesis seeks to fill 
a gap in scholarship on religion and nationalism during this time. Scholars of 
nationalism and religion in Central and Eastern Europe typically consider the 1980s 
and 1990s as the period which saw the gradual rise and, after the fall of the 
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Communist regimes, the full 'resurgence' of nationalism variously related to religion.19 
Studies of post-Communist nationalism generally treat the 1980s as the period when 
nationalisms, whether official or unofficial, were gradually taking root, only to blossom 
fully after 1989.20 The dynamics of the emergence of religion and religious 
nationalism as described by current scholarship is similar: the 1980s saw the revival 
of public religion and paved the way for its central political and cultural role after 
1989.21 The year 1989 is then seen as a watershed that saw the public resurgence of 
assertive and often anti-modern religion,22 as the watershed after which non-
Communist nationalisms swarmed into the public sphere.23 Although there are 
several studies about religion and nationalism and about nationalism before 1989 
specifically, the studies of post-1989 religious nationalism have so far paid little 
attention to how these nationalisms are connected and studied together as part of 
one story.24 Scholars of religious nationalism typically tell stories of emergence, or 
the return of pre-Communist nationalisms triggered by the return of political freedom, 
often venting frustration accumulated over the years of repression.25 Yet the 
examination of nationalised public Catholic culture in Slovakia suggests that although 
1989 was certainly important in making the public space available to non-Communist 
cultures, these cultures began to emerge publically already in the late 1980s. If we 
                                                          
19
 Mark Juergensmeyer, The New Cold War?: Religious Nationalism confronts the Secular State 
(Comparative Studies in Religion and Society) (Berkeley, 1994); Hank Johnston, ‘Religio-Nationalist 
Subcultures under the Communists: Comparisons from the Baltics, Transcaucasia and Ukraine,’ 
International Studies in the Sociology of Religion, 54(Autumn, 1993), 237-255. 
20
 See Rogers Brubaker, Nationalism Reframed, Nationhood and the national question in the New 
Europe, (Cambridge, 1996);-- Ethnicity without Groups (New Haven, 2004); Anthony, D, Smith, ‘The 
Resurgence of nationalism? Myth and memory in the renewal of nations’, The British Journal of 
Sociology, 47(1996), 575-98; Vladimir Tismaneanu, Fantasies of Salvation, Democracy, nationalism, 
and myth in Post-Communist Europe (Princeton, 1998); Taras Kuzio, ‘Nationalising States‘ or nation-
bulding? A Critical Review of the theoretical literature and empirical evidence’, Nations and 
Nationalism 7(2001).  
21
 Janusz L. Mucha and Maciej K. Zaba, ‘Religious Revival or Political Substitution: Roman Catholic 
Movements after World War II,’in B. Misztal and A Shupe (eds.), Religion and Politics in comparative 
perspective: revival of religious fundamentalism in East and West, (Westport, CT, 1992); Hank 
Johnston, ‘Religious Nationalism: Six Propositions from Eastern Europe and the Former Soviet Union,’ 
in B. Misztal and A. Shupe (eds.), Religion and Politics in comparative perspective: revival of religious 
fundamentalism in East and West, (Westport, CT, 1992).  
22
 See Porter-Szücs, ‘Introduction’, pp. 26-7.  
23
 Michael Carpenter, ‘Slovakia and the Triumph of Nationalist Populism’ in Communist and 
Postcommunist Studies, 2(1997), 205-220; Tismaneanu, Fantasies of Salvation.  
24
  Pedro Ramet (ed.), Religion and Nationalism in Soviet and Estern European Politics (Durham and 
London, 1989). Juergensmeyer, Religious Nationalism confronts the Secular State. Brian Porter-
Szücs, Faith and Fatherland (New York, NY, 2011), pp. 360- 90; Genevieve Zubrzycki, The Crosses of 
Auschwitz, Nationalism and Religion in Post-communist Poland, (Chicago and London, 2006) 
25
 Jüergensmeyer, The New Cold War? Johnston, ‘Religio-Nationalist Subcultures’, 237-255. 
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want to understand the post-Socialist dynamics of public cultures, we need to return 
to their roots in the 1980s.  
In Slovak historiography, there are virtually no accounts of the development of 
nationalised public Catholic or more generally Catholic cultures after 1948. There are 
two reasons for this. First, this state of the field owes to a more general lack of 
interest in studying the culture and the approaches of cultural history to the study of 
nationalism and religion in Slovak historiography.26 Accounts of Catholic nationalism 
and popular nationalised cultures before the Communist takeover typically focus on 
political Catholic nationalism as embodied by the Slovak People’s Party. The Catholic 
Church and the cultural construction of a ‘national Church’ are mentioned only insofar 
as it is related to this leading political force in the first Czechoslovak Republic and 
wartime Slovak Republic.27 Second, the Slovak historiography of the Church under 
Communism is essentially a field of political history of the Communist era in 
Czechoslovakia. This historiography has thus far focused almost exclusively on the 
religious policies of the Communist state and especially the suppression of religious 
life under Communism.28 The scholarship on the underground Church, which 
typically comes from former members of the underground community, is confined to 
descriptions of the mechanisms of internal functioning of the underground Church 
such as the production of samizdat (especially the technical aspect of this process), 
activities focused on spiritual life organised by secretly ordained priests, or various 
demonstrations and petitions for greater religious freedom.29 The public presence of 
                                                          
26
 See e.g. Mikuláš Teich, Dušan Kováč, Martin D. Brown (eds.), Slovakia in History, (Cambridge, 
2011).Valerián Bystrický, Dušan Kováč, Ján Pešek  (eds.), Kľúčové problémy modených slovenských 
dejín, 1848-1992, (Bratislava, 2012). 
27
 Ivan Kamenec, Tragédia Politika, Kňaza a Človeka, Dr. Jozef Tiso, 1887-1947 (Bratislava, 2013), 
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the Catholic Church after 1989 has been studied, mostly by political scientists, only in 
terms of Church-state relationships and only insofar it could serve to illustrate the 
development of political nationalism, democratisation, or the development of civil 
society.30  
It is true that outside of Slovakia, there is a general lack of foreign interest in the 
country’s history, but the development of nationalised public Catholic culture in the 
country has attracted particularly little in the way of scholarly attention.31 Perhaps the 
construction of Catholic cultures in late socialist Slovakia does not fit the current 
paradigms and perspectives in the study of Catholicism and nationalism.  
Non-Communist nationalist cultures in the 1980s have so far been studied 
typically in cases when: first, local Catholic Churches were strong enough to 
autonomously create independent Catholic (national) culture; second, only if they 
were related to (political) opposition or to the struggle for greater respect of human 
rights; or third, if they co-operated with the Communist state in the building of official 
Communist nationalism.32 The Church in Poland, based on these characteristics, has 
hitherto attracted the most attention. Historians, sociologists, and political scientists 
have described the rise of the Catholic Church as a proto-oppositional space in the 
1980s there, and the creation of an autonomous nationalised public Catholic culture 
under the leadership of Cardinal Primate Stefan Wyszyński. They have investigated 
the role of the Church and its culture in the rise of the first independent labour union 
Solidarity and its struggle for workers’ rights.33  
                                                          
30
 Shari J Cohen, Politics without a Past (The Absence of History in Postcommunist Nationalism), 
(Durham, 1999); Frans Hoppenbrouwers, ‘Winds of Change: Religious Nationalism in a 
Transformation Context’, Religion, State and Society, 30(2002), 305-316.--,‘Nationalist Tendencies,’ 
24-45.  
31
 See Felix Corley, ‘The Secret Clergy in Communist Czechoslovakia’, Religion, State and Society, 
21(1993),171-206; Franz Gansgrigler, Jeder war ein papst: Geheimkirchen in Osteuropa (Salzburg, 
1991), Ján Šimulčík, Svetlo z podzemia: Z kroniky katolíckeho samizdatu 1969-1989 (Bratislava, 
1997);--Zápas o nádej (Bratislava, 2000);--Čas svitania (Bratislava, 2005). 
32
 Miklós Tomka, Church State and Society in Eastern Europe (Washington, 2005); Barbara Falk, The 
Dilemmas of Dissidence in East-Central Europe, (Budapest, New York, 2003); Jan Kubik, The Power 
of Symbols against the Symbols of Power, The Rise of Solidarity and the Fall of State Socialism in 
Poland (University Park, 1994); Jose Casanova, ‘Civil Society and Religion: Retrospective Reflections 
on Catholicism and Prospective Reflections on Islam’, Social Research 4 (Winter 2001), 1041-1080;--
,Public Religions in the Modern World (Chicago, 1994), pp. 92-113. 
33
 Michael H Bernhard, The Origins of Democratization in Poland: Workers, Intellectuals, and 
Oppositional Politics, 1976-1980 (New York, 1993); Roman Laba, The Roots of Solidarity (Princeton, 
NJ, 1991); Falk, The Dilemmas of Dissidence, pp. 18-21; Brian Porter-Szücs, Faith and Fatherland 
(New York, NY, 2011), pp. 360- 90; Zubrzycki, The Crosses of Auschwitz; Kubik, The Power of 
Symbols; Roman Laba, The Roots of Solidarity, (Princeton, NJ, and Oxford, 1991); David Ost, 
15 
 
Catholic Churches (Church hierarchies) in Croatia or Lithuania similarly created 
nationalised public Catholic cultures.34 In Slovakia, the Catholic Church and 
especially its hierarchy were until the last months of 1989 incomplete, fragmented, 
and lacking an assertive leader. There was an absence of broader political opposition 
and the Church was, for the most part, excluded from official nationalist cultures. The 
underground Catholic communities in Slovakia did not, for the most part, identify with 
the broader themes of anti-Communist dissent. At the same time, there was an 
absence of assertive hierarchy which would provide institutional support for the 
construction of an independent Catholic culture. Nonetheless, the 1980s did see 
a gradual rise of nationalised public Catholic culture.  
During the 1980s and 1990s, Catholic culture in Slovakia attracted little attention 
as scholars were focused on searching for those cultures which anticipated the fall of 
state socialism and the onset of democracy. As H. Gordon Skilling, an expert on 
independent cultures in late Socialist Czechoslovakia and more specifically the 
Czech lands, wrote in 1981: 'In contrast to Bohemia and Moravia, [in Slovakia] there 
was an almost total lack of oppositional activity of any kind...Religious dissent, among 
a populace much more devout than the Czechs, was surprisingly rare.'35 Even now, 
when scholars abandoned the initial focus on civic dissent, Catholic culture in 
Slovakia continues to be interesting to scholars only as far as they can describe it as 
a case of the rise of civil society. For example, David Doellinger, the author of the 
only English language study of underground Catholic communities in Slovakia, 
identified these communities as an illustration of the political-social concept of parallel 
polis coined by the Czech Catholic political thinker and dissident, Václav Benda.36 
Exploring the various forms of public (pilgrimages), semi-public (petitions), and 
clandestine (samizdat publishing) ways of mobilisation, Doellinger concludes that the 
underground Catholic communities 'significantly contributed to the construction of 
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both political society and civil society in Slovakia.'37 This tendency may owe to an 
increased interest in Catholicism as a democratising force. Whilst these observations 
are certainly compelling, they say little about whether and to what extent these 
Catholics were involved in the creation of a distinctive culture.  
Scholars of religious nationalism have not so far explored this religious 
nationalism as a distinctive form of nationalism. This thesis makes the case for 
acknowledging cultural nationalism as an important force behind the construction of 
nationalised public Catholic cultures in the 1980s and the 1990s. This distinctive form 
of nationalism has, more generally, received little attention from social scientists 
because it is seen as non-political in character. Unlike political nationalism, whose 
aim is to gain political power in order to transform the state and make it congruent 
with the nation, cultural nationalism 'wishes to transform society in order to realise the 
nation. It strives to regenerate the true character of the nation, which is to be 
manifested in its culture, that is, in its art, thought, and way of life. By reviving the 
dormant national spirit, cultural nationalism seeks to unite the different aspects of the 
nation, or rather, of the nationalised culture; the traditional and the modern, the rural 
and the urban, reason and faith.’38 As this thesis will argue, Catholic cultural 
nationalism was the central force behind the construction of nationalised culture in 
Slovakia.  
 Last but not least, studies of religion and nationalism in Central and Eastern 
Europe have so far tended to produce national histories—according to these studies 
Catholic cultures were created by local actors and hierarchies. This may seem to be 
an entirely logical perspective to take when studying nationalism. Yet as this thesis 
suggests, nationalised cultures can be co-created by actors from outside the 
countries in question. Indeed, the lack of appreciation of transnational actors in the 
construction of popular Catholic cultures in current scholarship does not come from 
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an actual absence of transnational actors who would support distinctive popular 
cultures, but rather owes to a lack of appreciation of the perspectives of transnational 
history in the study of nationalism in Central Eastern Europe.  
These influences came both from outside of the region and from within. First, the 
1980s saw the rise of a pope as a powerful transnational actor. One of the first things 
Pope John Paul II did after his election in 1978 was to present an ambitious 
transnational project of uniting Europe divided by the Iron Curtain on the basis of 
shared Christian roots.39 He encouraged co-operation among different Christian 
denominations and among nations while at the same time strengthened nationalised 
public Catholic cultures in Eastern Europe. His was essentially a cultural nationalist 
project. While he encouraged the return to Christian national roots, he imagined 
these nations as part of a broader Christian European civilisation. According to 
Timothy A. Byrnes, the pope imagined the end of the concept of ‘Eastern Europe.’40 
This papal transnational project has been given sufficient attention as far as the 
papal vision is concerned.41  
John Paul II’s chief biographer, George Weigel, noted that the pope, through his 
attention to culture in diplomacy and other activities, sought to encourage 
identification with his vision throughout Eastern Europe,42 yet with the notable 
exception of Poland,43 little attention has been given to how this vision was received 
and whether and to what extent his papacy influenced the emergence of popular 
cultures elsewhere in the region. In Slovakia, the papal influence was crucial. When 
in 1985 John Paul announced the year of Cyril and Methodius, the answer was broad 
activation of Slovak Catholics, both in the underground and official Church; it was the 
cue they had been waiting for to mobilise. Slovak émigrés, particularly those in 
Rome, appropriated and spread the papal vision throughout the Slovak section of 
Radio Vatican in their own periodicals and publications which were smuggled into 
Slovakia.  
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Second, an important role in maintaining the popular Catholic culture in Slovakia 
was played by Cardinal František Tomášek and by what voices there were in terms 
of dissent in the Czech Republic and elsewhere in the region. When in March of 1988 
the first public demonstration for freedom of religion and respect of civic freedom 
organised by underground Catholic communities in Slovakia was brutally suppressed 
by official authorities, the Czech cardinal and Czech dissent openly supported and 
expressed solidarity with these underground Catholics. Helping these Slovak 
Catholics to find their own self-confidence was a critical act of transnational solidarity 
which further energized the construction of nationalised public Catholic culture.  
Third, Western radio channels played a crucial-- if, in comparison to the above 
two actors, a more practical-- role in the construction of Catholic culture in Slovakia in 
the 1980s. In the early 1980s, Radio Free Europe and the Voice of America began to 
give special coverage to the situation of independent religious groups, and sought to 
encourage mobilisation for religious freedom by criticising the religious policies of the 
Communist state and supporting independent religious communities. The first studies 
of these activities focused on the internal functioning of these channels. Although the 
field of diplomacy studies has started to hone in on these stations for study, their role 
in the creation of cultures is still being under addressed.44  
The lack of interest in the Slovak case (and more generally, in those Catholic 
cultures which were not clearly oppositional and part of official nationalist cultures) 
seems to be a matter of both perspective and methodology. There is a clear lack of 
communication between scholars of official nationalism and religious nationalism and 
of more broadly official and religious cultures. Popular nationalised public Catholic 
cultures during late Socialism have , to date, never been studied on their own. As 
those nationalised cultures which could not be clearly defined as either a result of 
oppositional activity or as official cultures which were mobilised, supported, and 
sponsored by the Communist states, their construction was glossed over as the 
product of clearly defined groups, typically either Communists or oppositional forces. 
Popular cultures created by Catholic nationalists typically fell to the latter category.  
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While the mainstream perception of religious life and its relation to nationalism 
under Communism has been governed by the verities of resistance and anti-national 
Communism, the post-Communist condition is evaluated against the narrative of 
resurgence and modernisation and democratization; the relationship between 
Catholicism and nationalism is typically considered only insofar as it appears 
politically relevant.45 In his much-quoted study, Fantasies of Salvation, Vladimir 
Tismaneanu, a liberal intellectual and former dissident, lamented the creation of the 
‘strange alliances‘ between 'religious and national zealots...whose basis is shared 
hostility to modernity, popular sovereignty, minority rights, and tolerance for 
diversity.'46  
Nuances, however, will emerge if we look closely at the particular developments 
of the various nationalisms throughout the 1980s and 1990s, which is what this thesis 
attempts to do, with particular attention to the forces beyond the specific construction 
of Catholic culture. To map these developments, we need analytical tools that will 
allow us to explore how this culture developed. In the following section I will first 
present a definition of culture and more specifically of nationalised culture. I will then 
introduce the theoretical framework that I employ in this study to understand the 
creation of this culture, presenting first the various cultural forms which contribute to 
production of meaning. I will then explain why and how culture is created within the 
cultural frameworks of memory, symbols and events.  Employing this conceptual 
framework I will then, in the last part of this section, offer working definitions of the 
two kinds of culture that are central to this thesis: the nationalised public Catholic 
culture and nationalised official culture. But before doing so I shall talk briefly about 
two important terms, Catholicism and nationalism, the two driving forces behind any 
of the endeavours which contributed to the creation of these cultural forms and thus 
to the creation of this nationalised culture.  
2. A Cultural Approach to the Study of Nationalised Public Catholic  Culture 
2.1. Catholics, Catholicism and Nationalism  
In its definition of Catholicism, my thesis follows approaches pioneered by recent 
research in the history of religion and inspired by anthropology and the sociology of 
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religion. First, I follow Brian Porter-Szücs, a leading historian of religion and 
nationalism, who understands Catholicism not simply as theology and ideology but 
also as a set of both written and unwritten rules, such as for instance the dominance 
of the pope. Catholicism should be seen as a ‘cultural framework that is forever being 
re-configured, sustained and recreated by those who speak and act within it (even as 
it constraints what they say and do); thoughts and actions of Catholics are 
determined by Catholicism only in ‘imperfect, historically variable, and contextually 
bounded ways.’47 For instance, while Catholicism teaches that the pope is the 
highest teaching authority, many Catholics either interpret this ‘authority’ or its 
teachings in their own ways, approach his teaching selectively, or ignore it 
altogether.48 Catholic identity is thus fluid: its consequences, political or cultural, 
change over time and vary from individual to individual. In extension, there is no 
single way in which Catholics imagine and represent the nation and relation between 
Catholicism and the nation. Catholic cultures, especially those related to the nation, 
can be constructed by various actors, including nationalists of various types. 
Exploring how the 'national Church' as a 'web of meanings' was constructed 
demands that we attend to the various sorts of nationalism.  
Nationalism also is not a static phenomenon. Nationalism, as historian 
Prasenjit Duara theorized, ‘is rarely the nationalism of the nation, but rather marks 
the site where different representations of the nation contest and negotiate with each 
other.’49 Following leading scholars of nationalism and religious nationalism in 
particular, I understand the ideology of nationalism as beliefs or ideas materialized in 
action, often in political and cultural struggles and often in discursive form.50 I am in 
particular concerned with those discursive struggles over the relationship between 
the Catholic Church and the nation in which the concept co-mingled with the history 
of the Catholic Church and Catholics in Slovakia, sometimes intersecting with other 
sorts of discursive struggles such as the role of the Catholic Church and Catholics in 
Slovak society.  
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2.2. Nation as a Symbol and Nationalised Culture   
Until relatively recently, scholars of nationalism primarily understood the term 
‘national culture’ or ‘nationalised culture’51 as an overarching term for language, 
ethnicity, and broadly defined national traditions (ranging from folklore to national 
histories and legends). Culture was the ‘material’ out of which nations were built and 
which nationalists sought to protect and perfect under the aegis of the modern 
nation-state.52 This essentialist perspective was radically unsettled with the coming of 
the ‘cultural turn’. As the leading theorist of nationalised culture Genevieve Zubrzycki 
observes, by embracing the cultural turn a new generation of scholars changed both 
‘the lens and the focus of the field.’53 The object of study shifted from an emphasis on 
an essentialised understanding of nationalism and national culture to one on 
culturally constructed national identity. Many scholars heeded the call of Benedict 
Anderson to see the nation as an ‘imagined community.’54 Since the cultural turn, the 
nation has been studied not only as a political entity, but also as a system 
constructed by means of cultural representation. A nation is now typically seen as a 
symbolic community. According to social scientists, it is this symbolic character that 
accounts for the nation’s ‘power to generate a sense of identity and allegiance.’55 This 
new approach to understanding the nation translated into a new way of 
understanding national culture as well. It has become common to think and speak of 
the creation or construction of culture by means of representations.56 Nationalised 
culture has been studied as a composition of not only cultural institutions (such as 
national education), but also of symbols, collective memories and other 
representations. Before I move on to explain the representations I’ve explored to gain 
insight into the creation of nationalised public Catholic culture in Slovakia, I shall first 
examine the post-cultural turn understanding of culture, its dynamics and 
development, and address how it is utilised in the present study.   
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Cultural historians, following the lead of cultural anthropologist Clifford Geertz, 
generally understand ‘culture’ as a ‘web of meanings.’ Nationalised culture, according 
to leading theorists of culture Stuart Hall, David Held, Don Hubert and Kenneth 
Thompson, is a ‘discourse, a way of constructing meanings which influences and 
organizes both our nations and our conceptions of ourselves.’57 Nationalised cultures 
‘construct meanings about the nation with which we can identify; these meanings are 
contained in the stories which are told about the nation, memories which connect its 
present with its past, and images and symbols which are constructed of it.’58 
Following Sewell and Zubrzycki, I view culture as a way of constructing meanings 
that is dynamic rather than static, and that has only a certain limited coherence.59  In 
fact, the very reason why I chose to refer to the culture that I study in this thesis as 
‘nationalised’ rather than ‘national,’ is to emphasize the dynamic and developing 
character of the culture. I will first elaborate on the idea that nationalised culture is a 
way of constructing meanings. In the following section, I will talk about the production 
of meaning and will focus especially on those sources relevant to the present study – 
narrative, performance and ritual. Before doing so I would like to clarify the difference 
between nationalised culture and national identity, the central focus of most 
contemporary studies of nationalism.  
The building of national identity is closely connected to nationalised culture 
and involves ‘the creation and recreation of collective memories, rituals, and symbols, 
their institutional maintenance and renewal, the selective appropriation and 
annihilation of divisive memories and alternative ‘identities.’60 In the modern world 
nationalised cultures are among the principal sources of national identities, as such 
identities are formed and transformed within and in relation to nationalised culture. 
The way Slovakness has come to be represented as a set of meanings by Slovak 
nationalised culture enables us to know what it is to be Slovak. The question of how 
a nation is imagined is thus closely connected to the question of how its nationalised 
culture is constructed. Nationalised culture refers to the set of discursive practices on 
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which nationalists draw in the construction of their national identity, and in this 
process they recreate, reconstruct and maintain this culture. Thus, building a national 
identity is one of the processes through which nationalised culture is recreated. As 
we shall see throughout this thesis, this was the case also in late socialist and post-
socialist Slovakia. 
2.3. Nationalised Culture and Production of Meaning  
When trying to grasp how a distinctive nationalised public Catholic Slovak culture 
was created and shaped during late-socialist and post-socialist periods, the tools of 
cultural history provide a very powerful resource. According to T. G. Ashplant and 
Gerry Smyth, ‘the production of an artefact includes its authorship (individual and 
collective), its mode of publication (that is, of bringing before the public), and its 
contemporary historical and cultural context.’61 As they argue, the systems of 
signification include the formal conventions, i.e. the ‘political and cultural contexts, 
within which the artefact was produced.’62 The study of reception of the artefact 
involves the examination of how it was ‘received and  “read” by contemporaries’ and 
it should pay attention to the ‘specific contexts within which this reception took 
place.’63 According to Ashplant and Smyth, production and reception can become 
interrelated; reception may become part of the process of production.64 In the specific 
case of the present exploration, it is important to emphasize that the process of 
production and reception is not confined only to those creators who enter the process 
of production with the goal of constructing nationalised culture. This is, for example, 
the case of the underground Catholics, who initially embraced the notion of the 
Church as an integral part of the nation due to a variety of influences from both inside 
and outside the Catholic Church.  
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2.3.1. Narrative, Performance and Ritual  
Narration, performance and ritual are important creators of meaning.65 As we shall 
see throughout this thesis, narrative, performance and ritual were central to the 
creation of nationalised public Catholic culture. In part, this was the result of the 
emergence of collective memory, symbols, and the occurrence of a number of large 
public events as major cultural frameworks during the 1980s. 
Narration is one of the central tools ‘by means of which human beings give 
meaning to their experience of temporality and personal actions.’66 Narratives 
function as ‘frameworks for understanding the past events of one’s life and for 
planning the future.’67 Nationalism, as a distinctively modern cultural form, attempts 
to create a new kind of narrative—national narrative. A national narrative seeks to 
‘define the nation, to construct its (typically continuous and uninterrupted) narrative 
past in an assertion of legitimacy and precedent for the practices of the narrative 
present—its own relation of the national story most especially.’68 By constructing 
national narrative, nationalists seek to ‘moderate diversity via the creation of a 
coherent unity that may sometimes appear to rely heavily on an essentialised 
narrative while at other times appears to be less so.’69 Similar tendencies can be 
noticed with regards to nationalised culture. The narrative of a nationalised culture 
can be told and retold (or constructed and reconstructed) in national history, 
literature, the media, and popular culture. These provide a ‘set of stories, images, 
landscapes, scenarios, historical events, national symbols, and rituals that represent 
the shared experience, trials and triumphs that give meaning to the nation.’70 
However, not all meaning is produced through the cultural form of narrative. Instead, 
it is sometimes acted out in a performative, and often ritualistic, manner. This often 
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happens in societies where access to sources of certain types of narratives is 
restricted, as was the case in late-socialist Slovakia, where access to sources of 
historical narrative was tightly controlled.  
This thesis does not go so far as seeing culture in performative terms as such, 
but it does recognise performance as an important cultural form for the production of 
meaning. David M. Guss identified four key elements of cultural performance.71 The 
first is that the performances are ‘clearly framed events’ set off from everyday 
reality.72 This ‘spatial and temporal bounding,’ however, does not mean that they 
constitute a ‘hermetically sealed world, particularly as new forms of mediation 
continue to redefine its borders.’73 In addition to being set apart and framed, cultural 
performances are ‘important dramatisations that enable participants to understand, 
criticise and even change the worlds in which they live.’74 As Richard Bauman points 
out, cultural performances are ‘forms about culture, social forms about society in 
which the central meanings and values of a group are embodied, acted out, and laid 
open to examination and interpretation in symbolic form.’75 As such, concludes Guss, 
‘cultural performance will remain both contentious and ambiguous, and while the 
basic structure of an event may be repeated, enough changes will be implemented 
so that its meaning is redirected. The same form, therefore, may be used to articulate 
a number of different ideas...over time.’76 Performance constituted an important form 
of meaning production in Slovakia during the 1980s and 1990s, mainly due to the 
increased interest in public and commemorative manifestations of national culture 
and identity among both Catholic and Communist nationalists. Some of these 
performances had a ritualistic character, which is why I give special attention to ritual 
as a major cultural form.   
The definition of ritual has recently undergone many changes. The ritual in this 
thesis refers to both secular and religious performances. The classic and perhaps 
most influential definition, formulated by British anthropologist Victor Turner,  is that 
ritual is a ‘prescribed formal behaviour for occasion not given over to technical 
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routine, having reference to belief in mystical beings and powers.’77 This definition 
has been criticised for drawing a too-close connection between ritual and religion. It 
has also been criticised for giving special privilege to the observer’s perception of the 
ritual and disregarding the heterogenous set of the participants’ points of view. 
Scholars now tend to focus instead on documenting the wide variety of the 
participants’ constructions of the ritual. Catherine Bell very usefully identified five 
features by which rituals, or ritual-like activities, are characterised. These are 
‘formalism,’ ‘invariance,’ ‘rule-governance,’ ‘sacral symbolism,’ and ‘performance.’78 
Ritual played a prominent role in the production of meaning and the related creation 
of culture in Slovakia during the 1980s and 1990s. The official authorities focused on 
constructing and maintaining new rituals that served the goal of creating socialist 
patriotism and national consciousness, while at the same time restricting those rituals 
that could potentially undermine this official goal. They encouraged a whole new 
range of rituals, many celebrating important historical figures and events. Ritual was 
thus a powerful cultural form of meaning production.  
Going back to the previously stated definition of nationalised culture, this 
culture is understood as a way of constructing or producing meaning in the forms of 
of narration, performance and rituals that moderate diversity and multiplicity of 
meaning with the goal of conceptualising the nation. As shall be demonstrated 
throughout this thesis, and as the authors of a recent study on narratives, 
performances and rituals argue, ritual and narration have many features in common: 
‘stories frequently shape and appear in performances and rituals, while performances 
and rituals regularly become the subject of narration. Moreover, there is often a 
ritualistic aspect to storytelling, narrative form, and genre.’79 This thesis focuses on 
how meaning was produced through narration, performance and rituals in the context 
of a variety of cultural frameworks, especially those of national collective memory, 
national symbols and national events. In the following section, I shall introduce the 
concepts of collective memory, symbols and events, and specify why and how I use 
these concepts to gain an insight into the creation of nationalised public Catholic 
culture.  
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2.4. Catholicism, Nationalised Culture, and Collective Memory  
Central to the idea of nationalised culture in the 1980s and the 1990s was history: the 
Catholic Church was imagined as national in part through embedding it in 
various nationalist narratives of Slovak history. Given the importance of the 
invocation of history to the creation of official nationalised culture and nationalised 
public Catholic culture in this period, I turn to the concept of collective memory.  
According to Stefan Berger, in contrast to individual memory, collective 
memory includes many elements or events which individuals did not directly 
experience. Nevertheless, as he argues, ‘they have internalized a memory which is 
presented to them through a mixture of public and private narratives as a collective 
memory with the assumption that individuals should partake in it. Collective memory 
is thus, like history, always contested, and the result of attempts to give meaning to 
the past through interpretation.’80 This thesis explores why and to what extent various 
historical narratives, especially public historical narratives (and of course their 
authors) contributed to the nationalised public Catholic culture and to the discourse 
centred around the notion of the Catholic Church as an integral part of nation.   
I depart from other scholars who, with their emphasis on memory as a form of 
resistance, have usually used the terms 'counter-memory' or 'popular memory' to 
describe the construction of oppositional narratives rooted in remembering differently 
from the Communist state.81 I do use the term ‘national Catholic memory,’ but without 
categorising this memory as counter-memory. Studying this process as the 
construction of 'counter-memory’ or 'popular memory' may lead to disregarding the 
influence of memory cultures which are deemed dominant or elite on the construction 
of this national Catholic memory. Thinking with 'Catholic national memory' without 
further qualifiers allows one to observe the various influences which have formed and 
constructed this memory. In explaining how a 'web of meanings' was constructed 
through collective memory, I follow presentism, which documents how groups use the 
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past for present purposes and argues that the past is a particularly useful force for 
expressing interests.82  
Literatures of collective memory typically distinguish between instrumental and 
meaning-making dimensions of collective memory.83 I understand these two 
dimensions as interrelated: the instrumental use of the past may, for instance, affect 
the cultural framework; those who instrumentalise the past also live within a particular 
framework and inevitably draw upon it. The former sees images of the past as direct 
manipulation for particular purpose, e.g., any national national memory can be 
understood as an ‘organisation principle that nationally conscious individuals use to 
organise their history…which allows them to place events into a national narrative, 
which functions as a matrix of meaning.’84 But we can also see it as 'an inevitable 
consequence of the fact that we interpret the world…on the basis of our own 
experience and within a cultural framework.’85 National memory is, therefore, not 
merely the manner of organising of past, but it also reveals, in Alon Confino’s words, 
‘the co-mingled belief practices, and symbolic representations that make people’s 
perceptions of the past.’86 This thesis will seek to explore how construction of 
national memory by various actors contributed to an understanding of the Catholic 
Church as an integral part of the nation. In other words, it seeks to explore how 
different cultures of collective memory helped construct national collective memory, 
albeit one that was never homogenous and always open to contestation and change.  
Scholars typically consider construction of a national memory as part and 
parcel of living in a community. According to this scholarship, nations as well as 
Churches are ‘mnemonic communities’ or ‘communities of memory’. According to 
Robert N. Bellah, at the heart of collective memory construction and reconstruction 
lies an assumption identified by the notion that ‘communities…have a history- in an 
important sense are constituted by their past- and for this reason we can speak of a 
real ‘community of memory,’ one that does not forget its past. In order not to forget 
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that past, a community is involved in retelling its story, its constitutive narrative.’87 
Given their important role in national identity construction, national memories have so 
far been under closest scrutiny with scholars observing the ways in which nations 
construct national narratives, according to the pressing needs and interests of the 
present.88 Yet as Iwona Irwin-Zarecka reminds us, in both the Jewish and the 
Christian traditions, collective memory of key ‘events’ of religious significance is built 
into the observance of festivals, into prayers, into the calendar itself.89 Religious and 
national communities come into existence through people’s sharing in living through 
events as well as in their (re)telling.  
In this thesis, community is understood as a group of those actors who seek to 
contribute to culture and form a ‘meaning-making community’ able to engage in 
meaningful action, but without necessarily agreeing in their emotional, moral, or 
political evaluations of the symbols, collective memories, and events.90 The 
construction of the Catholic Church as an integral part of national history (or histories) 
is thus not seen as a function of a hitherto existing nationalised Catholic community. 
Rather it is seen as a result of encounters between various meaning-making---- 
although not necessarily, or not yet, nationalist-- communities which contest the 
historical role of Catholicism in its present and future relationship to the nation. The 
historical narratives which had been historically instrumental in imagining the Church 
as an integral part of the nation were not a product of unified centralised process in 
which a community reflects on its past experiences, but of complex interactions, in 
which different interests vied for ascendancy and in which some interests were more 
successful at asserting themselves than others—the goal in this thesis will be to 
explore how the Church was read back into national history amongst these struggles.  
This approach to the construction of a national memory demands rethinking 
the use of collective memory as an analytical tool. But before I do so, I will briefly 
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state why it is useful to use the concept of collective memory to explore the 
construction of nationalised Catholic culture in this period.  
2.4.1. Collective memory in the 1980s and 1990s  
Scholars of nationalism have argued that collective memory, that is, different ways of 
appropriations of past, has been used throughout history to formulate and reinforce 
basic tenets of national identities, nationalist idioms and ideologies.91 Since at least 
the 1960s, remembering became central to the construction of nationalised public 
Catholic culture. Indeed, since the 1960s, Communist parties increasingly turned to 
cultural nationalism as a source of legitimisation. Czech historian Pavel Kolář argues 
that in the post-Stalinist era, 'self-representation through nationalist propaganda 
became essential to the legitimisation of the East European regimes.’92 The nation 
became increasingly important for these regimes as an organising principle of official 
memories.9394 Communist regimes in Central Eastern Europe have always ascribed 
central importance to history as a cultural resource and source of legitimacy, and this 
persisted even after 1968, especially in Slovakia, where most Slovak nationalists 
were co-opted into legitimising the post-Prague Spring regime.  
At about the same time (in the 1960s) the Catholic Church underwent its own 
'cultural turn' which then sparked greater interest in nationalised cultures and 
histories.95 In Slovakia, this ‘cultural turn’ did not translate  into an immediate (until 
after the 1960s) application for the construction of nationalised public Catholic 
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culture, mainly because during the Prague Spring, the Church did not manage to 
establish herself as an autonomous creator of culture.96 It is nonetheless useful to 
explore the 1960s 'cultural turn,' to explain why and how collective memory began to 
play an important role in the construction of public Catholic cultures.  
During the 1960s, the Catholic Church radically altered its stance towards the 
secular world and, relatedly, to the modern concept of nation. According to the 
leading sociologist of religion, José Casanova, the major change occurred when the 
Vatican 'aggiornamento' of the 1960s significantly shifted the traditional defensive 
Catholic position to the modern secular world and the modern secular age. Casanova 
argues that 'in its temporal dimension, the acceptance of legitimacy of the modern 
age entailed the acceptance of the principle of historicity.'97 In other words, the 
Catholic hierarchy accepted the possibility of 'the continuous revelation of God's 
plans of salvation in and through history, and it became the Church's obligation to 
discern prophetically 'the signs of the times' in history.98 According to Casanova,  
 
This inner worldly historicist reorientation has led Catholicism to embrace a 
progressive view of history to such an extent that Catholicism may be today 
the most post-millennialist of all major Christian denominations. Considering 
that traditional Catholicism had been characterized by a negative philosophy 
of history which viewed the modern age as a concatenation of related 
heresies from Protestantism to atheist communism, the reversal is quite 
remarkable.99 
 
This thesis examines the Catholic 'turn to collective memory.' In using this term 
I seek to emphasize that this 'turn to history' was not simply about turning to ‘purely’ 
Catholic memory or about construction of official memory of the Catholic Church; I 
seek to emphasize that this turn to history was the beginning of a process of 
integrating Catholic histories with non-Catholic  histories, most prominently national 
histories. These processes were of course not entirely new—Catholics had sought to 
create nationalised public Catholic cultures by fusing Catholic and national histories 
since at least the 19th century. This 'historicist re-orientation' led many Catholics to 
turn to national histories in search of Christian origins of their nations and then in turn 
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to use them as inspiration for and legitimisation of their involvement in the public 
sphere. Perhaps best known among the first such uses of history was the 'theology of 
nation' developed by the Polish Primate Cardinal Stefan Wyszyński already before 
the Second Vatican Council. Wyszyński’s theology became one of the central 
inspirations for Catholic engagement with histories and more specifically national 
histories throughout the region.100 But even more importantly, for the Slovak case, 
this interest in memory was embraced by John Paul II who placed a 'return to 
Christian roots' at the heart of his papal vision. John Paul developed a new Catholic 
culture, using every opportunity-- every existing anniversary, or creating new ones-- 
to integrate universal and local Catholic memories with national histories. He spoke 
about the Christian roots of Europe at the Vatican, during his many visits to countries 
across the world, at various institutions and organisations from universities to the 
General Assembly of the United Nations.101  
This Catholic culture became central also in his appeals to the Czechoslovak 
Catholics and the Czechoslovak society, and the Czechoslovak government more 
generally. In 1985, he announced the year of St. Methodius to commemorate the 
1100th anniversary of the death of Methodius, the Archbishop of the first Archdiocese 
on Czechoslovak territory.102 In 1985, the pope even attempted to get an invitation to 
visit Czechoslovakia, but the Czechoslovak government refused. Nonetheless, the 
year marked the beginning of the construction of a nationalised public Catholic 
culture in Slovakia; the pope, the Catholic culture he promoted, and the ways in 
which he did so played an important role in this construction. The Pope’s impact on 
remembering and constructing various strands of Catholic and national cultures was 
enormous, but he was not the only actor to influence the end results. Having 
explained why this Catholic culture again became dominant and why it is useful to 
study, I now return to examining how the construction of national memory contributed 
to the construction of this culture. 
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2.4.2. Collective Memory in the Construction of Nationalised Public Catholic  
Culture 
Central to this thesis is the question of who had the power to reshape collective 
memory, and the processes by which they did it. Wulf Kansteiner conceptualises 
collective memory as 'the result of interaction among three types of historical factors: 
the intellectual and cultural traditions that frame all our representations of the past, 
the memory makers who selectively adopt and manipulate these traditions, and the 
memory consumers who use, ignore, or transform such artefacts according to their 
own interests.'103 Scholars of social and collective memory seeking to describe the 
struggles for ascendency of particular memories have employed various conceptual 
frameworks. One common type of conceptualisation—one that resonates with my 
interest in the role of the hierarchy— assumes a central role for political and social 
elites. They usually operate through the state or church apparatus, all with the 
support of other powerful cultural agencies, as they seek to coordinate the way in 
which the past is remembered, producing an official past. Groups of individuals within 
society may either acquiesce in the official or dominant reading, or may in some way 
resist it, be passively alienated by it but also modify it. Different scholars have used 
different terminology to develop slightly different emphases. Some have juxtaposed 
popular and dominant memory, others preferred counter-memory to popular 
memory.104 As Geoffrey Cubitt, argues, any account of how collective memory 
operates in practice must recognise that 'conflicts and contestations, and the use of 
power by some groups against others, are endemic features of most collective 
experiences.'105 To an extent, this applies to the construction of memory in the 1980s 
and 1990s.  
Scholars exploring collective memory during late Socialism tended to see 
either repression of alternative memories by Communist states or confrontation 
between the Communist state and oppositional communities as the central dynamic 
to the development of memory during late Socialism. Scholars have typically 
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explained national memories as an important oppositional activity.106 When 
expounding upon the 1980s, these literatures typically describe a revival of those 
national histories that had been previously constrained. The interest in history is then 
described as continuing into the 1990s, with different groups recasting themselves as 
the only authentic and legitimate guardians of national history.107 After the fall of state 
socialism, scholars typically described the mobilisation of collective memories in 
building post-Socialist national identity and the institutionalisation of this collective 
memory.108 The scholarship on one such form of underground ‘memory’—the 
concept of ‘national memory’—well illustrates the weaknesses of this perspective. A 
concept of Czech and Polish dissent, which understood debates about historical 
figures and events as obliterated from official discourse, this underground memory 
conceived of ‘national memory’ in opposition to the state’s 'organised forgetting.' 
Rather than a useful analytical tool, this concept is a normatively charged 
construction by a particular group. It does not allow one to examine the origins of 
these memories and the extent to which they were embedded in broader cultural 
context. Newer scholarship began to describe similarities between official and 
unofficial narratives.109 Most recent studies argue that struggles over history were 
struggles which cut across political or religious identifications.110 The present analysis 
of memory will primarily focus on how history is used by Catholics and non-Catholics 
to construct different understandings of the 'national Church' and the ways in which it 
interacts with other groups. This understanding of the construction of a national 
memory challenges current understanding of the dynamics of construction of 
religious memory.  
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Scholars of religious memory maintained that the construction of collective 
memory in the Catholic Church in many ways reflects the hierarchical structure of the 
Church.111 First of all, in Catholic memory, the hierarchy and the clergy had been 
considered the central agent in the construction of memory. The French sociologist 
and philosopher Maurice Halbwachs, whose seminal work on collective memory is 
clearly influenced by his focus on Catholicism, observed that religious collective 
memory is characterized by a normativity which is 'inherent in the structure of the 
religious group, mostly in the unequal relationship that binds the simple believers in 
ritualized remembrance to the authorized creators of collective memory (the 
hierarchy).'112 The construction of collective memory in Catholic religious tradition, 
i.e., institutional or official memory formed by this hierarchy, often forms the basis for 
collective memory reconstruction at lower levels, most commonly parishes. A crucial 
role in the creation of Catholic memory is also played by the transnational authority of 
the papacy. The most tangible expressions of this authority are the processes of 
beatification and canonisation, through which the papacy, the highest teaching 
authority within the Church, confirms the compatibility of a personal story with the 
general narrative of Catholic collective memory and authorises the memory of the 
candidate for public commemoration.113 However, the centrality of hierarchy in the 
construction of memory within the Catholic Church does not mean that higher ranks 
ruthlessly promote their version of history. According to Barbara Spálova, 'the 
principle of the integration of opposites creates a certain  loyalty of hierarchs towards 
those in the body with them, one which compels them not to trespass the boundaries 
of good taste, of what is bearable, which allows them to say only that which is 
acceptable for the laity.'114 In the construction of nationalised public Catholic memory, 
the clergy no longer plays the only or even the central role. Indeed, in this thesis we 
will explore how groups ‘from below’ often played important roles in creating or 
reshaping memories – the power of which was soon more broadly recognised and 
                                                          
111
  Maurice Halbwachs, La cadres sociaux de la mémoire (Paris, 1952), p. 211 quoted in  Daniele 
Hervieu-Léger, Religion as a Chain of Memory (Cambridge, 2006), pp. 124-7. 
112
 Halbwachs, La cadres sociaux de la mémoire, p. 211 quoted in  Hervieu-Léger, Religion as a 
Chain, pp. 126. 
113
 For more on the process of beatification, see Kenneth Woodward, Making Saints, Inside the 
Vatican: Who Become Saints, Who do not, and Why…(London, 1990); On collective memory and 
construction of martyrs, See Elizabeth A. Castelli, Martyrdom and Memory, Early Christian Culture 
Making (New York, 2004).  
114
 Barbara Spálova, Bůh ví proč, Studie paměti a režimu moci v křesťanských církvich v severních 
Čechách (Brno, 2012), p. 372. 
36 
 
taken up within the hierarchy, who then had the power to further promulgate such 
visions of the Church.  
The public collective memory of the Catholic Church is not, however, 
constructed by Catholics alone. The French sociologist Daniele Hervie-Legér argued 
that modernity brought with it the fragmentation and decentralisation of religious 
collective memory and subsequently changed the position of the hierarchy, in favour 
of non-hierarchical actors, such as lay politicians, for example.115 I would argue that 
modernity also ushered in the fuller participation of non-Catholic actors. This thesis 
explores whether, to what extent, and in which ways non-Catholics, including 
Communist elites and especially Communist cultural elites (historians, writers, artists, 
etc.) could play an important part in the construction of a nationalised public Catholic 
memory. As has been mentioned, since the 1960s, the Communist states sought to 
construct national official memories. In studying how the Catholic Church was 
imagined as part of different cultures of national history, we thus need to take into 
account all these various actors and the dynamics between these actors.   
2.5.  Catholic National Symbols     
Collective memories are encoded in rituals, liturgies, and symbols. Symbols, that is, 
signifiers or things that represent something else, are the ‘building blocks’ of myths 
and collective memories.116 Yet when studying the emergence of these symbols 
during the 1980s we should not see them as ‘master symbols’ of the opposition, or 
counter-symbols to the ‘dominant’ Communist symbols- such an approach potentially 
overlooks the ways in which the non-Catholic official elites may be involved in their 
construction.117  
This focus on symbols is particularly important given the revival of their public 
use in Czechoslovakia of the 1980s. This revival was related to the return of religion 
to the public sphere as a result of developments, both within and outside of the 
Catholic Church, on both national and transnational levels. First, an important part of 
the emergence of public Catholicism was a turn to the public veneration of national 
Catholic symbols and an increase in events and rituals evoking these symbols. 
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However, interest in national patron saints, for instance, had been on the rise  since 
the Second Vatican Council and was related to a new appreciation of local cultures 
and popular devotions.118 The revival of national Catholic symbols was accelerated 
by the promotion of national Catholic  symbols under John Paul II, who widely used 
religious symbols and devotions to create a powerful nationalised public Catholic 
culture.119 John Paul was among the keen promoters of popular devotions as an 
important part of public Catholicism. As Atkin and Tallet remarked, John Paul 
retained traditional affection for ritual, visiting shrines at Częstochowa, Fatima, 
Knock, and Guadalupe.120 
Second, at about the same time, late Socialist elites also became interested in 
co-opting Catholic symbols. Communist states had used some religious symbols 
before the 1980s, but before this period, they had for the most part sought to recast 
them as secular symbols of Communist culture.121 Later, a subtle but important 
change occurred in attitude to public manifestations of religion and this change 
crucially influenced the revival of Catholic symbols. Communist states continued to 
see religion as a ‘regressive force’ but from the mid-1980s on, Catholic symbols 
gained new importance for Communist states. Initially, state authorities allowed 
broader public veneration of these symbols in an attempt to co-opt them and prevent 
them from being cast as related to the papacy. In the last two years before the fall of 
state socialism, these officials began to allow the public (official) Church to mobilise 
around these symbols (See Chapter One). By this time, late Socialist elites sought to 
reach wider audiences in an attempt to build popular nationalised culture. For 
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example, Cyril and Methodius were used by these nationalists to promote an ethnic 
understanding of national identity.122  
How then did these symbols become instrumental in the construction of a 
nationalised public Catholic culture? According to the British anthropologist Victor 
Turner, 'a symbol’s meaning depends on the power, authority, or prestige of the 
social groups that compete for its control, as well as each group’s rhetorical 
effectiveness at locating the symbol within mobilizing narratives and contexts of 
action.'123 A symbol’s meaning for a particular group can be the result of various 
influences, the meaning of which changes according to current political and cultural 
contexts. However, the meaning of symbols is not constructed only relationally. As 
Genevieve Zubrzycki demonstrated in her sociological study on Polish national 
Catholic symbols, symbols are also 'historically constituted by key narratives and 
events.'124 When I talk about a group’s 'rhetorical effectiveness' at locating a symbol 
within contexts of action and mobilizing narratives, I also have in mind the ability to 
place these symbols in nationalist narratives and act these symbols out through 
mobilising rituals. To answer the question of how and why national Catholic  symbols 
were revived in public use and what meaning they acquired in the process we need 
to attend to the question of acting symbols out, more specifically, to the question of 
public rituals.  
A public revival of symbols is closely connected with their public acting out, 
i.e., with rituals. A ritual generally observes the procedures with which a symbol is 
invested, which a symbol compels. According to Victor Turner, ritual is a ‘stereotyped 
sequence of activities involving gestures, words, and objects, performed in a 
sequestered place, and designed to influence preternatural entities or forces on 
behalf of the actors’ goals and interests.’125 Since the 19th century, rituals intended to 
express the bond between Catholicism and nationhood began to emerge. Rather 
than entirely new ‘inventions’, these rituals were typically appropriations of already 
existent Catholic rituals. One such ritual was the one of national consecration. 
Consecration, in general, is an act by which a thing is 'separated from a common and 
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profane to a sacred use, or by which a person or thing is dedicated to the service and 
worship of God by prayers, rites, and ceremonies.'126  
Over the centuries, Catholics (clergy) had consecrated buildings, parishes, 
dioceses, and countries to different saints, and formulas of devotion to nation was 
only one of many objects. The consecration of a nation is a ritualized use of 
a religious symbol; the ritual of 'national consecration' was a reaction to the creation 
of nation states and secularisation. Beginning in the 19th century, this ritual served 
as an ultimate confirmation of the supposed bond between the Church and the 
nation, and was typically a reaction to the supposedly increased threats to either 
Catholic faith from the newly secularized state or to the 'Catholic' nation. Most 
notably, in the aftermath of the Revolution, the French hierarchy called for the 
consecration of France to the Sacred Heart as a way to strengthen what the 
hierarchy presented as an ancient alliance between the homeland and religion, 
supposedly severed by the Revolutionaries’ secularism.127  
Since the late 1960s, national Catholic symbols experienced a widespread 
public revival, and were accompanied by the invention of new rituals. Scholars have 
on one hand, described cases in which religious symbols were mobilised typically by 
Church hierarchies or oppositional forces to become ‘master symbols’ of national 
opposition to communism.128 The Polish veneration of the Virgin Mary as the ‘Mother 
of the nation’ is a case in point.129 Scholars of Polish Catholicism emphasize that 
during the 1960s, the Polish Madonna became the 'master symbol of national 
consciousness'130 and was ‘skilfully employed by the Church hierarchy and adopted 
by Poles as a central symbol in Solidarity strikes.131 Less attention has been given to 
cases when these symbols were mobilised bottom-up by laity or even by the official 
communist authorities. In exploring how Catholic symbols were constructed as 
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national symbols and contributed to construction of national collective Catholic 
memory, I explore who used these symbols, how and why, and the extent to which 
these uses contributed to the construction of this culture.  
2.6. Events—Commemorations and Pilgrimages  
Events are important cultural vehicles to study if we want to understand the dynamics 
of construction of nationalised public Catholic culture. In the 1980s and 1990s, public 
events—such as pilgrimages to Velehrad, Šaštín, Nitra, Ružomberok, i.e., places 
dedicated to Catholic saints or important Catholic historical figures—were the central 
spaces in which creators and contributors of nationalised culture could meet and 
interact. Especially in the 1980s, when public media was monopolised by the 
Communist Party, public events became the only space where the assorted creators 
of Catholic culture could interact. Of course, this is not to say that the underground 
Catholic community, for example, did not have access to the official modus of the 
Church nor that it could not be inspired by the official nationalist ideas or vice versa, 
but it is extremely important to bear in mind that events do not merely uncover 
meanings but can change them. This thesis follows Rogers Brubaker in his call for an 
‘eventful approach’ to nationhood or 'nation-ness' and applies this to study of the 
construction of nationalised public Catholic culture. This way of theorisation of 
nationhood was inspired by the collapse of the Soviet and Yugoslav states and their 
aftermaths and by the relatively sudden and pervasive nationalisation of public and 
even private life. This process involved, according to Brubaker, ‘nationalisation of 
narrative and interpretative frames, of perception and evaluation, of thinking and 
feeling.’132 Following the lead of such thinkers as William Sewell, Jr., and Marshall 
Sahlins, Brubaker argued that in order to understand how this happened, we must 
give serious theoretical attention to ‘contingent events and to their transformative 
consequences.’133 Brubaker conceptualises nationhood or nation-ness as a 
'contingent, conjuncturally fluctuating, and precarious frame of vision and basis for 
individual and collective action, rather than as a relatively stable product of deep 
developmental trends in economy, polity, or culture.'134 The construction of 
nationalised public Catholic culture is then best described as a series of ‘intermittent 
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bursts of creativity, contestation, and redefinition of the “national Church” that are 
embedded in and caused by social, historical, and cultural environments.’135 Events, 
as Genevieve Zubrzycki defines them, are not necessarily those that change 
structures and create new cultural forms.136 According to Zubrzycki, events are 
‘meaningful and consequential in that they sporadically create, recreate, define, and 
redefine the culture in question through social contestation.’137 Public nationalised 
culture is thus a work in progress as constituted through nationalist events.  
Public events have been widely used as fields for analysis of various 
phenomena as they, according to Don Handelman, constitute ‘dense concentrations 
of symbols [and we may add, collective memories] and their associations that are of 
relevance to a particular people,’138 they are 'locations of communication that convey 
participants into versions of social order in relatively coherent ways.'139 Brubaker 
agrees that these events must be viewed as 'cultural objects' but he argues that they 
‘do not contain their own meaning’ and allow for ‘rich interpretative possibilities.’140 
Understood in this way, public events enable us to study the key questions of this 
thesis; the questions of who constructed nationalised public Catholic culture (and 
how and why) in the 1980s and the 1990s in Slovakia. The two types of public events 
are central to the construction of Catholic culture in late Socialist and post-Socialist 
Slovakia: public commemorations and pilgrimages. Again, similarly to collective 
memories and symbols, events studied in this thesis (more specifically events before 
1989) are not seen as counter-events to the official state sponsored events. Rather, 
they are studied as occasions where different influences, different actors, meet and 
which allow the observer to assess their role in the construction of Catholic culture.  
Commemorative occasions and ceremonies have been considered by 
scholars as making the past ‘an active rather than a merely passive element in 
people’s social awareness.’141 According to Geoffrey Cubitt, commemorative events 
contribute to the construction of public culture on two levels: they are ‘instrumental in 
constituting the past that is to be remembered, and the collectivity that is expected to 
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do the remembering.’142 As Cubitt maintains, ‘commemorative event calls on the 
participants to take part in or at least, to witness, the articulation of whatever element 
in the past is being evoked.’143 According to some theorists of social and collective 
memory, ‘commemorative practices help elicit a sense of social connectedness and 
the effects of commemorative activity are deepened and extended by repetition.’144 
Others, most notably the well-known anthropologist Katherine Verdery, have argued 
that commemorations are arenas in which the construction of culture as a 'continual 
struggle over meanings'145 can be observed. Seeing public commemorations as an 
important part of public Catholic culture, this thesis understands commemorations as 
events which can elicit a sense of connectedness as well as contestation. Moreover, 
‘commemorative activities and pilgrimages focus attention on particular events.’ In 
doing so, they ‘not only reflect the symbolic status that those events have acquired, 
but actively enhance it…’146 According to Cubitt, whilst ‘the observance of a 
commemorative or feast calendar allows groups or societies to do the rounds of their 
symbolic reference…more isolated commemorative performances and pilgrimages 
allow energy to be suddenly directed into a particular corner of the symbolic system, 
in ways which may sometimes modify the way the collective past is understood.’147 
This thesis analyses both types of commemorative performances.  
Pilgrimages, too, play a central role in the construction of nationalised public 
Catholic culture and can also be understood as either events of contestation or 
connectedness. One of the reasons for this (in Alan Morinis’ view) is that pilgrimage 
centres are ‘repositories of a culture’s ideals.’148 This is why they are either 
extensively supported or suppressed depending on the state’s approach to this 
culture. Political patronage is common if the state identifies with the religious culture, 
but pilgrimages have also been suppressed if religious culture is not accepted as part 
of the official culture. The present exploration of the place of pilgrimages in the 
construction of nationalised public Catholic culture combines functionalist and post-
modern approaches. Earlier functionalist approaches which followed Victor Turner 
had understood pilgrimages as taking people out of normal society and throwing 
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individuals together united by common purpose which is not related to society; the 
pilgrims would experience communitas, an experience of being part of one 
community and sharing a common purpose.149 John Eade and Michael J. Sallnow 
challenged this arguing that ‘pilgrimage is above all an arena for competing religious 
and secular discourses, for both the official co-option and the non-official recovery of 
religious meanings.’150 Through examining the use of pilgrimages by various groups, 
I explore how the nationalised public Catholic culture developed and changed 
through these events.  
The events that I study are not always easily discernible as either pilgrimage or 
commemorations. The 1980s and 1990s especially saw the rise of public events 
which combined elements of public commemoration and public pilgrimage—a 
development which was influenced by the revival of popular Catholic devotions and 
increased interest in national and religious histories. The main focus of my thesis is 
on pilgrimage and commemorations that took place during the national pilgrimages at 
the shrine in Šaštín. This pilgrimage site is by no means the only popular pilgrimage 
site dedicated to Mary in Slovakia. The most frequented one in Slovakia is in the 
eastern town of Levoča. Of no less importance are pilgrimages on the feast of Cyril 
and Methodius to Nitra which underwent even greater changes from the early 1980s 
onwards. However, the Nitra pilgrimage has been historically central to the 
construction of a nationalised public Catholic culture, as some members of the 
Catholic hierarchy saw these two saints as more appropriate to express the 
supposed unity between Slovak nation and Church.151 Since 1990, annual 
pilgrimages have been organised to Nitra on the feast day of Cyril and Methodius.  
 
2.7. Nationalised Public Catholic Culture  and Official Nationalised Culture   
Central to this thesis is the notion of nationalised public Catholic culture, in whose 
creation the official Slovak nationalised culture played an important role. I understand 
these two cultures as distinct, yet interrelated, types of Slovak culture. In the following 
section, I will offer extended definitions of these two cultures, employing the 
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conceptual framework introduced on the previous pages. Despite the fact that this 
study focuses on nationalised public Catholic culture, I shall start with the official 
nationalised culture. The reason for this is that nationalised public Catholic culture 
was formed, in part, as a reaction against this official culture.  
The official nationalised culture refers to the officially created and maintained 
‘web of meanings’ constructed through symbols, collective memories and events. 
The construction of this culture was spearheaded by a variety of ideological, cultural 
and academic elites (e.g. ideologues at the Ministry of Culture and the Institute of 
Marxism-Leninism, cultural elites at the heritage organisation Matica Slovenská and 
Slovak Television, and social scientists at the Slovak Academy of Sciences.) Starting 
in the late 1960s, the official authorities of the newly established Slovak Socialist 
Republic began building a new, real socialist national identity, officially referred to as 
‘national consciousness.’152 Following the rise to power of nationalist communist 
elites in the late 1960s, ‘national consciousness’ became an important part of the 
‘socialist consciousness’ of the new socialist man.153 Before the 1960s, national 
identity had been built intermittently and only to a limited extent, largely due to the 
proclaimed fears of the spread of pre-communist nationalism.154 However, starting in 
the 1960s, the Central Committee of the Communist Party in the Slovak Socialist 
Republic began to support the building of national identity and relatedly construction 
of official nationalised culture. The use of the term ‘consciousness’ reflected the belief 
that real socialism was a progressive forward-looking project being built in line with 
the scientific worldview of Marxism-Leninism.155 However, while building this ‘national 
consciousness,’ the Slovak political and cultural elites looked not only forward but 
also sought inspiration from their national past.  
The construction of the ‘national consciousness’ was, according to official 
sources, supposed to go hand in hand with the building of ‘historical 
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consciousness.’156 ‘Historical consciousness’ was broadly defined by the official 
authorities as a common awareness of the nation’s past in its Marxist-Leninist 
interpretation.157 The need for reinforcing a national ‘historical consciousness’ was 
often emphasized by official authorities and cultural elites alike as a key component 
of ‘national consciousness.’ According to a contemporary leading Slovak composer, 
Eugen Suchoň, ‘knowledge of history is the key to national consciousness.’158 The 
official nationalised culture was considered to be the main source of both national 
and historical ‘consciousness’, and therefore was actively being constructed by both 
political and cultural elites through ever growing investments into official nationalised 
culture. For example, in 1970 the official authorities doubled the number of ‘national 
memory sites’ which included various buildings and monuments, all of which were 
deemed central artefacts of Slovakia’s nationalised culture.159 The Central Committee 
of the Communist Party of Slovakia also sponsored the establishment of an 
independent Slovak Film Institute, subsidising it generously to produce national 
dramas.  
The official nationalised culture was represented in the cultural frameworks of 
collective memories, symbols and events, which portrayed the Slovak nation as a 
progressive independent nation, developing in line with the scientific laws of 
Marxism-Leninism. This ideologically-exclusive notion of the Slovak nation inevitably 
led to the exclusion of certain cultural frameworks from the official culture.  
Central among these excluded cultural frameworks were any collective 
memories, symbols, rituals or events that placed religion (especially Christianity) at 
the centre of the development of the nation and nationalised culture. Indeed, the 
creation of official nationalised culture was accompanied by a campaign against any 
real or potential challenges to this culture. This is not to suggest that these excluded 
cultures were entirely in opposition to, or disconnected from, the official nationalised 
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culture. As this thesis suggests, the official nationalised culture was an internally 
diverse system of meaning that was related to at least one alternative type of Slovak 
culture. The shaping of official culture contributed to shaping non-communist 
cultures, especially the nationalised public Catholic culture. The actors creating the 
nationalised public Catholic culture drew on and supported parts of the official 
nationalised culture, but also challenged some of its central tenets. 
Nationalised public Catholic culture presented a radically different view of 
Slovak culture. This culture was a way of constructing meanings about the nation and 
the church characterised by presenting the Catholic Church and the Slovak nation as 
vitally connected. A distinctive characteristic of this culture is that it was constructed 
by a number of different actors, including the official Church, the underground Church 
community, the transnational figure of the papacy, and the official authorities.  
This wide variety of actors coming from spheres related in various ways to the 
official one is the main reason why I do not refer to this culture as a ‘subculture,’ a 
term typically used by scholars to describe non-communist cultures during the 
Communist era.160 I do so despite the fact that the contributions of some creators of 
this culture, namely the underground Catholic community, might be seen as 
characteristic of a sub-culture. However, even these Catholics aimed to make their 
participation in the construction of nationalised public Catholic culture as public and 
open as possible. They for example took part in pilgrimages and official 
commemorations, and took an interest in the official production of cultural and 
academic history. These Catholics sought to create a culture in close co-operation 
with and as members of the official Church.  
The construction of both nationalised public Catholic culture and nationalised 
official culture occurred through a variety of cultural forms (narration, performance 
and ritual) and in the cultural frameworks  of collective memory, symbols and events. 
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The cultural forms included the construction of national Catholic narratives through 
samizdat, sermons and all-night programmes during pilgrimages. Performances also 
figured prominently. Pilgrimages to various (mostly Marian) churches across Slovakia 
can be seen as major national-religious performances during which nation and 
church were symbolically fused. Finally, rituals, especially the ritual of consecration, 
also played an important part, especially in the 1980s. After 1989, commemorative 
rituals such as the annual commemoration of the death of leading figures of Catholic 
nationalism (e.g. Andrej Hlinka in Ružomberok) played an important role. In the 
following section, I will offer a short historical overview of the development of a 
nationalised public Catholic culture before the Communist era. This section does not 
aspire to cover the enormity of this topic. Rather, it focuses on the two main symbols, 
the central collective memories and events that helped to constitute this culture—in 
so far as it helps the reader better orientate themselves before the story of the 
construction of nationalised public Catholic culture in the 1980s and 1990s—i.e., the 
main topic of this thesis.  
 
3. Nationalised Public Catholic  Culture before 1948 
In this section, I give a brief overview of the development of nationalised public 
Catholic culture and its relationship to Catholicism in the 19th and the early 20th 
century through the examination of the gradual nationalisation of two cults of popular 
Catholic devotion in Slovakia: Our Lady of the Seven Sorrows, and Cyril and 
Methodius. I argue that the ways in which and the extent to which these processes 
occur depends on various factors, but especially on the Church-state relationship, the 
position of the Church in the society, its relationship to the currently dominant 
national movement, and the position of the nationally-oriented Catholics within the 
Church. (This depends on the specific content of the faith and its current 
understanding of the idea of nation. The role of the Vatican has been crucial 
throughout the 20th century.) The extent to which this interweaving of the Catholic 
and national bonds occurs depends largely on whether there are conditions under 
which the Catholic and national other can merge. One of these conditions may be the 
existence of an ethnic group within a secularising state dominated by a different 
ethnic group. The Church-state relationship and the intra-Church relationships are 
crucial also in the sense that they determine the extent to which the Catholic elites 
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will be able to propagate their understanding of Catholic and national identity. Their 
manner of spreading this narrative may further reveal elements of structural support 
and cultural resources, both of which in turn influence the processes of 
Catholicisation and nationalisation.   
3.1. Our Lady of the Seven Sorrows  
The first attempts to place Our Lady of the Seven Sorrows (or, the Mater dolorosa, a 
Roman Catholic devotion which underscores the suffering of Mary) at the centre of 
a nationalised public Catholic culture appeared in the second half of the 19th century. 
At this time Slovakia was part of Austria-Hungary. Whilst the Slovak national 
emancipatory movement was growing and included increasing numbers of Catholics, 
it faced increased supression from the Hungarian state as well as from the Church 
dominated by Magyar nationalists. The use of the meme of Our Sorrowful Lady to 
mobilise Slovak Catholics specifically first came upon the scene in 1863, when   
Andrej Radlinský, a leading Catholic promoter of Slovak national rights, attempted, 
with the help of Bishop Štefan Moyzes of Banská Bystrica, to organise an all-national 
commemoration of the 1000th anniversary of Cyril and Methodius' mission at the 
shrine of Our Lady of the Seven Sorrows in Šaštín. Radlinský planned to connect the 
commemoration with the 300th anniversary of Šaštín pilgrimages which was planned 
under the auspices of the Esztergom Cardinal Jan Scitovský. Scitovský, however, 
rejected this manner of celebrating the Cyrilomethodian anniversary,161 and 
nationalist Catholic historians have tended to interpret Scitovsky`s rejection as a 
necessary concession to Hungarian pressure, emphasising Scitovský`s sermon in 
the Slovak language (instead of in Hungarian) as proof of his heartfelt support for the 
Slovak nation and of the protective role he played as a member of the hierarchy in 
the preservation of the Slovak nation.162 Yet the Catholic hierarchy, with the possible 
exception of Moyzes, did not see Slovak nation-building as a priority. Their main pre-
occupation at the time was the challenge of liberalism. Indeed, even if Ján Scitovský 
delivered his sermon in the Slovak language, the content of his sermon was not 
about the suppression of the Slovak nation. Rather, he focused on the 'danger' of the 
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'godless unfaithful’ posed by the liberals.163 The attempts of nationally-minded Slovak 
Catholics to use ecclesiastical traditions, and pilgrimages to mobilise Slovak 
Catholics were thus thwarted by the Catholic hierarchy, which was either Magyarising 
or more concerned about the ‘dangers‘ of liberalism.  
Our Lady of the Seven Sorrows became central to Slovakised Catholic culture 
during the first Czechoslovak Republic. Our Lady of the Seven Sorrows was 
introduced as a 'National Patroness‘ in the 1920s in the context of two processes: 
one, the construction of a political Czechoslovak nation, which supressed the dreams 
of Slovak nationalists of an independent and self-standing Slovak nation; and, two, 
the secularisation sponsored by the new Czechoslovak state which sought to 
circumscribe the previously privileged position of the Church and whose official 
memory was openly anti-Catholic (if not anti-Christian). The secular Czech 
nationalists elevated Jan Hus as the central symbol of the new state; the 15th century 
reformer had inspired the Czechs under the Hapsburgs to oppose Austrian 
hegemony. Symbols of Catholic memory were rejected in acts of vandalism or simple 
omission from the new commemorative national narrative. Throughout Bohemia, 
Catholic statues were demolished alongside statues of the Austrian emperors. The 
toppling of the Marian column in Prague in 1918 would be recollected repeatedly by 
the Catholic press in Slovakia as symbolising the dangers of secular Czech 
progressivism.164 Slovak Catholics were alarmed not only by the anti-clerical rhetoric 
and practices of the government, but also by their plans for the separation of church 
and state, as well as by their proposals on land reform, which would affect the 
Church.165 In 1925, a new Holiday Law was enacted which established the official 
feast days of the Interwar Republic. Despite the compromises made in the crafting of 
the law, the Catholic nationalists in both parts of the Republic were left unsatisfied, 
although moderate Catholics in the Czechoslovak People’s Party esteemed it as a 
major success166 More importantly for Slovak Catholics, the overwhelming majority of 
the feasts designated as holidays had their origins in Czech collective memory.167  
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The exclusion of Catholic saints was only one among many factors which 
prompted the Slovak episcopate to assert their own patron saint more actively. The 
introduction of the National Patroness came soon after the new Holiday Law was 
enacted in 1925. Alarmed by the use of the Czech Reformer Jan Hus in Czech 
nationalist as well as government discourse,168 the then Slovak Catholic hierarchy 
wrote to Rome, asking to acknowledge the Slovak nation’s veneration of Seven 
Sorrows and proclaim the Seven Sorrows as the National Patroness.169 The 
response from Rome, which had only recently interrupted diplomatic ties with the 
Czechoslovak state in reaction to the government’s elevation of Hus,170 confirmed 
that Slovaks could venerate this cult.171  
At first glance, it may seem that the Vatican’s support for a national patron 
saint in a new, Catholic-dominated state could be read as a blessing for religious 
nationalists. Most probably, however, it was a move meant to boost loyalty to Rome, 
thus centralising power in the papacy’s hands. This phenomenon is also known also 
as ultramontanism, advanced especially by Pope Pius XI.172 This, however, did not 
significally impact the rise of the symbol as a central element connected to the 
emerging nationalised public Catholic culture in Slovakia. The symbol was also 
understood as embodying the central logic of the development of the Slovak nation 
as presented by nationalists. The suffering of the National Patroness came to 
symbolise the ‘suffering’ of the nation throughout history.173 By the end of 1930s, a 
complete reconstruction of the shrine was undertaken, and Slovak inscriptions were 
added to the baroque walls of the Habsburg-sponsored basilica.174 From the 1920s 
on, national pilgrimages would be organised on the feast of Our Lady of the Seven 
Sorrows each year on 15 September.  
Soon leading members of the Slovak episcopate began to support Catholic 
nationalists in their agenda to promote an ethnic understanding of the Slovak nation 
and to attain greater political autonomy.175 Andrej Hlinka, the leader of the interwar 
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autonomist Slovak Peoples Party, promoted Our Lady of the Seven Sorrows as 
a symbol of territorial integrity and political autonomy of the Slovak nation. Our Lady 
of the Seven Sorrows was not only the patron of the nation, but also symbolised the 
possibility of an autonomous political entity on the present-day Slovak territory—the 
Slovak country, as it were.176 This connection is nicely illustrated by a relief that was 
installed at the shrine in this period depicting Our Lady of the Seven Sorrows with the 
double cross on three hills (the official emblem of Slovakia in Czechoslovakia).177 
This understanding of Our Lady of the Seven Sorrows was promoted by Catholic 
nationalists, who were the most ardent autonomists during the first Czechoslovak 
Republic. 
Our Lady of the Seven Sorrows continued to be promoted after the demise of 
Czechoslovakia and the establishment of the Slovak Republic in 1939. At the high 
point of the nationalisation of the Church during the Nazi-dominated Slovak Republic 
(1939-1945), led by priest-politician Jozef Tiso, the shrine of Our Lady of the Seven 
Sorrows was, thanks to subsidies from state, turned into a Slovak Church. The 
Catholic Church had, in the meantime, become a symbol of the national identity, 
territorial integrity and unity of the Catholic Slovak nation. Hungarian and German 
inscriptions were replaced with Slovak ones. Now Our Lady of the Seven Sorrows 
was fully connected to an ethnic Slovak nation, defined by a distinctive language, 
territory, and faith. The suffering of the National Patroness came to symbolise the 
‘suffering’ of the nation-state following the loss of territory to Hungary in the First 
Vienna Award (1938).178 After the Communist Party assumed power in 1948, the 
official authorities dismantled the Church as a basis for the construction of 
nationalised public Catholic culture, attempting to erase the Catholic Church from the 
narrative of Slovak ‘ethnogenesis’ and the development of Slovak statehood. In this 
new context, the symbol of Our Lady of the Seven Sorrows was reduced to a local 
patron saint and the shrine was abandoned, its status reduced to a local (diocesan) 
pilgrimage site.  
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3.2. Saints Cyril and Methodius 
St. Methodius along with his brother St. Cyril invented the Slavonic script and brought 
Scripture and liturgy books, which they had translated to Slavonic language, to the 
old Slavic chiefdom of Great Moravia. The chiefdom was in the 9th century, and it 
was located on the territory of what is now the Czech and Slovak Republics. This was 
not the first Christianising mission -- in the 9th century, there had already been 
missions by Irish and German missionaries --179 but since the 19th century, the 
mission has been presented as the first Christianising mission by emerging Slovak 
nationalists. In Hungary, the Catholic Church had promoted the cult especially since 
the 16th and 17th century as part of a re-catholicisation campaign, when the Church 
elevated locally venerated saints.180 In the 19th century, Cyril and Methodius began 
to be used by Catholic nationally-minded priests who, facing Magyar nationalism, 
sought to prove that the Slovak nation was not only a historical nation dating back to 
the 9th century but also highly developed nation. Cyril and Methodius thus played a 
prominent role in the Romanticist nationalist construction of national narrative. Most 
notably, the Slovak writer Ján Hollý wrote a poem in the early 19th century, 
Cyrilometodiáda, which became popular among nationally-minded Slovak literati. In 
it, the author praises Cyril and Methodius for Christianising and therefore, according 
to the author, civilising the nation and integrating it into European civilisation.181 This 
was followed by another poem Svätoplukiada, about Svätopluk, the last prince of 
Great Moravia, setting the missionaries into the context of what he saw as the first 
state of the Slovak nation. Merging the religious and political histories of the nation, 
Hollý played a pre-eminent role in marrying together the two central symbols of 
Catholic nationalism in Slovakia. 
Later in the 19th century, facing Magyar nationalism and Habsburg 
indifference towards the cause of Slovak national emancipation, Slovak nationalists 
of both Protestant and Catholic stock sought to support the idea of the historical right 
of the Slovak nation to the area of Northern Hungary, and promoted the idea of 
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Slovak historical primacy in the region.182 Great Moravia was the first Slovak state, 
the Golden Age, they claimed, and Cyril and Methodius made Slovakians the first 
nation to have the vernacular used as liturgical language. The cult of Cyril and 
Methodius was promoted by some Slovak Catholic clergy that had likewise faced 
Magyar attempts to promote nationalism through Church structures. Yet Cyril and 
Methodius could still have non-national meanings. On July 5, 1863, Štefan Moyzes, 
Cardinal of Esztergom in southern Slovakia along the Hungarian border, organized 
the first mass commemoration of the mission and requested Pope Leo XIII to make 
the day a Church-wide feast of Cyril and Methodius.183 This commemoration was 
never conceived as a nationalistic event, but simply as an acknowledgement of an 
ecclesiastical tradition and its importance for Slovaks and indeed all Slavs, and for 
Hungarians.184  
By the end of the 19th century, the two brothers were more and more often 
used as an argument for national independence. In the 19th century, this myth was 
cherry-picked to invent and promote Slovak and Slavic Church tradition and also to 
claim a degree of territorial independence.  As other Churches in the region were 
being nationalised, the 19th century advocates of Slovak political autonomy 
organised major nationalist events -- such as public proclamations or establishment 
of nationalist institutions-- on dates connected with the two brothers. (Notably, the 
Slovak heritage organisation, Matica Slovenská, was established on the tenth 
centenary of the mission in 1883.185) Thus the 'Cyrilomethodian tradition', as we have 
seen, became even more intertwined with the memory of national emancipation, a 
murky situation which left it vulnerable to reinterpretation not only on the feast day of 
July 5, which should have been a purely religious event, but also in connection with 
these other events, anniversaries, and public holidays with strong undertones of 
Slovak nationalism.  
The dismemberment of the Habsburg Empire in 1918 spelled the end of the 
marriage between the Church and the Monarchy on one hand, and Catholicism and 
Magyar nationalism on the other. With the creation of new states, Catholic culture in 
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Slovakia would be renationalised. However, the newly founded Czechoslovak state 
continued to observe the anniversary and sought to incorporate it into a newly 
forming Czechoslovak national memory. The Catholic feast of Cyril and Methodius 
became a civic holiday. The feast of the Czech King St. Wenceslas was the only 
other Catholic saint’s day to be recognised as they, unlike other Catholic Saints, were 
the only two which enabled the comingling of national and religious memory.186  
But at this point, the 19th century Slovak interpretation had already developed 
a widespread following who, even under a new Czechoslvakia, wanted to win back 
both the brothers and the idea of Great Moravia for the Slovak nation. The emerging 
Slovak Catholic nationalists led by Andrej Hlinka, the priest politician and leader of 
the Slovak Peoples’ Party, also sought, especially from the early 1930s, to use the 
tradition to promote the idea of Slovak autonomy. Therefore, when in 1933 the state 
co-organized Pribina festivities in commemoration of the consecration of the first 
Church on Slovak territory in 833 (during the reign of Duke Pribina of the Nitra 
Chiefdom), it became clear that Cyril and Methodius had become a site of conflicting 
memories.187 Albeit the consecration of the church had been performed by a bishop 
from Salzburg before the arrival of Cyril and Methodius, the two brothers and Great 
Moravia formed the focal point of the festivities. This clearly testified to the Prague 
government’s effort to put emphasis on the period of Great Moravia, which was now 
considered to be the first common state of the Czechs and Slovaks.188 Slovak 
autonomists interrupted the festivities and presented their requests for greater 
autonomy for the Slovak nation, emphasising that the Pribina Chiefdom, which they 
believed to be the first state of the Slovak nation, predated Great Moravia. Hlinka 
based his request on the 'historical rights' of the Slovak nation. Had it not been for the 
Pribina Chiefdom and that the Slovaks were already familiar with Christianity, they 
claimed, the Cyrilomethodian mission would not have been nearly as successful.189 
While some Bishops supported the HSĽS agenda, Bishop Karol Kmeťko of Nitra 
protested against any politicisation, and repeatedly stressed the religious nature of 
the event.190 Instead, Kmeťko used Cyril and Methodius to promote Slavic unity in the 
face of Bolshevism rising in Russia. Despite the fact that at this point, the Catholic 
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hierarchy was fully nationalised and the Bishoprics were occupied by Slovak bishops, 
the festivities showed that the nationalisation of the Church did not mean a marriage 
with religious nationalism. The main focus of some in the hierarchy was on the 
promotion of a much less politically-charged albeit nonetheless somewhat national 
cult of Our Lady of the Seven Sorrows as the National Patroness.191 Against the 
backdrop of consolidation (of a secular Czechoslovak unitary state), Cyril and 
Methodius were used to legitimise opposing views of Czechoslovak as well as Slovak 
statehood, religious as well as secular culture.  
During the nominally independent-- but in reality Nazi-dominated-- wartime 
Slovak State (1939–1945), Catholic nationalistic views prevailed in the political realm, 
and Great Moravia was presented as the first state of the Slovaks. As Cyril and 
Methodius could not, of course, feature as leaders of this chiefdom, the HSĽS joined 
this myth with the myth of 'King Svätopluk‘, the first king of Slovaks.192 The religious 
‘Cyrilomethodian tradition' was fully transformed into a nationalistic one and fully 
overlaid with the newly-constructed statehood collective memory.193 Both memories 
formed an important part of official national ideology and the period saw 
unprecedented state support of the public promotion of the symbol. Citing Christian 
principles, the Slovak state commemorated Cyril and Methodius as 'the Apostles of 
the Slovaks' and harbingers of national independence.194  
Inheriting the cult of Cyril and Methodius, the Communist use of its ‘legacy' was 
determined by a range of factors, especially in the first postwar decades: the 
progressive programme to establish a nationalised public Catholic Church as 
independent from Rome, the regime’s antagonistic relationship towards the wartime 
Slovak Republic, and the communist self-perception as the only legitimate fighter 
against Nazi occupation.195 While their employment of these themes was a result of 
what Cynthia Paces describes as ‘the unavoidability of the sacred in national 
memory, the party strove to strip Cyril and Methodius of religious meaning.The party 
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invoked the cult mainly in the context of Great Moravia to buttress the ideology of 
Czechoslovak unitary state, as well as the idea of Slavic brotherhood.196 In the official 
cultural production, the secular meaning of Cyril and Methodius was emphasised, 
whereas in practice, it meant that the legacy of their work was reduced to the script 
and language they introduced, and disregarded the Christianising content of their 
mission. During the Stalinist period, the tradition of Cyril and Methodius was first ‘de-
Slovakised’—they were no longer symbols of historicity of Slovak nation and but were 
promoted as symbols of ‘Slavic brotherhood.’ Pilgrimages to Nitra, where relics of 
Cyril and Methodius had been venerated in the pre-communist period, were now 
banned but those to Devín were turned into a secular 'Feast of Slavic brotherhood. '197 
As I will argue in Chapter 1, this situation began to change in the 1960s. Therefore 
we can see that the Cyrilomethodian tradition, Catholic ritual, saints and their shrines, 
already had a long history. They reemerged in 1980s, albeit in new forms. 
4. Data and Methods of Analysis 
4.1. Discourse and Discourse Analysis   
In gathering and analysing the data for this research project, I relied on discourse 
analysis. For the cases examined in this thesis, 'discourse' was the most signifying 
practice through which culture was constructed and shaped, and it was on a 
discursive level that many important differences and similarities in meaning emerged. 
This thesis explores how a nationalised public Catholic culture was constructed in 
different types of texts, from the spoken (e.g. speeches by Church or political leaders, 
speeches by 'ordinary' participants at events) to the written (e.g. newspapers, 
underground samizdat publishing before 1989). Most of the texts analysed in this 
thesis were produced in relation to symbolic events, including pilgrimages, public 
commemorations, and demonstrations. First, I analysed events related to Our Lady of 
the Seven Sorrows. These events include but are not limited to pilgrimages to the 
Šaštín shrine and events that took place at this pilgrimage site from 1984 to 1993. 
I also analysed commemorations and events related to Sts. Cyril and Methodius. 
These events included the commemoration of the anniversary of the death of St. 
Methodius in 1985 and pilgrimages devoted to Cyril and Methodius in Nitra (these 
have been organised annualy since 1990). I also analysed a demonstration 
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organised by the underground Church community in 1988, as well as a series of 
events, commemorations, and pilgrimages which emerged after 1989. In addition to 
the ‘national pilgrimages’ to Cyril and Methodius in Nitra, southern Slovakia, I looked 
at the production related to commemorations of the interwar leader of the Slovak 
People’s Party, Andrej Hlinka, in Ružomberok. In the next section, I will describe in 
greater detail which collections I used to study this production and why.  
For now, suffice it to say that the various public events analysed in this thesis 
were typically accompanied by an increased production of materials reflecting the 
various meanings these events had for different groups. These texts included special 
issues of periodicals (official, unofficial), commemorative publications, texts produced 
on the spot but mainly programmes and speeches, as well as texts produced after 
the events, which include but are not limited to reports in the media. I chose to 
analyse the texts related to those events that were typically organised or attended by 
groups which were interested in producing or in instrumentalising national collective 
memory and symbols. These texts, therefore, allow not only to examine the different 
meanings that were produced by these individual groups but also to observe whether 
and to what extent meaning was produced in encounters among these different 
creators.  
In the 1980s, discourses were produced, but not simply by opposing groups in 
strictly divided spheres that were fixed and bounded. Catholic culture was 
constructed in the discursive conditions of the 1980s when, given the common 
interest in the construction of the nation, both official and unofficial discourses 
overlapped, as they were at the same time constantly contested both from within and 
without the sites of their production. On the most general level, there are two 
approaches to discourse in communist countries. On one hand, some studies of 
discourse in communist countries typically divide discourse into an 'official' discourse, 
perceived as bounded, 'monologic' statements not responding to other discourses, 
and an 'unofficial counter-discourse' reacting against the official discourse and often 
created in a different parallel sphere of existence, such as the underground.198 Other 
studies, best represented by Alexei Yurchak, argue that official discourse became 
‘normalized, ubiquitous, and predictable', that it no longer functioned 'at the level of 
meaning as a kind of ideology in the usual sense of the word', and socialist citizens 
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no longer paid attention to its literal meaning.199 This thesis followed these 
approaches in some respects but departs from them in one important respect. It was 
indeed sometimes the case that nationalised public Catholic culture was constructed 
against the official socialist discourse and could thus be considered as a counter-
discourse. In other cases it was clear that it was possible to create this culture 
publicly, because its creators were able to place it within the context of the 
authoritative discourse. Thus, nationalised public Catholic culture was also 
constructed within the official discourse. It was also sometimes the case that 
unofficial creators of culture took a genuine interest in the official discourse. In fact, 
sometimes parts of this discourse were reproduced in unofficial production.  
4.1.1. Archives and Materials  
The central questions with which I approached the task of choosing archives and 
collections were: who constructed nationalised public Catholic culture, how and why it 
was done, and how this construction developed over time. These data are derived 
from groups which were most actively involved in this construction. In this section I 
will set out which groups’ materials I chose, describe these materials, explain why I 
chose them and suggest in what ways and how they are useful in analyzing the 
construction of nationalised public Catholic culture. I also touch on what I am missing 
out on by focusing on these collections and these sources, and what possible effects 
this may have on the analysis of this construction. Contemporary materials include 
but are not restricted to: materials accumulated directly in the process of cultural 
production or as a result of this process, as well as variety of materials analysed to 
understand the context of this construction. I chose these sources, because the 
groups who produced them were the most important in the construction of a revived 
Catholic nationalised culture. This section has two parts: the first part looks at 
materials from pre-1989 production and the second at post-1989 materials.  
First, I analysed materials produced by a community of Catholics which is 
typically referred to as the ‘secret Church’ or ‘underground Church.’ The goal was to 
find out when, why, and in what ways the underground Church began to construct a 
nationalised public Catholic culture. The central materials used to analyze the 
underground Church production were samizdat (that is self-published texts) texts. 
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Samizdat publications, especially samizdat journals, were an important platform of 
communication, mobilisation and exchange of information of the underground 
Catholic community in Slovakia. Wide use was made of mostly Catholic Slovak 
samizdat journals which are part of the LIBRI PROHIBITI collection in Prague. This 
library holds the most complete collection of samizdat available, including all Slovak 
Catholic samizdat journals published in the period from 1985 to 1989. Thanks to this 
collection, I was able to explore the overwhelming majority of samizdat journals 
published by various groups and individuals from the underground Church. From 
1985 the number of samizdat journals began to grow, as every major group within the 
underground Church produced its own samizdat journal. These journals include but 
are not limited to Náboženstvo a Súčasnosť (edited by the leading Lay Apostolate 
Fellowship, first issue published in 1982), Rodinné Spoločenstvo (edited by the 
Movement of Christian Families, first issue published in 1985), ZrNO (published by 
the Salesians religious community), Svedectvo (edited by Bishop Ján Ch. Korec, 
published since 1988), Bratislavské Listy and Hlas Slovenska (published since 1988). 
All of these journals include a wide range of materials covering the public mobilisation 
of underground Catholics, (including pilgrimages and commemorations) and articles 
about Catholic and national history. Published by different communities gathered in 
the underground Church they allow the different attitudes of these groups to be 
explored. The samizdat sources are also useful in giving insight into the ideologies 
which motivated the construction of these cultures and the strategies of its 
construction. They also allow establishing the ways and the extent to which the 
construction by the underground Church was inspired by other groups (by the 
papacy, émigrés, official production, the official hierarchy, Czech Catholics, and 
others). Although samizdat journals were typically not dated, the samizdat reports 
from pilgrimages always carried information about the time and place of each 
pilgrimage. My analysis of this material is the first of its kind and the most 
comprehensive content analysis of Catholic samizdat in Slovakia. Apart from 
journals, I explored a range of other samizdat sources related to the construction of 
nationalised public Catholic culture, ranging from essays, speeches, video and tape 
recordings, and materials accumulated in the construction of this culture, such as 
reports, written notes and letters. These sources were gained from the personal 
archives of members of the underground Church. Much of the production prepared 
for pilgrimages and commemorations, such as youth programmes, were not 
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preserved by their authors. I managed to gain access to transcripts of programmes 
which were identified by several members of the underground Church as the most 
popular in the personal archive of the author of these programmes himself (Pavol 
Abrhan Personal Archive).   
Samizdat sources as a source of data about the construction of public culture 
has to be approached with caution for several reasons. Currently accessible 
samizdat publications represented only a part of the samizdat production of the 
underground Church and were controlled by a select number of underground Church 
leaders. The process of drafting samizdat works can be seen as the first stage of 
construction of a nationalised public Catholic culture. The journals were edited by the 
leaders of the underground Church and, as became clear in oral history interviews 
with these men and women, the content of samizdat was often the result of struggles. 
In addition, samizdat journals were self-censored: the editors sought to avoid themes 
which, though popular in the underground community, were deemed too political or 
too contentious. This influenced their coverage of events. For example, they were 
silent about those programmes at pilgrimages which were deemed too ‘political.’ As 
will be mentioned in the following section on oral history interviews, these interviews 
can be used to get at some of these aspects of the production of the underground 
Church. Informed by oral history interviews, we can establish the extent to which the 
underground community struggled over which parts of the underground discourse it 
would become a part of.  
Second, I examined the production of the official Church, looking mainly at 
Katolícke Noviny and Duchovný Pastier, and Pútnik Svätovojtešský materials related 
to various commemorations and pilgrimages. The materials consulted in this thesis 
include newspaper articles, studies, essays and books. The material on the official 
Church is, however, rather thin. The public production of non-Communist actors was 
circumscribed by the Communist authorities for most of the 1980s. Even when the 
attitude of official authorities became less restrictive to various manifestations of 
public Catholicism towards the end of the 1980s, the number of official sources 
covering these manifestations did not increase. Church archives from this period 
have not yet been made available. Moreover, when using these materials we need to 
be aware that these materials were censored by the official authorities; the effect was 
typically that there is very little information on the involvement of official Church at 
pilgrimages, not to mention reports about what happened at these events.  
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Thirdly, I explored sources published by the official elite. The goal was to find 
out whether and in what ways public cultural construction was nationalised and to 
what extent and in what ways Christianity became part of this nationalisation. I also 
sought to answer the question of whether and how far this construction of 
nationalised culture went in relation to the official Catholic culture. I first explored the 
collection of the Central Committee of the Communist Party, the de iure highest body 
of the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia, located at the Slovak National Archive. 
The material found in this archive provided interesting information about pilgrimages. 
Since Velehrad 1985 leading authorities became interested in public manifestations 
of Catholicism. They began to monitor major pilgrimages and officials from the Office 
of Church Affairs (at the Ministry of Culture), took part in all major pilgrimages and 
produced reports which were then sent to the Central Committee. These sources 
included much useful detail about the official and unofficial programme at 
pilgrimages. The major downside of these sources is that they are written by officials 
who were trained to record those parts of the production of the official Church and 
underground Church which they saw as provocative – the reports thus include details 
about these ‘provocative’ aspects but are silent about other parts of the programme. 
Nonetheless, the information in these reports complements the reports published in 
samizdat form, which tended to be silent about these ‘provocative’ aspects of the 
programmes.  
Some archives, including those most relevant for this research (Ministry of 
Culture, the Office of Church Affairs at the Ministry of Culture, Matica Slovenská, 
Ministry of Education) concerning the official construction of culture, have not yet 
been made accessible to the public. This restrictions limited my data about the period 
(1987-1989) when the official authorities became directly involved in the construction 
of nationalised culture. I have learnt from reports to the Central Committee that 
beginning in 1988, official authorities at the Ministry of Culture began to prepare their 
own programmes for pilgrimages and that these were prepared in conjunction with 
the official Church. Transcripts of these programmes, provided they have been 
archived, could help establish the extent to which and the ways in which the official 
authorities sought to construct a nationalised culture and how the official Church 
participated in these efforts. I also did not gain access to Church archives for this 
period; these archives may also include records of the official programmes co-
organised by the state.  
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The materials found at the Central Committee concerned solely pilgrimages 
but did not provide much information about the official collective memory and 
symbols and the extent to which and the ways in which Christianity and the Catholic 
Church were considered as part of this endeavour. I therefore turned to public 
cultural production. I chose to analyse the production of those institutions and figures 
which played leading roles in the construction of official nationalised culture. I looked 
at the production of the three institutions which were at the centre of national cultural 
production in Slovakia: the heritage organisation Matica Slovenska, the Centre of 
National Development and the Slovak Writers’ Committee. The production of these 
institutions was immense; I therefore chose to focus on either major collected works 
or works by leading writers (Milan Ferko), historians (Viliam Plevza, the head of the 
Institute of Marxism Leninism, Matúš Kučera, Jan Dekan), archaeologists, literary 
historians (Vladimir Mináč, Juraj Chovan Rehák) and Communist intellectuals and 
artists (the leading film director Andrej Lettrich) who were amongst the most active 
and leading creators of official nationalised culture. These men were also closely 
related to political elites; their production thus reflects quite well what was being 
allowed by the political elite and when. Their production consulted in this thesis 
includes but is not limited to newspaper articles, studies, reviews, and books (popular 
and scholarly). These official elites had good access to official media (Nové Slovo, 
Literárny Týždenník) and official publishing and produced a lot of material and on a 
regular basis. This character of their production allows exploration of how the position 
of Catholic Church and more broadly Christianity developed over time.  
Another important source which allowed examining the extent to which the 
official elites sought to create this culture is television. I used the archives of Slovak 
Television and the Slovak Film Institute, which are accessible to public use. The 
materials from these archives perhaps even better reveal the manner in which 
Catholicism began to be made part of the public culture. The consulted materials 
included production plans (STV Archive) and a variety of materials related to film and 
series production. By far the most valuable among the materials I consulted are those 
from the preparation of the first Slovak historical drama film. Supported by the 
Ministry of Culture in Slovakia and the Central Committee of the Communist Party of 
the Slovak Socialist Republic, the project brought together major Slovak and Czech 
authorities in the field of official cultural production – scholars of ancient history, 
prominent artists and filmmakers – and gives a unique opportunity to explore the 
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reasons behind these contestations. The film was financed with what was then the 
biggest budget in the history of Czechoslovak film production. The project lasted five 
years before (1984-1989) it was halted, allegedly due to a financial crisis. The 
projects, plans and scripts produced over this time span allow an examination of 
when, whether and to what extent Christianity and relatedly the Catholic Church were 
related to the public nationalised culture. If in 1985 the authors of the film struggled 
over whether and what place should be given to Christianity, by 1988, after the 
official approach to the Catholic Church changed, they all agreed that Christianity 
was important for the history of the Slovak nation.  
For the post-1989 period, I looked at materials produced by groups which 
were engaged in the construction of nationalised public Catholic culture. These 
included the Catholic hierarchy, the Christian Democratic Movement (the political 
party established by former members of the underground Church), Matica Slovenská 
and the Slovenská Národná Strana, the Slovak National Party (SNS). The 1990s saw 
an unprecedented increase in the number of public events and interest in them. 
These events were covered in the Catholic and nationalist media, especially 
Katolícke Noviny (official weekly of the Catholic Church in Slovakia), Bratislavské 
Listy (monthly of the Christian Democratic Movement), Slovenský Denník (Christian 
Democratic daily), Slovenské Národne Noviny (Matica Slovenská began as a 
weekly). These papers include reports about these events, speeches, and pictures. I 
also make use of materials such as party programmes, political speeches, and policy 
proposals. During this period, the Catholic hierarchy began to play a central role in 
the construction of a nationalised culture. The archives of the Catholic Church from 
this period are, of course, not yet accessible; nonetheless, I have managed to gain 
access to the archive of the Spiš Diocese, which included the personal archive of 
Bishop František Tondra (Bishop from 1988-2011). During the period explored in this 
thesis (1989-1993) Tondra served as the main secretary of the Slovak section of 
Czechoslovak Bishops’ Conference, his personal correspondence thus includes 
copies of correspondence among members of the Czechoslovak episcopate. These 
materials cover only a small part of the communication among the Czech and Slovak 
Catholic hierarchy. This collection nonetheless provided interesting information about 
communication (letters) within the Slovak episcopate and between the Czech and 
Slovak episcopates concerning the issue of the Slovak political future and its 
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relationship to the Catholic Church. This fund provided me with interesting data about 
the role of various members of the hierarchy in the construction of public culture.  
 
4.1.2. Oral History Interviews   
I interviewed twenty-two persons who actively contructed public Catholic culture from 
the 1980s up through the early 1990s. As in-depth accounts of personal experience 
and reflections, in this thesis oral history interviews were used to obtain information 
about various aspects of the construction of nationalised public Catholic culture which 
could not be derived from the available archival material.200 Whilst I see oral history 
interviews as a valuable source of information, I am aware that they are subjective 
and constructed in interaction with the interviewer.201 In the following I will explain 
how I selected these interviewees, which groups they represent, how I analysed the 
interviews, and what questions I sought to answer in the process.  
Most of the interviewees for this sample were selected on the basis of previous 
research on the available cultural production of the groups (or institutions) to which 
they belonged. The rest of the sample is a result of the snowball effect: these 
interviewees were identified and contacted thanks to other interviewees.The largest 
group of interviews was done with people who were members of the so-called 
‘underground Church.’ This results mainly from the fact that this thesis began with the 
goal of focusing on the construction of this nationalised public Catholic culture by the 
underground Church. The interviewees can be divided into several different groups 
according to the sphere from which they created nationalised public Catholic culture.  
The underground Church members can be divided into several groups. The first 
group of these underground Catholics – mainly founding members of the 
underground Church communities – belonged to the interwar generation. All of the 
interviewees were imprisoned during the 1950s and 1960s, were released during the 
thaw in 1960s and during the Prague Spring became actively engaged in the 
religious revival. These men also played major roles in the public emergence of 
underground communities in the 1980s. I also interviewed a number of 'underground' 
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Catholics who had been socialized during the thaw of the 1960s and played a crucial 
role in politicisation of the underground community in the late 1980s. These men and 
women then went on to assume leading positions among the post-Socialist, mostly 
political but also ecclesiastical elites. I have also sought to include the youngest 
leaders of the underground community, many of whom first came upon the scene as 
it were in the 1980s.  
The more I explored the role of the underground Church in the construction of 
nationalised public Catholic culture, the more aware I became about the importance 
of members of the so-called official Church in construction of this culture, especially 
by the end of 1980s. These results of my research brought me to interview a second 
group, the leading members of the official Church in the 1980s. I interviewed leading 
members of the hierarchy, such as Jan Sokol (Archbishop of Trnava) or 
FrantišekTondra (Bishop of Spiš diocese). Some of the figures of central importance 
(Bishop Julius Gábriš of Trnava, Bishop Jan Pásztor of Nitra, Štefan Garaj of Spišská 
Kapitula) died long before this research began. I tried to explore their role through 
interviews with their close cooperators (Jozef Jarab, Viliam Judák, František Tondra). 
Third, I interviewed a number of those who were active in the construction of the 
official nationalised culture, including leading members of the hierarchy, editors at 
leading official media and from the heritage organization Matica Slovenská.  
This sample also omits various people who could have provided valuable 
information about the construction of nationalised public Catholic culture. These 
mainly include several leading figures of the official Church and the official cultural 
construction. This applies to the members of the association of priests loyal to the 
Communist state, the Association of Priests, Pacem in Terris (ZKD PiT). I tried to 
approach two of these priests, but they were not interested in being interviewed. 
These men, who wished to remain anonymous, were not willing to talk about their 
professional and personal lives before and after 1989. I assume that some of these 
men were not willing to talk because in the currently dominant official memory of the 
Catholic Church their professional and personal lives have been seen in terms of 
‘collaboration’ with the Communist state.  
This sample also omits state officials from the Ministry of Culture who began to 
play important role in the construction of this culture towards the end of state 
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socialism. One of the reasons for this omission is that I initially aimed to focus on 
grassroots and Catholic construction of this culture and did not look to official 
authorities as co-creators of this culture. Also, those of my interviewees who were 
closest to these officials (members of official Church) spoke about these men simply 
in terms of repression of Catholic culture (such as the last pre-1989 Head of the 
Office of Religious Affairs, Vincent Máčovský).  
My sample also omits Catholic émigrés who played an important role in the 
creation of the nationalised culture both before and after 1989. In some cases 
(leading Slovak émigré in Rome Cardinal Jozef Tomko, František Sočufka, director of 
Radio Vatican in Rome) these people did not make themselves available or did not 
think that their information could be useful for my research. 
Most of these interviews (with the exception of two) took the form of semi-
structured life-story narrative interviews which I, at points, interrupted with follow-up 
questions. These follow-up questions typically concerned details about various 
aspects of nationalised public Catholic culture. I tried to phrase such questions in as 
open-ended a manner as possible. In some cases I failed to ask follow-up questions 
at important parts of an interview and missed an opportunity to learn about issues 
relevant for my research. In other cases, I asked inappropriate questions which 
prevented the interviewee from developing crucial points. This was often the result of 
my lack of experience as an oral historian. In conducting and analysing these 
interviews I sought to be aware that 'oral history interviews are interactively 
constructed.’202 My role as an interviewer was influenced by the extent to which I 
knew the milieu from which some of the interviewees came.203 I am quite familiar with 
the environment of the underground Catholic communities and more broadly the 
environment of the Roman Catholic Church in Slovakia. I was much less familiar with 
the environment of Communist official elites.  
How did I analyse these interviews? In the most general sense there are two 
approaches to oral history interviews and their analysis. The first approach sees oral 
history as an opportunity to recover the voices of those groups whose stories are not 
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part of official histories or whose voices in public life had been supressed.204 For 
example, oral histories of religious communities in East-Central Europe have focused 
on the memories of repression of the religious in the 1950s.205 These interviews are 
typically analysed as a source of data for writing histories of these communities. The 
second approach in oral history understands these interviews as an opportunity to 
uncover ‘how people make sense of their past, but also how they connect individual 
experience and its social context and how past becomes part of the present, and how 
people use it to interpret the world around.’206 According to James Mark, analysis of 
oral history interviews then allows the historian to examine the impact of ‘public 
memories on the individuals’ conception of their own lives and the way in which these 
interacted with, and in some cases replaced, the ways that they had learned to think 
about their lives...’207 These oral historians thus analyse oral history interviews to 
uncover how narrators are influenced by public religious collective memories and 
how they appropriate these memories.208  
With regards to the first approach, the goal of the oral history interviews in this 
thesis was not to give voice to non-elite groups about which history is completely 
silent. Some of the men and women in this sample were at different points in their 
lives part of elite groups; some parts of their professional and personal lives and 
some aspects of their thoughts have been quite well covered. They have published 
memoirs,209 and parts of their personal and professional stories are part of social and 
political histories, as well as documentary films. The literature on the underground 
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Church especially is growing. However, parts of their stories which are crucial for 
analysis of the construction of nationalised public Catholic culture and its 
development over this period have not been covered for various reasons, and these 
figures tended to be silent about them. One of the aims of these interviews was to get 
at these aspects of their lives, which are for various reasons not public. In some 
cases interviewees were willing to talk; in others they wished to remain silent.  
With regards to the second approach to oral history interviews, the primary aim 
of the present analysis of oral history interviews was not to uncover the extent to 
which and the ways in which these interviewees were influenced by collective 
memory and how they appropriated these memories in return. Of course, in analysing 
these interviews I sought to be aware that the testimony of these men and women 
was also about representing the historical role of their community and was shaped by 
changes in the political context and public memory. The extent to and the ways in 
which the interviewees were willing to talk about different aspects of the construction 
of Catholic culture depended largely on how they understood their own life story and 
how they related it to the public memory of the current period. Members of the official 
Church hierarchy and more broadly of the official Church before 1989 tended to say 
rather little about the construction of nationalised public Catholic culture in the late 
1980s. One of the reasons may the fact that the current official memory of the Church 
focuses either on stories of suffering under communism or on the emergence of the 
undergound Church community.210 Some underground Church members on the other 
hand tended to emphasize only certain aspects of this public culture. A leading post-
1989 Christian Democratic politician saw this culture as anticipating anti-Communist 
opposition and the post-1989 Christian Democratic Movement and de-emphasized 
any links to the official culture. Other Catholics who after 1989 became involved in 
creation of civil society with former civic dissidents saw this period as the beginning 
of Catholic involvement in public culture and overemphasized their links with civic 
dissent. It also meant that they tended to underestimate or entirely omit the role of 
the clergy and the official Church, not to mention official communist authorities. They 
were also not willing to talk about cooperation with independence nationalists in the 
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the 1990s. Leading figures of Catholic hierarchy (Cardinal Korec) did not want to talk 
about the early 1990s because this period was marked by growing disagreement 
among nationalist Catholics.  
Having taken all these limitations into account, these oral history interviews were 
a valuable source of information in several respects. Interviews with the leaders of 
the underground community provided useful information about the origins of 
underground cultural nationalism, especially in the 1960s, and how this nationalism 
changed over the 1980s. The interviews with the younger generation of the 
underground Church members provided useful information about the extent to which 
and the ways in which the cultural nationalism of the undeground Church was 
inspired by both civic dissent and  the official nationalised culture. The interviews with 
members of official Church and official cultural elites helped establish the ways and 
the extent to which the Communist nationalists were involved in late Socialist 
construction of Catholic culture. These interviews were also helpful in exploring the 
extent to which and the ways in which these alliances continued after 1989 and how 
they became instrumental in construction of post-Socialist culture.  
5. Survey of Chapters  
My thesis consists of three chapters. The first chapter explores the origins of 
nationalised culture in the early to mid-1980s. The construction of this culture 
revolves around the ‘Methodian year,‘ which was a special year announced by Pope 
John Paul II with the official goal to celebrate Cyril and Methodius’s role in the 
development of Slavic cultures as specifically Christian ones. The chapter starts with 
an overview of how the official nationalised culture in Czechoslovakia had developed 
since the 1960s and observes the central role of collective memory in its genesis. I 
argue that the Catholic Church was not part of this nationalised culture. Catholic 
pasts and symbols were mobilised only as far as they were deemed 'patriotic.' The 
chapter charts how this began to change in the mid-1980s. By the middle of the 
decade, Catholic national symbols had been significantly revived and pilgrimages 
became an important space of construction of Catholic culture. The chapter analyses 
how nationalised public Catholic culture is constructed through increased interest in 
the construction of national Catholic memory, symbols and events, and assesses 
who played the central roles in the construction of nationalised public Catholic 
culture.   
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 Chapter Two explores the construction of nationalised public Catholic culture 
in the two years proceeding the fall of state socialism in November 1989. During this 
period, the underground Church remained a central player in the construction of 
nationalised culture. However, the official Church also became directly involved in the 
construction of nationalised culture. These two actors created nationalised public 
Catholic culture independently of each other, but since they were both interested in 
the same symbols (Our Lady of the Seven Sorrows) and religious histories, at first 
glance their efforts appeared as a common attempt to revive a nationalised culture. 
However, the underground Catholic communities were increasingly inspired by civic 
opposition and began to create this nationalised culture in support of civic liberties. 
Simmilarly to the first chapter, this chapter uses the construction of these symbols, 
memories and events to assess who plays central roles in construction of 
nationalised public Catholic culture and how these agents play this role. But it also 
explores whether, to what extent and in what ways this construction changes on the 
eve of the fall of state socialism. Catholic nationalised culture was not a result of 
post-1989—the underground ideas came increasingly into public spaces before 
1989—and the Communist state embraced this new Catholic patriotic culture and 
promoted it.   
 Chapter Three explores the development of nationalised public Catholic 
culture after November 1989 and in the new political system. This chapter tells the 
story of the run-up to Slovak independence. In the 1980s, Catholic culture expanded. 
Even if not all Catholic leaders wanted independence, they promoted a culture that 
allowed it to happen more easily. During the first three years, nationalised public 
Catholic culture flourished and became central to the construction of post-Socialist 
nationalised culture. There was an increased number of commemorations that fused 
national and Catholic memory. The former members of underground community were 
now in leading positions in Church and politics. The ideology motivating these 
creators was cultural nationalism focused on the renewal of Christian national 
identity. Again, I employ the construction of these symbols, memories and events to 
assess who plays central roles in the construction of nationalised public Catholic 
culture. I explore the ways in which this construction changed after the fall of 
Communism, but also the ways in which this construction followed from the pre-1989 
construction. Therefore, the thesis tells the story of the revival of a nationalised public 
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Catholic culture that had its roots long before Communism collapsed, and in the work 
of the underground Church in the early 1980s. Their activities would eventually 
provide a platform for the creation of a post-Communist nationalised public Catholic 
culture that would undergird the struggle for national independence. 
Conclusion  
My thesis sets out to document the rise of a nationalised public Catholic culture which 
positioned the Catholic Church as an integral part of the nation in the period between 
1985 and 1993. I explore the development of this culture after two major changes: 
the establishment of the Slovak Socialist Republic (nominally autonomous as part of 
the Czechoslovak Socialist Federation) and the establishment of an independent 
Slovak ecclesiastical province. The aim of my introductory section was to situate my 
thesis within the current scholarship on religion and nationalism, and more 
specifically on Catholicism and nationalism. My work explores the construction of 
nationalised public Catholic culture through analysis of collective memory, symbols 
and events. I argue that the development of a nationalised public Catholic culture 
during late socialism and early post-socialism is a significant part of a longer history 
of nationalisation of Catholic culture and Catholicisation of nationalised culture.  
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CHAPTER ONE 
The Re-making of a ‘Marian Nation’ 
Nationalised Public Catholic Culture during Late Socialism 
 
On 15 September 1985, on the feast of Our Lady of Seven Sorrows, the National 
Patroness of Slovakia, a mass pilgrimage was held at the national shrine of Our Lady 
in Šaštín in western Slovakia. It was the first mass rally of its kind to take place since 
1950 when Communist authorities had reclassified the site, denigrating it from 
national to local importance in an effort to discourage the participation of pilgrims 
from across Slovakia on the patroness’ feast.211  
 Just a year prior, however, in September of 1984, this situation looked completely 
different. Groups of lay Catholic activists came on foot from around Slovakia, 
presented a full night’s programme of songs, prayers, and lectures about Slovak 
history, and turned the main mass service into a manifestation of support for the 
Catholic hierarchy and the pope.212 They embraced Our Lady of the Seven Sorrows 
and believed that the predominantly Catholic Slovak nation continued to suffer 
because the Catholic Church was administratively and ideologically attached to the 
socialist state, and thus, in their view , was not fulfilling its role of a truly ‘national 
Church,’ a church fused with the nation. These Catholics believed that the Catholic 
Church should play central role in the creation of nationalised public Catholic culture 
and in a more broadly nationalised culture. The Church, in its subservience to the 
state, could not play this role.  
 Such an understanding of the relationship between the Slovak nation, the 
Church, and the state did not appear out of thin air. Before the Communist takeover, 
Our Lady of the Seven Sorrows had been the central symbol of a nationalised public 
Catholic culture. Because of the location of the shrine in western Slovakia (the 
historical hotbed of Slovak nationalism and movements for emancipation) and near 
Bratislava (the Slovak capital and political centre), the national pilgrimages had long 
served to reflect the state of affairs between the Church and the state; everything 
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from their attendee count to the details of their arrangement bespoke the underlying 
sentiments of the society towards their overlapping national and Catholic identities. 
 As a symbol, Our Lady of Seven Sorrows changed over time in accordance with 
prevailing winds of the current cultural and political context: for example, she had 
been used by Catholic nationalists in the struggle against the secularising interwar 
Czechoslovak government to promote ethnocentric understanding, the Slovak nation, 
and attainment of Slovak cultural and political autonomy. Our Lady of the Seven 
Sorrows also served as a symbol of national identity, territorial integrity, and the 
overall unity of the Catholic Slovak nation.213 Now, in the early 1980s, Our Lady of 
the Seven Sorrows was revived by these Catholics as a symbol of Christian national 
identity – with the aim of promoting institutional and moral renewal of the Church and, 
subsequently, of the nation. In fact, these Catholics are perhaps best understood as 
cultural nationalists seeking renewal of national identity – not as advocates for a 
revived form of Slovak political autonomy. After 1989, many of these Catholics would 
become involved in recasting Our Lady of the Seven Sorrows as a symbol of Slovak 
autonomy, but as of yet, they did not understand the meaning of this symbol in these 
terms.  
 The revival of a symbol related to the pre-Communist nationalised public 
Catholic culture in the mid-1980s is nonetheless important to study, as this was the 
beginning of gradual rapprochement between Catholicism and nationalism and the 
beginning of the re-building of a nationalised public Catholic culture. The 
underground activists, however, were far from the only agents in this revival.   
Studies of post-war Slovak Catholic nationalism typically commence in the 1990s, 
when Catholic nationalism became crucial to the articulation of a distinct Slovak 
identity, as well as to nation-building and the eventual attainment of political 
independence.214 Catholic nationalism is, however, not just a post-Socialist 
phenomenon. Its roots trace back to late Socialism. In fact, the rise of Catholic 
nationalism in this period was the result of processes which began the late 1960s, 
developments which created the context for its rapid growth in the 1980s. The story 
of Catholic nationalism was by no means a linear development of growing 
                                                          
213
 Letz, Sedembolestná Panna Mária, p. 65, pp. 77-9, 85.  
214
 See e.g. Hoppenbrouwers, ‘Nationalist Tendencies,’ 24-45. 
74 
 
oppositional nationalism in response to suppression by the Communist state as is 
typically assumed by scholars of post-war Central and Eastern European Catholic 
nationalism. Oppression - or the perception of it - does play an important part, but it is 
only part of the story of the rise of Catholic nationalism.  
In exploring how Catholic nationalism developed, this chapter follows more recent 
studies of Communist states, which see them not so much as oppressors of minority 
nationalism, but rather as ‘makers of nations.’215 This is also a story of the mutual, 
often unwitting, participation in the re-creation of a nationalised culture by many 
different groups: the official state-sponsored Catholic Church, the Vatican, John Paul 
II, and crucially, the underground Church which emerges in the 1980s. The grounds 
for the construction of this culture emerged as a result of clashing views about the 
appropriate role of the Church in Czechoslovak society, the relationship between 
Catholicism and national identity, and the relationship between religion and the idea 
of a Slovak state.  
This chapter will trace the growth of this Catholic nationalism in a variety of guises 
and assess the power of different visions of religion and nationalism in Slovak politics 
and society in the late Socialist period. It is divided into three sections. The first 
explores the fortunes of Catholicism and nationalism during the 1960s and during the 
early period of late Socialism (1968-late 1970s). It begins in the 1960s when Slovak 
nationalism assumed new importance for the Communist project in Eastern Europe 
as part of de-Stalinisation. This section explores the extent to which this change 
affected Slovakia and prepared ground for the late Socialist re-imagination of the 
Catholic Church as an integral part of the Slovak nation. This section also observes 
that from the 1960s on, Catholics became increasingly interested in the category of 
nation and national history, and that Catholic Churches in some countries of the 
region became actively involved in the forging of a nationalised public Catholic 
culture, constructed either independently of the Communist states or under their 
sponsorship (as part of the official nationalised culture).  
This period was likewise crucial in making collective memory the central 
‘discursive field’ for thinking about nationalised culture and national identity. The 
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Catholic Church in Czechoslovakia had never undertaken the construction of an 
autonomous nationalised public Catholic culture mainly because, first, it lacked the 
institutional autonomy and strength needed to create such a culture and second, the 
Communist Party prevented non-communist actors from creating a nationalised 
culture. Nonetheless, throuhgout the early 1980s, a nationalised public Catholic 
culture -- one which cast the Catholic Church as an integral part of the nation through 
collective memory, symbols and events--  began to emerge. 
The second section explores how and why this nationalised public Catholic 
culture began to be constructed in the 1980s. It argues that the nationalised culture 
was created especially by underground Catholic activists who began to surface at 
public pilgrimages and most consistently cast the Church as a part of the nationalised 
culture and national history. This was done mainly through the construction of a 
national Catholic narrative.  
Their construction of this narrative was, however, a result of direct and indirect 
involvement of several important actors. Most visibly, they were encouraged by the 
papacy which emerged as an important inspiration for the creation of nationalised 
public Catholic cultures in the region and throughout the world. The official authorities 
in turn, by allowing the use of pilgrimages and promoting official Slovak nationalism 
(while simultaneously circumscribing the Church both in its contact with the 
nationalising papacy and Catholic laity), helped create a community which began to 
cast the Church as an integral part of the nation. A nationalised public Catholic 
culture thus began to take form through a combination of selective repression with 
increasing access to Slovak nationalism. This limited whilst at the same time allowed 
just enough space to make sense of the Catholic role in terms of Catholicism and 
nationalism. The 1980s were also the first time when those cultural elites who began 
to imagine the socialist state as an ethnic one were compelled to think about the 
place of Christianity in the project of late Socialist nationalism. All of these 
experiences – whether those of the official Church, supporters of the Communist 
state, and the underground Church – would from now on become central to the 
construction of a nationalised public Catholic culture. 
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1. Nationalism and the Catholic Church in the 1960s   
To understand the revival of a nationalised public Catholic culture, we must return to 
the 1960s, which marked a key change in the relationship between state, nation, and 
Church, and would establish patterns that persisted into the last decades of state 
socialism. In Czechoslovakia, as in all of Central and Eastern Europe, and indeed, 
globally, the 1960s saw increased interest in nationhood. It was also a time when the 
first post-war Catholic nationalism emerged already in Poland in the 1950s. Slovakia 
itself did not see a significant revival of popular Catholic nationalism, but it was during 
this period when preconditions for the 1980s re-construction of Catholic nationalism 
were formed and when actors who would come to play central roles in the 
construction of a nationalised public Catholic culture emerged.  
These preconditions were: first, the re-emergence of an ethnic definition of Slovak 
nationhood propelled by a wide group of cultural elites interested in the maintenance 
of this nationalism; second, the re-assertion of the Catholic Church as an institution 
independent from the state; and, third, the appearance of a bottom-up mobilisation in 
the Catholic Church. This was also a time of emergence of interest in history as the 
central space within which new ideas of nationhood were discussed, and through 
which they were promoted.  
1.1. Nationalism and Communism in the 1960s 
Interest in nationhood began within Communist Parties, but in some cases soon 
turned into a broader assertion of different forms of nationalisms, including Catholic 
nationalism. Czech historian Pavel Kolář writes that in the post-Stalinist era, ‘self-
representation through nationalist propaganda became essential to the legitimisation 
of the East European regimes.’216 The first crisis of the Communist regimes in the 
early 1950s thus not only led to de-Stalinisation, but also to a revival of ‘national 
roads’ to socialism.  
This was not the first time that ‘national roads’ to communism had emerged. After 
1945, the Soviet leader Joseph V. Stalin tolerated the politics of ‘national roads to 
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Stalinism’ and thus of coalitions with non-communist democratic parties.217 With the 
onset of Cold War, however, Stalin, according to Kolář, ‘reconfigured this symbiotic 
relationship between nation and class.’218 He  goes on to say that, ‘with the slogan of 
“sharpening the class struggle during the construction of Socialism,” class came to 
predominate over nation,‘ and the ‘focus now shifted from external foes to ‘class 
enemies’ within the nation and later within the Communist Parties themselves.‘219 
Attacks on ‘right-wing nationalist deviations’ and ‘bourgeois nationalism’ were, Kolář 
notes, ‘key features of Stalinism,‘ especially in Poland and Czechoslovakia.220  
At the beginning of the 1950s in Slovakia, the well-known Slovak nationally-
minded Communists Gustáv Husák and Ladislav Novomeský were put on trial and 
imprisoned as ‘bourgeois nationalists’, their ‘deviation’ supporting greater Slovak 
autonomy within the post-war Czechoslovak state. Reflecting the slowness with 
which de-Stalinisation reached Czechoslovakia, the two men spent more than a 
decade incarcerated. In fact, in late 1950s another campaign against the remnants of 
‘Slovak separatism’ was initiated, removing all those Communists who believed that 
respect for ethnic distinctiveness should translate into the state’s and the Party’s 
structure and politics.  
Yet by the beginning of the 1960s, these ‘nationalists’ were released and became 
central to re-casting the Stalinist rule as ‘alien to the nation.’ This perception was a 
powerful driving force behind both the uprisings of 1956 in Poland and Hungary as 
well as the revival of interest in the nation within the party.  
In 1968, Novotný was replaced by Slovak Communist Alexander Dubček as Party 
Leader. A Slovak was thus placed in the strongets position of power in the party and 
in the common Czechoslovak state. As Karen Henderson points out ‘Dubček’s style 
came in stark contrast to the cold, aloof Communist leaders’ to which people had 
become accustomed during the past twenty years.221 However, Dubček aimed for 
more profound reform of the party and relatedly the Czechoslovak state. Yet, for all 
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the efforts to change both the form and the substance of communist leadership, the 
reform period saw ‘very few structural political and economic changes.’222  
On April 5, 1968, Alexander Dubček and his associaties in the Communist Party 
of Czechoslovakia issued a political plan the aim of which was to look for 
Czechoslovakia’s own path towards mature socialism. This so –called Action 
Programme (AP) called for acknowledgement of individual liberties, the introduction 
of political and economic reforms, and change in the structure of the state. This 
Programme was, however, not implemented since the personnel changes needed to 
facilitate its implementation did not take place.  
The main result, then, was, as argued by Henderson, a step towards what nearly 
twenty years later would be called glasnost.223 In the spring and summer of 1968, 
people could talk, more or less openly, about issues that had not been discussed in 
public since the Communist upheaval in 1948. The major issue in Slovakia was 
greater level of Slovak autonomy, cultural but even more so political. Federalisation 
became one of the central themes of the reform period.224 In fact, the formal 
transformation of hitherto unitary Czechoslovak state into a federation would be the 
only one of the Programme’s aims which was realised, if only to an extent. The 
federation would remain a purely formal arrangement, and would never become fully 
implemented.225 Nonetheless, the campaign for federalisation and the assertion of 
Slovak nationalist elites, cultural and political, which preceded it, would become an 
important source of inspiration for late Socialist as well as post-Socialist nation-
building, especially after the 1980s. The discourse about Slovak cultural and political 
autonomy, therefore, merits broader discussion. 
Calls for formal acknowledgement of Slovak sovereignty first appeared among 
official cultural elites. These elites first advocated the ethnic principle alongside the 
principle of class. The first impulses for this change began to emerge already in the 
early 1960s. At about this time, Slovak cultural elites connected to the periodical 
Kultúrny Život began to feel uneasy about their national history being framed as only 
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a stage in development towards a unitary Czechoslovak state.226 These reform- and 
nationally-minded elites began to uncover previously ‘forgotten’ pasts and reinterpret 
those which they felt had been distorted by Stalinist official history in a more national 
way. In comparison with previous histories marked by the centralising spirit of the 
Stalinist period, the Slovaks, especially cultural elites, began to search for their ‘own’ 
national narrative. This also meant challenging the class struggle as the central logic 
of the Slovak past, and these elites began to turn to development of the Slovak 
nation as an independent ethnic group and nation. Indeed, rather than class 
struggles between feudal princes and serfs, or workers and capitalists, the Slovak 
cultural elites now looked to the ‘beginnings of Slovak ethnogenesis’ in the 9th 
century chiefdom of Great Moravia, the Slovak ‘national revival’ in the 19th century 
and the 1944 anti-fascist Slovak National Uprising (SNP).227  
These Slovak nationalists also began to probe the official memory of the 
development of Czechoslovak statehood. In this, they began to understand the 
development of Slovak statehood tradition as independent from the development of 
common Czechoslovak statehood, and shifted emphasis to the Slovak elements in 
the narrative of the historical development of Czechoslovak statehood. When Czech 
historians questioned Stalinist understandings of the interwar Republic as a result of 
the Bolshevik Revolution and began to frame it as a work of the ‘founding fathers’ 
(T.G. Masaryk, Edvard Beneš and Milan R. Štefánik), Slovak nationalists preferred to 
turn to Milan R. Štefánik, the only ‘founding father’ of Slovak origin. The heritage 
organisation Matica Slovenská organised a ‘national pilgrimage to his mausoleum in 
western Slovakia in the spring of 1968.228 Given the re-assertion of the national 
principle within socialist patriotism, these periods and figures of Slovak emancipation 
were now included as progressive moments of history.229 This revival of interest in 
history and the use of history to think about new ways of political arrangement 
(federation) anticipated the roles history would play in official discourse for the 
decades to follow. This national memory and its creators would also play a central 
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role in the construction of a nationalised public Catholic culture in the 1980s and 
1990s.  
The role of this official nationalist culture in building a nationalised public Catholic 
culture had not yet become evident in the 1960s. This was primarily because leading 
Communist nationalists did not intend to abolish the power monopoly of the 
Communist Party and its related position of exclusive creator of official culture.  
During the 1960s, the movement of Slovak nationalist political and cultural elites 
focused on advocating greater political autonomy for Slovaks and the rearrangement 
of the common state with the Czechs from a unitary to a federal one. As 
federalisation became the central agenda of Slovak nationalist Communists, the 
construction of a Slovak national consciousness through the construction of an 
independent Slovak narrative became part of the legitimisation of the project of 
federalisation. During the Prague Spring, Slovak elites also debated the extent to 
which federalisation demanded democratisation. On one hand, there were those who 
saw democratisation as sine qua non of the federation and called for a common 
‘front’ of Czech and Slovak ‘progressive forces.’230 When in the spring of 1968, the 
USSR grew suspicious about the democratising persuasion of the changes in 
Slovakia, a group of leading Communist intellectuals who had disagreed with the 
democratising trend left Kultúrny Život and coalesced around the weekly Nové Slovo. 
(For the purposes of this chapter, I will call these Communists authoritarian 
nationalist Communists.)231 These different views translated into diverse approaches 
to the Catholic Church and its role in society, political life, and culture.  
Whilst authors around Kultúrny Život published articles about different aspects of 
the Church’s past and present and saw the Church as an autonomous creator of 
Slovak culture,232 the Communists at Nové Slovo regarded the Catholic Church only 
in terms of its contribution to working people and the development of socialism.233  
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Thus, shortly before the end of the political thaw which would reach its zenith in 
the Prague Spring, Slovak nationalist elites became divided over the extent to which 
further nationalisation of Slovak culture should translate to the inclusion of broader 
segments of the Slovak people into the Communist project of reform.  
This became clear in relation to the Catholic Church and its role in Slovak history. 
The Communists around Kultúrny Život began to read the Catholic Church into the 
history of Slovak ethnogenesis and national emancipation. Kultúrny Život became a 
space where religious rights were defended, and the first views about the positive 
role of Catholicism in the history of the nation were evoked.234 The Communists 
around Nové Slovo refused to cede the emancipation of the Church in this sense. For 
them, an independent and powerful Church was a reminder of the Slovak Republic 
(1939-1945). These Communists imagined nation-building as a ‘progressive’ 
process; that is, as a process which would happen under the lead of the Communist 
Party and within the Communist state. Characteristic for the approach of the group 
around Husák was the proposal to constitute a Slovak ecclesiastical province as a 
way to establish a ‘good relationship with the Church.’235 The motivation for support 
of an independent Slovak province was, however, not to grant greater autonomy for 
the Church. According to Husák, the goal was to consolidate the southern frontier 
with Hungary and adjust ecclesiastical boundaries according to state borders.236  
1.2. The Catholic Church in Czechoslovakia  
For the most part, the authoritarian elites took pains to keep the Catholic Church 
within the confines of the Communist system and extraneous to any debates about 
the Slovak past, about nationalisation or democratisation. Between 1948 and the 
1960s, the Catholic Church in Slovakia had been brought under extensive control of 
the state and isolated from society. The  state dismantled its structures, including its 
religious orders, charities, schools, and associations.237 The state also prevented the 
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Church from functioning as an autonomous creator of a nationalised culture by 
controlling its media, closing down its pilgrimage sites and eliminating any notion of 
the Catholic Church as an important agent in the history of the Slovak nation.  
All real power within the Church was held by an association of priests loyal to the 
state, the Movement of Peace Clergy. The Church was also controlled by the Office 
for Church Affairs through the Ministry of Culture. Throughout this thesis, I call this 
Communist concept of the Church and Catholic culture the ‘patriotic Church’ and the 
‘patriotic culture.’ In this arrangement, the Church could be involved in public life to a 
certain extent as dictated by the Communist authorities.  
Ostensibly, the Church was supposed to support the official ideology, including 
official nationalism. But as far as public life was concerned, the life of the Church was 
confined to church spaces. The Church was banned from mobilising independently of 
the state and without the permission of the state.238 However, some public 
manifestations of faith, which took place outside of Churches, such as pilgrimages 
and other practices of popular devotions, were more generally tolerated.  
 According to leading Czech historians of the Catholic Church under 
Communism, for the authorities, ‘these customs were a mere relic of the past which 
could not play any role in the growth of religiosity.’239 These spaces were, however, 
tolerated only to a point. They were tolerated only as long as the Church hierarchy 
did not attempt to use them for Church-wide mobilisation. However, during the 1960s 
and 1970s (with the exception of 1968) there were no attempts to use pilgrimages in 
this way. As Hanuš and Balík point out, Catholics in Czechoslovakia were divided 
over popular devotions. In fact, popular devotions and their related practices were 
criticised by progressive Catholics, who, inspired by the Second Vatican Council, 
sought new, more modern, ways of (mass) mobilisation of Catholics.240 This 
approach of these progressive Catholics to popular devotions would change by the 
mid-1980s; popular devotions (especially those to Our Lady of the Seven Sorrows 
and Cyril and Methodius) would experience a revival in which various actors would 
play a role (including official authorities, the papacy, and underground communities of 
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Catholics). But to understand why and how this revival occurred and what role it 
played in the rise of a nationalised public Catholic culture, I will first say a few words 
about the situation of the Catholic Church in the 1960s.  
 Despite the political thaw in the 1960s and the official support of nationalism, 
the official authorities in Czechoslovakia were not about to let the Church establish 
itself as a creator of an autonomous nationalised culture, as was the case in Poland, 
nor had they envisioned the Church as an active co-creator of a national official 
culture, as was the case in Hungary. In the 1960s the Churches in these countries 
underwent institutional reconstruction and became variously engaged in the creation 
of nationalised cultures. In Poland, the Church assumed the position of the creator of 
an autonomous nationalised culture. Under the leadership of the primate Cardinal 
Stefan Wyszyński, the Church engaged in a programme of ‘national consecration’ in 
1956. Through this programme, the Church gained sufficient strength and autonomy 
to be able to mobilise beyond an alternative nationwide programme, turning herself 
into a creator autonomous from the Communist Party.241 In 1966, the Polish Church 
celebrated a thousand years of Christianity in the country. 242  
 Similarly in Croatia, the Church soon established itself as a creator of a 
nationalised culture which was likewise autonomous, albeit slightly less so than in 
Poland. The Croatian Church began its own Great Novena modelled on a similar one 
in Poland to celebrate thirteen centuries of Christianity and Christendom, with early 
medieval Croatian kings celebrated alongside Catholic saints,243 and the Catholic 
Church in Croatia played a central role in the Croatian Spring. This new position of 
the Churches would be challenged by official authorities during the next decade as 
they sought to consolidate their power, but the 1960s would see the beginning of the 
creation of independent public nationalised public Catholic cultures.  
Czechoslovakia’s situation was very different. Until 1967, the Church had not 
involved itself in the reform movement. The first signs that the episcopate in Slovakia 
were preparing to assert themselves with respect to the state appeared in 1967, just 
over a year before the end of the Prague Spring (in August of 1968). The hierarchy 
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refused to see itself as subordinate to patriotic clergy and thus effectively questioned 
its hitherto subordinate position in relation to the state. Slowly, if slightly belatedly, the 
Czechoslovak hierarchy assumed a more independent position vis á vis the state. 
One of the reasons for Church’s lagging behind in that country was the fact that it 
had been substantially isolated from other Churches in the region. Even more 
importantly, it had also become alienated from the Vatican, which had since the early 
1960s been actively encouraging Churches to open up towards civil society (or 
nations).  
Indeed, the Polish and Croatian Churches were explicitly encouraged in their new 
role by the Vatican after the Catholic Church rethought its relationship to society and 
state at the Second Vatican Council, which was crucial for the development of the 
social vision of the Church. As J. Bryan Hehir argues, the change made the Church 
less political and more social.244 Vatican II’s Declaration on Religious Liberty in 
particular encouraged a distancing of the Church from the state. The previous model, 
which saw the confessional state as the ideal, assumed that the closer the Church 
could get to the state, the better off the Church would be. This model was embodied 
in a multiplicity of concordants. John Courtney Murray notes that after the Second 
Vatican Council, the idea was to recognize the state‘s appropriate secularity, to 
engage it selectively, but not to tie the Church‘s fate to formal engagement with the 
state.245  
Another important change in terms of agents taking part in constructing the public 
face of the Church was that greater authority was given to the laity.246 Whereas in the 
1940s and 1950s it was almost inconceivable that Church activities, including 
Catholic political parties, would not be fronted by priests, later such arrangements 
came to be accepted as standard practice.247 In Eastern Europe, this about-face 
would translate into various programmes of renewal in the decades to follow. For the 
majority of the 1960s, the relationship between the Czechoslovak state and the 
Vatican was not good enough to allow the Vatican to have any significant influence 
on the position of the Catholic Church in Czechoslovak society.  
                                                          
244
 J. Bryan Hehir, ‘The Old Church in the New Europe,’ in Timothy A. Byrnes and Peter Katzenstein 
(eds.), Religion in an expanding Europe, (Cambridge, 2006), p. 108.  
245
 John Courtney Murray, 'The Problem of Religious Freedom,‘ Theological Studies, 25(1964), 503-
75.  
246
 Hehir, ‘The Old Church’, p. 108. 
247
 Ibid., p. 108.  
85 
 
Even after the Church in Czechoslovakia became free enough to catch-up with 
Churches in Poland or Croatia, the main focus was on reforming and rebuilding the 
Church internally rather than on reshaping its relationship within society. Towards the 
end of 1960s, Catholics who had been in prisons for the better part of the past 
decade joined ranks with those involved in church reform, and came to play a crucial 
role there. Along with the hierarchy, they established the Project of Council Renewal. 
The main goal of this project was to ‘help the Church hierarchy to implement the 
reforms of the Second Vatican Council.’248 The hierarchy rather promptly resumed its 
leading position and began to talk about the need for national renewal, but it had not 
managed to become an autonomous creator of culture.249  
One of the hierarchy’s first steps was of an administrative character; it called 
for the establishment of an independent Slovak ecclesiastical province.250 
Historically, this could be seen as a step towards gaining autonomy from the state. 
However, this step was proposed in cooperation with former members of the 
association of patriotic clergy, an association openly loyal to the Communist state.251 
The proposal was, in fact, backed by several leading Communists, most notably 
Gustáv Husák. Whilst for the Catholic hierarchy this was a major step, the lay leaders 
of the Project of Council Renewal were left unsatisfied. The Catholic laity who had 
returned from prisons wanted to consistently de-politicise the Church and bring it 
closer to the nation.  
Not only was it the Second Vatican Council which inspired this understanding 
of the role of the Church amongst lay believers, but their pre-Communist engagement 
with the pre-Communist Catholic Action, especially its apolitical segment around a 
movement whose members referred to themselves as Rodina Movement also played 
an important role.252 The Rodina (English: the Family) Movement was established in 
the early 1940s by Croatian anti-fascist priest Tomislav Kolakovič (a pseudonym) 
                                                          
248
 Balík and Hanuš, Katolícka církev v Československu, pp. 279-84. Pešek and Barnovský, V Zovretí 
normalizácie, pp. 15-21. 
249
 Jozef Haľko, ‘Cirkev, Mierové hnutie katolíckeho duchovenstva a Dielo koncilovej obnovy 
v roku 1968,’ Impulz Revue (2008) accessible online at http://www.impulzrevue.sk/article.php?300 
(last accessed 5 August 2014).  
250
 Haľko, ‘Cirkev, Mierové hnutie,‘ http://www.impulzrevue.sk/article.php?300, (last accessed 5 
August 2014). 
251
 Ibid., http://www.impulzrevue.sk/article.php?300,  
252
 Jozef Jablonický, ´Tomislav Poglajen Kolakovič na Slovensku, 1943-1946,´ in Jozef Jablonický, 
Fragment of Histórii (Bratislava, 2009), pp. 284-5.  
86 
 
among Slovak students in Bratislava. The movement functioned until 1950, becoming 
one of the central groups for the budding underground church.253 Amidst attempts on 
the part of the Slovak wartime state to merge Catholicism and state fascism, 
Kolakovič advocated the need for Catholics to engage more zealously in social 
justice issues. Following Catholic social teaching and the teachings of Catholic 
philosophers such as Jacques Maritain, Kolakovič thus sought to follow both the 
demands of the Gospel as well as to block communist inroads among the lower 
classes.’254 Accordingly, as Silvester Krčméry, one of leading Rodina members 
pointed out, the movement was not ‘based on traditional structures, such as the 
clergy or the monastic communities, but rather it would be representative of every 
social group: youth, adults, lay people, priests, monks, and nuns, and single and 
married people.’255 During the early post-war years, Kolakovič and his followers, 
according to James Felak, kept aloof from politics: they engaged with none of that 
time leading political parties, the Demokratická Strana (DS, the Democratic Party) 
and the Communist Party.256 They maintained this attitude after the Communist take-
over, rejecting state control of the Church. In the 1950s alone, at least 35 members of 
Rodina, including two leading members, Vladimír Jukl and Silvester Krčméry, were 
sentenced to long prison terms as part of a major Communist clamp-down on 
Catholic structures. 257 When in the 1960s Jukl and Krčméry were released from 
prison after having served long sentences, they began to work to revive the 
understanding of the Church as focused on the society and nation, and autonomous 
from the state and politics; now in the 1960s, unlike in the 1940s, they could draw 
inspiration from churches across the region.  
The success of the Catholic Church in Poland was the main source of 
inspiration for the Slovak laity. They saw how the state respected the Catholic Church 
as a ‘moral authority’ and allowed the Church to retain its traditional structure, 
together with a certain liberty and activism of the laity.258 Earlier, in 1966, Jukl and 
Krčméry took part at the culmination of the Great Novena in Poland, the national 
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pilgrimage to the Polish national shrine at Jasna Gora Monastery.259 Jukl had been 
friends with Polish Catholics from the officially sanctioned Polish Catholic weekly, 
Tygodnik Powszechny, the intellectual powerhouse of a fledgling Polish nationalised 
culture. In hoping for a similar Catholic nationalised culture in Slovakia, Jukl and 
Krčméry envisioned a unified Church led by a strong hierarchy and supported by an 
active laity.  
These new Catholic leaders were now focused on what they saw as the first 
necessary step towards broader change of the Church’s position in society: to 
depoliticise the hierarchy, abolish the patriotic clergy, and establish Church structures 
separatete from the state apparatus. Rejecting the anti-Vatican and anti-hierarchical 
attitude of the Communist party, they sought to abolish peace clergy, restore the 
leading role of the hierarchy, leave engagement with politics to the laity, and restore 
loyalty to the papacy. As leading members of the Works of Council Renewal, they 
sought to incorporate these changes into the Church as soon as possible.260  
In 1968 they were joined by Bishop Ján Korec, one of the bishops who had 
been secretly ordained in the late 1950s.261 Korec immediately supported their 
initiative and would eventually become the leading figure in the promotion of these 
changes.262 It was not until 1968 that underground Catholics gained access to the 
media. At that time, they abolished the peace and patriotic orientation of the Church 
and focused on spiritual renewal in keeping with the guidelines of the Second Vatican 
Council.263 By the end of 1968, the Church had begun to act as an independent 
agent of national mobilisation, and in that same year planned another public 
pilgrimage to Devin celebrating Cyril and Methodius.264 Other places of mass 
mobilisation were revived, including the national pilgrimage to the shrine of Our Lady 
of the Seven Sorrows in Šaštín.265 At last, the Church in Czechoslovakia took its own 
strides along with its fellow Churches in the region.  
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Yet before these changes could fully take root and renew the Church as a 
creator of nationalised culture, Warsaw Pact armies occupied Slovakia in 1968 
effectively thwarting all reformist attempts, including those concerning the Church. 
The thaw in Czechoslovakia was too short-lived, and the Church policies that were 
eventually espoused by the post-Prague Spring regime were not democratising 
enough to enable the Church to establish itself as an independent and integrated 
agent of national mobilisation.  
In 1971 the peace clergy were re-established and the Church returned to its 
close cooperation with the state. The Project of Council Renewal was abolished, and 
the Church saw no progress in materializing its social vision, creating an alternative 
nationalised culture, or moving closer to the laity. In the next decades, the 
Communist elites supported the creation of a nationalised culture, but in this the 
Catholic Church was barred from playing a significant role. In the following section, I 
will describe how and why the post-Prague Spring political elites continued to create 
a nationalised culture and the position of the Catholic Church in this official project.  
1.3. Real Socialism and ‘National Consciousness’  
Real socialism in its last decades is typically understood by scholars as a mutually 
beneficial agreement between the society in question and the Communist Party: the 
society agreed to remain silent in return for increased access to consumer goods.266 
Most specifically, the 1970s have been identified as a time of ‘inertia.’  
That decade was certainly a time of setback as far as political rights were 
concerned. After the Prague Spring was crushed by Warsaw Pact tanks, the 
authoritarian Communists proceeded to build state-socialism, eager to prove the 
socialist patriotic credentials of Czechoslovakia. This was a process which was 
characterised not only by demonstrations of loyalty to Marxism-Leninism in both 
ideology and practice, and loyalty to the USSR and Brezhnevite concept of ‘limited 
sovereignty.’267. As mentioned, this led to an official halt to attempts to reform the 
position of the Church: the Project of Council Renewal was dissolved and several of 
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its leading members were forced to leave the public church and were relegated to the 
underground Church.  
The first phase of normalisation brought with it purges within the Communist 
Party, sending a whole generation of reform Communists underground. In the Czech 
lands, the better part of those who had been purged from the Party found themselves 
working menial jobs. However, in Slovakia many nationalist Communists who were 
involved in the Prague Spring were soon co-opted to help in the creation of a real 
socialist nationalised culture which would become the source of the official cultural 
identity—of real socialist national consciousness.    
The constitution of the Slovak Socialist Republic as part of the Czechoslovak 
Socialist Federation was officially presented as the definitive fulfilment of all national 
ambitions of the Slovaks, as well as the definitive solution of the amiable relationship 
between the Czechs and Slovaks. According to leading 1970s Slovak historian Miloš 
Gosiorovský, the wordage of the constitution of the Slovak Socialist Republic 
removed ‘all the remnants of the 19th century struggle for national self-assertion.’268  
In keeping with the new importance of nationality, ‘national consciousness’ 
became an important part of real socialist consciousness. ‘The greater the scope of 
the sources…the greater will be our pride of our national past and present.’269 
‘Historical consciousness’ was supposedly informed by the findings of the newest 
historical research and cultural production maintained by cultural elites, especially 
historians. Given the centrality of cultural elites to the legitimisation of the 
normalisation regime/real socialism, construction of ‘historical consciousness’ 
became central to building a ‘national consciousness.’ The aim was to strengthen 
‘Slovak national consciousness’ and proclaim the common state as the culmination of 
historical movements of emancipation of Slovaks, which were now regarded as the 
‘progressive’ parts of Slovak history.  
The role of the official maintenance of this ‘historical consciousness’ was to make 
sure that national consciousness as constructed by Communist elites expressed the 
process of unification of the two nations. The national consciousness acknowledged 
national distinctiveness but was cast as part of a broader federal consciousness. The 
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officially declared plan is nicely captured in the following part of a conversation on 
‘internationalism, patriotism, and nationalism’ published in 1978 on the 10th 
anniversary of the Federation. The participants in this conversation were three 
leading ideologues, including the editor-in-chief of Tribuna, the ideological weekly, 
who believed that,   
The socialist way of life will make progress and will become stabilised. At the same 
time, the process of unification between the Czech and Slovak nations and 
nationalities will become consolidated; the Czechoslovak Socialist Federation will 
further advance toward its goal of full accomplishment. As a result of the complete 
integration of all aspects of social life, the international relations of the Czech and 
Slovak nations with the nations of the Soviet Union, neighbouring socialist nations 
and all other nations of the world socialist system will be further reinforced. The 
above-mentioned objective processes will be reflected more actively in the 
conscience, and especially in the national conscience, of the people as our socialist 
ideology further develops.270 
The authors of this vision, it seems, did not see any reason to acknowledge that the 
‘consolidation of unification’ of the Czech and Slovak nation(s) may turn out to be a 
complicated and eventually unsuccessful process, nor did they seem to worry that 
the cultural elites tasked to safeguard this consolidation through the maintenance of 
a ‘historical consciousness’ might engender changes which would emphasize 
national sovereignty at the expense of unity.  
What they did believe was that Socialism would safeguard the proper balance 
between national and supra-national identities. Building national identity was not 
considered to have the potential to undermine this essentially civil supra-national 
project, since, these Communists believed, the historic goal of Slovak nationalism – a 
sovereign state – was achieved. The fact that post-Prague Spring consolidation 
removed all right-wing nationalists was enough for the Communists to declare that 
chauvinist nationalism had disappeared.  
 During the first five years of ‘normalisation,’ collective memory or ‘historical 
consciousness’ as unity was not questioned – the main goal, during this period, was 
to remove those Communists who were deemed inappropriate for the new Socialist 
‘national consciousness.’ For the nationalism which had appeared among Communist 
cultures, the biggest change was that, at least on a rhetorical level, it was brought 
back into the service of state socialism. Initially, maintaining ‘national consciousness’ 
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within state socialism involved making sure that those phenomena which were 
deemed regressive were excluded from this project. Crucially, according to Vladimír 
Mináč, the head of the ‘normalised’ heritage organisation Matica Slovenská and a 
leading figure of Slovak normalisation nationalism, pre-Communist Slovak 
nationalists were ‘alien’ to the Slovak nation.271 Post-Prague Spring purges thus 
applied only to the Prague Spring ‘democratic’ nationalists. Chauvinist nationalist 
elites were mostly spared any major sanctions, not to mention purges. The post-
Prague Spring regime dealt most harshly with those who went too far in their attempt 
to revive Slovak nationalised culture and began to seek inspiration in the vestiges of 
the pro-Nazi wartime Slovak state, or, even worse, got involved with the émigrés from 
the wartime pro-Nazi regime.272 The regime also restricted those institutions, such as 
the Catholic Church, whose very existence was deemed to be a persistent reminder 
of the war-time Slovak Republic’s nationalised culture.  
 The central characteristics of late Socialist historical and national memory 
can be illustrated through the key symbol of this socialist historical and ‘national 
consciousness,’ the Slovak National Uprising (Slovenské Národné Povstanie, SNP). 
Central to official memory was the official interpretation of this defining event in the 
development of Czechoslovak and Slovak statehood: the state was central to official 
memory and sovereign statehood was considered the central historical achievement 
of the nation.  
 The Socialist state also emphasized the centrality of the ‘people.’ 
Commemorations of the Slovak National Uprising (1944) became the key event of 
official memory of late Socialism in Slovakia.273 In the 1970s, the Communist 
understanding of the Slovak National Uprising—of a folk-led response as led by the 
Party--  was stabilised as the centrepiece of official Slovak memory and key historical 
referent for the current Slovak Socialist Republic. The Slovak National Uprising 
(SNP) was promoted as central to socialist statehood tradition despite a certain 
ambiguity in its use —in that during this uprising, no state was brought down or 
established. The SNP was nonetheless used as a central statehood tradition 
because it was seen as a moment when Slovaks rejected the fascist state and 
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showed support for the founding of a progressive communist state with the Czech 
nation.  
 Andrej Sirácky asserts that ‘historical consciousness’ meant the fact that ‘the 
Slovak nation had its own republic – in a common Czechoslovak state – that it has its 
own party and national organs, that it has all the attributes of a developed nation.’274 
The late Socialist official authorities banned those interpretations of the SNP which 
questioned the exclusive leadership of the Communist Party.275 It goes without 
saying that any alternative interpretations of the idea of the development Slovak 
statehood (the interwar Czechoslovak Republic and the Slovak Republic of 1939-
1945) were supressed by the official authorities.  It was also assumed that official 
collective memory was entirely secular. The main memorial hall of the SNP was 
conceived as both a museum and as a research institution, emphasising the scientific 
character of ‘historical consciousness.’276 This focus on the Slovak National Uprising 
demoted other traditions in addition to alternative sources of Slovak statehood that 
appeared during Prague Spring among the Communist elites.  
 With this new statehood tradition beginning in the SNP and culminating in the 
establishment of the Slovak Socialist Republic, the 9th century chiefdom of Great 
Moravia, presented as the first state of Czechs and Slovaks and the source of 
common statehood tradition, seemed to have been pushed into background. Great 
Moravia was, however, soon re-discovered by the mid-1980s, but not in attempt to 
reinforce an understanding of Slovak history as part of common Czechoslovak 
history. Rather, it became an inspiration for the re-definition of Slovak statehood 
along ethnic lines. Great Moravia remained important to those ethnic nationalists who 
had associated themselves with the new Slovak socialist state but who wanted to 
give even greater space to Slovak ethnogenesis in the official national narrative. 
These nationalists held leading positions in major cultural institutions. By the early 
1980s, they had become involved in attempts to strengthen Slovak national identity 
through the strengthening of Slovak autonomy. The rise of these nationalists in the 
1980s was, however, by no means linear.  
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Czech and Slovak historians, writing from a post-Socialist perspective, describe 
normalisation as a period of growing distance between the Czech and Slovak 
nations, as well as between Slovaks and Hungarians.277These scholars maintain that 
communist elites are responsible for tensions between these groups. The major 
reason lies in the fact that the Communists had institutionally disabled the Federation 
during the 1970s, and thus facilitated the alienation of Czechs and Slovaks from the 
idea of common Czechoslovak statehood, laying the groundwork for the break-up of 
the Federation in 1993. The focus on the institutional side of politics may be the 
reason why they have so far missed an important piece of the puzzle: the 
nationalisation of culture and, to some extent, politics as well. In Czechoslovakia as 
well as in other multi-national countries in the region, the nationalisation of culture 
and politics became an important facet of late Socialism. As Ronald Suny has 
pointed out with reference to Soviet republics, the republics had become nation-
states in nearly every way except the possession of genuine sovereignty.278 This, 
however, did not prevent their political and cultural elites from creating a powerful 
nationalised culture. Slovakia had officially been declared sovereign. Slovak (and 
Czech) sovereignty had also been declared but left unrealised, since the ‘sovereign’ 
state did not yet possess a constitution. Slovakia, like the Soviet and Yugoslav 
Republics, had its own Academy of Science, universities, museums, newspapers, 
theatre companies, and Communist Party. As Adrienne L. Edgar notes, they even 
had a ‘legions of scholars dedicated to studying their own culture and history.’279 By 
the end of the 1970s, further construction of a nationalised culture through 
nationalisation of historical narratives began to appear on a greater scale.. This shift 
would influence the emergence of other non-communist nationalised cultures, 
including, in powerful ways, the Catholic one.  
 By the late 1970s, socialist national consciousness in Slovakia began to turn 
into a space from which demands for greater appreciation of Slovak cultural and 
ethnic distinctiveness emerged. In the span of a few short years, Slovak cultural 
elites had begun to work to place Slovak ethnogenesis at the centre of official 
historical memory. The General Secretary of the Communist Party and President  
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Husák was not directly involved in this nationalisation, but it was widely known that 
the Minister of Culture, Miroslav Válek, supported the construction of a nationalised 
Slovak culture thanks to the support of the General Secretary. The heritage 
organisation Matica Slovenská, in particular, played an important role in promoting 
the ethnic distinctiveness of the Slovak nation. Nationalisation of state socialist 
culture and politics was already visible in the 1970s. By the late 1970s, the first 
attempts to promote the Slovak language as the exclusive language of education on 
Slovak territory appeared. From the late 1970s on, laws curbing the language rights 
of the Hungarian minority emerged (which, for official authorities, conveniently 
overlapped with the containment of Hungarian dissent which mobilised beyond 
requests for broader cultural rights).280 Soon the late socialist scholars began to give 
the idea of Slovak statehood a firmer ‘ethnic base’ and placed such an understanding 
at the core of the ‘historical consciousness’ they wanted to see launched.  
 Towards the end of the 1970s, historical national narrative was increasingly 
redefined in ethnic terms. This became apparent especially amidst changing 
understandings of ‘historical consciousness.’ Rather than a clear and fixed historical 
legitimisation of the current federal state, ‘historical consciousness’ was now being 
re-defined by leading cultural elites (medieval historians among them playing a major 
role) as the ‘most mobile part of socialist consciousness,’ ‘a part of active societal 
motion,’ a part of everyday reflection of ‘where we come from and where we are 
going,’ ‘connecting every individual to current political tasks.’281 According to leading 
medieval historian Ján Dekan, the nation was ‘a historically developing societal 
organism.’ The ‘integrative basis’ of ‘historical consciousness’ was, in his view, 
‘ethno-linguistic identity’. ‘Historical consciousness’ was a consciousness of 
‘historical, as well as ideological, continuity or discontinuity’ of national development, 
which relied on this ‘ethno-linguistic identity.’282 By the early 1980s, the first studies 
began to emerge which sought to emphasize the self-sufficient, stand-alone 
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character of the Slovak nation in terms of statehood. The return of the history of 
Great Moravia was an important part of this process.283  
 This emphasis on ethnic and linguistic identity was increasingly translated 
into the construction of national narrative, and with it, the understanding of the 
historical development of the idea of Slovak statehood began to change. Slovak 
historians began to promote the role of Great Moravia in the development of Slovak 
statehood. They also began to emphasize that Great Moravia had greater importance 
for the Slovaks than it could ever have for the Czechs or Moravians, because ‘only 
the Slovaks maintained their specific national identity’ within this early medieval 
state.284 Historical figures, events, and developments which, according to these 
nationalist elites, enhanced ethnic distinctiveness were progressive and could be 
integrated into official socialist ‘historical consciousness.’ The Slovak nation and 
statehood were thus increasingly understood in ethnic terms.    
In the mid-1980s, these nationalists made the first attempts at defining the 
historical development of the Slovak nation and statehood as independent from the 
development of the Czech nation and Czechoslovak statehood. Slovak historians 
began to claim that the Slovaks were the first state-bearing nation in the area and 
that the origins of Slovak statehood could be found in the Nitra chiefdom, which 
predated Great Moravia.285 In 1986, a highly popular history book by Matúš Kučera, 
The Figures of Great Moravian History, sought to cast the rulers and chiefs of tribes 
inhabiting current Slovak territory in the medieval era as predecessors to the current 
Slovak political elites. The most prominent role was given to Prince Pribina of Nitra 
chiefdom. Disregarding other documented rulers of Great Moravia, he turned his 
attention to Svätopluk, who was in the eyes of this esteemed historian, the only Great 
Moravian ruler of Slovak origin.286 These views became best visible in the 
preparation of the first ‘national historical drama film’ produced by nationalist Slovak 
cultural elites. The film presented the history of the Slovak nation and the 
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development of Slovak statehood as entirely separate from the history of 
development of Czechoslovak statehood.287 
Moreover, Slovak historians began to portray these ‘ancestors’ as ethnic 
Slovaks playing a central role in the preservation of the idea of Czechoslovak 
statehood. According to current official history of Czechoslovakia—this legacy was 
preserved by the first Czech king, Bořivoj, in the Czech Kingdom which had been 
established in Great Moravia’s neighbourhood, shortly before the disintegration and 
eventual fall of Great Moravia.288 Now leading Slovak historians began to reject this 
part of official history—this, too, translated into the historical/drama film being 
prepared at this time. The leading Slovak historian sought to potray Svätopluk as 
playing the central role in securing the historical continuity of the idea of Great 
Moravian statehood in subsequent state formations on Czechoslovak territory. The 
aim of this national historical drama film was to strengthen the ‘national pride and 
‘historical consciousness’ of the Slovak nation.’289 Kučera now claimed that the 
statehood tradition was passed on to the Czech Kingdom by the last Great Moravian 
‘king’ Svätopluk. This, according to Kučera, happened several years before the fall of 
Great Moravia, and at a time when the Czech Kingdom was being established 
amongst internal turmoil. At this time, argued Kučera, Svätopluk offered help to 
Bořivoj, and taught him how to rule and maintain order in his kingdom.290 This new 
trend was, however, not yet fully public. However, in 1985 this project came out in 
response to the emergence of a new Catholic nationalism.  This official nationalism 
would play a crucial role in the nationalisation of the Catholic underground community 
later in that decade, and would lay the groundwork for the emergence of a 
nationalised public Catholic culture in the 1980s and its maintenance in the 1990s.  
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 As part of the return to the ancient Slovak past, the so-called ‘cultural 
legacies’ of Great Moravia gained greater attention among cultural elites. As will be 
explained later in this chapter, this return would be crucial for the creation of a 
national Catholic narrative. This concerned especially the mission of Cyril and 
Methodius to Great Moravia and their subsequent work on the territory.291 In the ninth 
century Methodius came, together with his brother Cyril, from the Byzantine Empire 
to Great Moravia. They brought the Eastern liturgy, translated liturgical books, and 
invented script (known as Glagolitihic), and stood at the beginnings of the local 
Church organisation. (Methodius also became the first Bishop of Pannonian 
province.) During the period of the wartime Slovak Republic, Cyril and Methodius 
played an important part in the official memory of Great Moravia as the first Slovak 
state. This, however, did not mean an acknowledgement of the role of religion in 
Slovak history. It is important to keep in mind that socialist ‘historical consciousness’ 
was supposed to be remain consistently atheist. The official interest in Cyril and 
Methodius was, of course, not one of interest in the Christianising aspect of the 
mission, but rather the mission was used to emphasize the advanced development of 
the Slovak nation and the importance of language for national identity.292 This new 
interest in Cyril and Methodius would become apparent in the 1980s, and would play 
a crucial role in the construction of nationalised public Catholic culture.   
1.3.1. The Catholic Church and Socialist ‘National Consciousness’  
The official support of construction of a nationalist narrative did not mean that the 
Church would be allowed to return to public construction of at least some parts of its 
pre-Communist nationalised culture. Rather, since official elites sought to create a 
‘genuinely socialist’ nationalised culture, the role of the Church as a non-Communist 
creator was restricted. During the first years of ‘normalisation’ the socialist state 
brought the Church under its full control; the Church was re-established as a ‘patriotic 
Church’ and was not allowed to create a public culture independently of the 
communist state. Attempts to de-politicise the Church from the time of the Prague 
Spring were denounced as expressions of ‘right-wing reactionary forces.’ The ‘Project 
of Council Renewal’, which had sought to detach the Church from the state, was 
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abolished almost immediately after the beginning of the occupation.293 In 1971, the 
Association of Clergy, Pacem in Terris (ZKD PiT), an association of clergy loyal to the 
socialist state and the Church hierarchy, once again found itself breached by state 
sympathisizers and again fully under state control. The public life of the Church 
hierarchy was confined to participation in the construction of the official real socialist 
culture and the role of the Church was circumscribed especially where the public 
construction of a nationalised culture (national and historical collective memory) was 
concerned. The state continued to tolerate popular devotions but was careful not to 
let the Church use them as spaces of national mobilisation. This situation began to 
change at the beginning of the 1980s, and the central role in this change would be 
played by the papacy. But to understand how important this change was for the 
Catholic Church, we first need to look in greater detail at the situation of the Catholic 
Church during the 1970s and the role the Vatican played in this context.  
The Vatican played a crucial part in the reconstruction and legitimisation of the 
‘patriotic’ Church after the Prague Spring. In the late 1960s and early 1970s, the 
Vatican acknowledged communist governments as legitimate294 and seemed to have 
come very close to accepting the Church as imagined by the Communists. The 
Vatican agreed to name three new bishops (Ján Pásztor, Jozef Feranec, Július 
Gábriš) who were known for their support of the Communist Party. These three 
Bishops endorsed the post-Prague Spring regime and supported the current political 
leadership. The Vatican agreed to decrease its support for Slovak Catholic émigrés in 
Rome especially those who were counted amongst the most consistent critics of the 
‘patriotic’ Church. The Vatican also agreed to circumscribe the role of the 
underground hierarchy, i.e. the bishops and clergy who were secretly ordained in the 
1950s and who now constituted a structure which the official Church (and state) were 
unable to control fully. The Vatican weakened its contacts with the best known 
representatives of both groups: Bishop Pavol Hnilica, who had been active in the 
Rome emigration, was ordered to be silent on the situation of the church in 
Czechoslovakia, whilst the secretly ordained Bishop Korec was ordered to stop 
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secret ordinations.295 This arrangement of the Church as being close to fully 
absorbed by the state was, however, challenged by the Vatican itself after the 
election of Pope John Paul II in 1978.  
 On a rhetorical level, the Church hierarchy in Slovakia regularly declared its 
‘socialist patriotism.’ The Church leadership publically reiterated its attachment to ‘the 
socialist homeland, a commitment to the revolutionary transformation of society [and] 
the cause of communism.’296 The Slovak episcopate also agreed that the current 
statehood arrangement of the Czechoslovak Socialist Federation was the epitome 
and fulfilment of all Slovak national aspirations, past and present. Bishop Julius 
Gábriš, head of the Trnava diocese (the only Archdiocese in Slovakia), became 
especially supportive of the current system. He was one of the first supporters of the 
Federation Act (1968); as he claimed, ‘every Slovak could have felt [that] those 
desires, for which many Slovaks have sacrificed in Slovak National Uprising, were 
fulfilled.’297 Emphasising the centrality of Slovak National Uprising (SNP), Gábriš also 
identified with the central place of the SNP in Slovak ‘historical consciousness.’ 
According to Gábriš, the only other wish the Catholic Church had was the 
establishment of an independent Slovak province.298  
By the mid-1970s, the Catholic Church in Slovakia resembled the Church in 
Hungary, as far as its role in the legitimisation of the state was concerned. In 
Hungary, too, the episcopate became an ardent supporter of the communist regime. 
Yet their position in the official nationalised culture was rather different. Whilst the 
Church in Czechoslovakia was excluded from official official culture and especially 
official national memory, the Church in Hungary played an active role in the 
legitimisation of the current state and construction of narrative.299 The Church in 
Hungary was, for example, allowed to stage mass commemorations of Catholic 
saints who also had a central role in nation-building. For example, the Church 
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actively participated in the celebrations ofthe 1000th anniversary of the birth of the 
first king of Hungary, St. Stephen, the first Christian King and a Catholic saint, held in 
1970 in Budapest.300 Furthermore, the state relied on the structures of the Church in 
maintaining the Hungarian identity of Hungarians beyond the borders.301 In the 
Czech lands and in Slovakia, by contrast, bishops were mere attendees at state-
designed commemorations (e.g. anniversaries of the SNP) celebrating events and 
figures of the official memory of the state. Unlike the Hungarian Church, the Church 
in Czechoslovakia was thus not a co-creator of nationalised memory. Moreover, 
Church anniversaries could not be included in official national historical narratives.   
The Slovak Church was not afforded an active role in the late Socialist nation-
building and creation of a nationalised culture. First, with the official national memory 
focused as it was on Slovak statehood and dominated by Communists, any 
alternative participant in the construction of national narrative was by default 
excluded. The ability to keep the Catholic Church in check was no exercise in state 
socialist narcissism; rather, it was one of the major proofs that the emergent socialist 
Slovak nationalism was considered to be the only correct and truly ‘progressive’ one. 
Criticism of political clericalism, as exemplified by the wartime Slovak state, became 
an integral part of the articulation of Slovak socialist patriotism. Socialist patriotism as 
progressive culture was formed in opposition to ‘regressive nationalisms.’302 Given 
that the Church was a powerful creator of a nationalised public Catholic culture and 
had been part of the Slovak Republic, it was imperative to write this Church out of the 
Slovak national narrative.303  
What best showcased the position of the Church? An independent Slovak 
ecclesiastical province was established in 1977 as a result of an agreement between 
the Czechoslovak state and the Vatican. Such a province had long been one of the 
central goals of Slovak Catholic nationalists;304 even during the 19th century, it was, 
alongside political autonomy, one of the hot button demands in protecting Slovak 
Catholics from the Magyarising influence of the Church hierarchy. The impetus 
behind it dated back the Prague Spring when the Slovak hierarchy pushed for it, but 
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at that time, the proposal did not prove successful owing to the Vatican’s reticence in 
making decisions amidst political instability, but the province was eventually 
constituted in 1977 as a result of the Vatican’s more conciliatory approach to 
communist governments and late socialist communist nation-building. The 
establishment of an independent Slovak province, however, did not mean that the 
state would acknowledge the Church as an institution supporting Slovak sovereignty 
as such. The Communist apparatus was very vocal in expressing that the 
establishment of an independent Church organization was not intended to present 
the Catholic Church as an expression, not to mention a symbol, of Slovak autonomy 
or national identity and Communist authorities, as will be developed in the next 
section, did not allow this to be presented as a culmination of historical efforts of 
Catholic nationalists. They did not allow the Church to use this opportunity to present 
itself as an integral part of the nation. After 1989, independent Church organisations 
would be used by these same (by then ex-Communist) elites to claim that the Church 
had historically supported Slovak independence. However, in the 1980s, an 
independent ecclesiastical province was presented merely as an expression of state 
sovereignty and the result of historical development of the Czechoslovak and Slovak 
statehood.  
 Public proclamation of the establishment of the province at Trnava Cathedral in 
1978 was never once allowed by the official authorities to be depicted as a 
celebration of the Catholic Church as an integral part of the nation and its history. 
The event was intended by official authorities to shore up the idea that the 
Communist Party was the only representative of the nation. The proclamation, 
however, was not read in all Churches across the province, as would be typically 
done, but was announced in Trnava, the ecclesiastical centre of Slovakia, during a 
common weekday mass. The official authorities approved a special guest list which 
was dominated by members of the Pacem in Terris association.  
 Despite all these efforts to the contrary, an attempt to use this event to present 
the Church in exactly the opposite light did take place: Bishop Gábriš of Trnava gave 
a sermon in which he presented the Church as crucial player in the preservation of 
Slovak national identity and spoke about the role of the Catholic Church in the ‘social, 
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national, and cultural development of Slovaks.’305 The sermon was both an account 
of the development of Church administration on Slovak territory and at the same time 
an account of the importance of Catholicism in the historical development of the 
Slovak nation.306 The official authorities understood it as a provocation; it marked the 
first time that Bishop Gábriš, otherwise perfectly observant of the official rules, 
attempted to read the Church back into national history. The official authorities were, 
nonetheless, content that there were no other ‘provocations’ and the service did not 
have a greater, i.e. ‘nationwide’, appeal.307 Although Gábriš’ sermon would anticipate 
his future attempts to present the Church as an integral part of the nation and its 
history, for now, he was the only one in the Slovak hierarchy to cast the Church as 
part of national narrative.  
 For most of the 1970s, the authorities successfully kept the Church away from 
constructing the official nationalised culture or national narrative and successfully 
prevented Catholic symbols from taking on national meaning. Perhaps the best 
illustration of the Church’s subordinate position in the construction of the official 
culture was that at the centre of the Church’s public appearances was the annual 
attendance of the Slovak episcopate at celebrations of the Slovak National Uprising. 
The Church and its spaces were not part of the official nationalised culture; Catholic 
Church leaders were merely one of many participants in the broader system. The 
creation of nationalised culture was the exclusive domain of the Party elites. The 
absence of Catholicism from official nationalised culture, however, did not mean that 
the Communist elites completely erased these symbols and memories.  
The post-Socialist, largely Catholic historiography typically described the 
status of the Catholic Church and its symbols in late Socialist nationalised culture and 
politics as an illustration of the suppression of the Church as an institution.308 They 
argue that during the 1970s the Communist elites did not contribute in any way (not 
even indirectly) to the maintenance of cultural repertoires which could serve to 
construct a nationalised culture. It is also true that Catholicism was not considered as 
a source of inspiration in the construction of real socialist culture, and that the late 
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Socialist state promoted atheism and Marxism-Leninism as the only moral system.309 
The adherence of the Church to these roles was guarded by the same institutes 
which promoted atheism. The Institute of Scientific Atheism was chief among them; 
its role was to make sure that the Church did not step outside of the prescribed zone. 
Furthermore, the cultural institutions creating and maintaining late Socialist 
nationalised culture were also to make sure that the Church as such would not assert 
itself as an autonomous contributor to official nationalised culture, not to mention 
creator of an alternative national  culture.310 However, segments of nationalist 
Catholic memories, nationalist Catholic symbols, and sites which before 1948 had 
been used to create a nationalised public Catholic culture survived either via active 
preservation by official cultural institutions (this was the case of Cyril and Methodius) 
or because the official authorities saw them as irrelevant and were not interested in 
wasting energy in supressing them (Our Lady of the Seven Sorrows). It was these 
cultural artefacts that would by the mid-1980s gradually become part of the official 
nationalised culture. Before exploring how this happened, I will first examine how 
these artefacts survived the 1970s to emerge in the 1980s.  
The survival of these artefacts was safeguarded in at least two ways. First, a 
number of cultural and research institutions did undertake study of select Catholic 
figures,  especially those Catholics who were deemed to have helped to forge the 
Slovak national consciousness through promoting the Slovak language and culture 
and contributing to the development of the Slovak nation as a historical and self-
standing nation. These Catholics were studied as national awakeners, and their 
membership in the Catholic Church was de-emphasized. The official authorities 
celebrated Anton Bernolák who was the first to standardise the Slovak language. By 
the mid-1980s, they also celebrated Ján Hollý (1785-1849), the first Slovak poet to 
write exclusively in Bernolák’s standardised language311 and the first person to 
declare the Slovak nation as ‘self-standing’.312 He was considered to be part of 
progressive national history because of his interpretation of the Cyrilomethodian 
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tradition as a ‘tool activating national pride and consciousness.’313 By the mid-1980s, 
Holly was celebrated not only on major anniversaries but also annually at festivals 
and through films, radio programmes, and other media, and became the subject of 
extensive research.314 The state also began to build commemorative spaces related 
to these figures, renovating a number of parish buildings and turning them into 
memorial halls, such as, for example the Parish Centre of Ján Hollý. Yet, the Catholic 
Church was not allowed to commemorate these figures at these memorials; rather, 
commemorations were organised and led by the Matica. In short, the Communist 
state did not regard the Church hierarchy as a legitimate co-creator of the 
nationalised culture, and instead filled this role unilaterally. 
High-ranking members of the Church were excluded from official 
commemorations of Catholic national awakeners; rather these commemorations 
were led instead by leading figures of official cultural institutions.315 Not even the 
patriotic clergy-- officially loyal to the regime-- were actively involved. Their role was 
reduced to publishing articles about these national awakeners in Duchovný 
pastier.316 To be clear, these figures were celebrated not as Catholics, but rather as 
national emancipators; their Catholicism was of only passing importance. These 
historical Catholic figures who had supported the idea of the self-standing Slovak 
nation and Slovak language, were commemorated as exemplary Slovaks. However, 
the interest in promoting Slovak history as a story of emancipation of the Slovak 
nation contributed to the preservation of these figures and others like them.  
 Second, some of the symbols which had been favourites of Catholic nationalists 
prior to 1948 were once again introduced to public veneration as they were no longer 
considered mobilising. As chance would have it, this was the case of Our Lady of the 
Seven Sorrows, the state seemingly ignoring the fact that during the first 
Czechoslovak Republic, the National Patroness became an important symbol of the 
myth of Slovak victimhood, which in turn served to maintain Slovak Catholic 
nationalism. Yet although the state left the shrine of Our Lady open to pilgrimages, it 
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did curtail their scope. Our Lady of the Seven Sorrows was neither explicitly 
encouraged by the official authorities nor fully supressed by it. I would, however, 
argue that this attitude toward Catholic popular devotions was also a result of 
increased interest in popular customs as part of the nationalised culture.  
For most of the 1970s and at the beginning of the 1980s, the greatest space was 
allowed for those parts of Catholic culture which could be classified as part of ’folk 
culture’. Various Catholic symbols were allowed as part of the socialist state’s 
promotion of the image of the Slovak nation as a ‘plebeian nation.’ As Vladimír 
Mináč, head of the heritage organisation Matica Slovenská and author of this late 
Socialist concept of the Slovak nation, described the Slovak nation as ‘plebeian’ in 
his 1970 essay– that is, not a ‘passive nation without history,’ but a ‘nation making 
history through everyday work and folk customs. ’317 According to Mináč, Slovak 
history was made by common people. ‘Even though Slovakia was not considered to 
have her own history (that is, not in terms of having our  own kings, crown, or insignia 
of power, victorious battles, and peace treaties), we do not have our own feudal 
history, we still have our own history, predecessors, continuity. The bearers of this 
continuity are not…Kings and Dukes, but non-history makers, misera plebs 
contribuens.’318 One important result of this populist aspect of socialist patriotism was 
the acceptance of some aspects of ‘people’s Catholicism.’ Pilgrimages were not 
controlled as strictly as during the 1950s, and Catholic publications could be filled 
with praise of the practices and customs of the ‘common Catholic people.’ Catholic 
patron saints which could be marked as ‘people’ patrons, i.e. patrons of agriculture, 
for example, were studied at official cultural institutes.319 Furthermore, Catholic 
iconography was studied as a reflection of the consciousness of the ‘common 
people.’320 In doing so, the state maintained symbols which would in the 1980s begin 
to play a crucial role in the gradual, mainly bottom-up, revival of nationalised public 
Catholic culture.  
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 The late Socialist official authorities maintained some of the central historical 
figures and symbols of pre-1948 nationalised culture. Some (such as Cyril and 
Methodius) were maintained as objects of research; others were made increasingly 
part of the public nationalised culture (Ján Hollý). Still other symbols (Our Lady of 
Seven Sorrows) persisted simply because the state thought them ‘harmless.’ In this 
way, the Communist regime preserved these symbols, even as it imbued them with 
different meaning. However, the Catholic Church as such was still not allowed to 
become a co-creator of this nationalised culture. Except for rare exceptions (Bishop 
Gábriš of the Trnava diocese), the Church hierarchy did not protest against this 
arrangement.   
 During the late Socialist era, patriotic priests loyal to state were held up as the 
ideal Catholics in that they gave primacy to state socialist identity and ethnic identity 
over Catholic identity. Towards the end of the 1970s the hierarchy seemed to have 
embraced its role and the space marked out for it by the state. The Catholic Church 
in Slovakia was a consistent supporter of the socialist state, ready to reject any 
attempts to question the socialist state’s legitimacy, policies, or rhetoric. When in 
1977 the human rights movement, Charter 77, demanded that the Czechoslovak 
state observe its own obligations to the Helsinki Final Act, the Bishops condemned 
the initiative as an unfair and unpatriotic attack on the socialist state.321 The 
Czechoslovak hierarchy did not see these issues as a problematic and they 
continued to express their support in the ‘peace’ efforts of the state.322 They fully 
respected that the Church as such was not counted as a co-creator of national 
narrative. At the beginning of the 1980s, this system was, however, unsettled by a 
rather unusual actor: the pope himself. From the 1980s on, Pope John Paul II would 
repeatedly criticise the limited role of the Catholic Church in public life and more 
broadly in nationalised culture.   
2. John Paul II and New Vision of Nationalised Public Catholic  Culture  
John Paul II was the first pope to encourage the involvement of the Churches in the 
public life of their societies and their nations through the emancipation of Church as 
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part and parcel of nationalised cultures. John Paul II, the first Slav from a communist 
country to be elected the head of Roman Catholic Church, encouraged Catholics to 
imagine themselves as an integral part of the individual nations and to become 
actively involved in the creation of an autonomous nationalised public Catholic 
culture. Nationalised culture and identity were central to the papal geopolitical vision 
of a united Christian Europe.323 His vision was that of a Europe of unified ‘Christian 
nations,’ of a Europe in which each nation would understand that the origins of its 
nations are related to the origins of Christianity on its respective territory. According 
to the new pope, Eastern European nations needed to re-discover these Christian 
foundations of their national cultures.324 The pope called on individual Churches to 
engage in what was effectively a cultural nationalist project, aimed ‘to regenerate the 
true character of the nation, which is to be manifested in its culture, that is, in its art, 
thought, and a way of life.’325 Considered together with the papal documents on 
human rights and social justice, this call compelled Catholics to what James R. Felak 
coined ‘a Wojtyłan paradigm’ – a combination of ‘patriotism with openness to 
reconciliation, bridge-building, and cooperation, all concerns fostered by the Catholic 
Church at least since the Second Vatican Council.’326 In Eastern Europe, this cultural 
nationalism was part of broader programme of public engagement in ‘moral 
resistance’, which per the pope, ought to address two main objectives: the 
reawakening of each nation’s Christian spirit through culture, and historical 
awareness and the identification of values and ideas which Christians and non-
believers upheld in common.327 Before I go on to analyse the implications of this new 
programme of public engagement for the Church in Czechoslovakia, I will first 
describe the strategies and the objectives of this programme in greater detail, using 
the example of the Church in Poland.  
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This new public role for the Catholic Churches was clearly inspired by the 
pope’s personal experience of and engagement in the Catholic Church in Poland, 
which had by early 1980s been functioning as an independent and leading creator of 
nationalised culture in Poland. What is more, this position of the Church was fully 
accepted and revered by various segments of Polish society, including the 
traditionally anti-clerical Polish Left. This was in part a result of the fact that despite 
persecution, public suppression, and isolation in the 1950s and in the 1960s, the 
Church managed to establish itself as a relatively autonomous institution with a 
strong and unified hierarchy and was thus the only independent institution in the 
communist Poland.328  
This new public role was also significantly helped by the Church’s cultural 
nationalism, the central ideology used by the Polish Church to strengthen and 
legitimise its public role. Demands for greater freedom for the Church and later 
respect for workers’ and human rights were almost always legitimised by a distinctly 
Catholic nationalist narrative, by evocation of Catholic symbols and by regularly held 
events (pilgrimages and commemorations).329 From the late 1950s onwards, the 
Church, under the leadership of Primate Cardinal Stefan Wyszyński, historicized its 
role as the ‘saviour of the nation.’ According to Genevieve Zubrzycki, Wyszyński 
successfully integrated various strands of Polish nationalism: a theology of the nation 
influenced by the Biblical notion of the chosen people and by nineteenth-century 
Polish messianism while incorporating the 19th century ethnic definition of the 
national community.330 The Church appropriated as its own messianic narrative as 
invented by the 19th century Polish nationalists (after the partition of Poland) and 
represented itself as both a victim of the communist system and a timeless heroic 
defender of the nation…against an illegitimate, foreign, and colonialist party-state.’331 
This self-perception was built on a historical national narrative in which ethnicity was 
equated with religion. In Poland, Marianism became the symbol of the Church’s role 
in the protection of Polish statehood, and this role was firmly anchored in a narrative 
which began with Baptism of the first Polish Prince Mieszko, the moment which 
perpetually bound together the Church, Polish nation, and Polish state. Since the late 
                                                          
328
 Falk, The Dillemas of Dissidence, p. 21.  
329
 Zubrzycki, The Crosses of Auschwitz, p. 65 
330
 Ibid., p. 63 
331
 Luxmoore and Babiuch, The Vatican and the Red Flag, p. 205.  
109 
 
1960s, Catholic popular devotions, most notably those to Our Lady of Częstochowa, 
the Queen of Poland, and to the Martyr St. Stanislaw had been successfully used by 
the Church to mobilize Catholics for the cause of greater freedom for the Church.332 
Pilgrimages to the shrine at Jasna Góra, dedicated to the Queen of Poland, became 
central to this nationalised public Catholic culture. In the 1980s these narratives, 
symbols, and events were ready-made and readily embraced by emerging opposition 
groups.  
The creation of this autonomous nationalised culture prepared the Church to 
absorb societal discontent and become the site of ‘ersatz political pluralism’ even 
without intentionally adopting an activist stance against the Communist regime.333 
When in 1980 Solidarity, the first independent Labour Union, emerged as a powerful 
mass organisation and demanded bettering of worker’s rights, its members almost 
automatically embraced the cultural nationalism of the Polish Church. The symbol of 
Our Lady of Częstochowa was ‘skillfully employed by the Church hierarchy and 
adopted by Poles as a central symbol in the Solidarity strikes.’334 By the 1980s, the 
Catholic Church was widely acknowledged as the only institution entitled to represent 
the Polish nation.335 It was this public culture which the Catholic hierarchy used in 
turn in its defense of not only the rights of the Church, but human rights also more 
broadly. After Solidarity was driven underground and martial law was imposed in 
1981, the Church continued to employ its nationalised culture in defence of personal 
and national freedom.  
This creation of the autonomous nationalised public Catholic culture and its 
employment in defence of the Church was personally experienced and advanced by 
the Cardinal of Krakow, Karol Wojtyla. After he was elected pope in 1978, he 
continued to promote this understanding of a nationalised public Catholic culture. , 
The place where ‘we have always been free’ is what he said of Jasna Góra, the 
central pilgrimage site in Poland dedicated to the National Patroness, Mary the 
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Queen of Poland during his 1983 visit there. 336 In talking about freedom, he made it 
clear that he did not mean simply individual freedom but also ‘freedom of the nation, 
of the free fatherland which has recovered the dignity of a sovereign state.’337 As the 
pope specified, ‘Freedom is given to man as a measure of his dignity and to the 
nation as a measure of the dignity of that which claims to embody it-the state- and 
which cannot do it effectively unless it is sovereign.’338 As the head of the Catholic 
Church, the pope could now encourage Catholic Churches across the region to follow 
in the footsteps of the Polish Church, to become an independent creator of 
nationalised public Catholic cultures and to employ these cultures not only in moral 
renewal of society, but also in defence of human rights. He was of course aware that 
some Churches in the region were not in position to do so, at least not now in the 
early 1980s. The Catholic Church in Czechoslovakia was a case in point.  
The Catholic Church in Czechoslovakia was not able to co-create a 
nationalised culture, not to mention create a nationalised public Catholic   culture on 
its own. The Church was fully controlled by the state, which had not only prevented 
the Church from becoming an autonomous creator of a national  culture but which 
had also showed no interest in engaging the Church in the construction of the official 
nationalised culture. Nonetheless, the mid-1980s saw the first signs that segments of 
the Church might be able successfully to create a nationalised public Catholic culture. 
The pope would play an important role in this construction. But before I go on to 
explain why and how this happened, it is crucial to examine in what ways the papal 
vision was a challenge to the late Socialist communist elites and their understanding 
of politics and culture.  
The pope challenged the idea that the Communist Party was the only 
legitimate representative of societies and nations in communist countries and that 
Communist Parties were the only creators of nationalised culture. The pope also 
challenged the notion that all public efforts of Churches should focus on the 
achievement of world peace under the leadership of the Communist party. The pope, 
of course, did not reject the idea that humanity should strive for peace, but he argued 
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that peace had to go hand in hand with freedom of conscience and justice, which 
implied freedom for the public involvement of Catholic Churches.339 According to 
Timothy A. Byrnes, the pope effectively imagined the effective end of the concept of 
‘Eastern Europe.’340 His vision was of an alternative cultural system, one which would 
not be based on two alternative ideological systems and confrontation between East 
and West.  
This was, of course, a vision very different from the communist notion of a 
distinctive Eastern Europe carrying the progressive antifascist legacy under the 
leadership of the Soviet Union. The papal vision challenged the exclusive right of the 
state to construct national narrative and the centrality of statehood to this national 
narrative. The pope imagined the Church as creating nationalised culture in unity with 
the nation rather than the state. He effectively called on Churches to abandon the 
socialist patriotic vision of the national Church, both in structural and cultural terms. 
Indeed, implicit to this call was an image of a strong Church attached to the society, 
or, in the pope’s terms, the nation. Furthermore, for Pope John Paul II the fact that 
individual Catholics were counted as citizens sharing the same rights as other 
socialist citizens did not seem to be enough. He called on Catholics to engage in 
public life as nationally-minded Catholics. 
It must, however, be emphasized that in doing so, the pope called on 
Catholics in Central and Eastern Europe to abandon any lingering attachments to 
pre-Communist political Catholic nationalism in which Catholics were involved in 
nation-building that was closely related to the state. They were called on to abandon 
pre-Communist preoccupation with securing good relations with the state and instead 
reach out to society. Furthermore, Catholics were encouraged to open up to non-
Catholics and to members of neighbouring nations. They were called on to imagine 
their nations as not in conflict with other nations (in his speeches in Poland, the pope 
made distinctions between Nazis and Germans, Soviets and Russians), and to 
advocate for and cooperate in the  project of a unified Christian Europe. The pope did 
not encourage chauvinist nationalism or political nationalism. The central instrument 
in this quest was supposed to be culture rather than politics. In other words, the pope 
wanted to put ethnicity into the service of Catholicism.  
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The new pope did not abandon completely the conciliatory approach maintained 
by the two previous popes and continued to acknowledge the communist 
governments as legal representatives of the socialist states; the diplomatic 
negotiations with the Czechoslovak state went on as before. The pope, however, no 
longer saw these governments as the sole representatives of their nations. He also 
began to talk about those groups of Catholics which were excluded from the socialist 
patriotic project as ‘true’ representatives of the nation.’ As he told Vatican-accredited 
diplomats shortly after his election, the Church ‘remained open to every country and 
regime, in keeping with proven means of diplomacy and negotiation.’ However, he 
suggested that these were not the exclusive-- and what is more, not the ‘authentic 
representatives of nations.’ At the meeting with diplomats, the pope recalled 
spokesmen for ‘governments, regimes, and political structures’ but he also spoke 
about ‘authentic representatives of peoples and nations’ on the other.341 Who these 
authentic representatives were became clear in his new approach to émigrés and 
underground communities, especially in that he actively sought to involve these 
groups in the construction of a nationalised culture.  
Pope John Paul II would promote these thoughts at different occasions during 
his numerous visits to European countries. For East European Catholic audiences, 
the most powerful were John Paul II’s visits to Poland in 1979, 1983, and 1987. 
Some of the goals implicit in the papal vision had already been reached – albeit to 
different extent – by Catholic Churches across the region. The papal vision had 
different implications for individual Churches in the ‘Catholic’ countries of Eastern and 
South-Eastern Europe, depending on how much they were able to capitalise on the 
post-Stalinist thaw. For Poland this was a mere description of the current situation. 
For Croatia, it was an encouragement to engage with other religions and other 
nations. In Czechoslovakia’s case, it meant laying the groundwork – helping the 
Church hierarchy to become a national authority, to become independent from the 
state and to turn towards society. The pope effectively sent the message that if they 
considered the Catholic Church as the central source of their identity, national or 
otherwise, the socialist patriotic understanding of the Church was discriminating 
against them as Catholics; seeing as that for the pope, Catholic and national identity 
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were united, the socialist ‘discrimination’ was also a national discrimination. In other 
words, according to the pope, they deserved to be part of the nation as Catholics, 
and not solely as ‘Slovaks’; the Church was to be imagined as part of the nation.   
For the Church in Czechoslovakia, the most important part of this new papal 
policy was the support of a hierarchical Church and abolishment of political 
involvement of clergy. The major blow the Vatican dealt to the Czechoslovak 
authorities was the issuing of the papal decree Quidam Episcopi, according to which 
the priesthood was incompatible with engagement in organisations openly identifying 
with political ideologies. This document effectively outlawed Czechoslovakia’s Pacem 
in Terris priest association.342 At the same time the document was intended to 
enhance the authority of the traditional hierarchy and encourage participation of the 
laity. John Paul II supported lay movements, especially those which were known for 
their loyalty to the papacy, as was the case of Slovakia’s Lay Apostolate, the leading 
lay Catholic movement. In fact, this pope had been crucial for the emergence of the 
Slovak underground Church.343 The 1983 journey of the Slovak Catholic laity to the 
pope’s visit to Poland – which was vital to the self-confidence of the underground 
Church – did not happen solely on their own initiative. During his 1983 visit to Poland 
John Paul II ‘invited’ Vladimír Jukl and Silvester Krčméry to come to Poland.344 Later, 
in 1987 these laymen would be invited to the Bishops’ Synod held in Rome as 
representatives of the Slovak laity.345 The pope not only encouraged Catholics to 
become involved in the creation of nationalised culture, but he himself engaged 
personally in creating this culture, in a sense showing these actors how to do it.  
The pope also became personally involved in helping these segments of the 
Church in Czechoslovakia to become active creators of alternative nationalised public 
Catholic culture. He used various anniversaries to present the Catholic Church in 
Czechoslovakia as an integral part of the nation and its history. In 1984 the pope 
announced 1985 as the year of St. Methodius, calling on Catholics across the region 
to celebrate this anniversary under the leadership of their Churches as a central 
event in their nations’ histories. John Paul II proclaimed Cyril and Methodius as co-
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patrons of Europe in 1980.346 In 1985, a special encyclical letter about Cyril and 
Methodius, entitled Slavorum Apostoli (the Apostles of Slavs) followed at his 
issuance.347 The pope saw this mission as a Christianising one and as an exemplary 
case of ‘inculturation,’ that is, the integration of Christianity with non-Catholic 
Churches could become creators of nationalised culture.348 The pope used Cyril and 
Methodius to show how the Church could be made part of national  as well as more 
broadly European history, how its symbols could be turned into national and 
supranational symbols. The pope used Cyril and Methodius to mobilise Catholic 
Churches as active creators of Catholic nationalised culture in their countries.  
This anniversary was, of course, especially pertinent to Czechoslovakia, on 
whose territory Cyril and Methodius began their Christianising mission.349 The 
Methodian anniversary, as a celebration of the first Archbishop of Pannonia, was an 
opportunity to present the hierarchy as the central creators of nationalised public 
Catholic culture, and to emphasize that this creation should be done in cooperation 
with Rome. The pope held up the first Archbishop of Pannonia Methodius as an ideal 
for the Church hierarchy in Czechoslovakia. He spoke of Methodius’ assertive 
Church leadership and ‘willingness to suffer for the Church’ and to preserve the local 
Church’s unity with Rome.350 The pope emphasized the role of the papacy in the 
mission of Cyril and Methodius and in this case of enculturation of Christianity. Pope 
Hadrian allowed Cyril and Methodius to use the Slavonic language (an early Slavonic 
language) as a liturgical language. This permission to use Slavonic language, in the 
pope’s view, prepared the ground for building of the individual nations’ ‘national and 
cultural identity’.351 A couple of years before the anniversary, the pope had been 
sending signals to the Slovak hierarchy to assert themselves as active participants in 
creation of nationalised culture. In 1982 he sent a letter to Bishop Ján Pásztor of 
Nitra to celebrate 1,100 years from the establishment of the Nitra diocese, the oldest 
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diocese in Central Europe.352 At the time, as will be explained in the next paragraph, 
this papal initiative did not seem to reinforce the role of the hierarchy in the 
construction of a nationalised culture and enhance the position of the Catholic 
Church in relation to the official nationalised culture. However, it did mark the first 
time under Communism that the official Church in Slovakia attempted to imagine the 
Catholic Church as a part of the national narrative.  
The association of priests loyal to the state used the papal initiative to interpret 
papal thoughts to fit official national narrative, which cast the nationalised culture and 
its development as a secular phenomenon. In response to the letter, the Pacem in 
Terris association published a collection of materials and essays which did not 
present the Church as a constitutive element of the nationalised culture. Rather the 
contributions in the collection talked about Christianity as merely one of the factors 
contributing to development of secular nationalised culture. Christianity played a role 
mainly in the development of language.353 Nonetheless, this was the beginning of a 
broader involvement of these clergy in the creation of the nationalised culture. This 
construction would be distinctive in its attachment to state socialism and would not 
follow the papal call for greater engagement with nations. Nonetheless, as it would 
turn out during the next several years, the papal initiative would also encourage 
public mobilisation of the nationalised culture at the grassroots level. Moreover, the 
creators of official nationalised culture would also, if perhaps not intentionally, 
contribute to the construction of a nationalised public Catholic culture.  
3. The Methodian Year  
The main event which brought Catholic culture closer to the nationalising public 
culture and saw a variety of actors involved (directly or indirectly) in establishing the 
Catholic Church as an integral part of the nation was the year-long commemoration 
known as the Methodian year.354 In 1984 Pope John Paul II announced the beginning 
of the Methodian Year to commemorate the 1100th anniversary of the death of St. 
Methodius. Although the celebration of this year was intended by the pope as a 
common celebration of all Slavic nations, he focused especially on Czechoslovakia. 
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He planned to pay an official visit to Czechoslovakia to celebrate the ninth-century 
mission as a ‘Christianising’ mission.355 Official authorities in Czechoslovakia reacted 
by mobilising their ideological, cultural, and academic production (including its 
nationalising segment) to present a different, ‘secular’ understanding of Methodius 
and the whole early medieval period.356 The papal announcement also activated the 
Church in Czechoslovakia, both its official and unofficial factions. At the same time, 
bishop Julius Gábriš of the Trnava diocese was planning the year as preparation for 
a ‘consecration of the nation,’ which would be realised on the Methodian anniversary 
in July 1985.357 The underground communities also came up with a programme of 
‘national renewal’, which will be described in greater detail in the following pages. All 
of these initiatives and their authors would from now on play a role in the creation of a 
nationalised public Catholic culture. Some of them, the official authorities in 
particular, did not intend to create an alternative culture; however, they nonetheless 
did contribute to its creation, as will be analysed in the next section. Others, such as 
the underground community, were not initially interested in questions of the national 
past, an issue that would be at the core of this newly created culture. In the following 
section I will seek to analyse the various ways and the extent to which these agents 
contributed to representing the Church as an integral part of the nation.  
 These responses to the pope would crucially contribute to constructing the 
Church as an integral part of the nation and prepare the ground for a rise in the 
nationalised culture. First, in its response to the papal initiative the state rather 
unwittingly moved the Church closer to the centre of official national memory. It 
needs to be noted that this was done at a time when official ‘historical consciousness’ 
was becoming increasingly ethnicised. Second, the event saw public emergence of 
underground Church communities, which began to revive the construct of a ‘suffering 
Catholic nation’ through the revival of the Cult of the National Patroness, Our Lady of 
the Seven Sorrows. Following the initial papal impulse, these first parts of the 
nationalised culture emerged and evolved during encounters between different 
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groups: the official authorities, the official state-sponsored Catholic Church and, 
crucially, the underground Church which emerged in the 1980s. 
   
3. 1. Spiritual Cultural Nationalism  
The group in Slovakia which attempted to follow the pope most consistently was the 
underground Catholic community. Before I describe this community in greater detail, I 
will briefly state how this community reacted to the announcement of the Methodian 
year. In 1983 this community began preparation of a ‘national consecration’358 to the 
National Patroness, Our Lady of the Seven Sorrows. This initiative was an attempt to 
revive the ‘national’ character of the Our Lady of the Seven Sorrows popular 
devotion, to turn it from a diocesan pilgrimage to a national pilgrimage, and to elevate 
a local patron to a National Patroness. They also began to understand the Catholic 
Church as ‘suffering’ and the suffering of the Church as ‘the suffering of the nation.’ 
These Catholics revived the symbol of Our Lady of the Seven Sorrows as well as 
those national narratives which explained the history of the Slovak nation through the 
suffering of Our Lady of the Seven Sorrows, the pre-communist Catholic national 
narratives in particular. However, their identification with this nationalist Catholic 
understanding of the Catholic Church was not a result of links with pre-communist 
Catholicism. Indeed, they started off as a group focused on ‘spiritual renewal,’ with no 
special relationship to pre-communist Slovak nationalism. Support of individual and 
collective spiritual and moral development had been one of the constituting principles 
of the underground Church. This principle remained central even as the underground 
Church began to participate in pilgrimages. To better understand how and why this 
turn toward cultural nationalism took place, here follows a brief overview of the 
origins of these lay groups and their development in the 1970s.  
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 The origins of the underground Church date to the late 1940s and 1950, to the 
period when the Catholic Church in Slovakia was undergoing the harshest 
persecution by the communist state. The underground Church of the 1940s and 
1950s was led by secretly ordained Bishops and clergy.359 At the time the communist 
state had incarcerated most members of the Czechoslovak episcopate, and the 
Vatican decided to ordain these Bishops to make sure that the Church in 
Czechoslovakia would not be left without a hierarchy. Besides this hierarchy, the laity 
also played an important role in this underground community, which had been active 
in the pre-communist Catholic Action.360 The communist state banned Catholic 
associations, but many laymen and laywomen continued to meet in secret. Most of 
them were eventually detained and sentenced to long-term imprisonment. During the 
1960s these Catholics were released and assumed leading positions in the reform of 
the Church during the Prague Spring, focusing especially on de-politicisation of the 
Church.  
 With the end of the Prague Spring, these Catholics were forced back to the 
‘underground’, where they focused on expanding the underground Church among the 
Catholic laity.361 Silvester Krčméry and Vladimír Jukl, the lay leaders of the 
underground community, had done this primarily through forging personal 
relationships with students studying in Bratislava, who after returning to their home 
towns built up new communities. This entire mobilisation happened clandestinely, 
outside of the official Church. The Slovak underground Church developed a structure 
with many different branches or movements that offered Slovak Catholics of all ages 
and needs various activities and programs for the spiritual development they could 
not pursue in the official Catholic Church or in the public sphere more generally.362 
The community included the Lay Apostolate, the Fatima Movement, the Movement of 
Christian Families, the Focolare Movement, the Movement of Christian Youth 
Associations, as well as clandestinely organised communities of male religious 
orders (Salesians, Franciscans, Jesuits, etc.) and female religious orders. The 
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leaders of these movements estimated membership in the 1970s at around 2000 
members; by the 1980s this number had grown to 5000, making the underground 
Church the largest non-communist independent association in the country.363 By the 
mid-1970s the growing ‘underground Church’ organised meetings nationwide and its 
leaders began to think about public engagement of these communities.364 After 
‘minor work’ in secret in the 1970s, the goal of the underground Church in the 1980s, 
according to Jukl, became to ‘appeal to the masses.’365 
Towards the end of the 1970s, as the Catholic Churches in the wider region, 
particularly in Poland, were increasingly involved with their nations and began to 
make contacts with the independent associations, it was clear to the underground 
Catholics in Slovakia that the Czechoslovak state was not going to allow the 
emergence of alternative public cultures and that the Slovak Church hierarchy was 
not going to abandon its support for the state in this regard.366 This became clear 
after the emergence of Charter 77 in 1977. Encouraged by the fact that the 
Czechoslovak government had signed the Helsinki Accords, the final act of the 
Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe, which among other things 
stipulated a respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms, including the 
freedom of thought, conscience, religion, and belief, the Charter 77 movement began 
to monitor the observance of these rights by the Czechoslovak state and criticise any 
shortcomings.367 Inspired by the emergence of Charter 77, the underground Slovak 
Catholics attempted the first grassroots mobilisation of Catholics, focusing on 
religious rights. The lay leaders of underground Church communities, Jukl and 
Krčméry, composed a ‘memorandum’ criticising the current situation of the churches, 
especially the strict official control of their public activities and suppression of any 
activities which were not allowed by the state.368 In the late 1970s, they began to 
gather signatures in support of their memorandum.369 The memorandum turned out 
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to be a failure – some underground Church members rejected it as an ‘unnecessary 
provocation.’370 Jukl and Krčméry understood this rejection as a signal that the 
underground Church was not strong enough to mobilise on its own in public.371 Not 
only was the hierarchy unsupportive of independent Catholic mobilisation, but the 
underground Catholic leaders did not seem to have enough support within their own 
communities. However, at about the same time another event took place that would 
have major ramifications in Czechoslovakia and elsewhere: Karol Józef Wojtyła was 
elected pope – taking the name John Paul II. This election was crucial in encouraging 
wider segments of the underground Church to get involved in the public life of the 
official Church and to try to encourage the leaders of the official Church to weaken 
their links with the state and to support grassroots Catholic mobilisation.  
The main impulse for this activation of the underground Church was papal 
support of the Catholic hierarchy (exemplified especially in Quidam Episcopi and 
letters to the local hierarchy) as central leaders of the Church autonomous from the 
state on one hand and rejection of the current leading role of Pacem in Terris on the 
other. In the early 1980s, the underground Church leaders sent a letter to members 
of Pacem in Terris and to the Slovak episcopate (undated letter) in which they 
protested against Pacem in Terris (ZKD PiT), complaining that the current level and 
form of involvement of the Catholic Church in public life in Czechoslovakia was not 
satisfactory. They condemned the fact that the laity was not allowed to play any role 
in the public engagement of the Church.372 Clearly influenced by the pope and his 
understanding of national history, these laity assumed that since priests had been 
connected ‘…with their nations and their histories, with the society in which they 
live…It is therefore legitimate to ask whether their [public] work…addresses the real 
problems of society in which we live and reflects the responsibility we as Catholics 
have for its present and future.’373 They did not protest the PiT’s engagement for 
‘peace’ or for that matter the ‘building of the socialist system’, but the way this was 
done, especially the fact that its public involvement reflected the ideology of the ruling 
Communist Party rather than the current teachings of the Catholic Church.374 Peace, 
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they felt, could not be separated from justice (a respect for human rights), and it was 
‘fair’, according to these Catholics, that in its public life the Church should be free 
from the state. They also believed that not only PiT but also other segments of the 
Church should be involved in this public life and accordingly in the creation of 
nationalised culture. They felt that the current level of public engagement of the 
Catholic hierarchy and PiT did not sufficiently reflect ‘the needs of the faithful’ and 
more broadly the nation. The Church in their view was supposed to ‘bring the 
Christian spirit into societal thought, morals, laws, and the structure of society.’375 The 
papal call for mobilisation of the Catholic Church in Czechoslovakia during the 
Methodian year was seen by many of these underground Catholics as a call to 
engage in the life of the nation and in the creation of a nationalised culture in more 
active ways.  
They responded to the papal announcement of the Methodian year by 
mobilising in the spaces of the official Church with a programme which may be best 
defined as an instance of ‘spiritual’ cultural nationalism. On the day of the national 
pilgrimage in 1983, a group of pilgrims from the underground Lay Apostolate 
community distributed a leaflet encouraging pilgrims to see the event as a 
preparation for a ‘national consecration’ to Our Lady of the Seven Sorrows in 
preparation for celebration of the 1100th anniversary of the death of Methodius.376 
These underground Catholics in Slovakia used this consecration in 1983 to reinforce 
the public position of the official Church and to strengthen its attachment to the 
papacy and eventually also to the nation. They hoped that the ritual of consecration 
would be done by Pope John Paul II, during his (planned) visit to Czechoslovakia on 
the commemoration of the 1100th anniversary of the death of St. Methodius.377  
The central space for this programme was the national pilgrimage site 
dedicated to Our Lady of the Seven Sorrows in Šaštín. The authors of the 
programme used the fact that this pilgrimage site had not been monitored by officials, 
who, as mentioned earlier in this chapter, saw pilgrimages as harmless in the sense 
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that they did not expect that they could become spaces of wider mobilisation.378 But 
their choice of Our Lady of the Seven Sorrows, of Marian popular devotion, was also 
determined by the popularity of Marian devotion in the underground community. The 
first major samizdat journal in Slovakia, Náboženstvo a Súčasnosť, was devoted to 
Our Lady of the Seven Sorrows.379 Marian devotion was central to the spirituality of 
the leading group in the underground community, the Secular Institute of Fatima 
(named after the alleged apparition of the Virgin Mary in the Portuguese village of 
Fatima). These Catholics believed that popular Marian devotion could be effectively 
used for public mobilisation of Catholics. They also saw Marian devotion as a 
potentially unifying culture because of its mobilising role throughout Slovak history.380 
However, in their use of this symbol they did not look back to pre-communist political 
nationalist uses of the symbol of Our Lady of the Seven Sorrows. Overall, at this 
point, their choice of this official National Patroness stemmed from their focus on 
spirituality rather than on Slovak nationalism. They did not seek to imagine Our Lady 
of the Seven Sorrows as a symbol of national political autonomy. Rather, the main 
goal for these underground Catholics was to imagine the Church as being related to 
the nation. Even though Our Lady of the Seven Sorrows was at the centre of the 
programme of national consecration, the underground Catholics intended to include 
other Marian pilgrimage sites as well and to turn these pilgrimages into an integrated 
system of public mobilisation. It was the ambition of these activists to spread this 
programme to other pilgrimage sites in Slovakia, such as Marianka, Levoča, 
Gaboltov, or Staré Hory. Interestingly, except for Šaštín these sites had no special 
meaning in the history of nationalised culture and Catholic nationalism. The 
underground community was clearly driven by the desire to gain a mass following 
rather than mobilise beyond a distinctively Slovak Catholic public culture. The 
underground Church’s use was dissimilar from its pre-communist uses and from its 
use by pre-communist political nationalists in several other respects.  
At this point these new ‘underground’ Catholics did not associate Our Lady of 
the Seven Sorrows, as the pre-communist nationalists had, with a narrative of Slovak 
history which saw ‘suffering’ and oppression by various enemies as being the central 
state of the Slovak nation. These Catholics protested against the current position of 
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the Church, but at the beginning of their programme they did not associate the 
communist state, as the Polish Church had done, with historical national ‘enemies.’ 
Indeed, even if they talked about pre-communist Catholicism and the interwar 
construction of Our Lady of the Seven Sorrows as the National Patroness, they did 
not pay attention to interwar Catholic nationalism. Samizdat journals reproduced the 
papal decree from 1927, by which Pope Pius XI elevated the devotional formula of 
Mary, Our Lady of the Seven Sorrows, to the status of National Patroness of the 
Slovaks,381 but they did not draw any further parallels between the situation of the 
Church during the interwar period and now. In short, they did not draw any discursive 
parallels between secularisation during the interwar period and during communism 
and between the ‘suffering’ of the Church and the ‘suffering’ of the nation, as the pre-
communist nationalists had done. This identification with the nation would appear 
during the Methodian year as a result of their encounter with official cultural 
nationalism, which defined the Slovak nation and its identity against ethnic others. 
However, at this point, their main aim was to Catholicize the nation rather than to 
Slovakize the nation.  
 These Catholics sought to respond to the pope, but they seemed to have 
understood his message primarily as a moral one. Central to the national 
consecration programme was a ‘prayer of national consecration,’ and the 
underground Catholics envisioned that this prayer would be created by Slovak 
Catholics during the Methodian year and then used in ceremonial national 
consecration. The first draft of the consecratory prayer was published in the major 
samizdat journal NaS. The central idea of the prayer was to encourage moral self-
reflection. ‘We got into this situation through our own sins, due to our own character 
flaws...: inclination towards disunity…envy, greed, lack of courage, and servility 
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towards those in power.’382 The authors of the prayer encouraged Slovak Catholics to 
edit the prayer but emphasized that the prayer should address the ‘character flaws of 
the Slovak nation.’383 At this point, their programme emerged in isolation from official 
nationalised culture and was pre-occupied with renewal of the structures of the 
Church and the moral character of the nation. The underground Church assumed 
that the nation and the Church were unified, but they did not seek to explore their 
Slovak ethnic identity. 
The underground Catholics claimed that they were inspired by the Polish 
consecratory prayer written by Polish Primate Cardinal Stefan Wyszyńsky in 1956. 
The underground Church disagreed with the regime-supported patriotic Church and 
looked instead to the ‘unified’ and assertive Polish Church. But unlike the Polish 
Church these Catholics in Slovakia did not develop a narrative similar to the Polish 
national Catholic narrative. True, the clerical leader of the secret Church, bishop 
Korec, presented the Cyrilomethodian mission as the ‘baptism of the Slovak nation’ 
but he did not develop this idea any further.384 Two important events changed this 
situation and reinforced the ethnic identification of the underground Church. Both 
came from the ‘official sphere.’ First, at a 1984 pilgrimage to Šaštín bishop Gábriš 
gave a sermon which fused the past and the present situation of the Catholic Church 
with the story of ethno-genesis of the Slovak nation. Second, during the pilgrimage to 
Velehrad, which was organised by the patriotic Church and official authorities, the 
official authorities identified the Cyrilomethodian mission as an important part of 
official historical narrative. In doing so they made the Cyrilomethodian mission a part 
of the public discourse, which was being increasingly ethnicised, i.e. centred around 
the question of Slovak ethnogenesis.   
3.2. Official Catholic Nationalism  
Bishop Július Gábriš of the Trnava diocese planned to use the Methodian year as a 
preparation for consecration to Our Lady of the Seven Sorrows. The act of 
consecration would be done on the feast of Cyril and Methodius in July 1985. On 16 
September 1984, Gábriš addressed a congregation of more than 50,000 (mainly) 
young people, describing, as he saw it, the ‘vital’ role of Marian devotion in the past, 
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present and future of the Slovak nation.385 According to the bishop ‘Christianity gave 
birth to our nation...[and] the Marian Cult allowed for happy historical evolution...’386 
Therefore, he told the audience, ‘We are a Marian nation!’ He then went on to 
present the fate of the Slovak nation as being closely interrelated with the fate of the 
Catholic Church. According to Gábriš, Marian devotion grew during times when ‘our 
people were endangered,’ whether the ‘threat’ was the fall of the first common state 
of Great Moravia, the Tatar or Turkish invasions, the Reformation or Magyarisation. 
‘Our nation’, the bishop claimed, ‘survived the harsh times and was saved only 
because it has relied on Marian devotion.’ The bishop also hinted that the Slovak 
nation was now again endangered. This state of the nation, according to the bishop, 
was reflected in the increasing popularity of Marian devotion with the Slovak 
nation.387 This was not far from the official interpretation, in which the focus was on 
Marianism as a basis for cooperation between the Latin and Orthodox Churches and 
which was central for the socialist understanding of cooperation between Christian 
Churches.388  
For bishop Gábriš, Slovak distinctiveness had been forged by Christianity, and 
vice versa, since the very beginning of Slovak history. He claimed that the ‘Slovak 
nation had become the owner of the devotion’ since the fall of Great Moravia. This 
self-perception echoed that of the Polish nation as ‘Christ among European nations.’ 
This Slovak claim to main cultural primacy of Slovaks in the region, as presented by 
Gábriš, was informed primarily by religious identity. This self-perception was 
constructed against the Hungarians as the main other. Following the myth of Slovak 
cultural superiority to the Hungarians, perpetuated also in the official nationalist 
history, Gábriš claimed that the Slovaks converted the Hungarians thanks to Marian 
devotion. The Hungarians, Gábriš maintained, had not initially had much ‘religious 
sense and religious potential.’389 He claimed that the Slovak nation was instrumental 
in the Christianisation of Hungarians and more specifically in the first consecration of 
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Hungary to the Virgin Mary by the first Hungarian King, St. Stephen; this was the only 
way that consecration could be explained.390  
In some respects, the bishop followed the papal call for hierarchies to engage in 
the public revival of nationalised culture, but in several important respects, he did not 
follow the papal interpretation of national histories. For example, Gábriš did not give 
any special role to the Vatican in this narrative, as emphasized by John Paul II. Nor 
did he place the Slovak nation within the broader programme of European unification, 
the key motivation behind the papal interpretation. The sermon was nonetheless 
popular even among the underground Catholics, who strongly pushed for loyalty to 
the papacy in the Church.391 This sermon was embraced by these Slovak Catholics 
as the authentic history of the Slovak nation and became central to their 
understanding of the current situation of the Slovak Church, for their construction of 
national Catholic narrative, and ultimately for their creation of a nationalised public 
Catholic culture. For underground Catholics this was the first time the Church had 
been placed into the broader narrative of Slovak history. From this point on these 
Catholics began to reproduce this national Catholic narrative as an important part of 
their involvement with the official nationalised culture.392 This identification of 
underground Catholics of the Catholic Church with the Slovak nation through 
suffering was unwittingly supported by the official authorities.  
3.3. Methodius as Part of Official ‘Historical Consciousness’   
The reaction of Czechoslovak official authorities to the Methodian anniversary 
revealed that they were not willing to allow the Catholic Church to become an 
independent co-creator of an official nationalised culture, not to mention present an 
alternative understanding of the nationalised culture. The official authorities reacted 
to this activisation of Catholics in Slovakia by placing the Cyrilomethodian past into 
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the template provided by their histories of Great Moravia.393 The official authorities 
rejected ‘faith’ as the central element of the Cyrilomethodian legacy and instead 
located Cyril and Methodius in the narrative of Czechoslovak history which 
emphasized political development and presented culture as a secular phenomenon. 
Thus, Cyril and Methodius were placed within the narrative of Great Moravia as the 
first state of the Czechs and Slovaks and presented as ‘harbingers of peace’ and 
authors of the first Slavic script. More generally, official authorities refused the notion 
that religion could play a central role in the creation of culture in the past or in the 
present. However, in giving even this much attention to the Catholic Church, they 
helped it to assume a privileged position within the consistently secular ‘historical 
consciousness.’ Indeed, by the mid-1980s Cyril and Methodius did not play any role 
in official collective memory. As will be developed later in this section, in reaction to 
the Methodian anniversary the Czechoslovak official authorities began to integrate 
the ‘Cyrilomethodian’ tradition into state-socialist official memory officially referred to 
as ‘historical consciousness.’  
The Central Committee of the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia charged 
the Ministry of Education to instruct teachers to emphasize the official reading of the 
anniversary; the Czechoslovak and Slovak Academies of Science were charged to 
organize a conference and an exhibition on the beginnings of Czechoslovak 
statehood in Great Moravia; the Section for Propaganda and Agitation secured 
publication of materials ‘unmasking the goals of clericalism,’ and major media aired 
documentaries and discussions presenting the official version.394 Official authorities 
decided to co-organise the first public commemoration of Cyril and Methodius 
together with the Catholic Church, the first such commemoration since 1948,395 and 
they also made sure to involve the official Church in these celebrations. First, several 
Catholic publications related to the topic presented a patriotic Catholic understanding 
of the celebration of the Methodian anniversary.396 Bishops and Ordinaries (interim 
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administrators of vacant bishoprics) issued a pastoral letter on the occasion.397 The 
topic was also covered in Pacem in Terris, the controlled major Catholic paper 
Katolícke Noviny [Catholic News], and Duchovný Pastier [Spiritual Sheppard], a 
journal for priests.398 The commemoration at Velehrad was being prepared by the 
socialist state in conjunction with the official Catholic Church, especially from patriotic 
clergy openly loyal to the state. This event, officially referred to as a ‘peace 
gathering,’ was intended to make clear that as far as the nationalised culture was 
concerned, the Church was subordinated to the socialist state.  
 Official authorities took great care not to allow the pope to become directly 
involved in the organisation of a strong public nationalised Catholic event in 
Czechoslovakia. The pope was not invited to Czechoslovakia. In fact, since the early 
1980s all the initiatives of the pope had been presented as part of ‘anti-communist 
imperialism.’ With the end of deténte, i.e. the end of a period of general easing of 
geo-political tensions between the United States and the Soviet Union, the 
Czechoslovak state returned to its anti-Western rhetoric and saw any initiatives 
coming from ‘the West’ as part of a Western ‘anti-communist conspiracy.’ The 
Czechoslovak authorities linked any Western activities, especially those increasing 
Western pressure on communist authorities to observe basic human rights, as 
manifestations of Western imperialism and a legacy of Western fascism.399 Soon 
after the election of John Paul II, the Communists began to see the Vatican as part of 
this ‘conspiracy’. A 1982 Czechoslovak Pravda article condemned John Paul II, 
together with the Polish Cardinal Wyszyński, as fascists and Nazi collaborators 
during World War II.400 By mid-1985, the official authorities saw the émigrés and the 
underground Church communities in Slovakia as part of this campaign.401 In their 
response to the Methodian year, they therefore focused on preventing these new 
forces from coming into the open and influencing the official Church and more 
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broadly the public culture in Czechoslovakia. In doing so, they rejected the papal self-
presentation of such initiatives as purely cultural – they insisted that his 
understanding of religion was not progressive, that it was deeply political and directed 
against communist countries.  
Official authorities sought to present Cyril and Methodius as part of the secular 
national narrative. For the Czechoslovak state, the main event from the medieval 
past was the establishment of Great Moravia, now considered to be the first common 
state of the Czechs and Slovaks and a predecessor of the current federation. During 
the Methodian anniversary, official authorities sought to ‘purify’ the Cyrilomethodian 
tradition ‘from pseudo-historical and un-scientific sediments, prominent among which 
were’ according to the official authorities ‘clerical misinterpretations.’402 As a 
guidebook published for Socialist Academy instructors stated, ‘the clerical recourse to 
Cyrilomethodian traditions are too often connected with open or hidden provocations 
against the socialist state, misinterpreting laws and constitutional principles in the 
matter of its relation to Churches and religious people.’403 On the pages of the 
leading cultural-political monthly Nove Slovo, widely considered as the platform 
where the views of General Secretary Gustáv Husák were presented, the task was 
defined more positively as an attempt to ‘organically integrate this anniversary into 
the history of cultural-political and statehood-making efforts of the predecessors of 
our nations.’404 It was fitting that in August 1984, shortly after the commencement of 
the Methodian year, the Czechoslovak state celebrated the 40th anniversary of the 
anti-fascist Slovak National Uprising, the key event of late socialist public Slovak 
‘historical consciousness’ and national consciousness.405  
During the Methodian year Cyril and Methodius began to be integrated into an 
increasingly Slovakized understanding of the past. The Methodian year saw the first 
public emergence of a nationalising trend within the field of ‘historical consciousness’ 
in Czechoslovakia.406 This was also the first time that these cultural elites attempted 
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to integrate Cyril and Methodius into a narrative of the development of Slovak 
statehood and of Slovak ethnogenesis. The increasingly nationalist Slovak cultural 
elites used the opportunity to make their current understanding of Slovak national 
consciousness and culture public. Michal Pullmann’s observation about the dynamic 
within the field of authoritative discourse during late socialism also seems valid for 
‘historical consciousness’ in Czechoslovakia. If people used ideological terminology 
(the ideology of ‘developed’ or ‘real’ socialism) to support their views and thus 
publically confirmed ‘their adherence to the ideals of a happy and de-politicised 
society, then they could count on gaining a new space for realisation of various (non-
conformist even) needs and interests.’407 Cyril and Methodius thus remained secular 
in the interpretation of most Slovak nationalist cultural elites.408 However, some 
Slovak cultural elites went even further, explicitly integrating ‘Christianisation’ into the 
official narrative of Slovak ethnogenesis.  
The first official press organ to emphasize the Christianising aspect of the 
mission as part of public history was the major weekly Nové Slovo.409 This 
understanding of Cyril and Methodius was, in fact, promoted by Husák’s ‘court 
historian’410 Vladimír Plevza, the head of the Institute of Marxism-Leninism. Plevza 
was the first leading official figure to claim that Cyril and Methodius contributed to the 
construction of culture not only in terms of development of secular culture but also in 
initiating the ‘great work of Christianisation’ on Czechoslovak territory. In a similar 
vein, Marián Skladaný, a leading philosopher, historian, and author at Nové Slovo, 
maintained that ‘---it cannot be claimed that the importance [of the mission of Cyril 
and Methodius] was reserved to education and a cultural-political mission…that 
Christianisation was not the central aspect of their mission…that the brothers of 
Salonika did not bring to Great Moravia ‘Scripture’ but first of all [only] ‘script.’ Such a 
claim is ahistorical…it conflates the meaning of the historical event with its historical 
interpretation.’411 Similarly, leading archaeologist Jozef Vladár argued that those 
research results which clearly show the importance of the Christianising aspect of the 
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Cyrilomethodian mission should be taken into account in construction of the official 
narrative.412 As they emphasized, the Cyrilomethodian mission needed to be 
understood in the broader context of Slovak ethnogenesis and development of 
Slovak statehood. Later that year, Matica Slovenská published texts which made 
direct links between religion and national emancipation. Among others, the collection 
included the founding memorandum of Matica, which read (and was quoted in 
samizdat), ‘to the nation which by the acceptance and spread of Christianity 1000 
years ago had come into existence.’413 In post-socialist Slovakia these ideas about 
Slovak culture would play a crucial role in the mobilisation of nationalised public 
Catholic culture in support of Slovak political autonomy. Going back to the mid-
1980s, this change in official ‘historical consciousness’ was noticed by underground 
Catholics who had just began to get involved in construction of a nationalised culture. 
As will be explored in the next section, for these Catholics this was another 
opportunity to understand Catholic symbols as part of national history and in relation 
to Slovak ethnogensis and the development of Slovak statehood.   
3.4. The Making of a ‘Suffering’ Catholic Nation  
By the mid-1980s, many underground Catholics were beginning to understand their 
own mobilisation as part of a new nationwide religious movement in which the 
Church was a creator of a new nationalised public Catholic culture. On one hand, this 
was a product of the authoritative rejection of the ‘patriotic Church’ by the pope, 
which had convinced many to question the official narratives that had dominated the 
official culture since the Prague Spring. On the other hand, it was the product of a 
mass Catholic revival which had also been promoted by the socialist state to renew 
the nationalised public Catholic identity of Catholics on official patriotic terms. 
However, quite contrary to the official plans, this authorized construction of national 
identity created space for new oppositional discourses around nation and Church to 
emerge, which were to lead to confrontation with the socialist state.  
As I will eleborate in the following pages, the officially organised 
commemoration at Velehrad in particular was experienced as a confrontation 
between the Catholic Church and the communist state, and the very fact that 
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underground Catholics experienced this anniversary as a face-off between the 
Catholic and the communist interpretation was because the main event was 
organised by the state as both a secular and a Catholic ritual. In reacting against the 
state’s socialist understanding, which downplayed the religious significance of the 
event, these Catholics were mobilised by the papal vision of the early medieval past. 
In effect, the late socialist state prepared the ground for the assertion of the 
Cyrilomethodian mission as a Catholic symbol. Reaction against state policies was 
an important part of the Methodian year, but it was also the first time when such 
protests were allowed to take place. Furthermore, thanks to the involvement of a 
growing band of religious nationalists, these Catholics began to think not only about 
Catholic distinctiveness but also about Slovak distinctiveness. Radio Vatican leaked 
official instructions issued by the Party with the intention to ‘limit or minimize the 
effects of actions realized abroad and by the Catholic Church in Czechoslovakia,’414 a 
document which energised many to come to Velehrad and encouraged them to see 
the demonstration as misinterpreting the one ‘true’ Christian interpretation.415 The 
confrontational nature of this exchange was further intensified by the increasingly 
assertive leader of the Catholic Church in the Czech Lands, Arcbishop of Prague 
Cardinal František Tomášek. Tomášek, who was very much supported by many 
Czech and Slovak Catholics, sent a letter to Tribúna in reaction to an article 
published by the weekly earlier that year which rejected Christianity (i.e. its non-
socialist interpretation) as a positive force in Czechoslovak history. The letter was 
duly aired by Voice of America.416  
 The commemoration at Velehrad saw the ‘first open mass public protest 
against Church policies.’417 A group of about 5000 laypersons from Catholic lay 
fellowships in Slovakia came to the pilgrimage site in Velehrad the day before the 
main celebration. The Slovak underground Church leaders had arranged for them to 
be ‘invited’ by ‘young Moravian Catholics’ to ‘pray for the unity of the Church, for the 
pope, for bishops…but most of all for the young people of our nations so that we 
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would…carry our faith into the third millennium.’418 The underground and the official 
estimates of the turnout at the commemoration differ. According to official figures, up 
to 60% of approximately 100,000 pilgrims at Velehrad in 1985 were young people,419 
while the underground Church estimated about 300,000 thousand pilgrims, two-thirds 
from Slovakia. No matter which of these estimates is closer to the truth, the 
pilgrimage at Velehrad was the first mass gathering during the normalisation era that 
was not organised solely by the Communist Party.  
During the commemoration a small group began to protest against religious 
policies, shouting the slogans ‘We want Bishops’ and ‘We want religious freedom.’420 
According to several witnesses, the chants were started by the Czech or Moravian 
part of the audience, with the Slovaks joining in later.421 Jukl stated that the original 
intention of the underground Church’s leadership was to manifest ‘faith and fidelity to 
the pope’422 by the large attendence and a programme of prayer, meditation, and 
singing, and thus the open demonstrations for religious freedom started by young 
members was a ‘pleasant surprise’ to the older leaders of the underground 
Church.423 As mentioned, Slovak Catholics had already mobilised before Velehrad at 
pilgrimages to Levoča, Gaboltov, and Šaštín as part of the Slovak programme of 
national consecration in preparation for the Methodian year.424 Pilgrimages in 1984 
had already seen demonstrations of discontent with the current religious policies. Yet 
the discontent at these pilgrimages was shown in a less manifest way, and dignitaries 
who professed greater loyalty to the current pope (such as Gábriš) were given long-
lasting applause after their sermons.425 Velehrad was understood by underground 
Church members as the beginning of a re-assertion of the Church as imagined by the 
pope, as an assertion of the Church as a creator of an autonomous nationalised 
public Catholic culture. 
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Several samizdat journals in Slovakia published an article by Czech Catholic 
dissident and signatory of Charter 77 Václav Benda, who wrote that Velehrad was a 
signal that ‘next time we will attack and…[they] (the party) will have to retreat.’426 The 
participation at the Velehrad pilgrimage was understood to be ‘proof that the 
Cyrilomethodian legacy lives on and wants to be active in the formation of nations 
which have a ‘Slavic soul’ and feel a responsibility to contribute to today’s civilisation 
and culture.’427 These Catholics clearly understood Cyril and Methodius as part of a 
newly emerging nationalised public Catholic culture. Following the pope, they thus 
understood this culture as being interrelated with religion. The samizdat reporter saw 
the event as a demonstration that ‘a new generation has come of age…the number 
of witnesses who take their faith seriously and are not afraid to step out 
from…anonymity is growing.’ According to this report, ‘Velehrad was proof that young 
people are coming to realise that…the 1100 years old legacy of faith is the greatest 
gift which our nations could ever get and which needs to be defended, maintained, 
and passed on to the next generation.’428   
Furthermore, from this time on, pilgrimages in Slovakia became a space where 
the insufficient involvement of the Church in the creation of nationalised culture and, 
relatedly, its incomplete nature was recalled repeatedly. At the same time this 
situation was understood within the broader context of Slovak history. The 
pilgrimages, the ways in which they were re-constructed in the Catholic samizdat 
related to this topic, made these expressions of ecclesiastical traditions formative for 
the underground Church’s identity. They were presented as something the papacy, 
the leading members of the hierarchy, and the engaged underground Catholics, 
especially the younger generation, stood for, thus helping to forge a unity between 
the Catholic and the national identity.  
These pilgrimages were a regular reminder of the persistence of the ‘patriotic 
Church’ being closely related to the state in its construction. Nonetheless, 
underground Catholics began to turn the pilgrimage site of Šaštín into the first public 
space where a nationalised public Catholic culture was created independently of the 
state. This happened at annual pilgrimages on the feast of Our Lady of the Seven 
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Sorrows, on 15 September. Underground Catholics started off the pilgrimage 
programme the night before the main pilgrimage Mass with an all-night event held at 
the basilica. On the next day they prepared a special programme that continued 
during the main Mass service. They prayed for ‘the loyalty of Slovak priests to Rome’ 
and ‘the people to the Holy Father.’429 The youth also – very symbolically – 
responded to the official authorities’ resolute ‘no’ to a papal visit in Czechoslovakia. 
Gathered around the altar they held up portrait of John Paul II with a large letter M for 
Mary (The Church secretary interpreted this as an M for Mládež, or youth in 
Slovak).430 The papal personal motto Totus Tuus was written underneath. The 
response to this was a long-lasting chant ‘Long live the Holy Father.’ The portrait was 
held up for almost the whole two days of the national pilgrimage, right in the centre of 
the national shrine. There were also banners reading ‘Mary will never let us down,’ 
placing hope in the Catholic patron saint. During the main Mass service at the Šaštín 
pilgrimage in 1985, youth from underground communities entered the national shrine 
in procession, carrying Vatican and Marian flags. As Bishop Gábriš entered with the 
procession, the shrine sounded out with applause and chants ‘Long live Father 
Bishop,’ but again in conjunction with ‘Long live the holy Father.’431 In general, all 
manifestations of Marian devotion were done with a reference to Pope John Paul II, 
who was not only the most popular, but also the most unifying symbol across the 
various segments of the Church in Slovakia. The underground Church saw helping to 
unify the Church in Slovakia under the leadership of the papacy as its mission.432 
Various demonstrations of loyalty to Pope John Paul II and to the Vatican were an 
important way of protesting against the patriotic vision of Catholic Church laid out in 
Pacem in Terris. The pilgrims chanted only the names of those dignitaries who 
openly declared loyalty to the pope.433 The Slovak Papal Anthem was the single most 
frequent song sung at pilgrimages, and it was always followed by applause.434  
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At the pilgrimages the underground Church demanded greater institutional 
freedom for the Church and greater space for Catholics in the public sphere. During 
all-night programmes they demanded that the state allow ordination of new Bishops 
for vacant bishoprics (three out of six bishoprics were vacant).435 They also protested 
the state’s ban on religious orders; there was a group of young secretly ordained 
Franciscans, who were, according to the state, illegal since the Catholic order had 
been prohibited to receive novices since the 1950s.436 Indeed, some of its secret 
members had even been imprisoned in 1983.437 This group of Franciscans appeared 
dressed in their habits in Velehrad and then again in Levoča and Šaštín. Showing 
their discontent with the priest association Pacem in Terris, a group of mothers 
appeared at the 1984 Šaštín pilgrimage and protested the expulsion of their sons 
from seminary in Bratislava after they refused to join the priest association Pacem in 
Terris.438 The Catholics continued to demand that the official authorities allow a visit 
by John Paul II.439  
In 1986 a campaign against the abortion code became their important new 
agenda, alongside the cause of institutional autonomy of the Church. The campaign 
was presented in terms which clearly showed an increased embeddedness of their 
cultural nationalism in the ethnic understanding of the nation. These Catholics wrote 
a letter to the Slovak National Assembly, in which they stated that they saw the 
proposed abortion code as an ‘abolition of legal protection of conceived life’ which 
‘will have a serious effect on societal relations, will lead to an even less responsible 
attitude to sexual life, will lead to a loss of respect for life…which will in future lead to 
the moral destruction of our national and state community.’440 Those who signed the 
letter were seen as people who ‘felt responsible for the future of the nation.’441 The 
letter was followed by 6518 signatures. They also demanded a referendum on the 
issue, clearly believing that the Catholic nation would vote against it.442 When the 
letter was presented at the Šaštín pilgrimage, the symbols were not simply those of 
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the Church (pope and Mary), but also those of Catholicity of the nation (the national 
symbol of a double cross). This issue dominated the all-night programme in Šaštín.443  
Official authorities tolerated these protests as long as the underground Church did 
not engage in open criticism of the state. In reports the protests were sometimes 
presented as manifestations of political clericalism, but pilgrimages were still not seen 
as a major threat.444 State officials were content that there was no spill-over into other 
spheres of society. According to the head of the Office of Religious Affairs, Vincent 
Máčovský, ‘religious circles had been here for a long time, but they do not have any 
serious impact on societal questions. When we issued the new law about ‘artificial 
interruption of pregnancy,’ the underground Church protested, but the law was 
passed without any disturbance…Indeed, the circles have been functioning for over 
thirty years, but they have failed to have any influence on the development of 
society.’445 For Máčovský these groups were harmless, because in his view, their 
main pre-occupation was merely the singing of songs at pilgrimages.446 This 
approach was not unjustified. Although underground Catholics had begun to shape a 
nationalised public Catholic culture which saw the Church as an integral part of the 
nation, their appeal to the broader society remained limited. Nevertheless, the 
Methodian year and the programme of national consecration increased the self-
confidence of the underground community and was at the beginning of its broader 
public functioning first within and later (in late 1980s) outside of the Catholic Church.  
The programme of national consecration spread outside of western Slovakia. 
In 1985, several rituals of national consecration were performed through the public 
reading of consecratory prayers at pilgrimages across Slovakia. While some 
consecration prayers were rather vague, referring to ‘difficult times’, others openly 
and directly demanded the clergy’s fidelity to the pope, the unity of the Church, and 
‘protection from the enemies of the Church.’447 The most critical prayer was said in 
1985 in Gaboltov, an increasingly popular pilgrimage site in eastern Slovakia. A 
prayer which was read to the congregation of more than 100,000 stated: ‘We promise 
that we will remain loyal to the Holy Father John Paul [II], united with him, [and with 
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those] bishops and priests, who are united with him and that we will create a barrier 
against the decomposing misuse of the Magisterium of the Church [an allusion to 
Pacem in Terris], which threatens the very foundations of the Church’448 and asking 
for courage to ‘avoid all compromises with this world and enemies of our holy 
Church.’449 The programme of national consecration was thus embraced by 
participants at both newer and older pilgrimages.   
The leading underground journal saw these consecrations and the pilgrimages as 
expressions of a ‘nation that wishes to consecrate itself to the Virgin Mary.’ Based on 
these prayers, they believed that consecration has become the ‘desire of the 
nation.’450 Although the secret Church was conscious of the fact that none of these 
pilgrimages could be truly nationwide, they were convinced that they were ‘national.’ 
They were also able to maintain this attitude because they could ascribe any failures 
to poor co-operation on the part of the official Church, rather than lack of interest of 
the nation. The major samizdat journal, NaS, blamed the poor participation on poor 
organisation on the side of the official Church and ascribed responsibility especially 
to patriotic priests at ZKD PiT, which controlled all official Catholic communication 
channels. A dignitary who could consecrate the nation (according to the Catholic 
tradition this could be done only by an archbishop or by the pope) was not available, 
as the Communist Party did not allow the former to be ordained and the latter to 
make an apostolic visit.451 In December 1985 the official Church eventually did 
prepare a consecration ritual, but to the Immaculate Conception, not to the national 
patroness (Our Lady of the Seven Sorrows). This consecration was criticized in the 
underground press as formal and disregarding of the official patroness saint.452 
Although underground Catholics may have seemed to be acting against the official 
understanding of religion’s place in culture and politics, it began unwittingly to engage 
in the official discourse. Rather than becoming a spring-board for broader 
engagement with society, as they had imagined it in the early 1980s, their 
engagement led to greater involvement with the state and building a new vision for 
the Church.  
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These experiences within the Church were continually informed by official, 
especially nationalist, official cultural production. This became clear especially in their 
involvement with official public memory. An author in a major samizdat journal 
(Náboženstvo a Súčasnosť), in an article entitled ‘Our Past,’ encouraged Slovaks to 
become engaged in the construction of a national historical narrative. He argued that 
‘We Catholic Christians in Slovakia must ask: ‘What was our past like, what has its 
influence been on our present, and what lessons can we derive from it for our future? 
The Holy Brothers from Thessaloniki brought us Holy Scripture. The question is what 
has happened to this blessed work on our territory? How have our predecessors 
managed to apply (this legacy) into their personal and societal life? In what sense 
has it changed the morality of our nation?’453 The focus of the author was clearly on 
the morality of the Slovak nation, but she already talked about ‘Our Past’ and the 
effects of the legacy on ‘our territory.’ They understood this past increasingly in ethnic 
terms, engaged in re-constructing the connection between the Church and the nation 
through reclaiming the ethnic dimension.    
3.5. Ethnicisation of the ‘Marian nation’   
As the underground Catholics constructed the ‘Marian nation,’ they were continually 
informed about the official ethnicisation of ‘historical consciousness’. Catholics 
reproduced parts of this official discourse in samizdat form. In doing so they prepared 
the ground for full identification with the ethnic understanding of Slovak statehood in 
the post-socialist period. In the late 1980s parts of this nationalist official discourse 
were presented at public pilgrimages. The Cyrilomethodian anniversary was one of 
the major moments when these new tendencies to ethnicise the idea of Slovak 
medieval statehood became apparent. The Catholic Church continued to be 
excluded from the official national narrative (Velehrad was an exception), but parts of 
this official narrative were instrumental in enabling these underground Catholics to 
see this ‘Marian nation’ as being a distinctly ‘Slovak nation.’ As will be explained in 
what follows, Catholics did not yet fully identify with the ethnicisation of statehood, i.e. 
with imagining statehood as part of the ethnogenesis of the nation. But they identified 
with the tendency to imagine a process of ethnogenesis as the main line of 
development of the Slovak nation.  
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 The clerical leader of the underground Church, Bishop Ján Ch. Korec, 
presented the Catholic Church in Slovakia as an integral part of the national history. 
As he said, ‘Our nation not only respects the Church, it loves her. We have been born 
through [the church] as a nation; she has sustained us through centuries even in the 
hardest of times. The Church talked to us in sermons and in ‘confessionaries’ in our 
own language; maintained schools for us; gave us universities in Trnava and Košice; 
her priests defended and led the nation and gave it literature….She gave us writers 
and poets…educated many literati. The nation lived in Christianity, Christianity lived 
in the nation…It is our task to remind young people that which is being muted – the 
existence of the nation from the moment of its birth during the Cyrilomethodian times 
through the Church and its Gospel. This consciousness needs to be spread and 
deepened. The Church is very closely related to the nation and the nation to the 
Church. And history cannot be changed or re-written.’454 This understanding of the 
role of the Church in the Slovak past resembled the Polish Catholic national Catholic 
narrative. But unlike the Polish Catholics, the underground Catholics in Slovakia did 
not construct this narrative from their own sources. They were largely inspired by the 
pope, but they also begin to draw on official nationalist public histories.  
After having been moved closer to the official collective memory (‘historical 
consciousness’) and at the same time assured of the Catholic distinctiveness in the 
relation to this consciousness, the underground Catholics got inspired by this official 
cultural production. Towards the end of 1985 and the beginning of 1986, the leading 
samizdat journal Rodinne Spolocenstvo published several lengthy accounts detailing 
the ‘good’ contributions made by the official historical discourse to the celebration of 
the Methodian year.455 They covered official literature, reports from exhibitions, TV 
series, radio broadcasts, and journal articles. This official construction was referred to 
as ‘the cultural harvest of the Methodian year.’456 A major review article was entitled 
‘What made us happy about [official production] during the Methodian year.’ The 
underground Catholics were also interested in the year’s official commemoration of 
Ján Hollý (see above).457 The samizdat studies drew on history and popular historical 
                                                          
454
 ‘35 rokov od biskupskej,’ NaS, 3(1986), 10-15; See also, ‘Pri šesťdesiatke Biskupa Korca’, Hlas 
Slovenska, 1(1988), 6-8.  
455
 ‘Čím nás v kultúrnej oblasti potešil Metodovský rok,’ RoS 4(1986), 20-4.; A.S. Radoslav, ‘Ešte k 
žatve Metodovskeho roku’, RoS 10/5(1986), 18-20; ‘Sv. Metod vo Filatelii’, RoS, 6(1986). 
456
 Radoslav, ‘Ešte k žatve,’ 18-20.  
457
 Čím nás v kultúrnej oblasti,’ 20-4.; ‘Holliáda’, RoS, 4(1985), 9. 
141 
 
accounts produced on this occasion.458 A pilgrimage to Šaštín was accompanied by a 
visit to the birthplace of Ján Hollý, which was also the site of official 
commemorations.459 Catholics noticed and appreciated the emphasis on figures of 
the 18th and 19th century national movement and identified with the official focus on 
the Slovak nation as a historical self-standing nation, and to an extent also on the 
understanding of Slovak history as a struggle against the Hungarians. As will be 
explained later, they did not show much interest in identifying against the Czechs, 
however.   
Official production was crucial in increasing the underground Church’s 
identification with an ethnic understanding of the Slovak nation. The central Catholic 
samizdat journal Náboženstvo a Súčasnosť published an exchange between Slovak 
and Moravian amateur historians in which they argued about who was first on the 
current Slovak territory and where the centre of Great Moravia was located.’460 The 
Slovak author drew widely on official nationalist sources and claimed that Slovaks 
were the first nation on the current Slovak territory, that it played the central role in 
the establishment of Great Moravia, and that this centre was in Nitra. Located in 
southern Slovakia, Nitra is claimed to be the centre of the Pribina chiefdom which 
predated Great Moravia. Nitra was imagined by interwar Catholic nationalists as the 
symbol of the ecclesiastical and political primacy of the Slovaks and therefore as 
evidence of the right of the Slovak nation to an independent Slovak state.461 In the 
1980s these thoughts were revived by official Slovak nationalist historians,462 and it 
was from these historians that the underground Church members now took 
inspiration. When Bishop Korec, the clerical leader of the underground community 
and the central ‘moral’ authority of early post-socialist Slovakia, began to write his 
history of the Catholic Church in Slovakia, he drew widely on these official sources. 
Bishop Ján Ch. Korec quoted extensively official historian Matúš Kučera, who was at 
the centre of the changes within ‘historical consciousness’ and who claimed that 
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Christianity formed a unity of thinking on which a new Europe was built after the 
demise of the ancient world.463  
The underground Church’s interpretations shared the conviction that the 
Cyrilomethodian mission made Slovaks distinctive among other nations; they claimed 
that they were one of the first Slavic nations to be baptised by Cyril and Methodius 
and they therefore had a central role in Christianisation of other nations.464 This 
assumption echoed the interpretation by Slovak Catholic émigrés based in Rome, 
who considered the Slovaks to be ‘direct heirs of this tradition.’465 The underground 
Catholics noticed the shift in official discourse that now included ‘Christianity’ as an 
important force in the ethnogenesis of the Slovak nation. In fact, they liberally 
borrowed from official histories of the 19th century national emancipation to assert 
the idea of the relationship between Catholicism and nation building. An author 
writing for the major samizdat Rodinné Spoločenstvo praised the contribution of the 
Romanticist poet Ján Hollý to the maintenance of Cyrilomethodian tradition and the 
fact that he anchored his ‘own national consciousness in the baptism of all the Slavic 
people occupying the territory of contemporary Slovakia’ and Hollý’s view that 
Christianisation and ‘Christianising’ mission were central to the ‘Cyrilomethodian 
legacy.’ 
The underground Slovak Catholics benefited from the changes in official 
memory, but they stopped short of identifying with the ethnicisation of statehood. The 
chief reason may have been that the idea of statehood was mobilised against the 
Church. An underground Church author criticized Romanticist Catholic nationalists 
for their attempts to merge Christianising narratives with those of statehood. She 
criticized this attempt to make the Cyrilomethodian mission part of the story of Slovak 
statehood, to reconcile the Cyrilomethodian myth and the Svätoplukian myth, as 
historically inaccurate.466 The reason she rejected Svätopluk was the fact that 
Svätopluk ousted the disciples of Cyril and Methodius from Great Moravia.467 Indeed, 
as the author stressed, Christianity rather than statehood was ‘the most significant 
unifying element of Slovaks, and the strongest motive for…a new national 
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tradition.’468 Another samizdat author sensed the attempts of nationalist Communists 
to imagine Slovak history as entirely independent from Czech history. The author, 
however, argued that such a step also meant the erasure of the Czech contribution to 
the Christianisation of Slovakia.469 Official ethnicisation was thus taken with restraint, 
because it did not consider religion as an important historical agent, but also because 
the underground Catholics were not interested in these questions: they were clearly 
not yet interested in the question of statehood in general. Until 1988 the current state 
of Czechoslovak federation and the role of Slovaks in this state were not even 
mentioned in samizdat publications.470 Czechoslovak identity was not particularly 
promoted in any of the events of the underground Church, but nor was it openly 
challenged. 
In the longer term, this new ethnic reading would exclude other groups from 
what was increasingly a Slovak national movement. It did not seem this way at first, 
however: Slovak distinctiveness did not initially seem to challenge identification with 
the Czechoslovak state. Czechoslovak statehood was not questioned in samizdat 
journals or at pilgrimages. More positively, the underground Catholics in Slovakia 
were connected to the Czechs in important ways. Both felt themselves to be 
members of one ‘persecuted’ Catholic Church. Czech Cardinal Tomášek471 enjoyed 
great authority among Slovaks,472 and the cooperation between the Slovak and the 
Czech secret Church leaders was, according to Czech historian Jaroslav Cuhra, ‘[i]n 
the whole spectrum of anti-regime resistance...one of the most intensive.’473 Yet there 
were many reasons why such alliances were weak and diminishing.  
Indeed, religious events became more and more Slovak in focus. Velehrad 
was, indeed, the last joint pilgrimage of Czechs, Moravians, and Slovaks. As the 
importance of religion in Slovak cultural life increased, so the divergent levels of 
religiosity in the two parts of the country increasingly came to define a cultural divide. 
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According to official government statistics released in the 1980s, 71.6% of children in 
Slovakia in 1984 were baptised compared with 31.2 percent in the Czech lands and 
Moravia.474 Even though the Catholic Church strengthened its authority during the 
communist regime, the interest of Czech Catholics in public gatherings, as Cuhra 
points out, was much lower than Slovak Catholics.475 Nonetheless, the underground 
Catholics understood themselves as building not simply a Catholic culture, but a 
Slovak Catholic culture. This became clear especially in their relation to Charter 77. 
The relationship of most Slovak Catholics to Charter 77 is perhaps best captured in 
one of the most popular samizdat texts of the mid-1980s, the interview with Bishop 
Korec conducted on the 35th anniversary of his appointment as Bishop.476 In it he 
said that although he respected the work of Charter 77, ‘Slovak history’ pre-
determined Slovak Catholics to focus more on religious national activism rather than 
‘purely human issues.’477 Additionally, Slovak Catholics did not keep in touch with the 
Hungarian dissent and Catholic communities.478 While the Hungarians were, 
according to Slovak underground activists, welcome at Slovak pilgrimages, the 
programme at pilgrimages was in Slovak and was thus limited to those Hungarians 
who could speak the Slovak language.479  
 Official production was also instrumental in supplying Catholics with nationalist 
songs which would become an important material for construction of Catholic national 
narrative. This was the case of the Church’s song ‘Bože čos ráčil’ (God, what thou 
hast given). Bože čos ráčil was written by Catholic nationalist priest Tichomir Milkin 
(pseudonym of Jan Donoval) together with the previously left out verses echoing 
interwar and wartime Catholic political nationalism. The text was written in 1917 as a 
Slovak replacement for the Hungarian nationalist ‘Anthem for the King,’ which had 
been sung in churches across Slovakia during the last decades of the Austro-
Hungarian Empire. Milkin’s song was written as an anticipation of Slovak national 
liberation, and later, during the interwar period, it would be used as call to arms in 
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support of Slovak autonomy. It presented freedom as a reward for ‘a thousand years 
of suppression’ by the Hungarian neighbour. The song was sung at the height of 
Catholic nationalism during the interwar and wartime period and became central to 
the repertoire of public nationalised public Catholic culture. It was sung at Catholic 
nationalist events, pilgrimages and commemorations, and at Mass services.480 As 
well as other Catholic authors, Milkin believed in the self-standing nature of the 
Slovak nation and saw it as his mission to protect this character. Similarly to the 
much better known Polish song ‘Boże coś Polske,’ written during the time of 
partitions, this Slovak hymn expressed a fusion of Catholic and national identity, 
asking for preservation of both ‘moral’ and territorial integrity and sovereignty. 481 
Reflecting the difference between Polish and Czechoslovak socialist patriotism and 
relatedly the strength of the Catholic Church vis a vis the state, by the late 1970s the 
full version of the Polish song would be sung regularly at church gatherings. In 
Slovakia this was not the case. Since the late socialist state considered itself the only 
author and creator of nationalised culture, those passages which referred to national 
autonomy were left out, and only those parts which referred to the past suffering of 
the Slovak nation remained. However, now in mid-1980s, the song was again 
allowed to be published in its original form.  
In 1985 the leading official publishing house Tatran published a full version of 
the song. The lyrics of the song now included the following verses:  
The murderers of our nation wanted to kill the Slovak nation  
And its sweet language  
Forcing the nation to die in the world catastrophe  
As their their endeavour vanished in smoke 
 
In the beautiful valleys of Subcarpathian lands 
The Slovak nation, the master, ploughs its lands  
From the Danube to the streams of Sajov  
  …. 
You, Lord, hath given us this land forever 
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In return for faithfulness  
Not for villainy murders  
 
Shortly after its official publication in 1985, the Rodinne Spolocenstvo samizdat 
journal published the full version of this Slovak church anthem. The song was 
presented in the samizdat journal as an evidence of the Catholic Church’s 
involvement in the nation’s development. From 1985 this song would be one of the 
central parts of the underground Catholic community’s cultural repertoire of public 
nationalised culture at pilgrimages to the Šaštín shrine of Our Lady of the Seven 
Sorrows. Illustrating the trajectory of the ethnicisation of the nationalised public 
Catholic culture, the text was first published in a major publishing house, was then 
reproduced in an underground samizdat journal, and the next year it would appear at 
pilgrimages.  
Conclusion  
This chapter started in the late 1960s, when nationalism gained new importance for 
the communist project in Eastern Europe as part of de-Stalinisation. At that time, the 
ground was prepared for the late socialist re-imagination of the Catholic Church as a 
national Church. Yet, whilst nationalism and a public nationalised culture became 
important for the re-invigoration of real socialism in this period, the Catholic Church 
as an institution was excluded from this project. The Communist Party-state 
remained the only nationwide system of national mobilisation. Within this nationalist 
culture individual Catholics had a role only to the extent to which they were deemed 
progressive, i.e. instrumental in developing the socialist Slovak nation. Within this 
vision the late socialist state contributed to the creation  of an independent 
ecclesiastical province but used this as a confirmation of its own national legitimacy. 
Only a select group of clergy and laity were allowed to speak in national terms – 
according to the rules of socialist patriotism – but nevertheless, many had access to 
its products and were influenced by them. In comparison to the Stalinist period, 
Catholicism was included into the national narrative on a much broader scale. Late 
socialist ‘national consciousness’ and ‘historical consciousness’ thus made nationality 
an important part of the real socialist universe – whilst at the same time restricting 
Catholics from accessing this realm as distinctly Slovak (i.e national) Catholics.  
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By the late 1970s a new cultural nationalism had emerged which challenged 
this subordinate position of the Church. John Paul II laid the foundation for activation 
of Catholics as independent of a nationalised public Catholic culture. John Paul II 
also came to be the major impulse behind these Catholics’ engagement at public 
pilgrimages and their deepening interest in history. The pope was instrumental in 
leading these Catholics to understand the limited role of Catholics in the construction 
of nationalised culture as a form of ‘suffering,’ and this ‘suffering’ into suffering for the 
nation and the suffering of the nation. Official state socialism responded to this 
initiative by seeking to build a Catholic nationalised culture based around ‘socialist 
patriotism.’ In doing so it in fact opened the door to, and provided space for, 
oppositional Catholics to anchor their essentially moral protest in historical narratives 
and symbols, which had been partly provided by the new religious production of the 
state. Catholicity, considered in its traditional terms, thus gained new relevance, 
anticipating the post-socialist role of the Catholic Church as a symbol of ‘national 
suffering’ under communism, and this milieu nourished some of the leading figures of 
the post-communism Church. From the mid-1980s, the underground Church began 
to build a more exclusively Slovak nationalised public Catholic culture. As it did so, it 
found increasingly common ground with the official communist nationalised culture 
and came to know its cultural production better and better. As we will see in the 
following chapter, in the late 1980s the mutual identification between these groups 
continued. These new alliances, which created a new mainstream Catholic 
nationalised culture around the idea of suffering, would then have significant 
consequences in the post-communist period. However, this did not mean that the 
cultural nationalism of the underground community in the 1980s became supportive 
of the Communist Party and its policies. Rather, as will be explored in the next 
chapter, over the last two years before the fall of state socialism this cultural 
nationalism became increasingly oriented towards civic dissent. Thus, despite their 
identification with aspects of emerging official Slovak nationalism, the underground 
Church did not fully turn away from its engagement with broader society, civic 
opposition, and collaboration with Czech Catholics. Over the next two years this 
increasingly civic orientation of the underground church would crucially influence their 
role in the shaping of nationalised public Catholic culture in Slovakia.  
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CHAPTER TWO 
A Divided ‘Marian Nation’ 
Nationalised Public Catholic Culture during Perestroika 
On 15 September 1989, the feast of the National Patroness Our Lady of Sorrows, the 
annual pilgrimage to the national shrine took place. At first glance, this last pilgrimage 
that occurred during state socialism may have appeared to be another manifestation 
of an increasingly visible Catholic culture, anticipating the political changes to come 
in less than two months. It was certainly the case that this pilgrimage had the highest 
turnout of pilgrims at Šaštín pilgrimage under Communism (around 10,000), coming 
from all across Slovakia, had the most well-organised programme yet, and on the 
night before the main service on Sunday, had not only one, but two parallel all-night 
programmes of songs, prayers, and lectures. The first, held inside the shrine, was 
organised by the official Church, while the other, organised by the underground 
communities, was held in the nearby park. The main Mass was presided over by the 
newly appointed archbishop of Trnava, Ján Sokol. It may appear that this 
unprecedented interest in this historically central symbol of nationalised public 
Catholic   culture was the result of the activities of increasingly assertive and unified 
segments of the Catholic Church. However, upon closer examination it becomes 
clear that this emergence of nationalised public Catholic   culture was due rather to 
much more complex developments that had been taking place over the last two 
years. These included changes in the positions of both the underground and the 
official Church vis-á -vis the state and society. These developments had a significant 
effect on the way the various segments of the Catholic Church shaped this Catholic 
culture, and on the meanings they ascribed to its symbols, collective memories, and 
events. Although these two groups were shaping this culture together in 1989, their 
individual contributions differed in important respects. This became clear in their 
approach to several developments which occurred in the late 1980s. The national 
pilgrimage occurred at the height of the semi-public discussion about a Czechoslovak 
constitutional reform. The limited concession to the reform programme of perestroika, 
started by the Soviet leader Mikhail Gorbachev, was made public in autumn 1988. 
Dissidents and other independent groups (including the underground Church) 
immediately noticed this change and began calling for the democratisation of the 
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public sphere. The official authorities, however, were not planning on giving more 
space to alternative voices in this reform. While seeking to suppress groups that had 
formed as independent from the state, they also tried to co-opt non-communist 
groups as supporters of the Communist state.  
By the time of the 1989 Šaštín pilgrimage, this division was also clear within 
the Catholic Church. The all-night programme organised by the official Church 
presented the Catholic national symbol of Our Lady of Sorrows as a symbol of 
‘national unity’ and the maintenance of the status quo as far as the current political 
system was concerned, while the programme organised by the underground 
community advocated change. Similar to the programmes organised over the last five 
years, the content of this year’s programme was not limited to spirituality but also 
addressed current issues and demanded change. This chapter explores how the 
nationalised public Catholic culture was shaped on the eve of the fall of state 
socialism. It observes that in the two years before the fall of state socialism, 
nationalised public Catholic   culture continued to be shaped by both the 
underground Catholic community as well as by the official Church sponsored by 
official authorities. Both these groups saw the Church as an integral part of the 
nation, but for different reasons. The central argument of this chapter is that 
nationalised culture was the product of both the underground Church's increasing 
focus on civic cultural nationalism, as well as the official nationalism that sought to 
preserve state socialism.  
This chapter further explores the powerful, nationalised public Catholic   
culture that continued to be shaped by these various groups in the mid-1980s. To 
understand how and why this culture developed in the latter years of state socialism, 
we need to read the histories of both the official and the Catholic nationalism 
together. It is assumed that by looking at Catholic mobilisation in this way, we can 
better understand the post-1989 restoration of the Catholic Church as the central 
symbol of national unity, identity, and autonomy. This chapter follows how this 
identification was reached through the complex development of two processes: the 
institutional and cultural reconstruction of the Catholic Church by future Catholic elite 
on the one hand, and the construction of the ethnic state and culture by the official 
cultural and political elites on the other. This integration was not simply a result of the 
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growing assertiveness of society, nor a sign of the diminishing influence of the state 
as is typically assumed by church historians.482  
The following analysis of the development of a nationalised public Catholic   
culture is divided into two parts. The first part of this chapter analyses the 
mobilisation of underground Catholics during the Marian year - roughly spanning the 
period from June 1987 to August 1988. This part addresses how and why 
underground Catholics continued to build nationalised public Catholic  culture as part 
of their mobilisation, and how the building of this culture was affected by certain 
changes in the character of Catholic mobilisation. It analyses how these Catholics 
strengthened their understanding of the Catholic Church as an integral part of their 
nation through the wider use of symbols, rituals, events, and the fusion of Catholic 
and nationalist memories. The shaping of this  culture was supported by the papacy 
and its continued encouragement of the bottom-up mobilisation through nationalised 
public Catholic  culture, the identification of underground Catholics with broader 
democratising currents, and, relatedly to, their new understanding of their 
mobilisation at pilgrimages as a value in itself (rather than simply an activity 
complementing the official Church). Nationalised public Catholic culture continued to 
be shaped as Catholics abandoned their narrow focus on winning greater rights for 
the Church and began to focus on campaigning for human rights. This trend, 
combined with the increasingly trans-national nature of Catholic mobilisation, was 
aided by the support of Catholics from outside Slovakia. At around the same time, 
nationalised public Catholic   culture began to be built by the official state-supported 
Church. In the second phase, the official authorities began to change the position of 
the Church vis a vis the state — Catholic symbols and collective memories were 
increasingly promoted as a symbol of national unity. This change occurred as part of 
the broader campaign to strengthen national official culture and was intended to 
strengthen the power of the state. Both the official authorities and official Church 
members presented it as an official initiative that brought together the state and the 
patriotic Church as the fulfilment of the country’s ‘Cyrilomethodian heritage’ 
interpreted in terms of close co-operation between church and state. A growing gulf 
began to emerge between those Catholics within the official Church who understood 
nationalised public Catholic culture as being related to the state, and those who 
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understood Catholic culture as being related to the nation through participation in 
civic society, in the sense promoted by the Second Vatican Council. We can only 
speculate how the shaping of nationalised public Catholic culture would have 
developed in this situation. In November 1989 state socialism fell.  
1. Catholic Mobilisation during the Marian year   
1.1. An impulse from the pope 
During 1987–88, nationalised public Catholic culture centred around Marian devotion 
was created by both the official Church and the underground communities.483 The 
initial impulse for this construction was the papal announcement of a Church-wide 
celebration of a special ‘Marian year’, which was to be inaugurated on 7 June 1987 
and completed on 15 August 1988.484 This year would be devoted to Mary, ‘Mother of 
God and Mother of the Church,’ and would mark the 2,000th anniversary of the birth 
of Mary. Similar to the Methodian year, the Marian year was intended to be a 
preparation for the 2,000th anniversary of the birth of Christ. In accounts written by 
underground Catholics, the Marian year is presented as the ‘resurrection of the 
Church’ and at the same time the culmination of the ‘national awakening’ of Catholics 
that was encouraged by John Paul II.485 In Slovakia, there was indeed an 
unprecedented increase in pilgrimages organised by both the official Church and the 
underground Church. The number of attendees grew and the network of pilgrimages 
was expanded. The result, however, was not the straightforward and unproblematic 
unification of the various segments of the Catholic Church on a national level. The 
rise of pilgrimages would be the result of various, often unintended, encounters 
between various strategies of national mobilisation, both by different Catholic 
groups—those within the hierarchy as well as those underground—and from other 
actors such as the Communist authorities.  
The papal intention for the Marian year was to encourage grassroots 
mobilisation. The theological and pastoral framework for the Marian year was created 
through two papal documents: John Paul II’s sixth encyclical Redemptoris Mater [The 
Mother of the Saviour], issued on 25 March 1987, and his apostolic letter Mulieris 
Dignitatem [The Dignity of Women] issued on 15 August 1988. The first of the letters 
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is interpreted by John Paul II's biographer George Weigel as an encouragement of 
bottom-up mobilisation. The pope had already supported bottom-up mobilisation 
(through official Church structures) during the Methodian year, but at that time his 
main focus was on the reinforcement of the position of hierarchy (hence the focus on 
Archbishop St. Methodius). During the Marian year, the pope would often refer to 
Mary as the ‘Mother of the Church,’ a title that had profound implications for how 
Catholics should understand the Church. According to Weigel, this understanding of 
the relationship between Mary and the Church challenged the way many Catholic 
leaders had come to think of themselves and their authority. If during 1985 John Paul 
II emphasized the role of the hierarchy, he now put emphasis on bottom-up 
mobilisation. As Weigel argues, ‘the “Marian profile” in the Church is, John Paul II 
suggested, even “more…fundamental” than the “Petrine profile (the curia and the 
hierarchy).” Without being divided from it, the “Marian church”—the church of 
disciples—preceded and made possible the “Petrine Church”—the church of office 
and authority.’486 According to Weigel, this was not Mariology in the service of 
traditionalism. Rather ‘discipleship’ came before authority in the Church. The 
expressions of the Petrine Church-- hierarchical elements of the Church (i.e. the curia 
and the hierarchy) -- existed because of the ‘Marian Church of disciples.’487 No 
evidence can be found in the Slovak Catholic samizdat that would suggest that 
Slovak underground Catholics noticed these nuances. Nonetheless, they were clearly 
mobilised by papal support of the creation of popular Catholic cultures, which had by 
now become the preserve of the underground Catholic communities in Slovakia.   
The leading underground Catholic samizdat journal Náboženstvo a 
Súčastnosť488 gave special attention to the following quote from the encyclical letter 
Redemptoris Mater in which the pope placed pilgrimage at the centre of Catholic 
action: 
This presence of Mary finds many different expressions in our day… It also 
has a wide field of action. Through the faith and piety of individual believers; 
through the traditions of Christian families or 'domestic churches', of parish 
and missionary communities, religious institutes and dioceses; through the 
radiance and attraction of the great shrines where not only individuals or local 
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groups, but sometimes whole nations and societies, even whole continents, 
seek to meet the Mother of the Lord.489 
The samizdat author especially appreciated the focus on pilgrimage sites as 
important spaces of Catholic mobilisation. Revealing the Pope’s continued focus on 
connecting these popular devotions transnationally, the pope then joined pilgrimages 
together in one ‘geography of faith and Marian devotion,’ centred around ‘the Land of 
Palestine, the spiritual homeland of all Christians,’ through the ‘many churches in 
Rome and throughout the world centres like ‘Guadalupe, Lourdes, Fatima, and the 
others situated in the various countries…[and]…the one in my own native land, Jasna 
Góra,’ ‘raised up in the course of the centuries by the faith of Christians.’490 All of this 
was a great encouragement for underground Catholics who had since at least 1982 
made pilgrimages the central spaces of shaping nationalised public Catholic culture. 
But these underground communities were not the only ones who shaped a 
nationalised public Catholic culture during the Marian year. Indeed, the Marian year 
marked an increased involvement of the official Church in the shaping of this 
nationalised culture, specifically through supporting mobilisation around nationalised 
public Catholic symbols. To fully understand how Catholic nationalised culture and 
the relationship between Catholic and national identity developed during this Marian 
year, more generally during the period of the three years before November 1989, the 
Marian year needs to be placed into its current political context. The central 
development that influenced the shaping of nationalised public Catholic culture was 
the change in the attitude of official authorities towards public religion, including the 
expansion of the official shaping nationalised culture.  
1.2. Nationalised Public Catholic Culture during Perestroika  
This period saw changes in the relationship between the Catholic Church and the 
Communist state, which would significantly affect the construction of nationalised 
culture. First and foremost, by this time the Soviet leader Mikhail Gorbachev sought 
to co-opt Christian churches as partners in shaping nationalised culture. In 1987, 
Gorbachev indicated that he now saw religious people as ‘natural supporters’ of his 
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‘new thinking,’491 of perestroika and glasnost. Since 1986, Gorbachev had begun to 
realise that, if perestroika was to be successful, he needed the support of as many 
citizens as possible. He was also aware that he needed to improve the reputation of 
the Soviet government in the West. This new approach was further prompted by an 
event which dealt a serious blow to USSR’s reputation. First, during 1986, Gorbachev 
struggled to maintain support for perestroika. After the 1986 Chernobyl nuclear 
catastrophe, the centralism of the communist system of communication was exposed 
as a major obstacle to effective communication and the USSR got much unwanted 
attention. This catastrophe also dealt a major blow to the legitimacy of the communist 
states. There was thus a clear need to introduce a new style of communication—
Gorbachev turned to glasnost. While glasnost was initially intended to encourage the 
public sharing of information to prevent corruption, it soon encouraged Soviet citizens 
to talk about other issues unrelated to corruption or economic reform. Glasnost also 
provided fertile ground for the promotion of religious nationalist ideas.  
Furthermore, as Gorbachev pondered new ways of promoting the socialist 
system locally and internationally, the millennial celebrations of the first Christening of 
the Russian people, referred to as the ‘Christening of Russia’, were about to 
culminate. The occasion saw a public promotion of Orthodox symbols as national 
symbols, the merging of official Soviet history  and history of the Orthodox Church as 
part of the official Soviet collective memory, all of which celebrated the Orthodox 
Church as an integral part of the Russian nation.492 These celebrations, organised 
under the auspices of the Communist Party, revealed that the Russian Orthodox 
Church was a highly popular force capable of winning support both at home and 
abroad. The Russian Orthodox Church had enjoyed greater freedom since the 1960s 
and subsequently had become an important supporter of Soviet foreign policies. 
Since the early 1980s, the patriarchs of Moscow played a key role in promoting the 
idea that the socialist culture was not based on crude materialism—but had an 
important spiritual dimension. This was, in fact, the message Russian patriarch 
Filaret brought to Velehrad in Czechoslovakia during the Methodian year.493 The 
Russian Orthodox Church thus proved to be an irreplaceable mobilising force. Yet, it 
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was clear that if socialist states wanted to involve as many believers in reforms as 
possible, they needed to seek ways to engage the Catholic Church, both as a 
national and as a transnational actor. The Soviet authorities, with other Eastern 
European leaders in their wake, thus moved from restricting local hierarchies to 
helping build up the churches so that they would become more effective spaces for 
the national and international legitimisation of state reforms. By 1987, the creation of 
a nationalised public Catholic culture would no longer be advocated solely by the 
papacy as part of the programme for a unified Christian Europe. In that year, the 
situation of the Catholic Church began to change across the Central and Eastern 
European regions. The Communist states no longer saw them as subversive, but 
rather as potentially important partners in their own legitimisation on a local, regional, 
and global level.  
By mid-1988, the authorities at the Ministry of Culture’s Office for Religious 
Affairs, which had been instituted to ensure that religion, and especially Catholicism, 
would not become a mobilising force in society, changed their rhetoric. ‘It is absurd to 
claim,’ maintained the newly appointed head of the office Matej Lúčan, that ‘socialist 
society and the KSČ see believers as political enemies and that it would seek the 
suppression of religion and churches.’494 Although, as he maintained, ‘our society 
derives its building of socialism from a scientific world view,’ he claimed that ‘our 
society is not an atheistic society.’495 Accordingly, in Czechoslovakia the official 
authorities returned to negotiations with the Vatican and began to re-establish the 
Catholic Church as a nationally functional institution. The first changes were of 
administrative character. In 1988, the Vatican and Czechoslovak diplomats 
negotiated the appointment of two bishops (Ján Sokol, Bishop of Trnava and 
František Tondra, Bishop of Spiš). Even more importantly, by 1989, Bishop Sokol 
was promoted to be Archbishop of the Trnava Archdiocese. The independent 
ecclesiastical Slovak province, the highest administrative unit of the Church in 
Slovakia, now had its leader.496 The official authorities had taken the first steps in this 
direction already in 1973, when three bishops were named, and later in 1977, when 
the Church on current Slovak territory formed an independent ecclesiastical province. 
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However, until 1989, the Church was not capable of functioning nationally. Without 
an archbishop, the Church could be best described as an aggregate of more or less 
isolated dioceses. But now that the Church had its leader it could begin to work as a 
nationally functional institution. As far as Church administration was concerned, its 
current state began to resemble those in Poland, Hungary and Croatia in the 1960s, 
where the churches were institutionally reconstructed. In fact, the official authorities 
also began to support the official Church in organisation of national pilgrimages.497 
For example, the official authorities helped individual parishes transport pilgrims to 
the pilgrimage sites; at the pilgrimage sites the VB (the Police) helped co-ordinate the 
crowds.498 There were, however, limits to these changes. The Communists in 
Slovakia were not interested in encouraging nationalised public Catholic mobilisation 
for independence of the state.  
The official authorities did not intend these changes to enable a greater 
autonomy of the Church from the state as had been the case in Poland, and as the 
underground communities had imagined it since the 1960s. For reasons which will be 
explained in what follows, it is more probable that the official authorities were aiming 
to encourage creation of nationalised public Catholic culture as a part of official 
nationalised culture. The nationalised public Catholic culture would thus be created in 
close connection with the socialist state. The shaping of nationalised public Catholic   
culture would involve strengthening of the Pacem in Terris association, on the one 
hand, and the gradual edging out of the underground Catholic communities from this 
construction on the other.499 Following the model of the Orthodox Church, the 
Communists in Czechoslovakia supported the local Church hierarchy but at the same 
time sought to maintain her connection with the state. The reconstruction of 
nationalised public Catholic culture was thus accompanied and preconditioned by 
strengthening the position of Pacem in Terris, the association of priests openly loyal 
to the socialist state. Pacem in Terris would remain in place to maintain the Church 
as related to state socialism.500  
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This greater but still limited official support of nationalised public Catholic 
culture translated into a careful and selective approach to cultural repertoires that 
could encourage the creation of an independent Catholic culture. As far as events 
and popular mobilisation was concerned, the official authorities used the Marian year 
to strengthen the hierarchy, allow greater space for Catholic mobilisation within 
official spaces, but at the same time roll back the underground Church.501 The goal of 
these authorities was to prevent the underground Church from ‘misusing’ official 
Church events as displays of ‘Catholic triumphalism’ and public chanting of demands 
for the change of religious policies.502 As I will explore below, this strategy was 
successful only to a point. Indeed, by November 1989 the Catholic Church in 
Slovakia looked rather different from what was planned. By this time, there was not 
only, as the official authorities planned, a more complete episcopate, but there was 
also a strong underground Church closely connected to civic opposition in Slovakia 
and in the Czech lands. To understand why and how these changes shaped the 
construction of a nationalised public Catholic culture, a more general overview of the 
specifics of Czechoslovak perestroika follows. I will focus especially on the official 
construction of a Slovak ‘national consciousness’ by Slovak (mostly cultural) elites. 
As I will describe later in this chapter, the cultural elites also began to sponsor the 
construction of a nationalised public Catholic culture as part of this new national 
consciousness. To understand how and why this happened, and what effects this 
state-sponsored construction had on the underground community’s construction of 
nationalised public Catholic culture, I will first explore the construction of the ‘national 
consciousness.’ It is important to attend to this official construction because it 
affected the construction of nationalised public Catholic culture not only before 1989 
but also after 1989. 
1.3. Popular ‘national consciousness’  
During late 1980s, the Communist elites in the Slovak Socialist Republic began to 
promote nationalised culture and its further expansion (which included a greater 
public emphasis on an ethnic understanding of the nation) as an important part and 
manifestation of Czechoslovak perestroika. The Communist Party of Czechoslovakia 
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formally accepted the reform programme of perestroika in 1986. The Czechoslovak 
elites planned to focus on re-writing the Czechoslovak constitution. Unlike the USSR, 
where perestroika began as an effort to improve economic effectiveness, the elites in 
Czechoslovakia, and especially in Slovakia, understood perestroika as a chance to 
complete their nation-building. More specifically, they intended to focus on the 
furthering of federalisation, which was left unfinished after the abrupt end of the 
Prague Spring. Now the Communist elites in the Slovak socialist republic again 
sought to devolve power from the federation.503 In 1986, several deputies of the 
Slovak National Council spoke out against the centralised constitution and argued 
that, instead of reforming the federal constitution, the enactment of constitutions of 
the national republics should be the priority.504 At the same time, and similarly to the 
1960s, the official, especially cultural, elites in Slovakia began to talk especially about 
the issues of ‘national consciousness’ and national history. Slovak cultural elites 
played an important role in the promotion of this agenda. In September 1988, the 
Literárny Týždenník weekly was started by the Slovak Writers Council and became 
the central platform through which these changes were promoted. The weekly 
brought together official cultural elites.505 These late socialist Slovak nationalists were 
clearly convinced that perestroika was an opportunity to strengthen the focus on 
national identity, which they referred to as ‘national consciousness,’ as the central 
element of ‘real socialist consciousness.’ The first major changes that began to 
happen concerned the development of the Slovak ‘national consciousness’ through 
the promotion of ‘historical’ national symbols, and the differentiation of Slovak history 
as something separate from Czechoslovak history and as a story of the development 
of a ‘self-standing’ Slovak nation. These changes were, however, not confined to the 
elites. 
During late 1980s, the Slovak cultural elites intensified their efforts, which had 
already begun at the beginning of the 1980s, to strengthen a ‘national 
consciousness’ of the Slovak population. They now sought to promote ‘historical’ 
symbols in public, organising public commemorations of figures, and events deemed 
to represent the Slovak national identity as something independent from the Czech 
                                                          
503 
Jozef Žatkuliak, ‘Spory o novú ústavu česko-slovenskej federácie v druhej polovici. 80. rokov XX. 
Storočia,’Historický časopis, 56(2008), 161-90.  
504 
 Žatkuliak, ‘Spory o novú ústavu česko-slovenskej federácie,’ 161-90.  
505 
Jozef Žatkuliak et al. November 89, Medzník vo vývoji slovenskej spoločnosti a jeho medzinárodný 
kontext (Bratislava, 2008), pp. 45-6.  
159 
 
and Czechoslovak identity. The Ministry of Culture continued the work on the first 
national historic film, the production of which had begun in 1984, ahead of the 
Methodian year (1985). Now they placed an even greater emphasis on Slovak 
distinctiveness. If before, according to the 1985 plans, the starting point of Slovak 
history would be the late 9th century establishment of Great Moravia,—officially 
considered the first common state of the Czechs and Slovaks—now this history 
would begin before Great Moravia in the early 9th century chiefdom of Prince Pribina. 
Prince Pribina of Nitra would appear in the film as the leader of the first Slovak 
state.506  
This nationalised culture was not promoted only through film production. The 
city of Nitra, the historically documented centre of the Pribina chiefdom, was being 
turned into a symbol of the origins of Slovak statehood. Nitra Castle, which so far had 
been used as a research centre, was to be turned into a commemorative space; at 
the centre of the castle a large square for mass gatherings was being built, with a 
large statue of Prince Pribina erected in its centre.507 In their endeavour to portray the 
Slovak nation and state as developing independently from Czechoslovakia, the 
Slovak official nationalists sought to ‘slovakise’ more contemporary events. On the 
70th anniversary of the establishment of the first Czechoslovak Republic, the heritage 
organisation Matica Slovenská, the Ministry of Culture, and the government 
organised a commemoration of General Milan Rastislav Štefánik, the only one of the 
founding fathers of the first Czechoslovak Republic of Slovak origin.508 Official 
socialist patriotic memory was now a memory of the development of the Slovak 
nation as an independent nation and an independent state. These changes were not 
restricted to changing official national narrative.  
The official nationalists also began to promote the return of national symbols 
which they presented as ‘historical national symbols’. In summer 1989, the cultural 
elites presented a proposal to the central committee of the Party to replace the 
current state emblem of the Slovak Socialist Republic (a fire on a mountaintop, 
                                                          
506 
Kučera, Ideové otázky prípravy trojdielneho filmového projektu z doby Veľkej Moravy, Bratislava, 13 
February 1986, Unfinished Films, SFÚ, unprocessed materials, 9 
507
 Juraj Chovan Rehák, Interview with the author, 14 April 2015, Hubová, Slovakia.  ‘Sochy,’ 
http://www.nitra.sk/stranka.php?cat.226  
508 
‘Spomienková slávnosť na Štefánikovom bradle,‘ Bratislavské Listy, 2(1989), 12-3.; See also Jozef 
Jablonický, ‘Glosa o Štefánikovi‘, Samizdat o Disente, Záznamy a písomnosti III (Bratislava, 2007), 
p. 368. 
160 
 
symbolising the Slovak National Uprising) with the ‘historical’ Slovak nationalist 
emblem, the double cross on three hills. This ‘historical’ national emblem was 
removed at the height of the centralisation of the Czechoslovak state in the late 
1950s and this removal was criticised by emerging Communist nationalists in 
Slovakia. The Communist nationalists, led by Gustáv Husák, tried to change this 
symbol in the 1960s but did not succeed. Now, at the end of the 1980s, the 
nationalist Slovak Communists made another attempt. The main advocate for this 
change was Viliam Plevza, the head of the Institute of Marxism Leninism and the 
‘court historian’ of Husák. Plevza presented the proposal to change the national 
emblem to the Central Committee in July 1989.509 But before doing so, the issue was 
discussed on the pages of Literárny Týždenník by cultural elites including members 
of Matica.510 Matica played a specific role in the construction of this new ‘national 
consciousness,’ and was tasked to spearhead a public ‘discussion’ about the symbol. 
Vladimír Mináč, head of Matica, was convinced that the return to the ‘historical’ coat 
of arms would strengthen the ‘national consciousness’ of Slovak citizens. He claimed 
that ‘...only a profound and serious relation to state and national symbols can 
strengthen the state and national consciousness of citizens.’511 The official elites 
were thus preparing to engage a broader segment of society in the creation of 
nationalised culture.  
But even as the cultural elites sought to popularise these national memories 
and symbols, and broaden the appeal of this culture to a broader segment of society, 
they did not intend to democratise the construction of this nationalised culture. The 
official authorities were determined to retain full control of the creation of nationalised 
culture and took care to contain and repress any groups which had created or had 
the potential to create nationalised culture autonomous of the state. The party 
leadership was determined to keep the creation of this nationalised culture firmly at 
the hands of the party and institutions closely related to the party. The major reason 
for the restrictive character of the official construction of nationalised culture was to 
prevent this nationalisation of the official culture from turning into calls for 
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democratisation as had happened during the Prague Spring in 1968. The 1980s 
party leadership based its legitimacy on its claims that, by suppressing the Prague 
Spring, the party had, with the ‘brotherly help’ of Warsaw pact armies, protected 
Czechoslovakia from a return to ‘reactionary right-wing nationalism’.512 Now, in the 
late 1980s, as the party leadership began to create nationalised culture, it made sure 
to prevent any alternative nationalist undercurrents from surfacing. The 
Czechoslovak ‘perestroika’ was thus accompanied by a continued repression of 
those nationalists and civic dissidents who advocated a different understanding of the 
nation and polity, and especially those who openly called for a change of political 
system. The party was especially careful to suppress any popular remembrance of 
the Prague Spring on its 20th anniversary in 1988.  
The strategy of the official authorities was to isolate various dissenting groups 
from each other and from the population at large. This aspect of Czechoslovak 
‘perestroika’ became apparent first in the Czech lands, where civic dissent was 
increasingly active and emboldened by the changes in the USSR and the Soviet 
Union, and also by support from the West. Beginning in 1987, Czech dissidents 
organised increasingly successful demonstrations in Prague. When, in October 1988, 
a group of an estimated 5,000 dissidents in the Czech Republic filled the square 
chanting ‘Freedom! Freedom!’ and ‘Masaryk’ (the founding president of the first 
republic), and waved the national colours in defiance of the authorities, the police 
responded with force. This demonstration was preceded by one in August 1988, on 
the occasion of twentieth anniversary of the Soviet-led invasion, where an estimated 
10,000 demonstrators, chiefly students and young people, filled Prague’s central 
Wenceslas Square and demanded that the regime publicly acknowledge that the 
invasion was a criminal act. 
In Slovakia, the repression focused on the underground Church, especially 
after the underground Church intensified its contact with civic dissidents in Slovakia 
and the Czech lands.513 I will expand on its interconnections with Czech dissidents in 
greater detail below. Despite the increased pressure from the official authorities, the 
underground Church continued to create nationalised public Catholic culture. 
                                                          
512 
Pravda 6 September 1968, quoted in Kieran Williams, The Prague Spring and its aftermath: 
Czechoslovak politics, 1968-1970 (Cambridge, 1997), p. 40.  
513
 František Mikloško, interview with the author, 13 July 2010, Bratislava, Slovakia.; Ján Čarnogurský, 
Interview with the Author, 11. 11. 2011. Bratislava, Slovakia. 
162 
 
Although Pope John Paul II was less visibly present in promotion of Catholic 
mobilisation, Radio Vatican remained an important supporter of bottom-up 
mobilisation.514 Radio stations sponsored by the US government continued to 
support grassroots religious mobilisation, and their networking with civic dissidents 
would have important consequences affecting the eventual outcomes of the new 
policy. In fact, since the mid-1980s, their involvement in connecting civic and religious 
dissidents on a local and transnational level became even more effective.515 Since 
the Chernobyl nuclear disaster, the RFE and the RL developed a technique called 
‘cross-reporting’, which aimed to improve informing each country in Eastern Europe 
of current events in the other states in the region.516 These new connections helped 
not only to sustain the underground Church as a creator of nationalised public 
Catholic   culture, but also changed the community’s motivations for the construction 
of this culture. The largely spiritual and Slovak cultural nationalism of the 
underground community became more civic—the underground community was no 
longer interested solely in campaigning for the greater autonomy of the Church and 
religious freedom in Slovakia, but also began to support other rights and liberties. As 
I will explain in the next section, the community moved to a more civic and 
Europeanised understanding of national identity. The reconstruction of the official 
Church would in fact—contrary to the intentions of the Communist regime—be 
instrumental in the mobilisation of the underground Church. 
2.  The Underground  Catholic Community during the Marian Year  
2.1.  Pilgrimages during the Marian Year   
The programme the underground Church prepared for the Marian year signalled that 
the community was an increasingly effective creator of nationalised public Catholic   
culture.517 The initial impulse for the underground Church’s mobilisation came from 
                                                          
514 
František Mikloško, interview with the author, 13 July 2010, Bratislava, Slovakia.; Ján Čarnogurský, 
Interview with the Author, 11. 11. 2011. Bratislava, Slovakia. 
515 
Jacques Sémelin, Liz Libbrecht, ‘Communication and resistance. The instrumental role of Western 
radio stations in opening up Eastern Europe,‘ Réseaux, 2 (1994), 55-69. 
516 
 Sémelin, Libbrecht, ‘Communication and resistance,‘ 55-69. 
517 
 Even if both samizdat reporters and official authorities gave slightly different numbers of pilgrims 
attending pilgrimages: For samizdat reports see, ´K Mariánskemu roku´, NaS 4(1987), 2-5; 
´Levočská púť 1987´, NaS, 4(1987), 5-7.; ‘Mariánsky rok 1987/88’ NaS 3(1987), 2-3.; Peter Martin, 
‘The Pilgrimage to Levoča,´RFE/RL, 14 July 1988, 19.; ‘Šaštín—September 1987,‘ NaS 5(1987), 
11; ‘Šaštín—’88,‘ Katolícky mesačník, 5(1988), 1. For official report see, ‘Informácia o priebehu 
pútí v dňoch 13.-14. 8. 1988, 18 August 1988, Central Committee of the Communist Party of 
Slovakia, SNA, 1789/24. 
163 
 
the pope and his encouragement, spelled out in Redemptoris Mater, to renew their 
faith through frequent visits to pilgrimage sites.518 The pilgrimages were also planned 
to facilitate integration and co-operation among the various groups involved in the 
underground Church community. For the Marian year, the underground Church 
prepared a programme and actively supported participation in pilgrimages across 
Slovakia. In addition to regular reports, the underground community issued a bulletin 
with a short overview of pilgrimage sites.519 The underground community used its 
network to invite Catholics to these pilgrimages.520  
These underground Catholic communities continued to perceive the present 
and the future of the nation as being closely connected with the fate of the Church. A 
programme for the Marian year published in the major samizdat Náboženstvo a 
Súčasnosť (NaS) encouraged readers to maintain their Catholic faith so that ‘[this] 
most precious heritage [would be passed]…on to those who come after us…so that 
Slovakia [would] enter’ the third millennium ‘devoted to God through the Church.’521 
The nationalisation of the Catholic identity sometimes translated into understanding 
the Church as the embodiment of the nation. Activists increasingly conflated the 
Slovak nation with the Catholic Church in Slovakia, and talked in terms of the 
consecration of all of the nations ‘constitutive groups: youth, families, clergy and 
hierarchy, religious orders, and lay orders, and other religious denominations.’522 In 
this respect, the Marian year was a natural continuation of the nationalising 
tendencies of the Methodian year. According to Catholic activists, the Slovak nation 
needed to be ‘saved’ and this could only be done through the renewal of the Church 
and the subsequent renewal of society. For now, the underground Catholics 
remained focused on the revival of the official Church. However, by the beginning of 
the next year, the underground community had become engaged in two initiatives 
which further boosted its self-confidence to the point that they no longer saw the 
reconstruction of the official Church as a necessary pre-condition for the shaping of 
nationalised public Catholic culture and mobilisation for national renewal.  
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The opening event of the Marian year, the pilgrimage to Šaštín on the feast of 
Our Lady of Sorrows in September 1987, helped to forge the still rather diverse 
underground community as a unified public community. According to samizdat 
reports, the event was attended by over 2,000 young people, who travelled to Šaštín 
from around Slovakia and organised an all-night programme in the basilica.523 At this 
pilgrimage, the underground church leaders around Jukl, Mikloško and Krčméry 
organised the first nation-wide meeting of the various groups constituting the 
underground Church. A similar meeting took place in Levoča in July 1987. At the 
event the underground Church leaders openly presented themselves to the 
community. The clerical leader of the underground community, Bishop Korec, joined 
the underground Catholics during their programme for the first time. The lay leaders 
Vladimír Jukl, Silvester Krčméry, František Mikloško and Ján Čarnogurský also spoke 
during the all-night programme. Korec was thus for the first time present as a priest 
within a public space of the official Church—despite the fact that the official Church 
had not acknowledged him as a legitimate leader of the Church. The lay groups 
were, however, encouraged also by the leading members of the official church. The 
apostolic administrator Štefan Garaj delivered a sermon on the occasion of the 
Marian year, in which he told the congregation of more than 140,000 that ‘the love 
and loyalty of the Slovak nation to the Virgin Mary and her Son is a guarantee of the 
bright future of our people.’ 524 This higher level of organisation was noticed also by 
the official authorities. In a marked difference from the 1986 official evaluation of the 
pilgrimage, which described the all-night programme as ‘harmless,’ the official 
authorities now noted that ‘Lay groups came with a [well] organised programme with 
which they managed to appeal to other pilgrims [who were not from the underground 
Church]. The all-night programme focused on the lay glorification of Bishop Korec 
directly inside the basilica.’525  
The pilgrimages of the Marian year were perceived by the underground 
community as a great success. The Marian year of 1987 saw, according to both 
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underground and official sources, unprecedentedly high numbers of pilgrims.526 The 
celebrations of the Marian year in Levoča with, according to a samizdat author, more 
than 200,000 pilgrims, amply illustrate the increase.527 According to the samizdat, 
40,000 attended the national pilgrimage to Šaštín and 100,000 attended the one in 
Gaboltov, in Eastern Slovakia.528 Combined with their rapidly growing membership, 
the mass pilgrimages gave the Catholics of the underground Church much greater 
self-confidence and the inspiration to promote their agendas and push for further 
mobilisation from below. Catholic activists approvingly claimed that the pilgrimage to 
Levoča was a ‘truly national pilgrimage.’529 A Slovak Catholic youth samizdat ZrNO 
described the pilgrimages as a ‘perennial framework for national communication.’530 
NaS, the mouthpiece of the secret Church, maintained that ‘alongside their spiritual 
value…[pilgrimages] became places of self-assertion, places where our national-
religious identity was formed…’531 This perception was further reinforced by the 
pronouncements of some members of the official Church. A samizdat report 
approvingly quoted Štefan Garaj, the administrator of Spiš Diocese, who said that the 
high number of attendees was also a clear sign of the ‘fidelity of the Slovak nation to 
our Heavenly Mother and her Son.’532 The growing numbers at pilgrimages were 
seen by the secret Church as a sign of the re-emerging Catholicity of the Slovak 
nation and the self-assertion of the Church. The pilgrimages that were organised 
during the Marian year increased the self-confidence of the underground community. 
However, by the end of the Marian year, the underground Church would not be the 
only force using pilgrimages as tools for nation-wide mobilisation.  
During this time, the official Church also began to emerge as a creator of a 
nationalised public Catholic   culture. In September 1987, the official Church 
organised a night-long programme in the basilica. The programme was intended to 
reclaim the space that had, by now, been fully occupied by the underground Church. 
More positively, these were the first signs that the official authorities were assisting in 
the revitalisation of the Catholic Church and that this revitalisation was part of a 
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broader programme of strengthening the legitimacy of the socialist project. The 
official authorities presented the Church as part of the vitality of the socialist 
programme of world-peace. In September, Mother Theresa visited Šaštín. The visit of 
this founder of the well-known charity in Delhi, India, was intended to showcase that 
the Catholic Church in Slovakia was connected and actively involved in the 
continuing socialist struggle for peace and social justice. The news was spread only 
among priests from the official Church and members of the underground Church 
learnt about this visit only at its very end.533 Over the next two years, pilgrimages 
would also be attended by Slovak missionaries working in Third World countries. 
While these changes left the underground Church outside of the basilica, they did not 
seem to discourage them and they even seemed happy to see this new activity. The 
underground Church viewed the official programme as a partial fulfilment of their 
demands. Nonetheless, these underground Catholics were not prepared to stop their 
own programme. During the September 1987 pilgrimage, the underground Catholics 
organised their programme outside the basilica and managed to attract large crowds. 
Moreover, by the beginning of 1988, the underground Catholics took their shaping of 
a nationalised public Catholic   culture to a new level. 
2.2. The Candle Demonstration  
In March 1988, the underground Catholics organised the first public Catholic 
demonstration for religious freedom. This demonstration would be the central event 
mobilising in support of creation of a nationalised public Catholic culture. Once again, 
transnational support was crucial. Encouraged by the apparently highly functional 
underground information channels and success of mass pilgrimages, in March 1988, 
the underground community leaders organized the biggest public demonstration 
since the Prague Spring in Slovakia. Radio Free Europe and Voice of America 
perceived the situation of the religious as part of the broader assertion of civic society 
against ‘oppressive’ communist states and fully supported the demonstration.534 
Voice of America and Radio Free Europe filled the airwaves within two days, while in 
Slovakia announcements were posted on church notice boards instructing Catholics 
that ‘we will express our support with these demands by holding a lit candle during 
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the gathering.’535 On the 25 March 1988 more than ten thousand Catholics 
assembled on Hviezdoslav Square in downtown Bratislava in defiance of a police 
ban.536 Crucially for many of the Catholic participants, the demonstration fell on Good 
Friday, the major Catholic feast, commemorating the crucifixion of Jesus. The silent 
demonstration would become known as the ‘Candle Demonstration’. The 
underground Church activists called on the state to not only ‘…fill the vacant 
bishoprics in accordance with the decision of the Holy Father’ and grant ‘greater 
religious freedom in Czechoslovakia’, but also to instate ‘full observance of civil law in 
Czechoslovakia.’537 The cultural nationalism of the underground Church had thus 
changed from being narrowly focused on national spiritual renewal, to supporting the 
broader cause of respect of human rights. As one samizdat author claimed ‘…as 
believers we are also citizens and we should therefore express our demands for the 
[recognition of the] rights of the Church in a civic way, appealing to our laws.’538 The 
demonstration itself was organised in a more ‘civic’ space—a public square. 
However, reminiscent of the pilgrimages, they prayed and sang the papal anthem 
and national Marian songs.539   
At about the same time, the underground Catholics were co-ordinating a state-
wide petition for religious freedom, which had begun in autumn 1987. The petition 
originated among Catholic dissidents in Moravia and was authored by Moravian 
Catholic activist Augustin Navrátil. The general theme of the petition was made plain 
in its first point, ‘Our fundamental demand is the separation of the church from the 
state, which would mean that the state would not interfere in the organisation and 
activities of the Church. Through this fundamental demand, the majority of our 
remaining proposals can be fulfilled.’540 The petition was a great success. Catholics 
in the Czech and Slovak republics gathered almost 300,000 signatures, two thirds of 
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which were gathered thanks to the well-developed networks of the Slovak 
underground community. The petition gave an unprecedented boost to the self-
confidence of these underground Catholics. The success of the petition was also due 
to the backing of Cardinal Tomášek. Tomášek provided official support to the petition 
as well as the demonstration. Radio Vatican, Radio Free Europe, and Voice of 
America were also a crucial help. Anton Hlinka at Voice of America broadcast regular 
updates on its progress.541  
The reaction of the official authorities and the official Church in 
Czechoslovakia to the petition and the Candle Demonstration confirmed that the 
official authorities were not going to tolerate unsanctioned religious activities. The 
petition landed Navrátil in a psychiatric ward and the official propaganda launched a 
campaign against the petition.542 At the Candle Demonstration, the police moved in 
with clubs, dogs, a water cannon, and tear gas, beating the demonstrators and 
arresting more than a hundred of them. Similarly, even though the petition was 
tolerated, several signature collectors were detained and beaten by the Secret Police 
(ŠtB).543 The official authorities also sought to portray the underground community as 
related to the wartime Slovak Republic (1939-1945). The official authorities typically 
saw any unauthorised collective religious activity in this way. This framing was, 
however, also intended to isolate the underground Church both from civic dissidents 
and from the Western human rights organisations, both of which were careful not to 
lend support to any fundamentalist, not to mention neo-fascist, groups.544 Shortly 
after the launching of the petition (January 1988) and before the demonstration, a 
series of articles (published in Pravda, 10-12 February 1988) identified Pavol 
Čarnogurský, father of activist Ján Čarnogurský and an MP in the supposedly 
‘reactionary’ wartime Slovak Assembly, as the leader of the underground Church.545 
This framing was reiterated in commentaries on the Candle Demonstration, which 
was described as the work of ‘Pavol Čarnogurský and his accomplices from the 
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illegal church structures and emigration working in the service of world reaction.’546 
The author of a Smena article saw the Demonstration as a ‘return’ to the era before 
February 1948 (the date of the Communist takeover).547 Pavol Čarnogurský was 
known to many members of the underground Church community and respected in a 
small circle around his son, Ján Čarnogurský, but he was certainly not the leader of 
the underground community. 
This official strategy was not entirely unsuccessful. At the end of 1987, Ivan 
Polanský, one of the most prolific printers of samizdat, was detained on charges of 
‘promoting fascism’548 after he edited and printed a samizdat compilation entitled 
Historický Zápisník (Historical Notebook), which, in effect, celebrated Jozef Tiso, the 
president of wartime Slovakia. This issue was part of a series, the first one of which 
had already been dedicated to the interwar Catholic nationalist leader of the Slovak 
People’s Party, Andrej Hlinka. For some time the case was overlooked by human 
rights organisations.549 Yet framing the demonstrators in Bratislava in this way did not 
bring similar results. These attempts to suppress and discredit the underground 
Church both internationally and in Czechoslovakia did not bring the effects the official 
authorities had expected. 
2.3. The Aftermath of the Candle Demonstration  
Following the demonstration, the underground Catholics received unprecedented 
support from across Czechoslovakia, the surrounding countries, and Europe more 
broadly. The underground community was openly supported by the most senior 
churchman in Czechoslovakia, Cardinal Tomášek. The Cardinal played a central role 
in maintaining this positive image of the underground Church. By this point, Tomášek 
used the official tolerance towards public Catholic worship but did not back down on 
his support of civic dissent. He supported the demonstration during the major 
Catholic feast of St. Vojtech at central Prague’s Cathedral of St. Vitus, where he 
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claimed that these Catholics acted ‘in unity with Christ,’ hinting that, despite the lack 
of support from the Slovak hierarchy, these Catholics’ protest happened in unity with 
the Church.550 Cardinal Tomášek would remain an important supporter of the 
underground community in Slovakia and an important source of the intra-church 
legitimacy of the community. Tomášek’s support was vital, especially since the Holy 
See did not lend any clear support to the demonstration. Following the 
demonstration, the pope publicly prayed for the ‘Church in Czechoslovakia.’551 This 
was a rather vaguely-phrased support. In fact it may have been the case that public 
support of the underground Church community as such was not among the Vatican’s 
priorities, especially now when the Vatican was clearly careful not to disrupt contact 
with the Czechoslovak state, with which it was seeking to reach an agreement on the 
central position of the Bishop of Trnava.552 This silence went unnoticed in the 
underground community. It might have been a serious blow to the underground 
community’s self-confidence several years ago. Now the underground community felt 
supported by the church thanks to Tomášek, but also by broader and broader 
segments of civic dissent. 
The extension of the underground community’s activism from fighting for greater 
religious freedom to a broader interest in the defence of human rights won it support 
from civic dissidents, both in Slovakia, and in the Czech lands. Until the Candle 
Demonstration, civic dissidents in Slovakia were not interested in making contact with 
the underground Church. For instance, writer Hana Ponická, who had been purged 
from the Slovak Writers’ Committee in the 1970s, wrote a report on the 
demonstration, and from then on became involved with underground Church.553 
Another leading figure of Slovak civic dissent, Ivan Hoffman, wrote that the 
demonstration ‘confirmed that Christians, more specifically Catholics, are turning out 
to be the most compelling force capable of defending the traditional values of our 
nations, that they are a community that is able to make sacrifices for the renewal of 
public life.’554 The underground Catholics were supported also by the major human 
rights movement Charter 77, based in the Czech lands. The Chartists wrote a protest 
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letter in which they condemned the suppression of the Candle Demonstration. They 
argued that ‘this act of repression…is an attack on all honest efforts to find solutions 
to basic and pressing issues in our society. It is like a dark nightmare from the past 
and, before the world, it will remain a stain on our country.’555 This was the first time 
the underground Church community in Slovakia was openly supported by Charter 
77.556 The Candle Demonstration helped the underground Church see its activism in 
terms of the broader struggle for human rights. 
The radio stations broadcasting from the West amplified the self-confidence of 
the underground community and the awareness of growing solidarity. Given the RFE 
practice of cross-reporting, it was thanks to these stations that the underground 
Church could share the experience of the Candle Demonstration both in the region 
and in Western Europe. Voice of America and Radio Free Europe channels served to 
keep Slovak Catholics informed about the reaction of the international press.557 At 
the same time they furthered the self-understanding of the underground community 
as a representative of the nation against the oppressive state. Although the exact 
vectors of this influence are difficult to reconstruct, in part because RFE and RL 
archived the recording for only six weeks, these channels were instrumental in 
strengthening the self-awareness of the underground community as part of growing 
civil society.558   
Thanks to this solidarity amplified by Western radio channels, the official 
authorities eventually failed to present the underground church as an obscure group 
linked to Slovak state. In fact, even the case of Ivan Polanský began to attract more 
international attention and help. The main help for Polanský came from the Czech 
Charter 77. The Czech dissidents, especially the samizdat publishers, now saw 
Polanský’s trial as an attempt to silent illegal publishers. They consciously 
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disregarded Polansky’s work on history and decided instead to defend him as a 
publisher of samizdat literature. In summer 1988, the Committee for the Defence of 
Ivan Polanský was established and a petition requesting Polanský’s release was 
circulated throughout the Czech and Slovak underground. In a matter of days, 
Polanský had the support of the West, for which the ‘recommendation’ of Charter 77 
was crucial. In the meantime, Cardinal Tomášek stepped in writing a public letter to 
Ivan Polanský’s wife Ida Polanská, assuring her of his support. According to the 
Cardinal, the publishing activities of Ivan Polanský ‘were protected by international 
agreements on civic rights, which Czechoslovakia had ratified.’559 Although the 
charge was later changed to even more serious one of ‘subversion of the Republic’, 
Polanský was released on amnesty by the end of 1988.560 
As a result of this intensifying co-operation with the civic dissent, the hitherto 
largely low-key, spiritual-cultural nationalism of the underground community in 
Slovakia was, during the Marian year, taken to a new level. Although these 
underground Catholics did not comprise the majority of Catholics in Slovakia and 
were not supported by the hierarchy, they now began to see themselves as legitimate 
representatives of the nation. A samizdat summary published in NaS asserted that all 
the activities, such as pilgrimages, the petition, and the demonstration, had ‘formed 
our national-religious identity and deepened our consciousness of a shared 
responsibility.’561 The petition was seen as ‘perhaps the most important...nationwide 
referendum in our history.’562 The samizdat author also claimed that through the 
petition, ‘As a nation, we realized that we cannot be silent when the basic rights of 
the Church are not respected.’563 The extent and the ways in which these events 
contributed to the nationalisation of their Catholic identity can be illustrated through 
an analysis of the pilgrimage to Nitra, long considered by Catholic nationalists as the 
place where national and Catholic identity fused for the first time in history. 
2.4. Pilgrimage to Nitra- ‘National Awakening’ of Catholics   
The pilgrimage to Nitra, at the culmination of the Marian year, showcased the extent 
to which the nationalisation of these Catholics and their self-identification as national 
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leaders had developed. Their identification with the nation continued to vacillate 
between ‘suffering’ and ‘joy,’ self-confidence and defensiveness. At the same time, 
they came even closer to the symbolic spaces of pre-communist Catholic 
nationalism. The underground Church used their alternative communication networks 
to invite other Catholics to ‘ancient Nitra’, through samizdats and Voice of 
America.’564 The official authorities sought to prevent the underground Catholics from 
gathering in Nitra for at least two reasons. First, during interwar and wartime period 
for Catholic nationalists coalescing around the Slovak People’s Party Nitra became 
the site that symbolised the origins of Slovak political autonomy.565 Second, the 
official authorities, as mentioned earlier, were planning to use Nitra as a site 
symbolising official nationalism.566 Indeed when the authorities learnt that 
underground Catholics were preparing all-night programme for the pilgrimage, they 
began to prepare an alternative programme which would depict Nitra as the cradle of 
Slovak culture.567 However this programme was not allowed by Bishop Pásztor.568 
Pásztor was, of course, not strong enough to prevent the official authorities from 
staging it, should they insist. The fact that the official authorities gave in so easily 
might suggest that they did not want to unsettle their relationship with an otherwise 
loyal churchman that Pásztor certainly was.  
During the Nitra pilgrimage, the underground Church organised an all-night 
programme during which the underground community identified itself with the 19th-
century national ‘awakeners’. No longer did the underground Catholics understand 
themselves as symbolising solely the past and present ‘suffering’ of the Church.569 
The all-night programme was led by Catholic laity, and Bishop Ján Korec was at the 
centre of the gathering.570 The speeches in the all-night programme were hither-to 
the most manifest. The Catholics did continue looking at the current situation as one 
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of national suffering and evoked the suffering of the Church in the past. At Nitra 
pilgrimage they for the first time included those who had been persecuted in more 
recent history: youth groups from Bratislava, led by the priest Pavol Flajžík, talked 
about the persecution of the Church in 1950s and also about more problematic 
figures from that period of the Slovak state.571 Striving to ‘show that also, and 
perhaps first of all, churchmen were willing to suffer for the nation’,572 they read short 
biographies of Bishops Buzalka and Gojdič, who both died in Communist prisons. 
They also spoke of Bishop Karol Kmeťko of Nitra, who lived in interwar and wartime 
period, emphasizing his positive relationship with the Jewish community and the help 
he gave to his own religious community.573 But at the same time they already began 
to portray the Catholic Church as an emancipatory force in Slovak history. They now 
not only looked to the ‘martyrs’, but also to the 19th century ‘awakeners of the nation’ 
and the ‘great personalities’ of the Catholic Church in Slovakia. Indeed, according to 
the leading underground Church activist František Mikloško, the pilgrimage to Nitra 
was a ‘national awakening of Catholics.’574 
Performances and ritual further reinforced the extent to which, for some 
underground Catholics, the fate of the Catholic Church was fused with that of the 
nation. One of the central moments of the pilgrimage was the singing of Kto za 
pravdu horí. (Who Burns for the Truth). The lyrics of the song read, ‘To those who are 
consumed by the fire of Holy offering, To those who give their lives for the rights of 
mankind, To those who shed a tear for the grievances of the poor, To them my song 
goes.’ The song was written in the 19th century at the height of 1848 revolution by 
the Slovak nationalist Lutheran priest Karol Kuzmány at the height of the political 
emancipatory struggles of Slovak nationalists during the 1848 revolution.575  
The Catholic activists did not present a new programme, but their cultural 
nationalism took on a new form. A young Catholic activist from the southern Slovak 
town of Nové Zámky, Pavol Abrhan brought a Slovak flag with his group.576 The 
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gathering sung the Slovak part of the Czechoslovak anthem independently from the 
Czech part (The Czechoslovak anthem consisted of two parts, Czech and Slovak. 
These were always sung together). This Slovak part of the anthem was the most 
often sung song at the pilgrimage. A group of young Catholics from Nové Zámky also 
sang, Hej Slováci, the official anthem of the Slovak Republic (1939-1945), ‘Ho 
Slovaks, Our language lives, as long as our faithful hearts beat, The Slovak spirit 
lives, and it will live forever, Thunder and Hell, your anger against us is in vain.’ It 
should be noted that despite the lyrics of the song, Catholics did not yet demand a 
change of language laws, nor did they express support for the late 1970s laws 
proposed by official Slovak nationalists to restrict the use of minority languages and 
reinforce the position of Slovak as the state language. 
Despite the fact that the underground Catholics did this without consent of the 
official Church, they also openly identified with the first three Slovak bishops ordained 
after the dissolution of the Austro-Hungarian Empire and establishment of 
Czechoslovakia. At the pilgrimage the biographies of these first three Slovak bishops 
(Ján Vojtaššák, Pavol Gojdič and Michal Buzalka) were read.577 At the end of the 
pilgrimage, these Catholics sung the Slovak part of the Czechoslovak anthem 
including the last verse (which was not part of this official Czechoslovak anthem), 
‘Slovakia rises, tearing off its chains.’578 
Nitra was central in forging an even greater identification between the 
underground Church and the nation. This commemoration at Nitra broke new ground, 
expressing this link through nationalist songs and the singing of anthems. Symbols 
and songs at the Šaštín pilgrimage were confined to religious figures and symbols, 
and only indirectly reminded the audience of the fusion between the Catholic Church 
and the nation. The demonstration and a petition in 1987-88 marked a turning point 
for the underground Church in Slovakia. They now felt they had a mandate to speak 
in the name of the nation. The identification of the underground Catholic with the 
nation further deepened after the official authorities intensified their efforts to edge 
out the underground Church from the official church spaces. .  
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The Institute of Scientific Atheism began preparations for its first conference about 
Marian pilgrimages, entitled ‘Marian Pilgrimages as an Expression of Political 
Clericalism.’579 The official media began to publish articles discrediting the 
pilgrimages.  In Hlas Ľudu, the pilgrimage to Levoča was presented as an attempt to 
‘renew clerical fascist ideals in Slovakia.’580 The officials focused especially on young 
pilgrims, the number of which, as they often noted, increased each year. A local 
weekly in eastern Slovakia warned parents before the Levoča pilgrimage that at 
pilgrimages young people may encounter drug dealers.581 Similarly, in Práca, an 
anonymous author claimed that pilgrimages attracted ‘alcoholics, drug addicts, and 
prostitutes.’582 The youth monthly, Mladé rozlety, portrayed the young pilgrims as 
misguided ‘religious fanatics.’583 All of these official attacks on pilgrimages 
contributed to further mobilisation of the underground church, especially its 
increasingly assertive young members. 
After Mladé rozlety published a critical article about pilgrimages, over sixty young 
Catholics wrote in protest.584 They refused the official claim that pilgrimages attracted 
‘alcoholics, drug addicts, and prostitutes.’585 Given the high numbers of people at 
pilgrimages, they argued, that such an unfavourable portrayal of pilgrimages could be 
easily qualified as a crime of ‘discriminating against the nation, race, and religious 
conviction’ and may result in a complaint in court.586 The secretly ordained Bishop 
Ján Korec echoed this idea in a separate protest letter to the General Secretary of 
the Communist Party Gustáv Husák. According to Korec, by demonising these young 
people, the monthly journal was tarring those 300,000 citizens who signed the 
petition with the same brush.587 Furthermore, Korec claimed, the article was an attack 
on the whole tradition of ‘Christian national emancipators from Ss. Cyril and 
Methodius to Cardinal Jozef Tomko’-based prefect for evangelisation.588 In his letter 
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Korec alluded to increasing attempts to frame emerging national Catholic narrative as 
an instance of ‘clerical fascism.’  
2.5. Defending the Church, Defending the Nation 
Over the last year preceding the fall of state socialism, the leading figures of the 
underground church became involved in newly intensified construction of religious 
national narrative – often in response to official attempts to connect unsanctioned 
Catholic mobilisation with wartime Catholic nationalism of the Hlinka Slovak People’s 
Party and with Fascism. In this sense, the year 1988 saw the intensification of a 
battle between the authorities and the underground Church over how the role of the 
Catholic Church in national life was to be understood. Most notably, Bishop Korec 
assumed a role of central authority on the history of the ‘Slovak’ Catholic Church. For 
instance: in March 1989, on the 50th anniversary of the establishment of the Slovak 
State, Czechoslovak Television broadcast The Crucifix in the Snares of Power. The 
serial depicted the Catholic Church as the sole reason behind all the problems and 
crimes of the interwar period, and claimed it had undermined the very Slovak nation it 
sought to represent. It was at its most criminal, the serial contended, in its complicity 
with the Slovak state during the wartime period. Prepared by the Institute of Scientific 
Atheism, the film portrayed the Slovak state as culmination of Catholic Church’s 
negative role in Slovak history.589  
Bishop Korec wrote a protest letter to Czechoslovak Television that was 
published in every major Catholic samizdat. The letter was the first substantial 
attempt by an underground Church clerical leader to publicly read his understanding 
of the Church into the contemporary history of the Slovak nation. In doing so Korec 
continued in his project of constructing a new Catholic nationalist narrative of the 
Slovak nation, a personal project he had begun during the Methodian year. Korec 
claimed that ‘the Catholic Church and Catholic priests played a crucial role in the 
national emancipation’590 and thus ‘…all those who have trampled down Slovak 
Catholicism have performed, and still perform, a poor service to the Slovak 
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nation…’591 Korec protested at the description of the life in the Slovak state as being 
managed by ‘criminals’ who, with the assistance of the Church, ‘plundered and 
dragged the nation to the bottom.’592 Paraphrasing probably one of his favourite 
quotes by John Paul II, he claimed that, ‘Slovak history cannot be complete without a 
chapter about the faithful, the Christians, and the Church…’593 The letter was seen as 
a crucial public defence of Catholics; this defence was conducted in terms of placing 
the Catholic Church into the broader national Catholic narrative. He reversed the 
Communists’ interpretation: Catholicism had been vital to the development of the 
nation; the Catholic clergy had played vital roles in its national emancipation; and it 
was the Communist state that was the main danger for the Slovak nation - exactly 
because of its persecution of those who supported the true nation, such as the 
Church. He also mounted a defence of the role of religious believers in the Slovak 
National Uprising, noting how Communist public histories disregarded their role by 
associating them solely with the then-crumbling Slovak Republic (1939-1945). These 
attacks, wrote Korec, had for 40 years ‘overshadowed the positive beliefs of many 
SNP participants, which had, in fact, led them to fight against the ideology of 
Nazism.’594 Drawing on the views of émigré historians, he argued that the SNP 
expressed the generally ‘widespread resistance-defiance of Slovakia against the 
ideology and inhuman practice of Nazism, and as such it is known in the world.’595 
Korec for the first time mobilised wartime history in support of the idea that 
Catholicism was a major force behind the maintenance of morality of the Catholic 
nation.  
This letter had an important mobilising effect on dissenting Catholic Slovak 
voices. Sections of it were published in all major samizdat papers both in NaS and 
RoS and separately as a samizdat leaflet.596 The letter got a positive review from 
František Mikloško, who publicised it to support his view of the anti-Nazi orientation of 
the Catholic Church; Mikloško quoted a part of the letter which ‘proved’ the ‘clearly 
anti-Nazi orientation of Catholic clergy and Catholic students’ even during the Slovak 
                                                          
591 
Korec, Kríž vo svetle, p. 149 
592 
Ibid., p. 132 
593 
Ján Ch. Korec, Od Barbarskej Noci, Na Slobode (Bratislava, 1993), p. 450 
594 
Korec, Od Barbarskej Noci, Na Slobode, pp. 448-9.  
595 
Ibid, p. 447.  
596 
‘List otca biskupa J. Ch. Korca’, missing pagitnation; ‘Kríž v osídlach moci’, 4-5.  
179 
 
state period.’597 Vladimir Jukl, who was much more critical of the Slovak state, 
supported it too, and believed that the letter broke an important taboo in that it started 
discussion about the role of the Church in the first Slovak Republic (1939-1945).598 
These Catholics all had different views on the Slovak state, but they nonetheless 
welcomed Korec’s initiative. The Communist state thus unwittingly forced the 
underground Catholics (or perhaps rather gave them the opportunity) to reflect on the 
most political parts of pre-communist Catholic nationalism. Now members of the 
underground Church were reviving Catholicism as a central part of the nation’s 
history and telling stories that undermined the state’s account of the Church’s role as 
a reactionary force. However, despite the fact that in the process they looked to a 
past that saw the rise of political Catholic nationalism, the nationalism of these 
Catholics was not turning towards separatist nationalism. Rather, the fact that the 
underground Catholics were anchored in the civic dissident movement encouraged a 
more open cultural nationalism.  
3. The Origins of Catholic Civic Cultural Nationalism 
Underground Catholics began to find common cause with dissenting voices who 
were both civic in orientation and from outside Slovakia. In so doing, they began to 
embrace the ideals of democratic pluralism and started to become better connected 
with civic dissidents and non-Slovak activists. This translated into their increasing 
openness towards construction of a democratic nationalised public Catholic narrative. 
A major initiative in this spirit emerged on 28 October 1988, the 70th anniversary of 
the establishment of the first common state of Czechs and Slovaks. That month, 
Czech and Slovak Catholics published one of their best-known initiatives—the 
Declaration of the Czech and Slovak Catholics on the 70th Anniversary of 
Establishment of Czechoslovak Republic.599 At the end of 1988, a group of Slovak 
Catholics led by Ján Čarnogurský joined Czech Catholics to commemorate the 70th 
anniversary of the establishment of the first Czechoslovak Republic. Unlike the 
Slovak population at large, this group of Slovak Catholics was the only group to 
commemorate the anniversary. The occasion and its commemoration was, among 
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Czech dissidents, the central element of democratic national identity before and after 
1989. Composed by a Czech Catholic dissident Tomáš Halík, Slovak signatories 
included Jukl, the publisher of the political Christian democratic samizdat Bratislavské 
Listy, Čarnogurský as well as the wife of Ivan Polanský, Ida Polanská.600 
Čarnogurský co-authored this declaration in which Czech and Slovak Catholics 
showed support for the democratic ideals of first Czechoslovak republic. As well as 
editing the whole text, Čarnogurský also wrote passages about Slovak history.601  
The goal of the declaration was to provide Catholic support for the idea of 
Czecho-Slovak mutuality through remembering historical moments of Czechoslovak 
co-operation, seeking reconciliation and showing support for democracy. The Czech 
and Slovak Catholics wanted to help facilitate a renewal based on support for 
democracy and on what they called ‘ecumenical patriotism.’ In their view, renewal 
was not supposed to be about and for Catholics only, but they wanted to pursue this 
renewal in co-operation with other religions. Declaring adherence to the ‘values of 
democracy’, the underground Czech and Slovak Catholics showed appreciation for T. 
G. Masaryk and his ‘democratism and humanism based on authentic religious 
values’602 and, in line with Catholic social teaching following John Paul II, they 
proclaimed their support for the principles of ‘democratic plurality in political, cultural 
and civic life,’ and for a state that respects ‘human rights, which are based on the 
dignity of the human person.’603 They claimed that, in the struggle for religious 
freedom, ‘we do not ask for any special privileges for the Catholic Church…the 
respect for the rights of the religious and the free life of our church will allow us to 
develop fully our service to the common good…’604 This declaration signalled that 
Slovak Catholics moved from establishing links with the civic dissent and showing 
concern over human rights to the promotion of a democratic political culture. It also 
showed that in this concern they also identified with Czech Catholics.  
The underground Catholics were no longer only receivers of help from the 
civic dissent movement but had also begun to show their open support for non-
religious civic dissent. In April 1989, a group of underground Church leaders—
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including Bishop Korec, Ján Čarnogurský, Mikloško, and Ivan Hoffman—wrote a 
letter to Tomášek in which they reported that believers in Slovakia showed great 
solidarity with Václav Havel and other political prisoners.605 As the official authorities 
in Slovakia negotiated the strengthening of the official Church during 1987–88, the 
underground Church, supported by civic dissidents both in Slovakia and in the Czech 
lands, began to become a self-confident national community threatening to challenge 
the new position of the official Church as an aide in the creation of official culture. By 
the time the official authorities in Slovakia began to promote greater sovereignty for 
the Slovak socialist republic and were in need of a loyal Catholic Church, the 
underground community could no longer be held at bay. Indeed, as will be analysed 
in the next section, when the official authorities began to publicise their plans to 
rewrite the Czechoslovak constitution, the underground Church acted as an 
independent force within both the official Church and society at large. In doing so, the 
underground Church threatened both the plans to conduct the changes without 
interventions from civic dissidents, as well as those to instrumentalise the Catholic 
Church in the process.  
3.1. Underground Catholics and the Reform of the Constitution    
The underground Church imagined Catholic involvement in broader societal reforms 
in terms of a bottom-up mobilisation of independent Catholic associations. In this, 
they followed Cardinal Tomášek, who reacted to the news about the prepared reform 
of the Czechoslovak constitution by calling on the official authorities to observe the 
right to freedom of assembly.  He wrote to the Czechoslovak president (at this point 
no longer the General Secretary) Gustáv Husák, asking for ‘freedom of expression 
and freedom of assembly for religious communities.’606 Indeed, the underground 
Catholics utilised the official nationalist campaign to promote a democratic political 
system. In addition, some of the leading figures of the underground Church, such as 
Čarnogurský and Mikloško, were now focused on mobilisation for broader democratic 
changes. These Catholics led Slovak civic dissidents to support the first major pro-
democratic Czechoslovakia-wide initiative, to connect Charter 77 with the population 
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at large. Alongside their continued interest in greater religious freedom and moral 
renewal of the nation, a growing number of Catholics were attracted to different 
themes emerging in the official, as well as underground, discourse, especially those 
of democratisation (this issue was more prominent among dissidents) and the future 
of the Czechoslovak federation (a theme more prominent among official elites.) As an 
act of appreciation of the 70th anniversary of the establishment of the First 
Czechoslovak Republic, the Initiative issued a manifesto entitled Democracy for 
Everyone, in which they presented politics as a place of expression and assertion of 
the true interests of society. The authors also rejected the leading role of the 
Communist Party and class division of society, and said that the new constitution 
should, in their view, ‘secure state sovereignty, the plurality of ownership forms and 
the establishment of independent unions.’607 In October 1988, a group of about one 
hundred leading underground Catholics joined the Czechoslovakia-wide Hnutie za 
Občiansku Slobodu (Movement of Civic Freedom, HOS). Catholics including 
Čarnogurský (who became the leader of the Slovak section), Anton Selecký, Ján 
Langoš, Vladimír Palko, and Ján Hoffman, joined together with members of the civic 
dissent movement, including Hana Ponická, ex-Marxist Miroslav Kusý, historian Jozef 
Jablonický, and Milan Šimečka.608  
The main intention behind the initiative was to overcome the societal isolation 
of Charter 77 and further integration of dissent. The immediate impulse for the 
establishment of HOS was the official dispersion of the historical third gathering (so-
called fórum [forum]) of signatories of Charter 77 in January 1988. Although the 
movement was started as a federation-wide one, the Slovak members soon 
established their own organisation.609 Shortly after its establishment, the fact that 
HOS was a loose association of political groups and clubs, without any unifying 
centre, showed in gradual demarcation of different political orientations with the 
Christian Democratic orientation led by the Czech Catholic dissident Václav Benda, 
being the one closest to Slovak Catholics.610  
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The Slovak members of the Movement for Democracy, with Catholics at their 
helm, were also beginning to form a distinctive group within the Movement for 
Democracy. Most Slovak members were interested in official nation-building, 
especially now that nation building had become an important element of the official 
discourse and politics. But even if they in this respect turned to the official discourse, 
they continued to share the civic dissent’s focus on democracy. For these Slovak 
Catholics, Slovak sovereignty could only be fully realised within a democratic political 
system. This support for democracy was a natural continuation of their 1988 
mobilisation, which was conceived in civic terms. Nonetheless, their appreciation of 
nation-building meant that despite these reservations, these Catholics were mobilised 
by the broader official discourse on Slovak cultural sovereignty.  
The underground Catholics became involved in the official discourse on 
greater cultural sovereignty for Slovakia under the leadership of Čarnogurský. 
Čarnogurský attempted to create a group based on Christian Democratic principles  
in 1988, but did not find supporters. Čarnogurský would become the political leader 
of Catholics in the final days of the communist regime, the negotiator with Communist 
officials and, after 1989, the leader of the Christian Democratic Movement, the major 
Christian party in early post-communist Slovakia. During the last three years of state 
socialism, some of the basic tenets of future Christian Democratic national ideology 
would emerge. One of them was the dual support for democracy and at the same 
time for nation-building. During the last years of communism this meant engagement 
in both official and civic dissent discourses. . 
The Catholic dissent began to participate in official construction of the national 
narrative. On May 4th, 1989, the 70th anniversary of Štefánik’s tragic death, HOS 
published a manifesto in memory of M. R. Štefánik, a supporter of ‘Czecho-Slovak 
mutuality.’ The manifesto was read at a public commemoration at Bradlo, which 
followed an official commemoration organised by Matica Slovenská and the Ministry 
of Culture of the Slovak Socialist Republic. The underground Catholics and civic 
dissidents clearly identified with the idea of greater Slovak sovereignty. This idea 
would propel these Catholics into post-socialist politics, in which Slovak 
independence would become one of the central issues. The idea of Slovak 
sovereignty would also remain an important common ground for Catholics and 
Communist nationalists even after the fall of state socialism.  
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The manifesto issued by HOS celebrated Štefánik not only as an important 
figure of Slovak history but also as a representative of the first Czechoslovakia, the 
first democratic common state of Czechs and Slovaks. It celebrated Štefánik as ‘the 
co-founder of the Czechoslovak Republic, which provided basic civil rights, pluralist 
democracy, religious freedom and other rights.’611 The democratic interwar state 
which guaranteed the rights they were now lacking was juxtaposed with the current 
state. The manifesto criticized the official neglect of this personality and saw it as a 
reflection of the regime’s undemocratic character.  They complained that the memory 
of Štefánik and his role in history having been belittled and twisted, his monuments 
removed and destroyed.’612 Čarnogurský suggested ‘full rehabilitation’ of Štefánik, by 
which he meant the renewal of his monuments and the return of his name to those 
streets in Slovakia which, before the 1950s, had been named in Štefánik’s memory. 
Then the manifesto supported the proposed change of the national emblem, and the 
request was received with applause. A Lutheran writer, Hana Ponická, was asked to 
present this request to the Slovak government and the Committee for the new ČSFR 
Constitution. Before that, a reporter from Czechoslovak Television had an interview 
with Hana Ponická. The group around Čarnogurský sang Hej Slováci and the 
complete Slovak part of the Czechoslovak anthem, Nad Tatrou sa blýska (only the 
first verse was part of the official Czechoslovak anthem).613 The official authorities 
tolerated this alternative commemoration. There were no sanctions in its aftermath. 
The only intervention came after someone from Čarnogurský’s group put up the 
‘historical Slovak state emblem.’ The symbol was confiscated by an official standing 
nearby.614 At this point the official authorities were already preparing to detain 
Čarnogurský. But they did so only after Čarnogurský moved to challenge the core of 
the legitimacy of the socialist state.   
By spring 1989, underground Catholics around Čarnogurský moved to 
challenge the official interpretation of the Slovak National Uprising  and the Prague 
Spring. The commemoration of Štefánik expanded the boundaries of officially allowed 
discourse, but Čarnogurský began to challenge the core of the state socialist 
‘national/historical consciousness’ when he questioned the accuracy of the current 
                                                          
611 
Selecký, Iniciatíva protikomunistickej opozície v ČSSR.  
612 
Ibid.  
613 
Ibid.  
614 
‘Spomienková slávnosť,’ 12.  
185 
 
interpretation of the SNP. This understanding of the Uprising was advanced 
especially by the former general secretary of the Central Committee of the 
Communist Party of Czechoslovakia and president, Husák, who wrote his memoir in 
the 1960s and revisited the view that the Communist Party was the inspiration, 
organiser and leading force in the Uprising.615 This view was challenged by historian 
Jozef Jablonický in a work published in 1969 as one of the last remnants of the 
1960s thaw. The book cost Jablonický his academic career. But Jablonický was now 
returning and Bratislavské Listy was one of the platforms where he began to 
publish.616 The journal was thus giving space to a view that had emerged and was 
suppressed during the Prague Spring. Intending to bring up the officially forgotten 
democratic leaders of the 1944 Uprising, Čarnogurský, Hana Ponická, Anton Selecký 
and Vladimír Maňák requested permission to commemorate generals Rudolf Viest 
and Ján Golian —the main (non-Communist) commanders of the SNP who were 
executed by the Nazis in 1945.  At the beginning of August they wanted to gather at 
the site where a memorial to these men was erected in 1948 but was taken down 
soon after in the Stalinist years. Their request was denied by the official 
authorities.617 This way of commemorating the Uprising challenged the Communist 
version of the SNP as key for re-emerging Communist nationalists. It was also a 
reminder of the Prague Spring, since similar re-evaluations of the SNP had first 
emerged during the reform period. The official nationalists were not willing to accept 
non-socialist interpretations of this still core event of the ‘national/historical 
consciousness.’618  
This official rejection did not stop Čarnogurský, and by the end of the summer 
he set out to question the very source of legitimacy of the normalisation regime. 
When the 20th anniversary of the 1968 occupation came, five leading activists, 
including Čarnogurský, sent a letter to the Czechoslovak National Assembly and 
Literárny Týždenník.619 In it they demanded ‘rehabilitation’ of the Prague Spring and 
its leading figures. By this time, the neighbouring states of Czechoslovakia began to 
reconsider the participation of their individual armies in the 1968 occupation of 
Czechoslovakia. While the gradually democratising Hungary and Poland denounced 
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the occupation, Bulgaria and the GDR, Czechoslovakia’s co-members in the 
orthodox bloc, stuck to a hard-line approach.620 These changes emboldened and 
created space for the leaders of the Prague Spring in Slovakia who had been purged 
in the wake of the occupation and had remained silent for almost twenty years. On 
April 4, the Hungarian television show Panorama aired a long and detailed interview 
with Alexander Dubček, which could be easily picked up in southern Slovakia. RFE 
re-broadcast it over the entire country. The Czechoslovak government denounced 
the recent developments in Hungary, including the rehabilitation by the regime of the 
1956 Hungarian Revolution, and the re-burial in a place of honor of Imre Nagy, the 
reform Communist associated with it. The Communist state had already violently 
suppressed the first commemoration of 1968 in August 1988. The Czech human 
rights movement’s Charter 77, České Děti (Czech Children) and Klub Johna Lennona 
(The Society of John Lennon) recommended that no demonstrations be held on 21 
August, but the five Slovak activists sent letters encouraging peaceful 
commemorations at the places where two young victims of the 1968 suppression had 
been shot.621 This would be the first such commemoration in Slovakia.  
The reforming spirit from Moscow or domestic attempts to commemorate the 
Prague Spring was hardly welcomed by the leadership of the Communist Party of 
Czechoslovakia, whose authority stemmed directly from the Soviet occupation in 
1968, and which the new Soviet leader pointedly refrained from endorsing when he 
visited Prague in 1987. Importantly, 1968 was left untouched by Moscow. Official 
Soviet commentaries on the 20th anniversary of the invasion were largely 
unrepentant, although this can be explained by their concern not to embarrass the 
Husák-Jakeš regime in Prague.622 In mid-August, the activists around Čarnogurský 
were detained as a ‘representative sample’ of Slovak dissent, the so-called 
‘Bratislava Five.’ Čarnogurský and Anton Selecký represented Catholic dissent; the 
writer Hana Ponická represented Lutheran activists, and civic activists Miroslav Kusý 
and Vladimír Maňák the former reform Communists. Fearing a spill-over from 
neighbouring countries, the officials apparently wanted to discourage opposition 
circles from following the example of the opposition in Poland, Hungary and GDR. 
Indeed, the opposition circles in Slovakia were already coming together. Together 
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with the civic dissidents, the Slovak Catholics campaigned for the release of 
Čarnogurský. We will never learn what the outcome would have been. The trial of 
Čarnogurský encouraged further cooperation among dissidents in Slovakia: a petition 
against Čarnogurský’s detention was signed by Bishop Korec, as well as by the ex-
Marxist Milan Šimečka. According to historian Marušiak, this was a crucial moment in 
the short history of independent action, when all strands of the Slovak independent 
sphere met.623 By this point the integration between civic dissent and underground 
Catholics culminated. But as the previously considerable gap between them was 
narrowing, the gap between underground Catholics and the official Church was 
broadening.  
When the official authorities and Church hierarchy turned out to have little 
understanding of civic dissent, the underground Catholics were dismayed. This was 
despite the fact that in some respects, the official authorities seemingly fulfilled some 
of the demands raised by the underground Catholics. As we have seen in this 
section, the underground community developed a new concept of a nationalised 
culture the creation of which no longer involved only the freedom of worship, but also 
more broadly to a reform of the political system. Yet—as we shall see below—despite 
the growing strength of the underground Church, the most powerful new movements 
for the reconstruction of a new national culture now came from the Communist state. 
The authorities came to fully recognise the benefits of supporting a national church to 
sustain their own power, which they did in co-operation with many within the Church 
hierarchy. 
 
4. The Official Church, Communist State and ‘National Unity’  
By the end of the 1980s, the Communist authorities began to play a key role—in 
conjunction with the Church hierarchy—contributed to the construction of nationalised 
public Catholic culture. They sought to portray the Catholic Church as a symbol of 
‘national unity’. As I mentioned before, this began as a part of Czechoslovak 
perestroika, in an attempt to strengthen Catholic loyalty towards the communist state. 
As we shall see, the shaping of nationalised public Catholic culture by the Communist 
authorities remained highly hierarchical and closely connected to the state. This 
official contribution to the Catholic national culture excluded the underground Church. 
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In the following section, I will analyse to what extent these differences became visible 
and what effect they had on the overall shaping of nationalised public Catholic 
culture.  
 
4.1. Nationalised public Catholic Culture and Official Church 
In some respects, the official contribution to the nationalised public Catholic culture 
was similar to the one created by the underground Catholics, especially at its initial 
stages during the Methodian year. This is not surprising: the Communist state started 
to try to appropriate the message of the underground Church. First and foremost, 
official authorities followed the underground Church in that they placed a new 
emphasis on popular Catholicism in legitimising themselves. Second, they tried to 
integrate the Catholic Church into a socialist vision of a specifically Slovak history. 
Indeed, the changes that were made by the official authorities as they rebuilt the 
nationally functional Church, both as an institution and as a culture, fulfilled some of 
the demands of the underground Catholics, such as filling the vacant bishoprics. The 
state supported the ordination of more bishops and an archbishop, thus fulfilling a 
demand from the underground Catholics. Moreover, the new archbishop began to 
use his position to promote Catholic rituals with a nation-wide effect. One of the first 
acts of the newly appointed archbishop was the consecration of the Slovak nation to 
Mary.624 It is not clear whether the official Church was inspired by the underground 
Church in this respect, but the archbishop nonetheless performed a ritual very similar 
to the ritual of national consecration the underground Catholics had been calling for 
since 1983 and saw it as the best way of expressing the close relationship between 
the Catholic Church and the Slovak nation. 
Nevertheless, the Communist authorities were interested in involving the Church 
in the creation of a nationalised culture (and thus unwittingly contributing to the 
creation of a nationalised public Catholic culture) only in so far as this culture helped 
them to maintain their own power. They were not interested in bringing other groups 
such as the underground Church into dialogue. Indeed, they attempted to create an 
environment in which the underground communities did not feel that they were 
accepted as legitimate creators of nationalised public Catholic culture. Rather, the 
official authorities wanted to strengthen the position of the hierarchy and official 
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clergy as the real custodians of the Church. This promotion of the Catholic hierarchy 
as a symbol of national identity and unity did not suit the image of a ‘national culture’ 
that the underground Church had supported. Indeed, the hierarchy that the 
authorities supported – such as the newly appointed archbishop of Trnava – did little 
to stop leading members of the underground Church from being imprisoned; they 
also did not support civic dissent.  
This new image of the Church promoted by the authorities—as centralised, 
focused on the official hierarchy and patriotic clergy, and closely attached to the 
state—was also reflected in the new national official narrative that the official 
authorities promoted in the late 1980s. In one sense, the state embraced figures that 
the underground Church had supported, such as Ss. Cyril and Methodius. This had 
been evident already during the Methodian year when the saints were considered as 
part of the development of the Slovak nation, independent from the Czech nation. But 
now Ss. Cyril and Methodius were no longer considered solely as ‘teachers’ and their 
contribution was no longer seen solely in terms of a ‘contribution to the cultural 
development’ of the 9th century chiefdom of Great Moravia. Rather, they were 
celebrated as Catholic priests and Methodius as an archbishop. Moreover, the 
Ministry of Culture in the Slovak socialist republic was preparing to celebrate Ss. Cyril 
and Methodius as related to the origins of Slovak statehood. This would lead to a 
new focus on the southern Slovakian town of Nitra - the centre of the Pribina 
chiefdom, which Slovak nationalists saw as the centre of the first ancient Slovak 
state. In order to celebrate Nitra as the centre of the first ecclesiastical unit on Slovak 
territory, a monumental statue of Ss. Cyril and Methodius was planned to be erected 
near Nitra Castle and was to become a place of annual celebrations of Ss. Cyril and 
Methodius as teachers of the ‘Slovak nation.’625 Ten years after the establishment of 
the independent Slovak province, the official authorities began to fuse the history of 
the Slovak nation with the official history of the Catholic Church in Slovakia. What is 
more, the official authorities allowed leading Catholic émigrés to publicly present 
Catholic and national memory as vitally inter-related. Most notably, during the 
appointment ceremony of Archbishop Sokol, Cardinal Jozef Tomko, a Rome-based 
cardinal of Slovak origin, presented this appointment as an important episode in the 
common history of the Catholic Church and the nation. In his speech, he said that 
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‘today the ancient dream of Slovaks is coming true—Slovakia has its own archbishop 
in close relation to the Cyrilomethodian tradition, which runs through the history of the 
nation as a red thread. The desire for an independent Slovak province survived on 
these Cyrilomethodian roots, which would become the guarantee of the preservation 
of the faith, the faith which is the spiritual culture of the nation.’626 The head of the 
Office of Religious Affairs followed up by claiming that ‘in one heart, there can be love 
for God and for one’s homeland.’627 The official authorities also began to use the 
‘historical’ national emblem (the double cross on three hills) during church events. 
Most notably, on the day of the appointment of the archbishop of Trnava, the 
cathedral was adorned with this ‘historical’ Slovak national emblem flag. 
All of these changes signalled a significant change in the position of the 
Catholic hierarchy in the official construction of the national identity of the Slovak 
socialist nation. Prior to the appointment of Archbishop Sokol, major religious 
changes had not been the subject of official attention. For example, when the 
independent Slovak province was enacted in 1977, the official authorities made sure 
that the event did not take on national importance. They also prevented the head of 
the Trnava diocese at that time, Bishop Julius Gábriš, from using the opportunity to 
present the Church as part of national history. Now after more than ten years, the 
official authorities sought to make the hierarchy an important agent in the 
construction of a nationalist narrative of Slovak history. The official authorities now 
encouraged the Catholic episcopate to participate in the discussion on the new 
constitution.628 During the appointment ceremony of Archbishop Sokol at Trnava 
Cathedral, Vincent Máčovský, the head of the Office of Religious Affairs, informed the 
congregation ‘about the preparation of a new constitution and laws, which will be in 
accord with international agreements.’629 We will never learn what exactly the role of 
the Church hierarchy would be in these discussions as these negotiations were 
brought to an abrupt end in November 1989. Nonetheless, these were all significant 
changes that placed the Church, and the Church hierarchy especially, into a key 
position in the construction of nationalised culture and indirectly also the nationalised 
public Catholic   culture. Yet these changes did not seem to satisfy the underground 
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community, especially as the forces calling for a democratic political system were 
rapidly expanding both in Czechoslovakia and in the region more widely.  
 
4.2. Official Nationalised Culture, the Catholic Church and the Underground 
Catholic Community  
The underground Church sensed that these changes within the official Church and in 
its position in official culture were not intended as a first step towards a more 
autonomous, or ‘freer’, Church and autonomous nationalised public Catholic culture. 
The underground Church began to lose interest in some of the major changes taking 
place within the official Church.630 If, during the early 1980s, the underground 
journals would celebrate any sign of a stronger position of the hierarchy, by the last 
years of the decade, most of the main journals ignored them. This was for a number 
of reasons. First, the ordination of the archbishop of Trnava suggested that the 
official Church had embraced a very different notion of ‘national church’ and 
nationalised culture. Second, these changes were accompanied by the suppression 
of the underground Catholic leaders by official authorities and a disregard for the 
underground communities on the part of the official Church.  
The underground Church disagreed with the close connection between the state 
and the official Church. As Pavol Abrhan wrote to Augustín Navratil, the co-ordinator 
of the Petition for Religious Freedom, ‘we rejoice that we have an archbishop, but we 
are sad because Čarnogurský is still imprisoned.’631 Other underground Catholics 
were puzzled by the continued strong presence of Pacem in Terris, the association of 
priests loyal to the communist state. ‘Why is Pacem in Terris still working?’ inquired a 
group of priests from Košice in a letter circulated in the Catholic samizdat.632 
Furthermore, the underground Church communities were disgruntled by the fact that 
they could no longer organise their programme in official Church spaces. During 
pilgrimages in 1989, the official Church organised all-night programmes at the 
churches and thus took up the space and time used by the underground 
communities. As a consequence, the underground groups were effectively pushed 
out by the official Church. Bishop Korec, the underground Church leader, who had in 
1986 and 1987 attended the pilgrimages and played an important role in creating the 
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feeling of a powerful underground community, was now conspicuously absent, both 
from the Šaštín and the Gaboltov pilgrimages. The new official leaders of the Church 
even began to indirectly criticise the Church, calling on laity to fully obey the Catholic 
hierarchy and not contribute to creating ‘anarchy’ within the Church. Indeed, in a 
1989 article, one of the newly ordained bishops, FrantišekTondra, argued that 
Catholics needed to trust bishops and that the Church laity needed to stop 
contributing to ‘anarchy’ within the Church, emphasising that the laity needed to obey 
the hierarchy.633  
However, for all their respect for hierarchy, the underground Catholics were not 
going to heed these calls. Their understanding of a nationalised public Catholic   
culture was not limited simply to a strong hierarchy—they imagined the Church as 
related to the nation. At this point this connection meant that all independent groups 
and initiatives should be considered legitimate participants in the transformation of 
society. Considering the state’s initiatives to be insufficient, the underground 
Catholics believed that they could still fight for their own understanding of a national  
culture as a culture that was shaped, not only by the hierarchy, but also by the laity 
and what is more independently from the state. Catholic samizdat journals continued 
to be published and the underground networks kept working until November 1989. 
However, for the time being, these diverging views on what the relationship between 
the Church, the state and the nation should be did not translate into open clashes 
over the nationalised public Catholic culture.  
The last pilgrimage to Šaštín on the feast of Our Lady of Sorrows before the fall 
of state socialism in November 1989 saw two parallel programmes. On one hand, 
there was an all-night programme organised by the official Church. This programme 
was focused on faith and, unlike the previous programmes organised by the 
underground Church, did not show any discontent with the current religious policies. 
The underground Catholics continued to present their demands and did not accept 
the role of the hierarchy as the only representative of the Catholic Church in the 
semi-public debate about the reform of the Czechoslovak constitution.  
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Groups of underground Catholics wanted to use the pilgrimage to get involved in 
the debate on the reform of the Czechoslovak constitution. Catholic activist Pavol 
Abrhan found it appropriate to discuss the issue in the national basilica at the 
national pilgrimage.634 In a proclamation that was more a manifesto than a prayer, 
they said they wanted to look for ‘the truth about our national emblem and about our 
nation.’635 He concluded, ‘...we trust our patron saint... and hope that in the future, 
our nation will be of its own right...in the European community of nations.’636 Abrhan’s 
speech in Šaštín was remembered by many as the ‘most memorable moment.’637 
Their programme started with a song that had very little to do with Our Lady of 
Sorrows: ‘Slovakia my Fatherland.’638 Prayers comprised a rather insignificant part of 
the programme, and only one out of five songs was dedicated to the Virgin Mary, the 
rest featured the Slovak nation. For comparison, in 1985, only one out of seven 
songs was nationally themed.639 However, the November events which led to the fall 
of state socialism removed the central agent of this project and the issue of 
sovereignty was pushed into the background as democracy became the theme of the 
day. The underground Catholics were almost immediately mobilised by this 
discourse. The November events might have fully exposed the great difference 
between these two views of the nature of a ‘national church’.  
For the time being, the nationalised public Catholic culture was thus being 
shaped from two different directions, top-down by the official Church and bottom-up 
by the underground community. The symbol of Our Lady of Sorrows was accordingly 
invested with two different meanings. Whilst for the official Church the National 
Patroness remained a symbol of the faith of the nation, for the underground Church 
its meaning was already more politicised, related to the questions of Slovakia’s 
political future. We will never know how far the Church, or indeed the official 
authorities, would have allowed this development of nationalised public Catholic   
culture to continue on two parallel levels. November 1989 saw the end of state 
socialism and the end of the state control of the Church. As the November events 
eventually turned out for Catholics, they prevented a division and in fact helped to 
                                                          
634 
 Šaštín ’89 PAPA. 
635 
 Ibid. p. 2 
636 
 Ibid. p. 2 
637 
Jozef Vlkovič, interview with the author; Mikloško, interview with the author; Šulavíkova, interview 
with the author.  
638 
 Šaštín 1989, PAPA.  
639 
 Šaštín 1985, PAPA. 
194 
 
unify the Catholic Church and thus place nationalised public Catholic culture in strong 
position after November 1989.  
5. Catholics and the ‘Gentle Revolution’  
As we have seen throughout this chapter, a newly emerging nationalised public 
Catholic culture was not the product of the post-communist period—it was firmly 
rooted in the 1980s developments within various groups of Catholics. Indeed, by the 
end of the decade, the communist authorities were—in conjunction with the Church 
hierarchy—significantly contributing to the shaping of a nationalised public Catholic 
culture. This role of official authorities was apparent especially in the increased use of 
religious-national symbols, and the construction of Catholic national memories. 
Relatedly, the Church hierarchy now recognised the Communist authorities as 
potentially useful partners. As a result, the divides within the Church were deeper and 
deeper exactly because the underground church, influenced by civic dissent and 
embracing ideas of political democracy, now found themselves to be at a much 
greater distance from the Church hierarchy than they had been earlier in the decade. 
However, the gradual collapse of Communism was to change all of this. In the days 
leading up to the system’s ultimate demise, the hierarchy began to gravitate towards 
the underground church. Leading members of the hierarchy joined prominent figures 
in the underground Church to express support for what increasingly appeared to 
them to be a major political shift on the near horizon. 
 
Revealing the level of the Church’s involvement in the build-up to the November 
1989 strikes, the Czech and Slovak hierarchy, together with a large number of 
pilgrims, were in Rome, celebrating the canonisation of St. Agnes of Bohemia. On the 
17th of November 1989, when the first student demonstrations in Prague began, 
hundreds of leading Czech and Slovak Catholics were at St. Peter’s in Vatican 
square rather than on November squares in Czechoslovakia. Archbishop Ján Sokol, 
the newly appointed leader of the Slovak ecclesiastical province, also attended the 
ceremony. Bishop Ján Korec was also present, already wearing the insignia of a 
bishop. It was highly probable that his appointment to one of the dioceses in Slovakia 
(most probably Nitra) was approaching.  
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The first demonstrations began in Prague on 17 November, International 
Students’ Day, which, in 1989, was also the fiftieth anniversary of the Nazis’ 
repression of Czech universities. On that day, a peaceful gathering organised by the 
Socialist Association of Youth turned into a demonstration for broader political 
changes and was eventually violently suppressed by the police. In Bratislava, about 
200 students demonstrated on Thursday 16 November and demanded a dialogue 
about problems in the educational system.640 On 19 November, one day after 
individual groups of Slovak civic dissent and intellectuals had discussed the 
possibilities of civic mobilisation, about 500 people met and formed a broad civic 
movement Verejnosť Proti Násiliu, ‘Public Against Violence’,(VPN), which became 
the Slovak counterpart of the Civic Forum (OF), established simultaneously in 
Prague.641 The Catholics welcomed the demonstrations but still kept their own 
dissenting behaviour within religious spaces. By Monday, 20 November, popular 
protest had grown enormously – it had spilled into the Bratislava theatres, where 
actors went on strike. Students were beginning to hold assemblies, and by the next 
day the activity had spread all over Slovakia: Wednesday’s newspapers reported 
demonstrations in Košice, Banská Bystrica, Žilina, Zvolen, Trnava and Martin.642 
Initially the Catholic activists did not join them. They were not passive, but they kept 
to church spaces. A good illustration of their initial reaction is the action of the 
Catholic activists at the Trnava pilgrimage in mid-November, who gathered at the 
traditional annual Trnava Novena, a local Marian feast, and prayed for the release of 
the detained Catholic and civic activists.643 
 Eventually It was figures from the hierarchy who had the greatest impact on 
encouraging the involvement of Catholics in protest. The leading figure of November 
1989 from the Catholic hierarchy was initially Cardinal Tomášek, who joined in the 
bottom-up mobilisation for support of radical change. On the day of his return from 
Rome, he published a declaration to ‘All people of Czechoslovakia,’ encouraging 
Catholics not to stand aside from protest. ‘In this fateful hour of our history,’ appealed 
Tomášek, none of you should stand aside. Let’s raise our voice again, in unity with 
other citizens of our country, Czechs and Slovaks and with members of minorities, 
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believers and non-believers. The right to religious freedom cannot be severed from 
other democratic rights. Freedom is inseparable.’644 Tomášek also advocated the end 
of the one party monopoly on power. Archbishop Sokol, by contrast, was much more 
careful not to move away from the recently achieved co-operation with the socialist 
state too quickly. Archbishop Sokol sent a letter to all ordinaries and bishops in 
Slovakia, on the same day as Tomášek. In it he announced that, ‘since our Catholic 
Church is part of society, which is undergoing the process of democratisation, we 
have to take an official stance.’ By this time Sokol was already under pressure from 
within the Church in Slovakia. A leading group of young seminarians (candidates for 
priesthood) joined the students by gathering at the statue of the 18th century 
nationalist poet Ján Hollý and signing national songs.645 They were led by Alojz 
Martinec, one of the leading figures of Pacem in Terris, a well-known nationalist 
historian who would, after November 1989, become one of the central advocates for 
placing the Church at the centre of national history.646 On the next day, 22 
November, Sokol issued a declaration that supported the call for respect of human 
rights but did not explicitly reject the Communist Party. ‘I join the people of 
Czechoslovakia and many leading functionaries in this country and the whole world, 
in protest against this brutal violence, trampling on human dignity and violation of 
basic human rights. I hope that there will be people democratically elected.’ 
Importantly, however, Sokol did not call on Catholics to mobilise. Instead, he called 
on them to ‘pray so that violence would stop.’647 It took almost another week for Sokol 
to call for Catholic popular mobilisation.  
In the meantime, members of the underground Church began to mobilise in 
support of the Czech and Slovak students. In over 14 declarations, the first of which 
appeared on  23 November 1989, groups that had previously mobilised within the 
underground Church began to demand changes.648 They supported the demands of 
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the Czech and Slovak students and added their own demands. Three themes were 
paramount. First, the activists repeated some of their demands voiced in 1988, and 
these included an end to ‘discrimination against believers at schools, cultural 
institutions, in factories and scientific institutions’, to allow the establishment of an 
independent association of party members as well as those who do not belong to the 
party’, an end to censorship, and a greater allowance of religious publications.649 
Second, they repeated their demands for ‘moral renewal.’ The Movement of Christian 
Families challenged the dominance of the ‘atheist worldview’ in culture and 
demanded an ‘adequate’ role for religions and the abolishment of, in their view, 
‘demoralising and destructive sexual education.’650 A group of seminarians 
condemned the current political system as totalitarian, ‘leading to the deformation of 
true values.’651 Implicit in these demands was the basic claim that any truly ‘moral’ 
system had to respect Catholic values. These Catholics however, did not present the 
Catholic Church as a strong leader in the cause of this moral renewal. In fact they 
saw the current state of the Church as a symptom of broader moral ‘decay.’652  
Last but not least, the activists demanded an end to the close co-operation 
between Church and state. Emboldened by the society-wide mobilisation, the 
underground Catholics criticised the Church’s involvement with the state. It may well 
be that the events of November 1989 allowed these Catholics to voice the criticism 
they did not dare to say publicly before November, in fear of repression not only from 
the state, but also from the Church hierarchy. An activist priest Anton Srholec saw 
1989 as the beginning of the Church’s internal renewal as well as its work on 
renewing society at large. The Church was, in his view, ‘facing a difficult task: to 
genuinely atone, overcome fear, sympathise with the poor and un-free nation. We 
should become the conscience of the nation, spokesperson of her demands 
in…service, to make clear that we are not after money and prestige.’653 The 
Movement of Christian Families, which, since 1985, had been the fastest growing 
group within the underground community, demanded that the leaders of the Church 
begin to ‘publicly defend the interests of believers and other citizens and not let them 
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be abused by the authorities of the state.’ They also rejected Pacem in Terris priests 
as ‘representatives of the Church.’ They also protested the official labelling of the 
underground Church as an heir to a ‘clerical-fascist’ state.654 ‘We have our own 
views’, they asserted, which ‘matured under the conditions of real socialism and we 
reject the view that they had been forced upon us by émigrés.’ The Lay Apostolate 
around Mikloško and Jukl criticised current Church policies, claiming that a ‘state that 
constantly interferes with the internal matters of the Church is not a democratic 
state.’655 All these declarations demanded the separation of the Church from state 
control. It initially seemed that some in the official hierarchy might eventually abandon 
their support for the state and join in with the society.  
Meanwhile, the head of Slovak Province Archbishop Sokol caught up with this 
bottom-up mobilisation. Following the first common negotiations between the state 
and members of Public Against Violence, Sokol, as the head of the Slovak province, 
publicly supported PAV and called on all Catholics to join this movement.656 By this 
time, VPN had been joined by Čarnogurský. However, the rest of the hierarchy did 
not follow Sokol’s lead yet; they did not show any signs of abandoning their recently 
inaugurated state-oriented cultural nationalism. At the end of November 1989, the 
Slovak hierarchy published a letter to all believers in which it announced the 
beginning of the ‘Year of Faith’ and related this year to the 370th anniversary of the 
death of three Catholic ‘martyrs of Košice’ who died during the Reformation. 
According to the Slovak hierarchy, the message of the story of these martyrs for 
Catholics was to stay away from politics. As the hierarchy put it, the martyrs were 
‘victims of the confrontation between different confessions, which were marked by 
different political interests.’657 Rather than encouraging societal engagement, they 
called on Catholics to focus on faith. Indeed, the only priest present at the main 
November stage at the Slovak National Uprising Square in Bratislava was Anton 
Srholec, a priest who, after 1989, would be suspended from his service for 
unorthodox views. In the meantime, Čarnogurský came to the centre stage of the 
demonstrations. The imprisonment helped gain Čarnogurský the large following 
necessary for his long-term project of establishing a Christian political movement. He 
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was now the ‘martyr,’ a suitable leader for the Catholic nationalists, but also more 
broadly for the Slovak society. 
In the meantime, the demonstrations led to changes in the highest echelons of 
the party. Wednesday, 22 November, saw another trial of Čarnogurský, which 
attracted a crowd of protesters who outside the courtroom demanded his freedom. 
Daily rallies began on SNP (Slovak National Uprising) Square in Bratislava, and 
Alexander Dubček appeared before the crowd, as VPN demanded access to the 
press and television. On the 24 November, Dubček appeared in Prague alongside 
Havel, the dissident Czech playwright and Civic Forum leader. Later that night, the 
entire presidium of the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia resigned. Miloš Jakeš, 
current General Secretary who had only recently replaced Husák, was now replaced 
by an unknown Karel Urbánek. On Saturday, between half a million and a million 
people met in Letná, Prague, as the crowds had outgrown Wenceslas Square, while 
some 70,000 people assembled in Bratislava. Havel announced that Ladislav 
Adamec, the Czechoslovak prime minister, had met a delegation from the Prague 
based Občanské Forum, OF, and that President Husák had stopped the prosecution 
of Čarnogurský and a number of other dissidents. On 27 November, a 2-hour general 
strike gained wide support across the country, symbolising that, according to Karen 
Henderson, ‘the working class and intellectuals were pulling together for the first time 
since the Communist takeover.’658 From that moment, the regime collapsed very 
rapidly. When the Czechoslovak government next met the citizens’ movements the 
day after the strike, it was talking not only to Havel (only released from jail in May 
1989), but also to Čarnogurský, who had been released the previous Saturday. In 
Bratislava, VPN began negotiating with the Slovak government, and one of its first 
demands – the removal of Article 4 of the constitution, guaranteeing the lead role of 
the Communist Party – was almost immediately conceded by the Federal Assembly 
in Prague on 29 November.  
The underground Catholic activists would form the leading post-1989 political 
party. They began their political mobilisation in December 1989 (the Christian 
Democratic Movement would be officially launched in January 1990). The 
politicisation of most of the Catholic dissent movement happened independently of 
the ‘liberal’ VPN. In a matter of months, Catholic dissidents issued an appeal for the 
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establishment of Christian Democratic clubs. This mobilisation lasted several months. 
In the meantime, the Christian Democratic Movement gained positions in the 
executive and legislative structures of state (Čarnogurský was appointed vice-
chairman of the Federal Assembly).659 From December 1989 to April 1990, 
Čarnogurský was the first federal vice-prime minister, and from April to June 1990 the 
vice-prime minister of Czechoslovakia.  
In the meantime, some Catholics had begun where they left off during the 
Prague Spring in 1968. They again began to call for swift integration of the 
underground Church leaders into the structures of the official Church. Vladimír Jukl 
returned to the strategy rehearsed in 1968 and called for removal of Pacem in Terris 
members from the leading positions in Church administration and an end to the PiT 
influence in Katolícke Noviny.660 This did not come as fast as the underground 
Church had expected. These Catholics, who, in the last months preceding November 
1989 struggled to understand the hierarchy’s lack of interest in the underground 
Church, were now happy to see Sokol’s support of VPN. They probably saw it as an 
indication of broader support of bottom-up mobilisation by the Catholic Church 
hierarchy. As Jukl wrote for Katolícky Mesačník, ‘We abound with gratitude and 
admiration for our university students and actors, who triggered this chain reaction. 
But we are even more enthusiastic and proud of the reaction of our Church 
dignitaries who reacted promptly, courageously and wisely to the situation.’ Jukl’s 
demand for the removal of PiT functionaries was partially fulfilled in December, at the 
first meeting at the Trnava Archbishopric Office.  
The fact that Jan Sokol, the leading Church dignitary, supported democratic 
mobilisation did not mean that the hierarchy would embrace the underground Church 
wholeheartedly. Archbishop Sokol reacted to the public emergence of secretly 
ordained priests with restraint.661 Indeed, to the great disappointment of some 
formerly underground clergy, clergy loyal to Pacem in Terris were handled with ‘kid 
gloves’, while underground priests came under close scrutiny because of fear from 
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liberal elements within the Church.662 Curiously, this conservatism was supported 
directly from the Vatican - which sought to contain possibly liberal influence from 
formerly underground churches. Moreover, the pope saw the issue of purges and 
debates about collaboration as highly divisive and was determined to prevent any 
division by treading carefully with regard to PiT members.663 Certainly, 
representatives of the secret church wanted something more radical: Jukl argued that 
‘The nation is loyal to the Holy Father…[but] PiT members are a disgrace to the 
Slovak nation.’664 Jukl’s plea was based on the fact that even if PiT was officially 
abolished by the Vatican, its leading members retained their positions.665 Bishop 
Sokol answered by questioning Jukl’s legitimacy as a priest (because of his secret 
ordination.)666 On December 11, 1989, the communist-controlled Pacem in Terris 
was disbanded, alongside its counterparts in the region. Overall, the Catholic Church 
would come out of the November events as a symbol of change and a vehicle of 
post-socialist national identity. The Catholic hierarchy, as well as large groups of lay 
Catholics, had adapted themselves reasonably quickly to the new democratic 
discourse and the emerging democratic system.  
Conclusion 
This chapter attempted to shed some light on the complex process of the 
nationalisation of Catholic identity and the development of nationalised public 
Catholic culture in the last three years before the fall of the socialist state. During this 
period, the process of nationalisation that had begun during the Methodian year 
developed in two respects. First, the underground Church began to understand itself 
as part of a broader history of national emancipation. Second, the first changes in 
official culture helped to turn the Church hierarchy into a symbol of national unity. 
This chapter aimed to examine how nationalised public Catholic culture changed 
through two processes: the institutional and cultural reconstruction of the Catholic 
Church by future Catholic elite and the intensified creation of an ethnic state and 
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culture. The first part of this chapter looked at the mobilisation of underground 
Catholics during the Marian year, roughly spanning the period from September 1987 
to September 1988. During this time, underground Catholics began to perceive 
themselves as ‘national-awakeners’ seeking not only emancipation for the Church as 
an institution, but also free expression of religious communities. In the second phase, 
underground Catholics, as well as patriotic priests, were increasingly presented as 
part of a national mission for sovereignty - this was promoted by the socialist state as 
part of the belated Czechoslovak perestroika. Initially, this official discourse mobilised 
underground Catholics, who understood support of this change as a natural part of 
their cultural nationalism. However, the socialist state did not imagine that this 
‘national church’ would be a result of a bottom-up mobilisation and legitimisation. 
Instead, they imagined a reconstructed centralised and authoritarian patriotic church 
as a leader of this process. This change occurred as part of the broader campaign of 
the promotion of nationalised culture as well as the promotion of culture on par with 
other aspects of socialist life. It was presented within the concept of a patriotic church 
and as a fulfilment of the ‘Cyrilomethodian heritage’ of close co-operation between 
church and state. Excluding the underground Church, this new arrangement 
threatened to antagonise the underground Church. The official discourse of greater 
national sovereignty, however, helped to preserve a minimal sense of unity within the 
Catholic Church. However, the November events which led to the fall of state 
socialism removed the central agent of this project and the issue of sovereignty was 
pushed into the background as democracy became the theme of the day. The 
change of the status of Our Lady of Sorrows, and the popularity of nationalised public 
Catholic symbols, did not start as a result of the fall of state socialism. Contrary to 
currently dominant histories of Catholicism and nationalism in the last years of state 
socialism and early years of post-socialism, November 1989 was not the only 
important turning point. 
 
 
 
 
203 
 
CHAPTER THREE 
‘The Return to Nitra’ 
Nationalised public Catholic culture after 1989 
On 5 July 1991, the feast day of Saints Cyril and Methodius-- the first post-
Socialist ‘national pilgrimage’ to Nitra took place. It had been more than fifty years 
since the last such pilgrimage took place, since before the Communist Party 
assumed a power monopoly in 1948. Before that, Nitra, a sizable city in central 
Slovakia, was at the core of nationalist and Catholic interpretations of Slovak history. 
Since at least the 1920s, Catholic nationalists had been using Nitra for various 
commemorations and pilgrimages to promote the connection between Slovak 
national autonomy and Slovak Catholicism.667 During this first post-Socialist  ‘national 
pilgrimage’, Jan Ch. Korec, the former leader of the underground Church and now 
the first Slovak Cardinal and Bishop of the Diocese of Nitra, presented the early 
medieval Saints Cyril and Methodius not exclusively as symbols of the Catholic 
Church in Slovakia, but also as symbols of Slovak political autonomy. Korec 
presented a vision of a ‘national Church’ in which Slovak ethnicity was connected 
with Catholicism by memory, values, myths, and symbolism – drawn from blood ties 
and bonds to the land and native traditions.668 Since at least 1985 Korec had 
crusaded tirelessly for a nationalised public Catholic  culture, but now in 1991, in a 
step away from his pre-1989 rhetoric, he no longer evoked Cyril and Methodius to 
promote ‘faith’ as an important part of the national narrative in support of religious 
freedom. His Nitra speech was given at the height of debates about Slovak political 
future and amidst revision of the Czechoslovak constitution. According to public 
opinion polls, most Slovaks agreed that Slovakia should have greater autonomy 
within the Czechoslovak federation – however, they disagreed on how to achieve 
this. On the most general level, Slovaks debated over whether this should be 
achieved in collaboration and through negotiation with the Czech nation, or whether it 
should be a unilateral decision made by Slovak representatives at the Slovak 
National Assembly. Cardinal Korec, by this time the most popular Church 
representative in the country and widely regarded as a leading ‘moral authority,’ 
supported the latter – and mobilised nationalised public Catholic culture in support of 
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national autonomy. According to Korec, the ‘Slovak nation has a right to a life on its 
own; it has a right to sovereignty; it has a right to decide on its own on how it wants to 
develop.’669 This was an important turning point in the shaping of a nationalised 
public Catholic culture in post-Socialist Slovakia.  
This chapter explores how the symbol of Cyril and Methodius acquired this 
meaning and, more generally, how nationalised public Catholic culture developed 
and changed in Slovakia’s first post-Socialist years. The post-Socialist vision of a 
‘national Church’ culture continued to be shaped as a result of a combination of two 
processes: the continued Slovakisation of the Catholic Church and its growing co-
operation with emerging political nationalism. Indeed, the emergence of Cyril and 
Methodius in this specific interpretation is a symbolic expression of the fact that, 
during the first years of the post-Socialist transformation, Catholicism was woven into 
a specific political and nationalist vision of a post-Socialist transformation: one which 
saw greater Slovak autonomy as being central to the renewal and preservation of a 
distinctive Slovak national culture and identity. 
 Most recent scholarship on religion and nationalism after 1989 typically 
observes the rise of Catholic nationalism as a function of freedom of expression and 
as a result of repression of Churches under Communism.670 This chapter follows 
these studies in this assumption, but goes even further. As the previous chapter 
illustrated, by 1989, Catholics from the ranks of the underground Church as well as 
those coming from the official Church, had  contributed to the development of a 
Catholic national culture composed of symbols, collective memories, and events 
which depicted the Church as an intrinsic part of the nation. Although from outside 
the development of this culture may look like a general revival of religion, not unlike 
public revivals in neighbouring countries, including the Czech lands and Hungary, the 
late 1980s ‘revival in Slovakia’ was marked by tensions between the official and the 
underground Church. These tensions stemmed from the fact that the reconstruction 
of the official Church was in part directed by the state, which wanted to use this 
reconstruction to strengthen its own power and to edge the underground Church out 
of the public spaces of the Church (especially pilgrimages). We will never know what 
would have happened; November 1989 brought state socialism to an end, and the 
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nationalised public Catholic culture could be now developed without any restraint. 
With Catholics from the underground Church assuming leading positions in the new 
hierarchy and political elite, the tensions seemed to have been forgotten. Moreover, 
after 1989 Catholics in Slovakia, regardless of their previous relationship to the 
Communist regime, assumed a central position in the construction of post-Socialist 
nationalised culture. After 1989, the Catholic Church was put on a pedestal by a 
range of post-Socialist elites, and this gave it the opportunity to further develop a 
powerful, distinctively national Slovak popular Catholic culture. This meant that 
Catholic national culture moved towards the centre of official nationalised culture, a 
culture which had itself resulted from the influence of many different religious, 
political, and cultural forces: the interventions of the papacy, the first post-Socialist 
interim government, the personal involvement of leading figures in the hierarchy, 
such as Jan Chrysostom Korec, and the rise of the Christian Democratic Movement.  
Between 1990 and 1992, calls for declaring Slovak sovereignty and for deciding 
Slovakia’s future independently of the Czech nation became stronger and stronger. 
The nationalised public Catholic culture stepped forward to play an important role in 
these debates. This was, however, not because all Catholics would support the direct 
involvement of the Church (hierarchy) in political debates. The importance of the 
Catholic Church in these debates was not in the direct political involvement of the 
Church leaders. Rather, the Catholic Church became important through the 
mobilisation of nationalised public Catholic culture, which was used by a variety of 
nationalists, including leading members of the hierarchy, to promote and legitimise 
their views about the Slovaks’ political future. This use of the Catholic culture was a 
result of several developments. First, the nationalised public Catholic culture was 
now maintained not only by the hierarchy, but also by nationalists who sought to 
mobilise this culture in support of various degrees of Slovak autonomy. Second, the 
pope, who had since the early 1980s been considered the central creator of 
nationalised public Catholic culture, did not, at least not publicly, prevent this use of 
Catholic culture. Although the pope’s priority was the rebuilding of post-Socialist 
Churches rather than nation-building, his mission of a return to national ‘Christian 
roots’ could be instrumentalised by those who sought Slovak independence. Within 
this post-Socialist culture, those repertoires of Catholic cultural mobilisation that had 
been developed in the 1980s continued into the 1990s. They became connected with 
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the issue of Slovak political autonomy and were eventually used to legitimise Slovak 
independence.  
1. Nationalised Public Catholic  Culture after 1989  
The development of a post-Socialist nationalised public Catholic  culture was a 
powerful phenomenon of post-Socialism – a feature of the former underground and 
the official hierarchy coming together and playing important roles in the political and 
culture life of early post-Socialist Slovakia. The fusion between Catholicism and an 
ethnically-defined Slovak nation was promoted as national heritage and through 
national symbols on an unprecedented scale. Our Lady of the Seven Sorrows and 
Cyril and Methodius became central to the symbolic construction of the post-Socialist 
nation. These symbols were used to celebrate the various changes that had 
happened in Church life in 1989 – several mass pilgrimages were made to Our Lady 
of the Seven Sorrows to give thanks for the 'renewal of political freedom of society 
and within it also the freedom of the Church.'671 On major feasts, the shrines were 
visited by political leaders. Following the fall of state socialism, leading political 
figures such as President Václav Havel, the Prime Minister of the Slovak Federal 
Republic, Vladimír Mečiar, and others of similar clout visited the shrine of Our Lady of 
the Seven Sorrows in the first year alone.672 Cyril and Methodius underwent an even 
more radical change of status: Nitra quickly metamorphised into the central 
pilgrimage site for devotees of Cyril and Methodius, and these saints became 
symbols of the new post-Socialist Church hierarchy. Together, these symbols, 
narratives, and events came to play a central role in building a new national identity 
for the Slovak nation. This transformation took place as a result of many different 
political, religious and cultural forces: the interventions of the papacy, the change of 
the position of Catholics and Catholicism in the early months of the democratic 
regime, the first post-Socialist interim government. Already at this point separatist 
nationalist voices began to emerge, attempting to mobilise nationalised cultures, 
including Catholic culture, in support of Slovak independence and to turn this 
Catholic culture into the culture of the Slovak nation and for Slovak nation. The 
shaping of nationalised public Catholic   culture was in the first months, however, fully 
at the hand of underground Catholics and the Catholic hierarchy, who focused on the 
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promotion of Christianity in the public sphere. In doing so, they focused their energies 
on building a strong Christian presence and on cooperating with both the Czechs and 
the Hungarians. The Church was imagined as an integral part of the nation, but this 
was motivated by cultural rather than political nationalism. In the following section, 
I will analyse in greater depth why popular Catholic culture gained central importance 
during post-Socialist transformation, and explain the centrality of Catholic national 
memory, symbols, and events to the post-Socialist culture as well as how and to what 
ends these cultural repertoires were used by the Slovak hierarchy and by Christian 
Democrats.  
1.2.  ‘Christian Europe’ after 1989  
The fall of state socialism marked a new stage in the development of the papal vision 
of Christian Europe, a stage at which he could be ever more directly involved in the 
promotion of his vision directly in Eastern European countries. With the newly 
acquired political freedom, freedom of expression, and free assembly and the related 
end of official regulation of Church life, the project of a united Christian Europe could 
move ahead. Indeed, within a matter of months after the November ‘Velvet 
Revolution’ events, the pope travelled on his first official visit to Czechoslovakia. As 
he told audiences in Prague, Velehrad and Bratislava, the post-Socialist nations, in 
his view, needed not only political and economic but also ‘spiritual and moral 
renewal.’ The pope returned to his vision of Churches as leading creators of 
nationalised culture that encouraged Churches to break free from control of the state 
and become more involved with the people and with the nation and return to a ‘true’ 
nationalised culture. During his Prague visit, he reiterated that this culture and this 
position of the Church stemmed directly from the history of these nations. According 
to the pope, the previous regime was ‘in discord with national traditions.’ And since in 
his view, the life of the nations in Central and Eastern Europe is still ‘paralysed by the 
effects of repressive enforcement’ of this ‘materialist ideology,’ if these nations 
wanted to revive themselves they needed to return to their ‘authentic national 
histories.’673 The pope thus encouraged the shaping of a national Catholic culture, 
but it is important to note that he was not encouraging political nationalism or ethnic 
politics. 
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Rather, the pope promoted a certain cultural nationalism – a nationalism that 
encouraged nations to turn to their nationalist Catholic symbols and narratives. He 
encouraged these nations to do so not in rivalry but in cooperation with other nations 
in building a common Christian civilisation. This papal nationalism encouraged 
looking back to ethnic roots but did not endorse defensive ethnic politics. This 
reminiscing and sorting through national histories was supposed to lead these 
nations to greater awareness of the importance of Christianity and to encourage 
greater unity with other nations with Christian origins. This was especially pertinent in 
the case of Czechoslovakia.  
When the pope visited Czechoslovakia in the spring of 1990, he emphasized the 
‘universal’ dimension of his vision. He had good reasons to do so. The pope visited 
Czechoslovakia amidst the first ethnic clashes. About this time, the so-called Štúr 
Society was established by a group of formerly communist nationalists and began 
campaigns against the Hungarian minority in southern Slovakia.674 This rise in 
intolerance against Hungarians roughly coincided with Hungary’s decision to champion 
the Hungarian minorities in neighbouring states. This was promptly used as a pretext 
for further anti-Hungarian attacks by the newly established Slovak National Party 
(March 1990) and Matica Slovenská.675 The first complications in Czech-Slovak 
relations in this phase and a chance for separatist ultranationalists to mobilise 
beyond ethnic politics occurred in connection with the new name of the state. These 
separatist nationalists remained a marginal group electorally and would play a 
marginal role in the shaping of nationalised public Catholic culture. During his visit the 
pope nonetheless emphasized the importance of cooperation. In the light of these 
developments, the pope emphasized that national spiritual renewal of Central 
European nations had to go hand in hand with a ‘deepening of European 
unity…mutual understanding…peace and respect for human rights.’ As always, the 
pope presented a rather grand vision.  
However, as we have seen in the previous chapters, whether and in what ways 
the individual Catholic communities would follow this vision depended on various 
factors. The most crucial factor was the character of official nationalism. As has been 
analysed in the previous chapter, before 1989 Catholics had returned to nationalist 
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Catholic discourse within the context of cultural nationalism and the struggle for 
religious freedom and human rights. The National Patroness, Our Lady of the Seven 
Sorrows and Cyril and Methodius, and the narratives related to them were evoked to 
support these causes. This fusion was happening on two levels, in the underground 
and in the official Church. Now, after 1989 the position of Catholics changed. For the 
Catholics in Slovakia this broad agenda would soon focus on creating a nationalised 
culture of Slovaks and for Slovaks. However, in the first months following the ‘Velvet 
Revolution’ the Catholic nationalists in Slovakia, both from underground and from the 
official Church would together focus on a programme of ‘moral renewal’, and this 
programme would not yet involve a decrease in cooperation with the Czechs or the 
Hungarians.  
1.3. Catholics in Slovakia after 1989 
The fall of state socialism in Central and Eastern Europe brought the end of 
official control of the Church and constraints on religious participation in the public 
sphere. The developments in the first months after the fall of the communist regime 
brought an entirely new situation for the Catholic Church in Slovakia, one which 
created favourable conditions for the long-wished freedom from state control. The 
implosion of the socialist state spelled the end of state control over the Catholic 
Church, which had been the basic demand of Catholic activists throughout the late 
1980s.676 The situation of religious groups was one of the priorities of the new 
political elites. As the Communist Party lost its monopoly on power, an interim 
government was formed together with dissidents from human rights movements and 
the underground Church, with the goals of preparing free elections and setting up a 
separate legislature, executive and judiciary, facilitating the transformation to a 
market economy, enacting a new constitution, and last but not least preparing a law 
on religious freedom.677 The structures of state control of the Church created by the 
communist state began disappearing one by one. The fall of state socialism was 
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followed by the banning of Pacem in Terris (PiT) and the Office for Church Affairs, 
which had regulated public expressions of Catholicism.678  
As state control was receding, the Vatican was regaining its traditional influence 
and was re-enabled to appoint new Bishops to long-vacant Bishoprics. The most 
important changes of the Church’s status included the restoration of Czechoslovak-
Vatican diplomatic ties, an invitation to the pope to visit Czechoslovakia (which he did 
in April 1990), the filling of all the vacant episcopal seats by candidates selected by 
Rome and the establishment of Czechoslovakia’s first standing Bishops’ Conference 
(originally urged by Paul VI at the conclusion of the Second Vatican Council in 1965). 
The Church was also able to open new seminaries, and its male and female religious 
orders were reconstituted.679 Catholics in Slovakia, but perhaps the newly forming 
Catholic elite in particular, now had a good chance to move away from the self-
limiting discourse of struggle for freedom of the Church and loyalty to the Vatican to 
broader questions on the role of the Church, and more broadly, Catholicism in the 
transforming society. 
After the revolution, the two levels at which nationalised public Catholic   culture 
was created through construction of Catholic nationalist narratives and symbols 
merged. The revolution was the beginning of the process of bringing these two 
strands of discourse and practice together in the creation of nationalised public 
Catholic culture. As described in the previous chapter, by 1989 the two-level creation 
of Catholic culture was determined by a different understanding of the Church-state 
and nation-state relationships. Both groups believed that Catholicism was the central 
source of national renewal, but whilst the underground Catholics, mainly consisting of 
laity, believed that this was supposed to be a bottom-up process involving 
cooperation with civil society and support for democracy, the second group, which 
began to form around official hierarchy on the eve of the revolution, seemed inclined 
to believe that the creation of a ‘national Church’ was essentially a matter of 
acknowledgement of the Church’s role by the state. Although both of these strands 
essentially supported the fusion of Catholic and national identity, there was a chance 
that they might become estranged should the communist state continue to exist and 
seek to suppress any unauthorised bottom-up mobilisation. November 1989 and the 
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hierarchy’s detachment from the state and support for popular mobilisation changed 
this situation and prepared the ground for future rapprochement of these two strands. 
This development continued after 1989.  
The character of post-socialist transformation further reinforced this convergence. 
Several changes prepared the ground for a further coming together of these two 
strands. First, underground Catholics entered into post-socialist politics, when in 
February 1990 a group of former Catholic dissidents formed one of the strongest 
political movements, the Christian Democratic Movement (KDH); they thus moved 
from civil society and cultural nationalism toward the political field and the state. 
Second, the Church hierarchy moved in the opposite direction: after 1989 three new 
Bishops were named, all of whom came from the underground Church. The hierarchy 
promptly showed support for the Christian Democrats. Archbishop Ján Sokol at the 
Trnava diocese and the highest ranking hierarch in the Slovak ecclesiastical province 
sent out a letter supporting the formation of the KDH.680 This convergence was thus a 
result of not only the hierarchy’s detachment from the state, but also politicisation of 
underground Catholics. A number of Catholics from the underground communities 
came into the open and gained a variety of leading posts. This meant a stronger 
position in the creation of a nationalised public Catholic culture. The emerging 
Catholic elites were also supported by the emerging media, often led by former 
producers of samizdat publications.681 The end of censorship saw an increase in the 
number of public Catholic print media.682 Katolícke Noviny, the former stronghold of 
the Pacem in Terris Association, now became interested in the laity, and their 
production was no longer confined to the hierarchy and clergy.683 Indeed, top lay 
leaders of the underground Church became editors of Katolícke Noviny.684 In fact, 
one of the leading pre-1989 editors of the samizdat Rodinné Spoločenstvo, Jozef 
Zavarský, became the new editor-in-chief of Katolícke Noviny.685 The institutional 
consolidation of the Church and its greater presence in the public sphere prepared 
the ground for the expansion of nationalised public Catholic   culture, especially as it 
was combined with unprecedented public appreciation of non-communist cultures. 
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The following section describes how non-Catholic post-socialist elites strengthened 
the position of Catholic nationalised culture and influenced its direction.  
1.4. Anti-communist National Identity and Nationalised Public Catholic 
Culture    
After 1989 the construction of nationalised public Catholic culture was supported due 
to the broader focus on the construction of an anti-communist and non-communist 
national identity. During the early months of post-socialist transformation, 
nationalised culture was created and mobilised as part of the efforts to condemn the 
past communist regime and legitimise the new democratic one. The new elites 
perceived themselves as initiating the moral renewal of society. Religion, as a system 
focused on maintaining morality, now gained a central role in this project. Although 
not traditionally religious, President Havel viewed Christianity as a ‘moral compass 
for the modern era.’686 This appreciation of Christianity was, however, more 
specifically, an appreciation of its role in the construction of non-communist national 
identity. According to Havel, ‘Our two nations – Czechs and Slovaks – were not free 
to realize their national sovereignty for long decades and centuries.’687 
Deconstruction of old symbols and narratives and construction of new ones became 
central to reckoning with the former political system.688 The symbols of the 
communist regime (such as the ubiquitous five-pointed red star) were being erased in 
favour of new symbols; the central figures and histories of the old regime (the Slovak 
National Uprising or the Prague Uprising) were being replaced with new figures and 
pasts (Czechoslovakia’s inter-war president, Tomas Garrigue Masaryk, or the leader 
of the Slovak People’s Party Andrej Hlinka). These leading post-socialist political 
forces made it clear that their primary task was the ‘moral’ renewal of society and that 
central to this ‘moral renewal’ was a return to ‘authentic national symbols’ and 
authentic ‘histories.’ Various public commemorations, organized by forces which 
perceived the past or ‘national memory’ as an important source of thought about non-
communist arrangements of the state and society, became an important part of post-
socialist public discourse. Catholics, Catholic symbols, and Catholic interpretations of 
national history promptly became central to these developments. In the following 
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paragraphs I will explain how Catholicism gained a major role in this discourse and 
how Catholic leaders themselves responded to this change.  
The goal of the dominant post-socialist discourse dominated by former anti-
communist dissent was to break away from the communist past. As James Krapfl 
argues in his cultural history of the ‘Velvet Revolution’ and its aftermath, November 
1989 was initially interpreted in terms of romance, as a triumph of ‘good’ over ‘evil.’ 
Accordingly, the central strategy of the new political and cultural elites was to ‘break 
away…from the recent past and in certain ways to fight against the symbols of this 
regime.’689 The authoritative position of this idea derived from the dominance of anti-
communist dissent in the interim government that formed at round table discussions 
with the Communist Party. In the Czech lands Civic Forum became the leading non-
communist force and in Slovakia Public Against Violence (VPN). Both of these forces 
were led by former members of Czech and Slovak dissent, including members of the 
underground Catholic communities in Slovakia. Several members of the underground 
Church became members of the interim government and the national assembly. 
František Mikloško became one of the leading figures of the VPN. Ján Čarnogurský 
established the Christian Democratic Movement, which promptly became the most 
powerful party in Slovakia. Catholics, and more broadly the Catholic Church as an 
institution, would quickly begin to play a central role in this post-socialist change. 
There were, however, also cultural reasons for this position of the Catholic Church.   
The period under communism was interpreted by the now-ruling former 
dissidents as a time of moral decay, materialism and the rule of an anti-national elite 
that served the Soviet Union, compromised national sovereignty and had no sense of 
‘spirituality. ‘True’ transformation, according to these new leaders, demanded action 
by forces such as the Catholic Church. One of the central voices was again President 
Havel. Initially, the focus was on the ‘universal values’ of human rights and solidarity. 
These new values and this new national identity were presented as being the 
opposite of the past system, a system that was cast as a symbol of ‘moral decay.’ 
Socialist politics and politics more generally were presented as an immoral way of 
achieving illegitimate interests. In addressing the country on New Year’s Day 1990, 
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Havel spoke about the legacy of the ‘totalitarian state.’ He described the 
‘obsolescence of the economy, the environmental degradation, and the deficits in 
education’ and last but not least the unwanted legacy of ‘contaminated moral 
environment.’690 Communism was seen as aberration in national history. The goal, 
however, was not simply to dismantle communism but also to legitimise the new 
democratic order.  
The second reason why Catholicism was central to this change was the 
importance of history to the building of a post-socialist national identity. The Catholic 
Church, as the only non-communist institution which (alongside other Churches) 
remained existent during communism, could present this more spiritual national 
identity as having been in existence before communism and preserved during 
communism. Reviving the parts of history that had been supressed by the 
Communist regime was central to the process of post-communist transformation:691 
previously forgotten or supressed pasts emerged into public discourse as a function 
of the post-1989 ‘liberation.’ The return of these histories to public discourse was 
initially perceived as a symbol of victory over the past regime, because they had 
been among the most constrained areas in the previous regime, in Czechoslovakia 
as well as in other countries in the region. Shortly after the Velvet Revolution the 
major Slovak daily Smena challenged Slovak historians to ‘concentrate ... on forming 
a true historic consciousness among our people.’692 According to the American 
historian James Mace Ward, a common demand in the first months following 
November 1989 was for the victims of communism including politicians, writers, 
journalists, religious people, and members of discriminated groups, to be 
rehabilitated.693 An important part of this recovery was a new appreciation of pre-
communist figures and events related to the Catholic Church.  
If the goal was to return power to people, as was famously maintained by Havel, 
this also meant returning an ‘authentic’ social life and collective identity to the nation; 
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this meant being national and anti-communist. Havel talked about the ability of 
people to not be simply a product of their external world but to actively change 
themselves and the human condition, ‘to make their own history.’694 The first post-
Communist president called for restoration of ‘Masarykian morality’ to politics. 
Accordingly, Havel appealed to Czechs and Slovaks to ‘restore this concept of 
politics…(to)  teach ourselves and others that politics should be an expression of the 
desire to contribute to the happiness of the community rather than of a need to cheat 
or rape the community…Politics can be…the art of improving ourselves and the 
world.’695 Although the call for restoration of morality resonated with similar calls in 
Slovakia, the situation was different, especially as far as historical referents were 
concerned.  
The identification with the first president of first Czechoslovak Republic was not 
so widely shared among the population at large and more specifically among Catholic 
elites. These elites began to look to different historical figures and indeed different 
pasts which, in their view, better represented the vitality of Christianity for the Slovak 
nation. However, during the first months after the revolution, this difference was not 
visible. Catholic elites seemed to identify with the values included in the Havel’s 
concept of ‘Masarykian morality.’ The mutuality was certainly strengthened by the 
fact that the Catholic Church was repeatedly presented by Havel and early post-
socialist elites as being simultaneously an embodiment of the morality of this nation, 
the guardian of this morality and a source of change. In fact, post-socialist political 
elites did not demand simply any national identity: by being the very opposite of 
communism, Christianity was held up as an important source of change.  
1.5. The Catholic Church and National Renewal  
President Havel argued that ‘the Catholic Church and Christianity in general helped 
society to recover [after 1989],’696 and coverage of the papal visit in the non-religious 
media, but especially in lifestyle magazines, showed that this view was not held by 
the President only: in 1990 these journals featured interviews with Catholic Bishops 
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and former Catholic dissidents about the need for moral renewal.697 The new elites, 
as well as the popular discourse, perceived Christianity as a positive and crucial force 
in the transformation, and nothing seemed to be standing in the way of free public 
participation of Catholics and the production of a discourse within which the 
questions of Catholic and national identity and their relationship to one another could 
be addressed and which would contribute to creating nationalised public Catholic 
culture.  
The task for the Catholic Church was to engage in this ‘moral renewal’ of society 
and help the nation return to its ‘authentic identity’ and ‘authentic history.’ At the first 
post-November 1989 meeting of Church and political leaders Milan Čič, the interim 
Slovak prime minister, asked the Catholic episcopate to assist the government in the 
‘moral and general renewal of our society,’ to help the government renew the morality 
and patriotism of citizens.’698 This role of the Churches stemmed from what Čič called 
the ‘[previous] patriotic’ role they played in maintaining nationalised culture during 
communism and at its end.’699 The Catholic Church was also encouraged by the 
support of the papacy, which enjoyed wide popularity at the time, as evidenced by 
the widely popular visit of Pope John Paul II in April 1990,700 which was a major event 
for all Catholics and many non-Catholics alike. This visit was a moment during which 
Churches were installed as symbols of ‘national renewal’ and ‘brotherly unity in 
diversity.’701 In his welcome speech at the Prague Airport President Havel presented 
the papal visit as an opportunity ‘to remind Czechoslovak citizens of the importance 
of the spiritual dimension of life.’702 Havel welcomed the pope as a ‘harbinger of 
peace, dialogue, mutual tolerance and respect and love’ who comes to a ‘country 
which was being destroyed by an ideology of hatred.’703 Catholic elites were ready to 
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put the Catholic Church in the role of a victim of communism and at the same time 
the victor over communism.  
Czech theologian, sociologist and a former dissident Tomas Halik, writing in the 
early months of the new democratic regime, captured this perception of the Church 
very well. According to Halik, two tendencies were observable in Czechoslovak 
society between the ‘Velvet revolution’ in November 1989 and the papal visit in April 
1990. These were ‘the rising moral authority of the Church and the rapprochement 
between the Church and people.’ This in his view was a continuation of the growing 
sympathy towards the Church in recent years among intellectuals as well as young 
people in cities.’704 In the Czech Republic this new position of the Catholic Church 
was believed to have been achieved by Cardinal Tomášek and his actions on behalf 
of civic dissent and the contacts between the underground Catholic communities and 
civic dissent. After 1989 Tomášek was ready to present the Catholic Church as a part 
of Czech history and Czech identity. When John Paul II arrived in Czechoslovakia, 
Tomášek referred to Czechoslovakia as a ‘country with a glorious Christian 
history.’705 The Czech Catholic Church continued in its programme of a ‘Decade of 
Spiritual Renewal’ (started in 1987), part of which was construction of a Czech 
national Catholic narrative.706 In many ways, this observation also applies to the 
Church in Slovakia; however, it is important to point out several differences. 
Initially, the Church hierarchy in Slovakia did not play a significant enough role for 
a long enough time in the construction of a national narrative and national symbols to 
be ready to play a leading role in the creation of post-socialist nationalised culture 
and provide the nation with ready-made non-communist narratives and symbols. 
Although the Catholic hierarchy appointed before 1989 supported the ‘Velvet 
Revolution’ and quickly embraced the language of a radical breaking away from the 
communist past and the promoting of Catholic symbols,707 their public speeches were 
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characterised by a lack of grounding in the nationalised public Catholic narrative.708 
However, the appointment of new Bishops from the underground Church and the rise 
of the Christian Democratic Movement changed this situation. From the day of his 
appointment, Bishop Jan Ch. Korec, the former clerical leader of the underground 
Church, used almost every public event to promote an understanding of the Catholic 
Church as an integral part of the Slovak nation through contruction of a distinctly 
Catholic national memory, symbols, places, and events. Likewise, the Christian 
Democrats, most of whom were recruited from the underground Church and had 
already embraced the notion of the Church as an integral part of Slovak history, were 
ready to place the Catholic Church at the centre of post-socialist nationalised culture.  
1.6. The historical ‘Christian’ Slovak nation  
The central event in terms of reviving the role of the hierarchy in the construction of 
nationalised public Catholic symbols and national memory and more broadly the 
creation of nationalised public Catholic culture was the appointment of Bishop Korec 
to Nitra. The ordinations of Bishops in Rožňava and Košice were central events of 
the post-socialist Church, but the most publicity was focused on the inauguration of 
Bishop Jan Chrysostom Korec in Nitra. The inauguration of Bishop Korec in April 
1990 in Nitra, the oldest diocese on Slovak territory (dating back to the 9th century), 
was designed as a commemoration of the 9th century mission of Cyril and Methodius 
to Great Moravia (Methodius is believed to have been the first Bishop of Nitra).709 
The appointment of Korec, the clerical leader of the underground Church, to ancient 
Nitra was no coincidence. The choice was made by John Paul II on the 
recommendation of Slovak Cardinal Jozef Tomko (exiled in Rome).710 The point was 
clearly to emphasize that the new hierarchy was related to the historical 
‘Cyrilomethodian tradition.’ Tomko (then Prefect for Evangelisation, exiled in the 
Vatican) was an indefatigable promoter of the Cyrilomethodian tradition, and the 
pope himself, as mentioned in previous chapters, showed an interest in promoting 
the tradition and Nitra as the new centre of the Slovak nation (The pope referred to 
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Korec as the ‘Slovak Wyszyński.’).711 The main effect of Korec’s presence in Nitra 
was public presentation of the new hierarchy as the direct continuation of the first 
hierarchy on Slovak territory. As Tomko maintained in his sermon, Bishop Korec was 
‘the direct successor of Bishop Methodius.’712  
After Korec’s arrival to Nitra, the idea of Nitra as the city of ‘Cyril and 
Methodius’ and as the cradle of Slovak Christian and nationalised culture began to 
be revived. Korec personally worked to return Nitra to its former glory as a pre-1948 
centre of Cyrilomethodian pilgrimages. He used his ordination to fuse the histories of 
the Slovak nation and the Church and to place Nitra at the centre of this narrative. As 
he said, ‘It was here in Nitra where our Christian, cultural and national history began.’ 
As he continued,  
It was here in Nitra where the first Christian Church was built around 828. 
Cyril and Methodius walked upon this land. The first Benedictine monastery 
was located here on Zobor … Nitra was … the epicentre of the spiritual life 
which was developing in the space around Devin, Velehrad and later spread 
towards Prague, Cracow and Eszterghom. In Nitra Jan VIII established the 
first bishopric under Archbishop Method’s leadership. As … John Paul II 
wrote on the 1100th anniversary of the establishment of the Nitra diocese, “A 
great certainty is being born out of the ancient character of Nitra: God has 
always been with us and with the whole of the Church. His continuous 
presence is the guarantee of our [national] life and vitality.”713  
Korec’s reconstructions of Nitra’s place in the narrative of Slovak history drew on 
Catholic nationalist narratives dating back to the 19th century, which presented the 
early Christian history of contemporary Slovak territory as an integral part of the 
history of Catholicism and its relationship with the Slovak nation.714 For Korec this 
national Catholic narrative of Slovak history was the only authentic interpretation of 
Slovak history, the ‘nation’s memory,’ and he was convinced that the Slovak nation 
could not function without this ‘memory.’715 According to Korec a nation which does 
not have or maintain such ‘memory’ is ‘lost.’716  
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The communist regime, in the Bishop’s view, did everything to ‘exclude 
Christians from [national] history, despite the ‘fact’ that the Slovak nation and its 
culture had from its beginnings been connected with the light of the gospel and with 
the great work of Cyril and Methodius.’717 The supposed ‘spiritual decline’ during 
communism was also evident, in his view, in the regime’s ‘misinterpretation’ of Slovak 
history. Korec juxtaposed the present celebration of Cyril and Methodius to the pre-
1989 Slovak National Theatre opera Svätopluk (a figure celebrated as the first 
‘Slovak King’ of the early medieval Great Moravia). The latter was, according to 
Korec, only about ‘pagan rituals’ and was an inauthentic representation of the 
beginnings of Slovak history.718 Korec saw Slovak society as being split between 
those who had lost faith and those who were protecting it during the previous regime. 
According to Korec, communism was not what ‘the nation’ wanted, and the 
underground Church petitions and the demonstration for religious freedom in March 
1988 were all public demonstrations of the fact ‘that in our nation, in Europe, and in 
the world there is only one true spiritual life, whose foundation is in Christ.’719 At this 
point Korec fused national Catholic and nationalist narratives to encourage a 
‘renewal of faith.’ In his view this ‘renewal of faith’ was a central aspect of national 
renewal, since faith ‘preserved the Slovak nation during the years of Godless 
communism.’720  
One of the most important symbols Korec used was that of the ‘burning bush.’ 
Whilst the ‘burning bush’ has taken on many different meanings in Jewish and 
Christian tradition, in the Biblical narrative, the burning bush is the location at which 
Moses was appointed to lead the Israelites out of Egypt and into Canaan. This is 
probably the meaning Korec ascribed to this metaphor: Christianity and Christian 
roots were the source of national liberation for the Slovaks. The forty years spent in 
the desert by the Israelites were commonly used by former Catholic dissent to 
symbolise the forty years of communism, thus emphasising the experience of 
persecution of the Church during this period. The fall of state socialism was likened to 
the Israelite arrival to the ‘promised land’ Canaan.721 Indeed, Christian Democrats 
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and more broadly former Catholic dissidents fully shared this understanding of the 
past forty years. Like Korec, they were ready to utilise their pre-1989 constructs of a 
nationalised public Catholic narrative as part of the post-socialist nationalised public 
Catholic culture and their understanding of Catholic symbols as being firmly anchored 
in this national narrative. Like Korec, they sought to publicize the idea that 
Christianity was vital to the Slovak past, present, and future. Alongside, the Catholic 
hierarchy began to play a central role in organizing and promoting a distinctly 
Catholic national culture: through promotion of Catholic national symbols, memory, 
and events. Indeed, the Catholic-led commemorations during the first year after the 
Velvet Revolution suggested that their common goal was ambitious and one typical 
for the religious revivals of the 1970s, 1980s, and in some cases also the 1990s, 'a 
revival of essential religious principles as a basis of individual morality and social 
organisation.’722 Shortly after 1989 they were joined by two other important actors 
who also sought to intrumentalise nationalised public Catholic culture to attain their 
mostly political agendas.  
1.7. Nationalist Émigrés and ex-Communist Nationalists  
A central role in the creation of a nationalised public Catholic culture and more 
specifically a national Catholic narrative was also played by groups of Slovak émigrés 
who were returning to Slovakia from exile in Rome, Germany, Canada, and the 
US.723 Their contributions to nationalised culture were characterized by the 
identification against the ethnic 'others,’ historical and contemporary, of the Slovak 
nation. Alongside Christian (Catholic) values, these émigrés saw the Slovak 
language and resistance against both Hungarians and Czechs as the most important 
building blocks for Slovak nationalised culture and identity.724 This view was firmly 
anchored in their interpretation of Slovak history, characterized by, as a Slovak 
historian Adam Hudek points out, a ‘clear preference of ethnic over civic principles 
and national independence over a democratic regime.’725 The time when Slovakia 
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was part of Hungary and Czechoslovakia were seen by these émigrés as times of 
repression of Slovak culture and national identity. Some of these émigrés focused on 
pre-communist Catholic nationalism and more specifically on the Slovak state (1939-
1945) as the central positive referent. However, most of the émigrés who played a 
central role in the mobilisation of nationalised public Catholic culture in support of 
Slovak independence focused on other moments of Slovak history, especially the 
early medieval chiefdom of Pribina and Great Moravia as the main historical referent. 
Nonetheless, all of these nationalist émigrés understood the communist past through 
this prism as a ‘Czechoslovakist’ and Soviet attempt to destroy the idea of Slovak 
statehood. Groups of nationalist Slovak émigrés were convinced that this ‘historicity’ 
of the Slovak nation had more concrete meaning for the Slovak nation, that this past 
meant a responsibility for the present to create an independent Slovak state as soon 
as possible. For these nationalists to evoke historicity, whether through national 
memory or symbols, meant to demand Slovak independence. The goal now was not 
only to revive the ‘authentic national identity’, part of which was Christianity, but to 
safeguard Slovak independence in order to protect this reviving Slovak culture and 
identity. They joined the Christian Democrats and the Catholic hierarchy in producing 
a nationalised public Catholic culture. Their views about Slovak history, Slovak 
identity and its implications for Slovak politics were closest to those presented by ex-
communist nationalists.   
Ethnic nationalists who emerged in the late 1960s and were later co-opted by the 
post-1968 communist state also contributed to the creation of nationalised public 
Catholic culture. These Communists returned to the public sphere in Slovakia thanks 
to their support for the creation of a national culture and construction of a national 
identity through rediscovering ‘authentic’ national history championed by early post-
socialist political elites. Indeed, official anti-communism did not mean the 
demonisation of all Communists, particularly not in Slovakia. The Czech case was 
different: the Czech parliament would launch a campaign for the enactment of a 
Lustration Law intended to purge Communists from leading positions of power. In 
Slovakia, nationalist heritage organisations left over from the previous regime were 
encouraged to take part in the post-socialist ‘moral national renewal.’ The heritage 
organisation Matica Slovenska and the Centre of National Development (Národné 
Osvetové Centrum, NOC) were the two leading such institutions. The new political 
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elites, including former dissident activists, sought to re-include national institutions, 
such as Matica Slovenská, into the project of ‘national renewal.’ On 16 June 1990, 
President Havel paid an official visit to Matica. In his speech Havel argued that ‘Our 
two nations, Czechs and Slovaks, were not free to realize their national sovereignty 
for long decades and centuries. This is why their cultural institutions took on special 
political meaning. Matica, as a centre of political education…as the guardian of the 
identity of Slovak nation, has always been indirectly a political institution.’726 Thus 
encouraged, these Communists continued to develop their ethnic understanding of 
the nation, but they also embraced Christianity as an important part of national 
identity. They continued to develop the idea of an ethnic historical Slovak nation, but 
in contrast to their pre-1989 attitudes toward religion, these former communist 
nationalists now gave religion a central role. In their construction of a national 
narrative, they were now returning to the ‘Christian’ roots of Slovak history.727 Matúš 
Kučera, the leading late-socialist nationalist historian, now talked about Christianity 
being at the beginning of Slovak history. According to Kučera, the Cyrilomethodian 
tradition is the ‘memory of the nation,’ and the nation is ‘built on Christian 
foundations.’728 Some ex-communist nationalists now even began to criticise the lack 
of appreciation of the Christianising aspect of the Cyrilomethodian mission during the 
Methodian year of 1985729 and began to support expansion of a nationalised public 
Catholic culture. However, their goal was not simply to support such expansion but 
also to mobilise this culture in support of ethnic policies and prompt attainment of 
Slovak independence. Like the émigré nationalists, these ex-communist nationalists 
saw the Slovak past as binding them to support swift attainment of Slovak 
independence. As one of the leading figures of the Slovak National Party, Jozef 
Prokeš, put it, ‘the coexistence of two nations in one state leads to suppression of the 
identity of one of them.ʼ730 As will be discussed in the second section of this chapter, 
during the next two years the émigrés and ex-communist nationalists sought to 
mobilise Slovak history and symbols in support of the cause of Slovak independence. 
In the process they shaped nationalised public Catholic culture, contributed to its 
expansion, and played an important role in its politicisation. 
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1.8. The Catholic programme of ‘national moral renewal’  
As Catholic elites, both political and ecclesiastical, entered the post-socialist 
public sphere, cultural nationalism, buttressed by evocations of the beginnings of 
Christianity in the Slovak nation and its role throughout history, was at the centre of 
their public engagement. National renewal in terms of ‘spiritual renewal’ was initially 
the central programme of most Catholics. In the first months following the fall of the 
communist regime, ex-dissident Catholics were focused on moral renewal of the 
Slovak nation and accordingly evangelisation of Slovak politics. As far as pastoral 
letters were concerned Bishops were also pre-occupied with moral renewal: the 
central programme of the 1990s was the ‘The Decade of Spiritual Renewal.’731 The 
supposedly poor moral state of the nation and the importance of religion and 
personal conversion to the improvement of this morality became the single most 
important issue of all major sermons and pastoral letters issued by the Slovak 
episcopate.732 Indeed, the central theme of the decade of spiritual renewal was ‘the 
seven deadly sins.’ Beginning in 1990, each half-year would be dedicated to 
meditations over an individual ‘sin.’733 In order ‘to raise moral standards’ they 
proposed religious instruction734 while also seeking re-criminalisation of abortion in a 
joint effort with the federal Bishops’ Conference.735 
The first political force to support this programme was the Christian Democratic 
Movement. Led by Čarnogurský, the Christian Democrats saw it as their common 
task to maintain the morality of the Slovak nation and to return the Slovak nation to its 
‘Christian roots.’ For Christian Democrats, Catholic identity and national identity were 
vitally connected in issues of morality, which was for them the central theme of post-
communist national renewal. The leading figures of the movement were at one in 
criticising the ‘bad moral situation of the nation’. Ján Čarnogurský regularly lamented 
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the poor moral situation in culture, and party member and vice-chairman of the 
federal government Jozef Mikloško took care to inform the Federal Bishops 
conference about the bad moral situation and the need for the Church’s help in this 
respect.736 The Christian Democrats also worked to build a public space for the 
Church and its teachings. Their proposals were very similar to those advocated by 
the Catholic Church in Poland, and following the Polish example they promoted 
religious instruction in schools and also sought to change the law on abortion. In 
doing so they continued in the campaign they had started in 1986, when the abortion 
law was liberalized in Czechoslovakia.737 In fact, the anti-abortion law activists from 
1986 were now members of the Christian Democratic movement..  
The role of the Christian Democrats, as they saw it, was to help the Church 
overcome the legacy of socialism and contain the liberalism they saw arriving from 
the West. The inspiration for their agenda was set in an idealised picture of pre-
communist Catholicism, but particularly one drawing on the figures of Catholic 
nationalism. The Christian Democrats, similarly to the Catholic hierarchy, regularly 
criticised the ‘poor’ moral situation, maintained close links with the Bishops’ 
Conference, and regularly informed Slovak Catholics about the situation on the moral 
front, typically on the pages of the main Catholic mouthpiece Katolícke Noviny.738 
These themes would continue to resonate during the 1990s. However, after elections 
in the summer of 1990 the theme of Slovak cultural distinctiveness would also 
become central for Christian Democrats.  
2. Nationalised Public Catholic Culture and ‘National Autonomy’ 
In the first months following the first democratic elections the creation of a 
nationalised public Catholic culture became central to the promotion of Slovak 
political autonomy. This was not because all Catholics would support Slovak 
independence, but rather because the Catholic Church was already focused on 
mobilizing nationalised public Catholic culture, and this fact was in turn 
instrumentalised by the independence movement. Slovak independence became 
legitimised by a Catholic, historical, and ethnic understanding of the Slovak nation, 
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which many different Catholic actors had helped to strengthen in the first years after 
1989. In the process, the nationalised public Catholic culture based around the idea 
of the ethnic nation began to be constructed not solely by members of the hierarchy 
and Christian Democrats, but also by many other actors, most notably former 
émigrés and ex-communist nationalists. They began to participate together in the 
creation of nationalist Catholic symbols, national memory, and events alongside the 
Catholic hierarchy and the Christian Democrats. They also began to participate in the 
creation of a nationalised public Catholic culture in which the Church became the 
symbol of national autonomy. On the most general level this alliance was based on 
the appreciation of Christian culture as a central part of Slovak nationalised culture: 
all of these actors shared the view that a nationalised public Catholic culture was 
central to post-socialist transformation. Before I develop this claim further, it should 
be pointed out that these groups differed in several important respects: first, each 
had a slightly different attitude towards the future of the common Czechoslovak state 
and Slovak political future, an issue which was central to Czechoslovak politics when 
the reform of the Czechoslovak constitution became the central task of the first freely 
elected federal and national governments. They also differed in their attitude toward 
the rights of ethnic minorities, and last but not least, they differed in their attitude to 
Slovakia’s future in the international community, especially the European Union. 
These differences crucially influenced how the common national Catholic culture 
would be mobilised in the legitimisation of Slovak independence in 1992.  
This national culture was created against the backdrop of debates about the 
future of the common state, more specifically the federal constitution, led by the 
winners of the June 1990 parliamentary elections. In Slovakia, Public Against 
Violence (VPN), the broad civic movement formed during the November 1989 
demonstrations, and the Christian Democratic Movement (KDH) formed a coalition 
government. In the Czech Republic, the first democratically elected government was 
formed by Civic Forum (OF) and the Christian Democratic Union-Czech People’s 
Party (KDÚ-ČSL). In this first phase the main theme of discussions was the division 
of powers between the federal and national bodies. The talks led to a revised 
Constitutional Act which renewed the division of powers as they were originally 
defined in 1968, when the federation was first formed, and repealed a series of 
articles from the early 1970s which strengthened the central federative institutions at 
227 
 
the expense of the national ones. This debate was, of course, not confined to the 
Czech and Slovak ruling parties and to the federal and national assemblies. Slovak 
nationalists also sought to get involved.  
In terms of attitude to the future of the common state, three major groups can 
be identified among Slovak political and cultural elites: First were federalists, mostly 
present in the leading Public Against Violence, and they refused to consider Slovak 
autonomy; their sole aim was to make the federation work quickly, so that 
Czechoslovakia would be able to join the European Union as soon as possible.739 
Second were the autonomist nationalists, who gathered around the Christian 
Democratic Movement and advocated greater political autonomy within the common 
state. I call these Slovak nationalist ‘autonomists’ since for the most part they wanted 
to achieve greater autonomy – not necessarily independence – through constructive 
dialogue with their Czech partners. But whilst they were fully engaged in negotiations 
with Czech representatives and saw these negotiations as a perfectly legitimate way 
of making decisions about Slovakia’s political future, they did not hesitate to disrupt 
them, if they saw their outcomes as not being beneficial for the Slovak side. The 
Christian Democrats typically talked about the need for ‘eventual’ Slovak ‘self-
determination’. Similarly to the federalists the Christian Democrats envisioned 
Slovakia as a member of the European Union. The third group, the ‘sovereignty 
nationalists,’ were led by ex-communist nationalists and the émigrés and coalesced 
around Matica and the Slovak National Party. These nationalists were convinced that 
Slovakia needed to take control of its future by advocating for its own future 
unilaterally rather than relying on discussions with the Czechs. They wanted to look 
for a solution to the question of Slovak political future independently of the Czechs 
and sought to disrupt negotiations with the Czechs. For three years they urged the 
Slovak National Assembly to declare ‘Slovak sovereignty,’ and they themselves 
issued several such declarations.740 They also demanded that the Slovak constitution 
(still pending since 1968) be enacted before the federal one and insisted that Slovak 
language be given the status of an official language. 
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Different attitudes in regard to minority rights (especially those of the 
Hungarian minority) became clear in debates about the status of the Slovak language 
in Slovakia. In the autumn of 1990 two alternative language bills emerged in the 
Slovak National Council. One, drafted by Matica and sponsored by the SNS, which 
saw this code as part and parcel of 'Slovak sovereignty',741 stipulated the exclusive 
use of Slovak as the official language of the state and clearly discriminated against 
the sizeable Hungarian minority in Slovakia’s south.742 The Christian Democratic 
Movement defended the second draft proposed by the VPN, which made no 
exclusionary attempts.743 Indeed, the Christian Democrats attempted to cooperate 
with the Hungarians on a 'Christian basis'; the KDH had from its very beginning had 
a Hungarian section, but this section soon left to form a coalition with Együttélés 
(translates as ‘co-existence’) in the first parliamentary elections.744  
The Slovak nationalists who supported mobilisation of a nationalised public 
Catholic culture also differed in the extent to which they sought to involve the Catholic 
hierarchy in attaining their political goals, especially those concerning Slovakia’s 
political future. The émigrés were the first to demand active involvement of the 
Slovak hierarchy in support of the cause of Slovak sovereignty. They looked back to 
the constitution of an independent Slovak ecclesiastical province in 1977, which was 
regarded as papal confirmation of Slovak sovereignty.745 The leading émigré writer 
and head of Matica Slovenska abroad,746 Imrich Kružliak, wrote a letter to the 
Bishops and Federal Assembly as well as to the Slovak National Council, asking 
them to proclaim the papal decree which constituted a Slovak ecclesiastical province 
as a ‘state-constituting’ law.747 This past would become the basis for a nationalist 
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narrative constructed to present the Catholic Church as a supporter of independence. 
These émigrés were not alone in their notion of a Church actively involved in the 
promotion of Slovak sovereignty. They were soon joined by ex-communist 
nationalists, and their first public appeal for a declaration of Slovak sovereignty 
included suggestions on how the Catholic Church could contribute to advancing the 
cause of Slovak sovereignty. The declaration, titled ‘61 steps towards a Slovak 
identity,’ presented the vision of a ‘national’ Church. They demanded that the seat of 
the Archbishop of Trnava be moved to Bratislava, the capital of Slovakia; that a 
national shrine be dedicated to Slovak saints in the capital; that a diplomatic mission 
of the Vatican be established in Bratislava and that ‘Slovak saints’ be canonised by 
the Vatican748 The Christian Democrats closely co-operated with the Slovak hierarchy 
in promoting their political programme, but, as mentioned earlier in this chapter, this 
cooperation concerned issues of religious instruction, establishment of Catholic 
schools, etc. and not the above mentioned issues, at least not yet. 
Despite these clear differences in their political approach towards political 
independence, European integration, national minorities and the involvement of 
Catholic hierarchy, there was nevertheless much that was shared between these 
different groups. Indeed, as will be developed in the following section, these 
nationalists all claimed to be creating a united movement around the concept of a 
distinct Slovak nation embodied in a ‘revived’ nationalised public Catholic culture. 
This culture was conceptualised not only as a post-socialist renewal but also as a 
defence of this reviving nation against others – the Czechs, Western liberalism and 
Hungarian nationalism – and the need to protect Slovak identity and culture against 
such potential incursions.  
The sense of this shared culture – defined against ‘others’ – would become 
clear at a number of pilgrimages and commemorations at Ružomberok and Šaštín in 
1990. In the following section I shall analyse these events, as they allow observing 
the ways in which and the extent to which Catholics identified with a defensive 
understanding of the Slovak nation and culture. These events themselves were vital 
for the development of this nationalised public Catholic   culture: they were the only 
public spaces where these groups openly expressed that they all acknowledged and 
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shaped this nationalised public Catholic culture. These were attended by figures from 
all of these groups and they helped develop a common understanding of what was 
shared in this new Slovak culture. This section shows that despite different political 
outlooks these different nationalist groups contributed to strenghtening the fusion 
between ethnicity and Catholicism in the nationalised public Catholic culture. Whilst 
the focus in the first section is on the Catholic laity, ex-communist nationalists and 
émigrés, the next section describes how the Slovak hierarchy began to play a key 
role in employing Catholic national symbols and constructing narratives to promote 
both greater sovereignty of the Church as well as political sovereignty.  
2.1. Expanding Nationalised Public Catholic Culture  
2.1.1. Andrej Hlinka and ‘National Unity’  
The first event these nationalists initiated together was a celebration of the 
birthday of Andrej Hlinka, the interwar leader of Hlinka’s Slovak People’s Party. The 
first commemoration took place at the end of August 1990 on the 127th anniversary 
of Hlinka’s birthday and was conjoined with a commemoration of the victims of the 
Černová tragedy in Ružomberok, northern Slovakia, in 1907. This celebration did not 
happen in traditional Church spaces but was designed as a national ‘pilgrimage’ and 
led to a strengthening of the position of the Catholic Church in the public national 
memory. Ružomberok represents an important moment when all these groups came 
together – they were all there for slightly different political reasons – nevertheless, 
they all recognised the importance of building a distinctive Catholic Slovak memory. 
Coming together for a Catholic ceremony, they all recognized the power of the 
Catholic national past for construction of Slovak identity in the present. Ahead of the 
commemoration, the Ministry of Culture declared Černová as a space of the ‘Slovak 
struggle against magyarisation’, and the memorial was listed as a site of ‘national 
heritage.’749 In addition, plans were also in place to restore the Andrej Hlinka 
mausoleum in Ružomberok, northern Slovakia, originally built during the Nazi-
dominated Slovak state. Its current neglected state was seen as a result of 
‘persecution of the Church by the totalitarian regime’ and its renovation as a victory 
for Catholicism.750 These nationalists did not only want to remember Hlinka, but, 
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again, as with Nitra, they wanted to return Ružomberok, the pre-communist 
intellectual centre of political Catholicism, to its former glory. 
The commemoration was organized as an ‘all-national’ event and was aimed at 
demonstrating ‘unity’ of Slovaks in celebrating the ‘father of the Slovak nation.’751 The 
central part of the commemoration was a ceremonial mass presided over by Bishop 
FrantišekTondra and co-celebrated by all members of the Slovak episcopate, 
including Bishop Korec.752 It culminated in the joint issuing of a manifesto in which 
representatives of these nationalists declared that they were dedicated to the idea of 
‘Slovak political sovereignty.’753 The document did not give details on how or when 
this sovereignty would be achieved, but this was the first time when these different 
groups issued a joint statement, and the document clearly declared that despite their 
differences in rhetoric and politics, they were all dedicated to the cause of Slovak 
sovereignty. For some of these nationalists, this would be the only space in which 
they would make such pronouncements. When after the event ‘sovereignty 
nationalists’ i.e. émigrés and ex-communist nationalists, proposed proclaiming a 
similar manifesto at the Slovak National Assembly, the Christian Democrats did not 
agree. Nonetheless, the commemoration was presented as a moment of ‘national 
unity’.754 Despite these differences, all of these actors remained involved in ‘returning' 
Andrej Hlinka to Slovak history and constructing a national Catholic narrative. They 
all agreed that the moral integrity of the Slovak nation was under threat. Despite 
disagreeing about exactly who was responsible for this situation and to what extent, 
and despite disagreeing about what should be done and when, they agreed that this 
integrity needed to be strengthened and protected.  
Although the Catholic hierarchy was not among the organisers and was not yet 
directly involved in debates about Slovakia’s political future, this event provided an 
opportunity for leading hierarchs to assume an important role in co-producing the 
central new event of the expanding nationalised public Catholic culture. Bishop 
František Tondra of the Eastern Slovakian Spiš diocese was invited to concelebrate 
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the mass which was the central ceremony of the event. Tondra used the occasion to 
argue that the hierarchy was entitled to be actively involved in the public sphere. For 
Tondra all the central events of Slovak and world history were moments when 
Churchmen 'did politics', 'when Cyril and Methodius brought us script and freed us 
from the Western neighbours' or 'when the popes of last hundred years 
stood...against uncontrolled liberalism and just in the same way against absolutist 
collectivism.'755 Tondra used the celebration of this priest-politician (Hlinka) to present 
the Church’s involvement in ‘earthly' and more specifically political matters as 
desirable. He asserted that Andrej Hlinka’s voice of 'defence of the Slovak nation' 
sounded even stronger because he was a Catholic priest.’756 Tondra then supported 
Andrej Hlinka’s autonomism as not only striving for the ‘Slovak becoming the master 
of his own country’ but also so ‘that a Slovak would be a person with all the dignity of 
a personality…[and that Slovaks would] live for values which are worth sacrifice.’757 
Evoking Cyril and Methodius and Andrej Hlinka as a follower in their footsteps, 
Tondra continued in the reconstruction of national Catholic narrative started by 
Cardinal Korec in Nitra. 
Commemorating Hlinka, these nationalists also presented and promoted a 
defensive understanding of the Slovak nation. According to Jozef Klepáč, 'great 
forces of history’ have always ‘endangered Slovak existence...the central 
characteristic of the development of our nation is a constant defense of the nation.’758 
According to Čarnogurský, Andrej Hlinka was always able to recognise where these 
'dangers' came from and was ready to face them; Hlinka defended the Slovak nation 
from 'magyarisation when the Hungarians wanted to erase us from the European 
map.' Second, Hlinka 'protected moral norms in the life of our people, because this is 
the future of our nation.' One of the reasons for Čarnogurský’s initial support for this 
future independence was the conviction that Slovakia’s destiny was to become a 
Catholic oasis within European ‘Godless consumerism.’759 In this sense Slovak 
Catholics were similar to conservative Catholics throughout the region who, led by 
the pope’s criticism of Western secularisation, believed the situation in the West to be 
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the other ‘extreme.’760 Third, according to Čarnogurský, Hlinka defended the Slovak 
nation against Czechoslovakism and promoted Slovak autonomism and the 
'Pittsburgh Agreement, the basis of our state law.'761 The Pittsburgh Agreement was 
concluded in May 1918 between Czech and Slovak émigrés in America. Providing 
legal claim to autonomy, the pact promised Slovakia an independent administration, 
judiciary, and diet (national assembly) while giving preference to the Slovak 
language.762 During the the first Czechoslovak Republic, the Pittsburgh Agreement 
was the central argument in the interwar Slovak People´s Party´s campaign for 
Slovak autonomy.763 Čarnogurský thus identified with some of the basic tenets of pre-
communist political Catholicism and Catholic nationalism.  
Leading members of the Catholic hierarchy present at the commemoration 
supported some of these ideas, especially the call for the protection of morality. As 
Bishop Tondra asserted in his sermon, ‘morality is a question of national 
existence.’764 Similarly to the Christian Democrats, Tondra saw the communist rule 
as a time of ‘moral decay’, but he also saw Western liberalism as a new ‘danger.’ 
According to Tondra there was not much of a difference between, as he put it, the 
'totalitarianism' imposed by communism and the 'totalitarianism' of liberalism.765 Both 
were, in his view, harmful for a Catholic Slovak nation. They began preparing for the 
next year’s commemoration. In the meantime, the 'sovereignty' nationalists began to 
lay the groundwork for mobilising leading Catholic national symbols, narratives, and 
events in support of 'Slovak sovereignty.'   
2.1.2. Our Lady of the Seven Sorrows and 'National Unity'   
In addition to creating new public events and commemorations, the nationalist 
movement began to use traditional symbols of nationalised public Catholic culture to 
reinforce this newfound ‘national unity.’ At the same time it was becoming clear that 
‘sovereignty nationalists’ were able to successfully mobilise these symbols in support 
of sovereignty. As far as ‘national unity’ was concerned, the symbol of Our Lady of 
the Seven Sorrows was now used to symbolise that the unity of the Slovak nation 
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was of central value to these nationalists. Nationalised public Catholic culture was 
made an important part of celebrating this holiday. On 1 November 1990 these 
nationalists co-organised a national pilgrimage to Šaštín and actively participated in 
the pilgrimage and the programme. The pilgrimage was planned to be celebrated as 
‘a liturgy for reconciliation;’ the officially announced intention was to celebrate the 
ideals of 'non-violence' and pray for all victims of political violence. This employment 
of a nationalised public Catholic symbol confirmed the conciliatory approach to the 
nationally minded Communists and more broadly to the communist past. Unlike, for 
example, Czech dissent, former underground Catholics in Slovakia were especially 
conciliatory toward nationally-minded Communists – this was clearly a result of their 
pre-November 1989 engagement with nationalist narratives. This approach to the 
communist past was reflected in the various ways of remembering of the fall of state 
socialism in November 1989. Rather than celebrating the 17th of November as 
a bank holiday and a 'Day of the Fight for Freedom and Democracy,' the Slovak 
National Assembly adopted a 'Day of Reconciliation.'766 The Christian Democrats 
talked about ‘historical reconciliation on the basis of Christianity and national 
orientation.’767 The Catholics thus approached the communist past from, in their view, 
a 'genuinely Christian perspective’ characterized by ‘forgiveness.’ This approach to 
the communist past was not unusual among Catholics in the region. The first post-
communist prime minister in Poland, the devout Catholic Tadeusz Mazowiecki, 
argued that a 'thick line' should be drawn between the past and the present.768 The 
Šaštín pilgrimage demonstrated that a similar approach was wide-spread among 
nationally minded Catholic elites in Slovakia. Leading figures from November 1989, 
such as President Havel, were present, but the point of the pilgrimage was not to 
celebrate the end of state socialism and the ‘Velvet Revolution.’769 For Christian 
Democrats the main point of the pilgrimage was to support ‘national reconciliation.’ 
The ‘sovereignty nationalists’ went much further, obliterating the anniversary of 
November events altogether and focusing on promotion of Slovak sovereignty. They 
used the pilgrimage to publicly relate Our Lady of the Seven Sorrows and the 
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Catholic Church to national sovereignty. This pilgrimage was the first time when the 
Vatican was evoked in relation to the project of Slovak sovereignty.  
The ‘sovereignty nationalists’ turned to leading Catholic symbols, seeking to 
imbue them with new meaning, especially with the idea of Slovak political 
sovereignty. This was a crucial change in the use of Our Lady of the Seven Sorrows. 
A few months earlier Our Lady of the Seven Sorrows and the national shrine had 
seen a thanksgiving service for the ‘gift of freedom’ and the new Bishops; there were 
no indications that the symbol would soon be used in support of Slovak 
sovereignty.770 However, in the meantime, the ‘sovereignty nationalists’ succeeded in 
convincing the Slovak hierarchy that the Catholic Church needed to publicly support 
the territorial integrity of the Slovak ecclesiastical province. In autumn 1990, Slovak 
Bishops reacted to letters from Imrich Kružliak sent in early summer in which he had 
demanded ceremonial public announcement of the papal decrees by which the 
Vatican established an independent Slovak ecclesiastical province in 1977.771 It 
seems that the main reason for this change was the campaign of Catholics from the 
Hungarian minority for an independent Hungarian diocese in southern Slovakia. The 
Slovak hierarchy rejected these Hungarian demands, determined to keep the Church 
administration in Slovakia, in Slovak hands, and saw the Hungarian demands as a 
challenge to the territorial integrity of the Slovak province.772 By establishment of an 
independent ecclesiastical province, the Slovak dioceses were taken out of the 
Esztergom and Eger provinces – a change Slovak Catholic nationalists requested, 
fearing magyarisation of Slovak Catholics. In his response to Imrich Kružliak, Bishop 
Ján Baláž of the Bánska Bystrica diocese maintained that it was ‘a very pressing 
matter to emphasize our boundaries, so that the territorial integrity of Slovakia [would 
not be] challanged.’773 Baláž was clearly alluding to the activities of Hungarian 
Catholic nationalists. It was these Hungarian demands that prodded the Slovak 
hierarchy to agree to publicly announce the decrees. The ‘sovereignty nationalists’ 
immediately stepped in and began to prepare the announcement. They proposed 
                                                          
770
 Jukl, ‘Celonárodná ďaková púť,’ 1.; Jukl, Bédi, ‘Národná púť,’ 1.  
771
 For copies of the letters from Vladimír Filo, František Tondra, Jozef Baláž and Ján Sokol see 
Kružliak, Cyrilometodský kult, pp. 223-6.   
772
 Jan Sokol, Interview with the author, 29 May 2012, Trnava, Slovakia.; František Tondra, Interview 
with the author, 11 November 2011, Spišská Kapitula, Slovakia.; See also Alojz Tkáč, Interview with 
the author, 12 November 2011, Košice, Slovakia.; Ján Ch. Korec, Interview with the author, 17 August 
2012, Nitra, Slovakia.  
773
 Letter from Biskup Baláž to Imrich Kružliak, 30 December 1990, in I Kružliak, Cyrilometodský kult u 
Slovákov, Dlhá cesta k slovenskej cirkevnej provincii (Prešov, 2002), p. 225.  
236 
 
that these documents should be read at the ‘national reconciliation’ pilgrimage in 
Šaštín.774 But the ‘sovereignty nationalists’ were not intending to use the event simply 
as a response to Hungarian demands; they also turned it into a celebration of Slovak 
sovereignty within the common Czechoslovak state.  
The public proclamation in Šaštín of a decree constituting a Slovak 
ecclesiastical province turned into a celebration of Slovak sovereignty within the 
Czechoslovak federation. The ‘sovereignty’ nationalists used the event to present the 
Church as a central force supporting the cause of Slovak ‘sovereignty’ to the leading 
figures of the Czechoslovak federation. At the end of the mass, a group composed of 
ex-communist nationalists – Roman Kaliský, actor Gustáv Valach, and writer Milan 
Rúfus – publicly read the papal decree.775 At this point the hierarchy was not yet 
directly involved in support of political Slovak sovereignty, but the nationalised public 
Catholic culture was gradually being turned into a repertoire of cultural tools which 
could be mobilised to support Slovak independence. This event was remembered by 
leading members of the Slovak hierarchy as the first time they realised the extent to 
which the Vatican, in the words of Bishop Tondra, had ‘acknowledged the integrity of 
Slovak territory.’776 Following this event, leading figures in the Slovak hierarchy 
became more active and soon came to play a central role in the mobilisation of 
Catholic symbols in support of Slovak sovereignty. Initially they simply boycotted 
attempts made by the Czech episcopate to mobilise the federal Bishops’ Conference 
in support of the common state. In doing so they began to play an important role in 
strenghtening the ‘national unity.’ 
As is clear from private correspondence,777 Slovak Bishops began to distance 
themselves from the Czech episcopate towards the end of 1990. This became clear 
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in the communication between Czech and Slovak Bishops about Czechoslovakia’s 
political future. At the time, the Czech Episcopate was advocating what is perhaps 
best understood as a more universalist cultural nationalism. Similarly to Slovak 
Catholic leaders and most Catholics across the region, the Czech hierarchy called for 
moral renewal and a re-building of Czech identity, but they did not see Czech political 
autonomy as necessary to achieve this goal. On the contrary, they focused on 
integration with Europe. Towards the end of the turbulent first year of democracy, the 
Auxiliary Bishop of Prague, František Radkovský (1990-1993), who was also the 
secretary general of the Federal Bishop’s Conference (BK ČSFR), drafted an ‘Appeal 
from the Federal Bishops’ Conference and the Ecumenical Committee of Churches to 
Christians and the general public in the ČSFR.’778 Radkovský was clearly alarmed by 
any plans for Slovak independence. In the appeal he urged the citizens of 
Czechoslovakia to remain faithful to the values which they ‘so clearly demonstrated 
to the world during the Revolution.’ The proclamation was designed to urge Czech 
and Slovaks not to allow their common state to disappear ‘because of national 
intolerance…’779 The letter criticized the strategy of Slovak nationalists of all stripes 
by stating that ‘for both nations, it would be a bad way of entering a unified Europe, if 
we would look for our way individualistically only because we were not able to create 
unity between ourselves.’780 Radkovský’s appeal did not seem to resonate with the 
Slovak Bishops.  
Leading figures in the Slovak hierarchy, namely Archbishop Sokol, head of 
Slovak province, and Bishop František Tondra, head of the Czechoslovak Bishops’ 
Conference, did not show much interest in this more universalist Czech Catholic 
cultural nationalism. The Slovak Bishops did not worry much about the international 
reputation of the common state or the democratic legacy of the revolution; for them 
the theme of the day was Slovak sovereignty. The two Slovak bishops whose 
reactions are available – Ján Sokol of Trnava and František Tondra of the Spiš 
region in eastern Slovakia – responded in a manner which showed that their 
understanding of 1989 did not dictate a defence of the common state at any cost. In 
a clear appreciation of the Slovak nationalist interpretation of the revolution as a mere 
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stepping stone towards Slovak independence, Archbishop Ján Sokol of Trnava 
suggested that the paragraph about the revolution should be replaced by ‘in the first 
place legislate what is just for both republics… may Slovaks be considered as an 
equal nation and may their justified demands be realised.’781 Bishop Tondra’s 
suggestion was more concerned about economic equality between the two nations, 
and he likewise seemed more interested in the fate of the Slovak nation than its 
international reputation. He proposed leaving out the sentence about future 
independence and instead suggested adding the following text: ‘May the Slovaks be 
given space to develop to the level of Bohemia and Moravia, because the 
backwardness of Slovakia in comparison to the Czech lands during the first Republic 
bred a lot of evil in their mutual relations.’ Based on this experience, the common 
state would be, in Tondra’s view, ‘united and prosperous’ only when both nations 
develop [equally].’782 Both Bishops were clearly much more interested in advocating 
what they considered the interests of the nation, rather than safeguarding the 
continuation of the common state.  
This support for Slovak ‘sovereignty’ at the expense of cooperation with the 
Czechs became evident first on the intra-Church level, when the Slovak episcopate 
attempted to separate from the Federal Bishops’ Conference and create an 
independent Slovak Bishops’ Conference. In March 1991 Ján Ch. Korec 
spearheaded the decentralisation of the Federal Bishops Conference, which later 
turned out to be the first step in his sustained support for Slovak independence. In 
March 1991, Korec, backed by all Slovak Bishops (and the papal nuncio G. Coppa, 
who was also willing to support the cause) suggested that the federal Bishops’ 
Conference should split into separate Czech and Slovak conferences. Korec was 
convinced that this separation was legitimised by the history of ecclesiastical 
independence dating back to the first ancient diocese of Nitra. He argued that ‘after 
more than 1000 years of waiting [since the time of establishment of an independent 
diocese in Nitra administered by St. Methodius, the Archbishop of Velehrad], 
Slovakia was given in 1977 an independent ecclesiastical province within the Slovak 
[Socialist] Republic…the faithful, the clergy, and bishops are convinced that this feat 
of the Holy See must be fulfilled by [constituting] an independent Bishop’s Committee 
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of the Church in Slovakia.’783 By employing Cyrilomethodian legacy in this way, Korec 
clearly abandoned the pre-1989 interpretation of this legacy as demanding spiritual 
renewal. The history of the Slovak nation was now re-interpreted by the hierarchy as 
obligating them to support decentralisation of the common state. Decentralisation of 
the federal Bishops’ Conference was one such step.  
Calling for decentralisation of the Bishops’ Conference would not be unusual in 
an already independent state. Indeed, since the 1960s, when the Vatican fully 
recognised the legitimacy of the nation state, Churches in individual states were 
typically led by national Bishops Conferences.784 Accordingly, the Vatican still fully 
supported this degree of nationalisation on both the cultural and institutional level. 
The decentralisation of the conference was requested with the knowledge of Nuncio 
Coppa. Yet, as it soon turned out, this step was not solely a matter of more effective 
administration. Korec’s argumentation and the relative urgency with which he sought 
to attain this goal betrayed the increased influence of the ‘sovereignty nationalists’. 
Korec referred not only to the distinct character of the Catholic community but also to 
the sovereign state, the Slovak Socialist Republic.  
2.2. Cyril and Methodius and Slovak Sovereignty  
Under the leadership of Cardinal Korec, the Catholic hierarchy began to play an 
active role in mobilising the nationalised public Catholic culture in support of an 
immediate declaration of Slovak sovereignty, as suggested by the ‘sovereignty 
nationalists.’ The pilgrimage to Nitra became central to the largest event of 1991 – 
Cyrilomethodian days – designed as a celebration of the Slovak nation as the direct 
heir of Cyril and Methodius and co-organised by Matica Slovenská, the Christian 
Democrats, the Slovak National Party and the Centre of Nationalised culture. 
Together these nationalists prepared a series of events, including pilgrimages, 
conferences, and cultural programmes, to celebrate the Slovak nation as a ‘direct 
heir of the Cyrilomethodian tradition.’785 In addition to developing and expanding the 
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celebrations of Cyril and Methodius in Nitra, new symbols were inaugurated to 
support the idea of a Slovak Church, most notably the tradition of ‘St. Gorazd, the 
first Slovak priest.’786 The nationalised public Catholic culture, which had begun being 
created around Nitra and Cyril and Methodius since Korec’s arrival, was now being 
merged with the origins of a Slovak nation in the medieval Pribina chiefdom of Nitra, 
promoted by ‘sovereignty nationalists’ as the foundation of independent Slovak 
statehood. During the central event – the national pilgrimage – Cardinal Korec 
supported for the first time in public the proclamation of Slovak sovereignty as a 
legitimate solution to the Slovak question, and this event was the beginning of his 
attempts to get directly involved in the promotion and legitimisation of the cause at 
the Slovak National Assembly.  
Cardinal Korec presided over the ‘national pilgrimage’, as he planned it, on 5 
July, the feast of Sts. Cyril and Methodius.787 The event was attended by leading 
figures of Slovak political and cultural life as well as leading Slovak émigrés, most 
notably Cardinal Jozef Tomko.788 This pilgrimage was clearly considered by Korec as 
an appropriate context for talking about the question of Slovakia’s political future. He 
claimed that ‘the Slovak nation has a right to a life of its own, it has a right to self-
determination, [the nation] has a right to decide on its own how it wants to 
develop.’789 Following the ‘national pilgrimage,’ Korec became personally involved in 
the central cause of the ‘sovereignty nationalists’, i.e. to declare Slovak sovereignty 
at the Slovak National Assembly. The ‘heritage’ of Cyril and Methodius in Slovakia 
became the Cardinal’s main argument in his support for speedy attainment of 
independence.  
The constitution of the independent diocese on Slovak territory in the 9th 
century and the constitution of the independent ecclesiastical province centuries later 
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was in Korec’s view papal confirmation of Slovak sovereignty. Supported by émigrés 
and Matica Slovenská, Korec now sought to have the papal decree constituting an 
independent Slovak province incorporated into Slovak law. In July 1991 Korec wrote 
a letter to the Ministry of Culture and to the chairmen of the Czech National and 
Slovak National Councils, asking them to qualify the decree as a law. In his view, the 
decree had an ‘unquestionable state-constituting (constitutional) importance not only 
as far as ecclesiastical independence of Slovakia was concerned, but also for its 
national sovereignty’790 Korec’s support for a prompt public declaration of Slovak 
sovereignty did not stem only from his personal longer-term support for the cause but 
was further encouraged by several other new developments. 
In the spring of 1991 a new political force emerged in the country. This new 
force turned out to be more capable than anyone before it to effectively mobilise the 
Slovak public, including broader segments of the Catholic Church, in support of 
Slovak sovereignty. The ‘sovereignty nationalists’ were in turn more confident to 
mobilise the nationalised public Catholic culture in support of this cause. The rise of 
this force was preceded by several important events. In early 1991 Public Against 
Violence came apart at the seams over the question of Slovakia's political future, the 
pace and form of economic reforms, and last but not least the lustration law. The key 
figure in this argument in the run up to Slovak independence and more generally in 
Slovak politics as a whole for the next decade was the Slovak Prime Minister 
Vladimír Mečiar. A lawyer who before November 1989 had worked in a provincial 
factory, After November 1989 Mečiar was co-opted to become the Minister of the 
Interior of the first post-1989 government. Despite initial general enchantment with 
his charismatic leadership, Mečiar soon became estranged both from VPN as well as 
the KDH. He was proving increasingly unaccountable to his coalition partners mostly 
because of his rather mysterious past and his handling of secret police files while 
interior minister. However, his falling out with his coalition partners had little effect on 
his popularity among the population at large. As Karen Henderson maintains in her 
analysis of Slovak post-socialist politics, Mečiar had succesfully 'tapped into the 
undercurrents of popular unease about the indifference of Prague politicians to the 
consequences of economic policy in Slovakia, and the failure of the Czechs to 
recognise that the Slovaks might have valid reasons for emphasising their 
                                                          
790
 Kružliak, Cyrilometodský kult u Slovákov, p. 200.  
242 
 
otherness.'791 Mečiar, along with a group of followers, left the broader VPN 
movement and named itself the Movement for a Democratic Slovakia (HZDS). Under 
Mečiar's leadership the HZDS leaned to the left, rejected lustration (many of its 
members were ex-Communists) and began to promote confederation.792 HZDS 
promptly became the most popular political force in the country, and Mečiar emerged 
as a popular populist leader capable of mobilising others behind anti-Czech rhetoric. 
Yet unlike the ‘sovereignty nationalists,’ he based his attacks on the issue of 
economic inequality as the primary evidence of the suppression of Slovaks within the 
federation. Nonetheless, his voice easily resonated with those of the ‘sovereignty 
nationalists’.  
The new alliance between Mečiar and the ‘sovereignty nationalists’ was 
mutually beneficial. The ‘sovereignty nationalists’, on one hand, were in dire need of 
an electorally strong political force and saw Mečiar as the new ‘national leader,’ 
following in the footsteps of the great historical nationalist leaders of the Slovak 
nation.793 Mečiar, on the other hand, needed to legitimise his programme as 
authentically Slovak. He had only recently belonged among the strong proponents of 
the common state, and his newfound nationalism was seen by many (including the 
VPN and Christian Democrats) as inauthentic.794 In the spring of 1991 the 
‘sovereignty nationalists’ organised rallies in support of Mečiar; he in turn supported 
their second proposed declaration of sovereignty, which was issued in the spring that 
same year. Later, in autumn he came up with his own attempt to declare Slovak 
sovereignty, known as the 'Initiative for a Sovereign Slovakia’.795 This document 
promised the achievement of Slovak sovereignty and the adoption of a Slovak 
constitution as its priority. The initiative exacerbated conflicts over Slovakia’s future, 
and the ‘Initiative for a Sovereign Slovakia’ (Za zvrchované Slovensko) was 
immediately countered by the creation of a pro-federation citizens’ initiative, mostly with 
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members from VPN.796 These conflicts only further hardened their conviction that they 
needed to act as fast as possible.  
A second development which contributed to understanding the early 1990s as 
the right time for declaring Slovak sovereignty was the fact that Christian Democrats, 
one of the central supporters of the engagement of Catholic culture in Slovak self-
determination, assumed a leading position in the Slovak government. According to 
Cardinal Korec, this new position of the Christian Democrats was the central reason 
for him to hope that his personal involvement in the issue of declaration of Slovak 
sovereignty would be successful.797 This change in the composition of the Slovak 
government was related to a split between the KDH, the leading political force in the 
country, and its coalition partner, Public Against Violence. After the ouster of Mečiar, 
Čarnogurský became the new prime minister and formed a new coalition government 
from which Mečiar and his followers were excluded.798 However, shortly after 
assuming this leading position the Christian Democrats became increasingly 
opposed to attempts to declare Slovak sovereignty. The position of Christian 
Democrats on the question of Slovak political sovereignty had by this time changed 
significantly. According to Czech political scientist Jíři Pehe, the new position exposed 
the Christian Democrats to pressure from different quarters. ‘First, it was subject to 
pressure from the federal and the Czech governments to clarify Slovakia’s stance on 
the future of the common state. Second, the government led by Christian Democrats 
had to face intensifying demands from nationalist forces in Slovakia, strengthened by 
the followers of Mečiar, to defend Slovak national interests more vigorously. Third, 
the Christian Democratic Movement was under a degree of pressure from its coalition 
partners.’799 Not having enough votes in the Slovak National Council and the 
Presidium to enforce its own policies, it had to rely on the support of the Public 
Against Violence and the Democratic Party, both of which were strongly in favour of a 
federation. The Christian Democratic Movement eventually opted to keep the 
coalition alive rather than give in to sovereignty-nationalist pressure within and 
outside the movement. The movement slightly modified its stance on the future of the 
common state and the state treaty, abandoning the idea of a confederation in favour 
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of a loose federation. This affected their approach regarding direct involvement of the 
hierarchy on behalf of the ‘sovereignty nationalists.’ The papal decree constituting the 
Slovak province was not, as Korec had requested, proclaimed as a ‘state-constituting 
document,’ and the main decision in this case was made by Christian Democrats.800 
Nonetheless, Christian Democrats continued to support Slovakia’s right to self-
determination, but did so less ambitiously.  
Third, leading representatives of the Vatican continued to support this Catholic 
culture, even now when it was mobilised for the cause of Slovak sovereignty.801 By 
this time the pope was involved much less directly,802 and Cardinal Jozef Tomko 
played a central role. Tomko supported this interpretation on several occasions, but 
the best known were his sermon at the Nitra pilgrimage and a speech at the Slovak 
parliament. Tomko did not talk about the Slovak political future. Instead, the main 
theme of his speech was Slovak distinctiveness, its historical roots, and in terms of 
the present concerns, moral renewal of the nation.  
Although Tomko avoided the issue of Slovak political sovereignty, he 
nonetheless dwelled on the idea of the Slovak nation as a historical nation and on 
Slovak national distinctiveness. He paid the most attention to the cultural rights of the 
Slovak nation and obligations, giving short shrift to the question of the rights of 
minorities or the value of the common state. Tomko urged Slovaks to be ‘just towards 
national minorities.’803 Central to his speech, however, was the idea of Slovak 
distinctiveness. Tomko emphasized that the pope recognised Slovak distinctiveness 
internationally and listed all the instances when John Paul II had acknowledged the 
Slovak nation as an independent nation. Speaking as a Prefect of the Congregation 
of Evangelisation of Nations, Tomko likened a nation to a tree, and like a tree the 
Slovak nation, in his view, could not ‘live without roots…and without a future.’ Tomko 
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encouraged Slovaks ‘to return to the deepest roots of national life.’ The goal, 
however, was no longer to merely ‘return to Europe’ but to play a distinctive role in 
Europe. ‘The roots of our life are in the Cyrilomethodian heritage (legacy). Slovaks 
are the direct heirs of the spiritual treasure the great missionaries brought to us.’804 
For Tomko the role of the Church and the state was to build a democracy true to 
these national traditions. The Slovak nation should in Tomko’s opinion focus on its 
own morality. He talked about national renewal in terms of reviving the ‘good’ 
‘features of the Slovak character, which have been harmed by a system of mutual 
distrust.’ These were the ‘return of religious conviction to the public sphere’ (to 
prevent the ‘decline of civilisation,’ which in Tomko’s view was already underway in 
the West); and moral renewal, that is support for of ‘all that is good, beautiful and 
healthy’ (this in his view included, for instance, “protecting unborn life”). The speech 
was widely circulated across all major Catholic and nationalist papers and was later 
widely used, especially by Catholic nationalists, in their legitimisation of Slovak 
sovereignty.805 
In addition, the Vatican had just recently supported independence movements 
elsewhere in the region. It was one of the first states to extend diplomatic recognition 
to the newly established states of Croatia and Slovenia in 1991.806 According to 
official Vatican sources, both countries had a ‘moral and lawful right to 
independence.’807 But this step should not be interpreted as unreserved support for 
post-communist geo-political changes. It is worth mentioning that the main papal 
project for Europe was re-evangelization of a unified Europe through reintegration of 
its ‘faithful East’ with the secular West.808 Accordingly, as Ramet argues, ‘whatever 
we might conclude about the merits and demerits of its dissolution, from the 
standpoint of the Catholic Church in Croatia and the Vatican, the breakup of the 
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multi-confessional Yugoslavia was virtually an unmixed blessing.’809 The crucial point 
here is that Croatians, similarly to Slovenians, were in the majority a Catholic 
population living in a state where they were far more bitterly attacked than the 
Serbian Orthodox or Islamic communities, and where the influence of Serbian 
nationalism and the Serbian Orthodox Church was growing, making the non-Serbian 
minorities feel threatened. Even though John Paul II also envisioned cooperation 
among different Christian denominations, with special regard to Orthodoxy, the 
dissolution of Yugoslavia worked rather well in his plans for strengthening Christianity 
against secular forces. The pope was already more careful in the case of Lithuania. 
Lithuanian independence could potentially turn religion into a reason for conflict in 
a region which the pope envisioned as being the centre of the revival of ‘the glorious 
traditions of Russian Christianity, forgotten and lost in the last 70 years.’810 The pope 
offered moral support for Lithuanians, but the Vatican, similarly to Poland or the 
United States, did not initially grant it diplomatic recognition.811 The case of Slovakia 
was rather different. It is very probable that the combination of traditional Slovak 
religiosity and more intellectual Czech Catholicism were seen by the pope as 
a usefully strong combination in his vision for a Christian Eastern Europe.812 In the 
Slovak case the Vatican did not encourage political separation, but its 
representatives did support cultures that were mobilised for separation. 
2.3. Andrej Hlinka and Slovak Sovereignty  
That year, the Hlinka festivities were used by the Catholic hierarchy to promote the 
Slovak ‘right to self-determination,’ with František Tondra, like Cardinal Korec before 
him, using the occasion to argue in favour of such rights. In his 1991 sermon, Tondra 
reflected on Andrej Hlinka’s role in Slovak history and used this reflection to openly 
support ‘the right to make its own decisions.’   
Every nation has a right to self-determination i.e. to decide whether it wants to 
become an independent state or stay in a common state with another nation, 
but on equal terms. The right to self-determination is a right to make decisions 
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about oneself. This was the goal of Andrej Hlinka and he achieved this goal, 
even though he never lived to see it come to fruition…His ideals are still valid. 
What concrete form we will give them depends on the possibilities and 
circumstances. [But] We should never abandon the ideals of sovereignty; that 
would be anti-national.813 
As their political programme became less clearly national, the Christian 
Democrats continued to present themselves as part of the nationalised public 
Catholic   culture. Despite the conflicts over the future of the common state, the 
central events of the nationalised public Catholic culture continued to be supported 
by all forces. Most notably, the Christian Democrats continued to organise and take 
part at Hlinka festivities in Ružomberok, celebrating the birth of Andrej Hlinka.814 The 
Christian Democrats continued to support these commemorations, as they 
understood these memories as central to creating a ‘self-standing’ Slovak nation. 
They were still convinced that ‘national unity’ with the nationalists, including émigrés 
and ex-communist nationalists, was important. In fact, even if their disagreement with 
sovereignty nationalists over the Slovak political future became more pronounced, 
they continued to support the sovereignty nationalists in important respects.  
By the end of 1991, the Slovak episcopate was united in the idea that the 
Church hierarchy should officially and publicly express their view on the question of 
the Slovak political future. In November 1991, these bishops issued a pastoral letter 
on the relationship between the Czech and Slovak nations. Writing in rather 
ambiguous terms, they claimed that ‘the [Catholic] Church has always proclaimed the 
right to self-determination.’ The Bishops were convinced of ‘the fact’ that each nation 
has a ‘moral right to self-determination.’815 This wording was ambiguous indeed in the 
very fact that they did not use the word ‘sovereignty’ but more broadly ‘self-
determination.’ The hierarchy supported self-determination, but it was not clear which 
political programme exactly it was that was being endorsed. This absence of clarity 
signalled disagreements within the Slovak episcopate over how far they should 
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interfere in political debates.816 Furthermore, the bishops also might have been 
seeking to unify the sovereignty nationalists, who by now were increasingly 
embattled. However ambiguous this wording, the bishops would unambiguously unite 
behind Vladimír Mečiar by the same time the following year, the candidate who would 
by that time have emerged as the winner of the parliamentary elections.  
 Between the pastoral letter and the elections, all negotiations about an 
agreement on the basis of which it would be possible to ratify the federal constitution 
failed. General elections planned for June 1992 were thus awaited in an athosphere 
of deadlock and lingering confusion.817 Vladimír Mečiar’s HZDS ran on a platform 
proposing a vague form of confederation and gradual economic reform. Althought 
Mečiar did not advocate disintegration of Czechoslovakia; he successfully portrayed 
himself as the strongest defender of Slovak interests. In addition, Mečiar was 
supported by Matica Slovenská and the Slovak National Party which used the 
election campaign to strongly push the sovereignty issue.818 The Christian Democrats 
supported the common state but continued to propose that Slovakia should 
eventually represent itself in the EU. When compared to the often unscrupulous 
rhetoric of sovereignty nationalists and Mečiar, the Christian Democrats may have 
easily appeared as lacking in resolve.  
 The HZDS subsequently won a decisive victory, with 37 per cent of the vote; 
the KDH and the SNS both lost ground, winning around 9 and 8 per cent, 
respectively. Following the elections, Mečiar became Slovak Prime Minister and 
formed a new government which continued in negotiations with the Czech 
representatives. But it soon became clear that the winners of the parliamentary 
majorities in each republic, both with a hard and uncompromising stance towards 
each other and both clear on the constitutional issues, would not be able to reach an 
agreement. Whilst, on the Slovak side Vladimír Mečiar supported a confederation, on 
the Czech side, the Civic Democratic Party (ODS, Občiansko Demokratická Strana) 
led by Václav Klaus supported a firmer ‘functional federation’ (no international 
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recognition for republics and clear sovereignty of the federal government).819 The 
former was unacceptable to Klaus, the latter to Mečiar, which left only a third option: 
the disintegration of the state. In a matter of a month, Mečiar moved to declare 
Slovak sovereignty in the Slovak parliament. Leading sovereignty nationalists and 
leading members of the Catholic hierarchy were ready to mobilise the nationalised 
public Catholic culture in support of their new national leader, Mečiar. 
3. Nationalised public Catholic Culture and Slovak independence  
The repertoires of nationalised public Catholic culture that were developed in the 
1980s and expanded in the 1990s were used in 1992 to legitimise Slovak 
independence. The newly elected Slovak government made the declaration of Slovak 
sovereignty by the Slovak parliament its central priority. In the next few months, 
between this declaration of sovereignty and the declaration of independence, the 
nationalised public Catholic culture, together with its major symbols, memories, and 
events, would be mobilised in legitimisation of this programme. Despite the fact that 
not all Catholics agreed with Slovak independence, Cyril and Methodius were placed 
in the preamble of the new state constitution as an important historical source of 
Slovak statehood.820 On the feast of Our Lady of the Seven Sorrows in September 
1993, a ceremonial thanksgiving mass was held at the national shrine for the gift of 
independent statehood. After the establishment of an independent Slovakia, the feast 
of Our Lady of the Seven Sorrows was declared a ‘bank holiday‘ with the then prime 
minister declaring that ‘Our Lady of the Seven Sorrows had played an important role 
in Slovak independence.’821 In the last months between the declaration of Slovak 
sovereignty and the declaration of Slovak independence (July-November 1992), the 
differing approaches to the Slovak political future translated into struggles about the  
meaning of Slovak history , and eventually into different interpretations of the 
meaning of the symbols, memories, and events central to nationalised public Catholic 
culture.  
On 17July 1992, the Declaration of Sovereignty of the Slovak Nation was 
passed by the Slovak National Council. Although Prime Minister Vladimir Mečiar 
refused to admit that this was a step towards independence, the declaration was 
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widely regarded as such. The Czechs, including President Havel, read the 
declaration as a Slovak consensus on separation and Havel used it as a pretext to 
resign. Klaus was subsequently able to exploit the declaration as further proof that 
‘the Slovaks were intransigent and that the federation was simply not salvageable.’822 
The declaration was followed by a hasty enactment of a Slovak constitution in 
September that same year.823 The dissolution of the Republic was hastily carried out 
in the last few months of 1992. In August, the HZDS and ODS ceded the 
constitutionality of the break-up, and 25 November 1992 the law on the break-up of 
Czechoslovakia was approved. As of 1January 1993, Czechoslovakia was no more.  
3.1. Catholics and the Declaration of Sovereignty   
Catholics were divided over whether these steps were legitimate not only 
constitutionally, but in terms of national memory. The differences in approach to the 
Slovak political future translated into struggles about the different meaning of Slovak 
history and eventually into different interpretations of nationalist Catholic Slovak 
culture. On one hand, the Christian Democrats saw this process as not only 
constitutionally but also historically illegitimate. On the other hand, sovereignty 
nationalists and the Slovak episcopate became firm supporters of a process that 
would lead to independence. Following the declaration, the Bishops’ Conference 
issued a proclamation ‘The Hour of Sovereignty’ in which they presented the 
declaration as a ‘natural’ outcome of Slovak history.  
The Slovak Bishops Conference acclaimed the declaration as a ‘natural’ 
culmination of Slovak history.’ The introductory lines are worth quoting at length:  
Every nation with a long cultural tradition desires to accomplish its national life 
in state sovereignty. This was the desire and goal of the endeavours of the 
noblest personalities in our history, especially in the last 150 years…This 
natural right established in international documents was fulfilled in 1968 by the 
establishment of the Slovak Republic…824  
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The hierarchy claimed that the declaration was in accord with Catholic teaching and 
Slovak Catholic memory. The Declaration also referred to John Paul II and his 
speech to the Polish nation during his first visit to Poland in 1979. Showing just how 
liberally these words could be interpreted, the declaration stated that ‘Peace and 
rapprochement of nations can be built only on the foundation of respect for objective 
rights of a nation, such as the right to being, to freedom, to confession.’825 The 
declaration was published on the front page of the Katolícke Noviny.826 Cardinal 
Korec then suggested that the declaration should be welcomed by the ringing of 
church bells.827  
 The establishment of a Slovak province was presented in the major Catholic 
weekly Katolícke Noviny as papal confirmation of the Slovak right to ‘Slovak 
sovereignty.’ Archbishop Sokol wrote a central article in which he celebrated 
‘sovereignty.’828 Katolícke Noviny applauded the declaration of sovereignty in an 
article entitled ‘Love for the Nation.’829 A hither-to little known author, associated with 
Matica Slovenská, claimed that love for one’s nation has an important place in the 
Christian hierarchy of love. He also argued that loving the Slovak nation is every 
Slovak's moral responsibility.830 The weekly openly presented the constitution of the 
Slovak province in 1977 as first of all the Vatican’s approval of Slovak sovereignty.831 
Another author at the weekly saw the constitution of the province as establishing an 
obligation for the Slovak Bishops and Catholics to support the declaration of Slovak 
sovereignty.832 The weekly also rejected claims made by Christian Democrats that 
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the pope was against the split.833 According to the weekly these were mere 
‘rumours.’834 The official Catholic support for the sovereignty nationalists also 
translated into further support of the Matica Slovenská, the leading force among the 
sovereignty nationalists. In August 1992 Cardinals Jozef Tomko and Ján Ch. Korec 
joined Matica Slovenská as honorary members,.835 Matica issued a declaration in 
which it stated that ‘national and Christian principles are ‘indivisible.’836 The 
hierarchy’s open support of sovereignty nationalists dismayed some Catholics, 
especially Christian Democrats. The Christian Democrats, however, did not go into 
direct confrontation with the hierarchy.  
Their discontent transpired most visibly in their clashes with the émigrés. The 
main bones of contention are best captured in an exchange between Imrich Kružliak, 
a former émigré and one of the leading ideologues of the sovereignty nationalists, 
and Čarnogurský. Following the KDH’s vote against the Declaration, Kružliak wrote to 
Literárny Týždenník. Writing in an agitated tone Kružliak argued that the KDH’s 
rejection of the declaration and absence at the drafting of the Slovak constitution was 
a fatal misunderstanding of the ‘logic of Slovak history.‘837 For Kuržliak and for 
sovereignty nationalists alike, the achievement of independence was a culmination of 
historical efforts of Slovak nationalists. Moreover, Imrich Kružliak claimed that 
Vladimir Mečiar was now following in the footsteps of Andrej Hlinka and Martin 
Rázus, the leaders of the two autonomist parties during the first Czechoslovak 
Republic.838 Čarnogurský defended the Christian Democratic decision as making 
complete sense. He did not see this moment as the culmination of historical 
emancipation of the Slovak nation. He did not see the previous episodes of national 
emancipation (19th century emancipation, interwar autonomism and wartime Slovak 
Republic) as laying the groundwork for the current efforts for Slovak independence. 
Rather, he saw them as warning signs for future generations.839 Based on these past 
events, Ján Čarnogurský was convinced that Slovakia should not seek independence 
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at any cost lest it risk international isolation and descend into a semi-authoritarian 
regime under Vladimír Mečiar. Kružliak countered that the Christian Democrats had 
not 'grasped the meaning of the Slovak history…the good initiatives [for Slovak 
independence] were unsuccessful because of the outside balance of forces which 
were anti-Slovak.’840 According to Kružliak, today the situation was favourable: since 
1989 several independent states had been established and diplomatically acclaimed, 
and Slovakia had an (electorally) strong political leader capable of carrying through 
the cause of Slovak independence.   
3.2. The Christian Democrats and the Catholic Hierarchy  
Following the publication of ‘Hour of Sovereignty’, Christian Democrats and 
‘sovereignty nationalists’ clashed openly for the first time over the extent to which the 
Catholic hierarchy should be engaged in political debates. Leading Christian 
Democrats criticised the hierarchy’s support for this project of Slovak sovereignty as 
undue involvement with politics. The clearest and most visible herald of this 
disagreement came in the form of three short interviews with Mikloško, Čarnogurský, 
and Korec as published in the daily Narodná Obroda.841 The three Catholic leaders 
were asked whether their different stances on the Declaration would in any way 
divide the Church. Čarnogurský refused to talk about Church in this way, claiming 
that he knew nothing about internal Church matters. Mikloško indirectly criticised the 
‘Hour of Sovereignty,’ and argued that ‘the historical problem of the Church 
(hierarchy) is interfering with the temporal matters.’ Mikloško and Čarnogurský thus 
no longer identified with what they helped to create in the early 1990s. Cardinal 
Korec did not seem to see a reason why the Church should be less engaged in 
politics, maintaining that in the public sphere, the Church is represented not only by 
the bishops, but also by Catholic politicians. What is clear, however, is that he felt 
that the Catholic hierarchy was the leading representative of the nationalised culture 
and should determine its use. In addressing the views of the Christian Democrats, he 
said that ‘the Church tolerates their views in all respects and the Christian Democrats 
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should do the same thing.’842 The nationalised Catholic culture thus could no longer 
serve as a unifying space for Catholics.  
The Christian Democrats also tried to de-politicise the nationalist Catholic 
public culture, recalling the struggle in the late 1980s of underground Catholics for 
religious freedom. At the most recent Congress of Christian Democrats in 1992, 
Čarnogurský had referred to the Christian Democrats as the only legitimate 
successors of the late socialist nationalised public Catholic culture and its ‘legacy of 
struggle for religious freedom and democracy.’843 As he said,  
It was us, our people, who started to implement a national programme for 
Slovakia far earlier than anyone else. Youth groups, which were also 
associated with us, sang [national] songs at our pilgrimages.... Articles about 
true Slovak history were published in the samizdat journals Náboženstvo a 
Súčasnosť and Bratislavské Listy.... We organised group visits of activists who 
were detained and tried. By the way, it was our activities which had created an 
accurate and positive picture of Slovakia abroad.844  
He also identified the current behaviour of the Church hierarchy as reminiscent 
of the wartime connection between the state and the hierarchy. According to 
Čarnogurský, the Christian Democrats had begun to shed their pre-1992 cooperation 
with the Church and were moving towards a more Western European model of 
Christian democracy.845 They also attempted to resuscitate the understanding of 
Cyrilomethodian ‘heritage’ as based on faith, and argued that this ‘heritage’ should 
be utilised to support political agendas. The Christian Democratic daily Slovenský 
Denník recycled the pre-1989 criticism of secularisation of Cyrilomethodian tradition. 
The author at Slovenský Denník accused the SNS of convoluting the role of Cyril and 
Methodius by turning their legacy, which was ‘first and foremost spiritual’ into a 
‘merely secular one.’846 The one thing the author failed to mention was that unlike the 
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official culture of late Communist era, the sovereignty nationalists fully declared 
support for promoting the spiritual aspect of the legacy alongside its political 
interpretation.  
Despite criticism from the Christian Democrats, the Catholic hierarchy 
remained consistent in its support of the declaration of sovereignty. The hierarchy 
cooperated with the government in presenting nationalist Catholic discourse as 
related to Slovak independence. The New Year’s pastoral letter included a paragraph 
remembering the anniversary of the constitution of the Slovak ecclesiastical province 
and emphasized its importance for the newfound independent Slovak Republic. This 
addition was suggested by Jozef Markuš, the head of Matica.847  
We accept...[Slovak independence] on behalf of the Church with gratitude and 
hope. With gratitude, because whilst other states were established as a result of 
cruel conflicts and bloodshed, Slovak independence was achieved peacefully 
after prudent …negotiations with representatives of the Czech nation... We are 
grateful to God…But also to those who have contributed to [bringing about] this 
peaceful solution in any way…In this spirit we gratefully remember the 15th 
anniversary of the papal decree constituting the independent Slovak Church 
province. In this spirit we entrust the Slovak nation and nationalities at this 
historical beginning of new Slovak life in [its own nation-] state into the hands of 
the God of history and under the protection of Ss. Cyril and Methodius…848  
The Bishops thus basically not only acclaimed the new state as legitimate but also 
mobilised nationalised public Catholic culture in its support.  
The Slovak government and the broader sovereignty movement in return put 
Christianity, in its Catholic version, at the centre of the symbolic universe of the newly 
founded Slovak Republic. Slovak sociologist of religion Miroslav Tížik argues that 
after 1993 ‘Christianisation of the state’ could be observed in Slovakia. This is in his 
view a process when the state transforms from an ‘ideologically neutral state’ to a 
state ‘legitimised through Christianity’ by using Christian ‘mythology and symbols to 
legitimise itself.’849 According to Tížik, the first government of an independent 
Slovakia encouraged special consideration of the mythological and cultural 
importance of the Churches and Christianity and made explicit the connection 
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between the various Churches and national consciousness of Slovaks.850 Great 
Moravia and Cyril and Methodius would feature prominently in the symbolism of the 
new state. Symbols of the ancient state – the ninth century’s Prince Pribina and the 
last prince of Great Moravia, Svätopluk-- were featured on both stamps and currency. 
The feast of Our Lady of the Seven Sorrows was also deemed a state holiday.851  
 The nationalised public Catholic culture which had expanded after 1989 was 
now effectively employed to celebrate the Slovak Republic as a culmination of Slovak 
history. The 1993 festivities of Saints Cyril and Methodius in Nitra celebrated the 
Slovak nation as a historical nation and Slovak independence as the culmination of 
the nation’s historical development.852 The feast was co-organised by Matica 
Slovenská, the Bishopric in Nitra, the Centre of Nationalised culture, and the 
Cyrilomethodian society. This was the beginning of a new tradition which has lasted 
until the present. That year, the Cyrilomethodian Festivities were turned into 
Festivities of Cyril and Methodius and Duke Pribina to emphasize the relationship 
between the Christianisation of Slovakia, the origins of distinctive ethnic identity, and 
the origins of independent statehood. The Catholic hierarchy and a number of 
leading Catholic nationalists continue to play a central role in these festivities to this 
day. However, quite contrary to the original plans of the nationalists who stood at 
their origins since late 1980s, the festivities, including other events, symbols, and 
memories of this nationalised public Catholic  culture, have since become a source of 
controversy, rather than of ‘national unity,’ as originally intended by this culture’s 
creators.   
Conclusion  
After 1989, the nationalised public Catholic culture began to develop and expand at a 
nexus of a growing number of events, memories, and symbols, all of which supported 
the notion of the Slovak nation as Christian and historical. Initially this expansion was 
the result of a process during which Catholics of all stripes, both from the 
underground and the official Church, assumed a central position in the first months of 
post-Socialist transformation. Soon they began to closely cooperate with émigré 
Catholic and ex-Communist nationalists who were also convinced that the Slovak 
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nation needed to return to its roots. Together these nationalists began to deepen the 
fusion between Catholic and national identity through Catholic nationalist events, 
constructing a national memory and evoking national Catholic symbols which were 
used to symbolise this role of the Catholic Church. Initially, the essence of post-
Socialist change for the Catholic Church was a ‘moral renewal’, i.e. bringing faith 
back into public discourse.  
 This direction of the Catholic culture at first stemmed from the close 
cooperation between former underground Catholics. However, with the beginning of 
debates about reform of the Czechoslovak constitution, it became clear that this 
nationalised public Catholic culture would not be mobilised solely to confirm the 
historicity of the Slovak nation. As became clear at the events organised by these 
nationalists, for these actors, this ‘historicity’ implied an obligation to support Slovak 
political autonomy. Moreover, at this point it had already become clear that some of 
these nationalists, called in this chapter ‘sovereignty nationalists’, understood this 
‘obligation’ as a call to take immediate action, to cease negotiations with Czech 
representatives, to declare Slovak sovereignty, and to dictate Slovakia’s future 
unilaterally. Nonetheless, despite these differences, these nationalists continued to 
participate in the creation of this nationalised public Catholic culture: they were 
unified not only by the belief that they needed to return to historical roots, but also by 
the belief that they need to defend the Slovak nation from its ideological enemies and 
from ethnic ‘others.’ However, as they continued to create this culture together, the 
‘sovereignty nationalists’ began to be more successful in determining the direction 
that the mobilisation of nationalised public Catholic culture would take: in favour of an 
immediate declaration of Slovak sovereignty.  
 The main developments which encouraged this mobilisation of the Catholic 
nationalised culture in favour of an immediate declaration of Slovak sovereignty were 
several: first, the assertion of Hungarian Catholics; second, the rise of Christian 
Democrats to the leading position in the Slovak government; and third, the 
emergence of a new and popular political force which began to advocate immediate 
declaration of Slovak sovereignty. Importantly, this use of nationalised public Catholic 
culture was indirectly supported by the leading representatives of the Vatican, who 
did not protest the mobilisation of a nationalised public Catholic  culture to such an 
end. Even if they, most notably Cardinal Tomko, did not openly support the 
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sovereignty nationalists’ understanding of the national (including Catholic) memory as 
not only anticipating but also obligating Slovak elites to seek Slovak independence, 
they allowed the nationalised public Catholic culture to be used in the mobilisation 
toward Slovak sovereignty, and supported institutions which promoted a unilateral 
declaration of Slovak sovereignty as their main agenda. When, in July of 1992, the 
Slovak parliament declared Slovak sovereignty, leading members of Slovak Catholic 
hierarchy and sovereignty nationalists were fully prepared to mobilise the 
nationalised public Catholic culture in support of this step. The mid-1990s thus saw 
the development of an official, state-sponsored nationalised public Catholic culture 
which would serve to legitimise the newly-founded Slovak Republic.  
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CONCLUSION 
This thesis attempted to shed light on the origins and dynamics of the creation and 
mobilisation of a nationalised public Catholic culture during late Socialism and early 
post-Socialism in Slovakia. When the first portents of this culture’s creation surfaced 
in the early 1980s, the nationalised public Catholic culture and its repertoires 
(histories, symbols, and events) had been suppressed for over thirty years. During 
the late 1950s and 1960s, the communist state took apart the largely nationalised 
public Catholic culture which had been created over the previous years during the 
interwar and wartime periods. By the early 1980s, this situation remained largely 
unchanged. The Catholic Church as such was not an officially recognised creator of 
the real socialist nationalised culture. Catholics often saw themselves as having 
a duty to remain 'pure', unsullied by engagement with the official culture. Collective 
public activities of the Church were confined to liturgies within the Church; 
pilgrimages were allowed, but the official authorities made sure that these 
pilgrimages did not acquire nationwide importance or resonance with nationalist 
thought. Even as the idea of a 'nationalised culture’ came to figure more prominently 
in real socialist culture after the 1960s, nationalised culture involving the Catholic 
Church had remained excluded from its creation. Catholic collective memories and 
symbols were not part of the official ‘national consciousness,’ and patriotic priests 
remained the only creators of this restricted Catholic culture. The Church was fully 
subordinated to the Communist party: its ideology and practice. Symbols which in the 
pre-Communist era had embodied unity between the nation and the Church were 
now demoted, retaining only local value. Other symbols, such as Cyril and 
Methodius, were promoted as ‘international’ – they were no longer employed to 
symbolise Slovak national identity and its connection with Christianity. Now, they 
symbolised Slavic brotherhood and the fact that the Slavic cultures had been highly 
developed materially and culturally for over a millennium.  
In the mid-1980s a new nationalised public Catholic culture--- a culture in 
which the Church was increasingly seen as an integral part of the nation, that is, with 
Catholicism inherently intertwined with national identity-- began to emerge. In some 
ways, this process was dissimilar to the building of other nationalised public Catholic 
cultures elsewhere in the region (Poland, Croatia, or Hungary), especially in that in 
the 1980s, the central role was played (for the most part) not by the hierarchy, but by 
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transnational actors (the papacy) and Communist cultural elites. The creation of a 
nationalised public Catholic culture in Slovakia was a complex process which 
involved many actors playing a variety of roles.  
The initial force in the creation of this culture was an underground community 
of Catholics which had successfully fused Catholic and national identity through the 
development of a range of cultural practices that sought to build a new cultural 
community – they effectively reconstructed the  history (especially medieval history) 
of the Church as part of national history through the construction of basic elements of 
the national Catholic narrative, and through rituals intended to evoke symbols such 
as the National Patroness (Our Lady of the Seven Sorrows) and especially saints 
Cyril and Methodius. The underground Church created this in response to other 
important actors who also sought to participate in creating the meaning of such 
commemoration.  
At this point, however, not all of these actors sought to use the event to 
support the fusion between the Catholic and national identities. On one hand there 
was the papacy, which was instrumental in two ways. From the late 1970s, Pope 
John Paul II encouraged Catholics to return to the 'Christian roots' of the nation. In 
promoting this vision, he sought to encourage Catholics to embrace this cultural 
nationalism and become active and autonomous creators of nationalised culture. The 
approach of official Communist authorities in the mid-1980s unwittingly helped 
develop this nationalised public Catholic culture. The official authorities sought to 
present Cyril and Methodius only as symbols of secular culture, Slavic civilisation, 
and the historicity and sovereignty of Czechoslovak statehood. Yet by attempting to 
influence the meaning of this past and symbol, they contributed to the shaping of 
a nationalised public Catholic   culture and the understanding of the Church as an 
integral part of the nation. First, in an attempt to control the official Church 
celebrations of this event, they placed Cyril and Methodius, who at that time were not 
part of the official, not to mention, public memory of the state, closer to the centre of 
the official nationalised culture. At the same time, by using the event and more 
broadly the anniversary of their mission to the Slovak lands to promote secular 
understanding of these symbols and narratives, the official authorities further 
reinforced the underground community’s perception of the current religious situation 
as one of 'suffering.' The official authorities thus reinforced the position of 
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underground communities as creators of Our Lady of the Seven Sorrows as a central 
part of the nationalised public Catholic culture. Second, as official authorities sought 
to place Cyril and Methodius firmly in the official ‘historical consciousness,’ they 
opened up space for official cultural elites who were beginning to promote the Slovak 
nation no longer in terms of class, but in terms of ethnicity and Slovak distinctiveness. 
In doing so, even official publications began to see Cyril and Methodius not as 
contributors to the development of Slavic civilisation in general, but more specifically 
as creators of a distinctly Slovak culture and identity. This official production provided 
the underground community with important resources for further imagining of the 
Church as part of a distinctive nationalised culture. In the process, the underground 
Church’s nationalism, which was initially a more spiritual cultural nationalism, 
acquired a more ethnic character. Each of these actors, the pope, the official 
Communist authorities and the underground Church, thus contributed in various ways 
to the nationalised public Catholic culture.  
The last two years of state socialism saw attempts at the appropriation of this 
new culture by the Communist elites. As a result of perestroika, Communist 
authorities across the region and in Czechoslovakia specifically began to ascribe to 
religion a greater role in the construction of official culture. Accordingly, authorities in 
Czechoslovakia began to enable the official Church to play a greater role in the 
creation of the official nationalised culture. During this period, the underground 
community became an ever more effective creator of the nationalised public Catholic 
culture. At these events, but also in samizdat publications, the underground Catholics 
continued to imagine the Catholic Church as an integral part of the nation through 
returning to Catholic national symbols and evoking Catholic history as part of the 
national history. The papacy continued to play an important role by encouraging 
Catholics to engage in the construction of a nationalised public Catholic culture 
autonomously from the state. Following the pope, the underground Catholics were 
increasingly convinced that creation of a nationalised public Catholic   culture needed 
to be independent from the state. However, at about the same time, the official 
Church and indeed official authorities began to actively cast the Catholic Church as 
part of the official ‘historical consciousness’ and as part of a nationally-conscious 
nationalised culture. As a result, the nationalised public Catholic culture would be 
created as a result of co-operation and clashes between the underground and the 
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official Church (sponsored by the state). Although both of these creators 
reconstructed this connection from a slightly different angle and with different 
motivations, the underground Catholics shaped this culture, increasingly influenced 
by democratising currents. They revived the symbols and pasts not only in relation to 
the perceived or real suffering of the Slovak nation and the Catholic Church, but also 
in relation to ideas of civic self-assertion and support for democracy. The official 
Church, on the other hand, was influenced by homogenising and nationalising efforts 
of official authorities and sought to create a nationalised public Catholic culture as 
a symbol of national unity in support of state socialism. The official Church was 
allowed and encouraged by official authorities to mobilise the nationalised public 
Catholic culture, but it was not allowed to do so independently of the state. It was 
expected by official authorities to remain under official control and help suppress any 
groups (this of course also applied to the underground Church) which were not 
satisfied with this position of the Church. As a result, whilst the official Church created 
a nationalised public Catholic culture as a manifestation of national unity and loyalty 
to the Socialist state, for underground Catholics, this culture was increasingly 
associated with freedom of expression and assembly. This understanding was 
maintained by the underground Church’s intensifying contacts with civic dissent and 
Catholic leaders from outside Slovakia (most notably the Czech Cardinal Tomášek), 
who had associated the nationalised public Catholic culture with the struggle for 
freedom of religious assembly, human rights, and eventually also democracy. In the 
process-- and as a result of these influences-- the cultural nationalism of the 
underground Church became more civicly-minded. The official Communist authorities 
countered by attempting to prevent underground communities from the public 
creation of Catholic culture, targeting pilgrimages most stringently. The official 
Church assisted the authorities with this, and used her influence to contain the 
underground communities. That is, it began to edge the underground community out 
of the pilgrimages.  
We will, of course, never learn what the effects of these different attitudes 
within the Catholic Church would have been if this situation had lasted longer. What 
can be said with certainty is that whatever differences there may have been between 
the underground community and the official Church, the ‘Velvet Revolution' of 1989 
brought the downfall of the official authorities and of any attempts to create a 
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nationalised public Catholic culture closely related to the state. Moreover, the ‘Velvet 
Revolution’ helped with rapprochement of the two central creators of the nationalised 
public Catholic culture: the underground and the official Church. Although the official 
Church reacted with restraint and called for a focus on faith, its leading figure, 
Archbishop Ján Sokol, lent open support to the revolution. This support meant that 
the official and the underground Church were preparing the ground for cooperation 
between Catholics from the underground and the official Church in post-Socialist 
construction of a nationalised public Catholic culture. These Catholics would not, 
however, be the only creators of such a nationalised culture after the fall of state 
socialism. Most notably, official nationalist Communist elites, which momentarily 
disappeared as creators of the nationalised public Catholic culture, re-emerged soon 
after 1989 and began to play an important role in the post-Socialist creation of this 
culture.   
After 1989, the nationalised public Catholic culture, already developed in late 
Socialism, was to lay the cultural foundations for eventual Slovak independence in 
1993. The nationalised public Catholic culture was not a by-product of the post-1989 
disappearance of state regulation of religious life and had its roots in the 1980s. After 
1989 this creation intensified and expanded as the national narrative of historical 
unity between the Slovak nation and the Catholic Church became an important part 
of post-socialist official culture; the public use of Catholic symbols increased, as did 
the number of events during which this collective memory and these symbols were 
given attention by an increasing number of actors. Initially it was former members of 
the underground Church spearheading this movement, members who by that time 
formed the ranks of the post-Communist political and ecclesiastical elite. These 
formerly underground Catholics were crucial especially in the first months: after years 
of constructing a national Catholic narrative, they were ready to provide the Catholic 
Church with an anti-Communist national narrative, fit for the current political context. 
The expansion of the nationalised public Catholic culture was also supported by non-
Catholic post-Socialist political elites, including dissidents-turned politicians (most 
notably President Havel), and even more importantly, by returning émigrés and re-
emerging ex-Communist nationalists. While at the get-go, the main motivation for the 
creation of this nationalised public Catholic culture was ‘moral’ renewal as 
understood in terms of spiritual revival and a shift toward conservative Catholic 
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values in the public sphere. However, as the issue of Slovak political future became 
the theme of the day, political nationalists drew upon Catholic culture more and more 
in support of their agenda of swiftly achieving of Slovak independence. In the 
process, this national Catholic narrative was increasingly co-constructed by 
sovereignty nationalists who began to shape its part of the story of gradual 
emancipation of the Slovak nation, a story which would, it stood to reason, naturally 
culminate in the achievement of Slovak independence. Along with these nationalists, 
leading figures of the Slovak Catholic hierarchy, who were now at the centre of 
creation of nationalised public Catholic culture, began to believe that the fall of state 
socialism was the historical chance to realise independent Slovak statehood. Even 
those who did not necessarily fully agree with the goals and strategies of the 
‘sovereignty nationalists’ contributed to this instrumentalisation of the Catholic 
culture, as they sought to maintain a nationalised public Catholic   culture. These 
post-Socialist creators of a nationalised public Catholic  culture were unified by an 
ethnic defensive nationalism which viewed Slovakia as a historical Christian nation 
needing to be one, autonomous, and two, protected from outside influences – often 
a conflated mixture of the Western, liberal, and Czech. As became clear during 
events (pilgrimages and commemorations at Šaštín, Nitra and Ružomberok) 
organised by these nationalists, this ‘historicity’ implied an obligation to support swift 
achievement of Slovak political autonomy. Especially ‘sovereignty nationalists’ 
understood this historicity as an ‘obligation’ to take immediate action. Towards the 
end of 1990s, these sovereignty nationalists became dominant in the shaping of 
Catholic culture mainly as a result of the emergence of a new popular political force 
(Vladimír Mečiar’s Movement for a Democratic Slovakia), which began to 
successfully promote an immediate declaration of Slovak sovereignty. Eventually, 
repertoires of the Catholic cultural mobilisation (which had been developed in the 
1980s and throughout the1990s and had become associated with debates over 
Slovak political autonomy) were then used to legitimise Slovak independence, finally 
proclaimed by the Slovak National Assembly in 1993.  
Creation of a nationalised public Catholic culture before 1989 has so far been 
understood as a question of contestation between the Communist state and the 
Church. After 1989, it was understood as a function of post-Communism. However, 
as this thesis has sought to show, neither was the case. This culture is better 
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understood as a combination of confrontation and co-construction between various 
actors. Nationalised public Catholic  culture has been defined in this thesis as a ‘web 
of meanings’ constructed out of symbols, collective memories and events, a 
conjunction of these cultural forms which variously contribute to understanding of the 
Church as an integral part of the nation. Exploring how this 'web of meanings' was 
produced means asking how these symbols and memories were constructed and 
received as symbols and memories supporting the notion of the Church as an 
integral part of the nation. This network of meanings, and the specific meanings of 
which it consisted at different points during this period, was not, for the most part, 
a result of neatly formulated ideologies, coherent memories, and well-organised 
events with predictable outcomes. Since the mid-1980s, the nationalised public 
Catholic culture had been created by various actors, who in the process became 
capable of engaging in ‘meaningful action’ without necessarily having the same 
motivations for engagement in this action. Thus, over this period of less than ten 
years, the users and creators of this culture formed a meaning-making ‘community’ in 
the sense that they were able to engage in ‘meaningful action,’ but without 
necessarily agreeing in their emotional, moral, or political evaluations of these 
memories, symbols, and events.853 However, they all agreed that Slovak nation was 
a historical nation and that Slovak cultural distinctiveness needed to be promoted 
and maintained.  
The creation of a nationalised public Catholic culture was a process in which 
both conscious and unconscious, direct and indirect co-creation and contestation 
between different creators of this culture played important roles, both before and after 
1989. For example, the communist nationalists who became involved in the creation 
of Catholic national symbols with the goal of de-emphasizing the religious aspect 
took (unwittingly) the first steps towards placing the Church near the nationalising 
official memory. This move had important consequences for both the underground 
Church communities and the Communist nationalists. Whilst the former began to 
think about the Church’s role in Slovak history in terms of Slovak ethnogenesis, the 
latter began to think about Christianisation as an important part of the process of 
Slovak ethnogenesis. This thesis has also drawn attention to the importance of 
considering transnational forces in the creation of the nationalised public Catholic 
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culture in the 1980s, especially the papacy. The first impulse to understand the 
Church as an integral part of a nation through common Catholic national histories 
and national symbols came from the pope, who sought to evoke these memories and 
symbols and to encourage these events with the goal of connecting 'Christian' 
European nations in one Christian community. In other words, his goal was to utilise 
nationality to create a more universal community. The group which was most 
receptive in seeking to follow the papal call-- and indeed the group which began to 
create a nationalised public Catholic memory-- eventually came to be influenced by 
other cultural elites in the process who had sought to counter the papal 
understanding of the relationship between nation and religion. The members of 
official Church and the Communist cultural elites took on important roles in the 
creation of a nationalised public Catholic culture, influenced the underground Church 
and established themselves as important creators of the nationalised public Catholic 
culture. After 1989, these actors continued to play an important role in the creation of 
a post-Socialist nationalised public Catholic culture, even in light of their changing  
position in the public sphere.  
This thesis focused on four sub-themes primarily: the creation of 
a nationalised public Catholic culture, the ways in which the Catholic Church in 
Slovakia was imagined as a part of Slovak history, how local or transnationalised 
public Catholic symbols were imagined as national symbols, and how a network of 
local Catholic events was expanded to support this understanding of the relationship 
between the nation and the Church. This culture remains an important part of the 
public sphere and an important repertoire of meanings, especially for Slovak 
nationalists. Nationalised public Catholic culture dominates the nationalised culture in 
Slovakia, continues to be created and mobilised by various actors who, in the 
process, seek to appropriate it according to their ideological orientation and current 
interests.  
Nationalised public Catholic culture remains an important space of struggle for 
dominance over the character of the Slovak culture and Slovak politics. This applies 
especially to the symbol of Cyril and Methodius and the national memory cultures 
and events related to this symbol. These struggles again became clear on 5 July 
2013, when a special ‘year of Cyril and Methodius’ was commenced. Central to these 
celebrations was a ceremonial mass in Nitra, which was attended by leading 
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members of political and cultural elites. Among others, Robert Fico, the current prime 
minister and the leader of the most popular political party in Slovakia, took part. Since 
the mid 2000s, Fico formed the most popular populist nationalist political party 
(SMER) and gained a significant following among those nationalists who played a 
central role in the instrumentalisation of nationalised public Catholic culture in support 
of the independent Slovak state in the early 1990s. Most notably, Fico has enjoyed 
full support of one of the central figures of revival of 'Cyrilomethodian tradition' in 
post-1989 Slovakia, Cardinal Jan Ch. Korec.854 At the 2013 commemoration in Nitra, 
Fico gave a speech in which he used Cyril and Methodius to connect the Catholic 
Church and the development of Slovak statehood. In it, Fico referred not only to the 
medieval past, but he connected this past with post-1989 developments and referred 
to Cardinal Jan Ch. Korec as someone who had ‘contributed significantly’ to the re-
emergence of independent Slovak statehood.855 This interpretation of Cyril and 
Methodius and more broadly this way of mobilisation of the nationalised public 
Catholic culture sparked controversy among Catholics. For example, a Catholic anti-
abortionist activist, Jana Tutková, argued that it is ‘shameful that the Church 
(hierarchy) does not mind the misuse of Cyrilomethodian heritage’ by the leader of 
a party which takes a 'liberal stance' on the issue of abortion.856 The leader of 
the Conservative Christian Party, Vladimír Palko, argued that Fico, as a former 
member of the pre-1989 Communist Party, 'who never apologised for the 
atheistisation of this country by the Communists' was not entitled to speak about Cyril 
and Methodius.857 According to Palko, Fico, as a former Communist, is a 
‘gravedigger of Slovak memory', and Slovaks must seek to build a 'culture of 
memory' against a 'culture of forgetting.'858 The struggle over the nationalised public 
Catholic   culture in Slovakia is thus not simply a struggle over the interpretation of 
the repertoires of this culture, but now also a struggle over the memory of their use in 
the post-Communist era. 
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Nationalised public Catholic culture has also been related to broader 
geopolitical developments, especially the increased tensions between the current 
Russian leadership and the governments of leading Western countries or the 
question of immigration from Northern Africa. Some Catholics see these 
developments as an encouragement to reinforce the nationalised public Catholic 
culture and thus safeguard the integrity of nationalised cultures. Others, in a similar 
vein, see these new developments not only as a challenge to their national identity, 
but also as 'a danger to state security’ and a call for closer cooperation between 
Church and state.859 As I write, a mass demonstration against immigration is being 
organised in Bratislava; these demonstrations are not related to churches, but 
Christian symbols, especially national Christian symbols, are used in abundance.. 
The demonstrators refer to the Christian history of the nation and argue that 
immigration is a threat to the integrity of the Slovak nation. The Church hierarchy 
calls for respect for immigrants and is actively involved in helping them.860 Indeed, 
some Catholics see these new developments as an opportunity to shed particularism 
and rediscover Catholic universalism. These are, as this thesis has suggested, not 
entirely new phenomena. Understanding the origins of these cultures can hopefully 
contribute to understanding their current role. 
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